


UGANDA'S FIRST REPUBLIC:

Chiefs, Administrators
and Politicians,
1967 - 1971



Edited by

A.F. Robertson

AFRICAN STUDIES CENTRE,

CAMBRIDGE.

October 1982

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Director,
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Cambridge University

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
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
Uganda:

Regions
and
Districts
1969



Buganda:

Sazas
1969



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We are very grateful to the many people who have contributed to this book, directly and indirectly, during the protracted course of its preparation. The data on Buganda presented and discussed in Part II were mostly collected by Mr. Simon Musoke, a former saza chief and official of the Buganda government who worked for the East African Institute of Social Research at Makerere and eventually became its Administrative Secretary. The project as a whole owes a great deal to his skill and persistence in circumstances which did not facilitate research. Mr. W.P. Tamukedde, who has contributed an autobiographical chapter to this book, collected data on the more senior officials. Dr. T. Sathyamurthy, then of the Political Science department at Makerere, organised the collection of career histories in Bunyoro, Toro and Kegezi, and Mr. A.G.G. Gingyera-Pinyowa in the Alur country. Mr. M.T. Mushanga collected career histories in Bunyoro and sent some useful comments on chiefship in Ankole. Although we have not in fact made reference to Tanzania, the project benefited from data collected and advice given by Professor Goran Hyden and Professor J.G. Liebenow.

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The views expressed in these pages are at times contentious, even amongst ourselves; we should therefore make it clear that we are solely and severally responsible for what we have written.

INTRODUCTION

On April 15, 1966, three and a half years after Independence, Apolo Milton Obote was sworn in as President of Uganda. Compared with many other African states at the time, Uganda could be described as prosperous and law-abiding, a country whose prospects were by general assent very good. Its economy was healthy and expanding, and social welfare was improving steadily. There was a modest army and an effective police force which, with what seemed to be a well-established administrative system, offered assurances of orderly progress. As a fledgling state Uganda enjoyed the goodwill of the international community; a buoyant and competitive world economy offered ample opportunities for trade, aid and political patronage.

On December 15, 1980, Apolo Milton Obote was sworn in as President of Uganda for a second time. In the fourteen interceding years Uganda had become a byword for civil disorder. As a state it was a shattered shell, a ruin which owed its continued existence mainly to external guarantees of sovereignty. Economy and polity had collapsed into civil disorder; there was no administrative bureaucracy worthy of the name and black markets had displaced most orthodox economic transactions. To fascinated observers, all this seemed to be the work of a notorious dictator, whose government was regarded as a mixture of brutal depravity and black farce.

However dire the effects of these eight years of misrule may have been, there were deep fissures in the fabric of the Ugandan state long before the accession of President Idi Amin Dada. These were evident when the colonial state relinquished control in October 1962, but optimists felt sure that prosperity and the goodwill generated by independent nationhood would enable Ugandans to strengthen and refurbish their constitution. This was apparently Dr. Obote's mission when he took over Presidential powers from Sir Edward Mutesa, Kabaka of the kingdom of Buganda, in 1966. The revised constitution which he offered to Parliament was accepted sight unseen, but this was merely temporising: Dr. Obote plainly felt that a crisis had to be precipitated to validate the changes which must be made. His use of the forces of the Ugandan state to suppress insurrection in Buganda in June of that year gave him the legally endorsed status of revolutionary leader, and the authority to establish Uganda's First Republic. What it did not provide was national unity and popular consensus. Instead it triggered off a pattern of violence and civil disorder from which Uganda has since had no respite.

Dr. Obote's return to power in 1980 was no less turbulent. No one doubt the enormity of the task of reconstruction and rehabilitation which confronted him, but even his most devout well-wishers must have regretted the means by which he resumed the role of President. In an urgent effort to re-establish some authoritative link between government and the people, a general election was held in December 1980

which - according to one British newspaper - was 'so flawed by violence and cheating that it has left the country more deeply divided than ever'.¹ Since then, despite some strenuous efforts to regain control, the country has continued its dispiriting downward spiral into political, economic and social decay.

The problems confronting Dr. Obote in his attempts to construct a second Republic are, to put it very mildly, formidable. He will find nothing in the experiences of the 1970s to inspire him, and there is no doubt that he (and any possible successor) will wish to return to some careful contemplation of the 1960s and to the last coherent phase of constitutional development in the years of the First Republic. What threads, if any, can be gathered up from these years which might advise the future development of Uganda?

This is the basic question which we address in this book. Its main purpose is to report on a project carried out between 1968 and 1971, designed to monitor developments in local government and politics. The base-line for this survey was a detailed study carried out some eight years before Independence, published under the editorship of Audrey Richards as East African Chiefs in 1960. This earlier project involved the collection of more than 1,000 career histories of chiefs and administrators, and was the work of a closely-knit group of scholars based on the East African Institute of Social Research at Makerere College. The second survey involved the collection of almost as many career histories, but from only half the number of Districts, all of them in Uganda. The scholars who worked on this data were a much more diffuse group than those who contributed to East African Chiefs, and represented a much wider range of interests and experience. The problems of producing a new edition of the book were compounded by the complexities of political developments in the 1960s and 1970s, as well as by the attenuation of Makerere and its community of scholars. As the Amin regime established itself, and as the world's media resounded to tales of atrocities, an exploration of local government in Uganda during Dr. Obote's regime seemed a little inconsequential.

From the perspective of the 1980s, the data collected in the late 1960s seems to have acquired greater salience. Uganda's current predicament focusses attention once more on the processes of state formation and on the relationships between central and local government. It is evident that governments are not constructed by the act of overthrowing a malign regime, by establishing an entente among a group of former political exiles, or even by composing an elaborate constitution. They are built over time in terms of relationships among people, extending from leaders in capital cities out into distant rural localities, and from central government out into the global community of states. 'Integration' within a unitary state of Uganda is a dream which is, alas, even more remote today than it was in the years of Dr. Obote's first Republic. However, the experience

of those years has contributed several important lessons: 'integration' cannot be a simple, dyadic relationship between leaders and led, nor between some vaguely distinguished 'centre' and 'periphery'. It can only be construed as a complex web of interests, relationships and transactions involving the entire population. In such a formulation 'central' and 'local' government cannot sensibly be regarded as discrete, nor can the latter be allocated a secondary and largely consequential role in the processes of state formation.

We hope, therefore, that there may be something to be learned from the debilitating schisms which emerged in Uganda during the 1950s and 1960s, schisms in which, it now seems apparent, the perceptions of social science played a significant role. For Dr. Obote, almost everything was predicated on the creation of a viable, integrated state of Uganda, and to this day opinion remains divided about the wisdom and the success of his strategies. It seems significant that the major obstacles he encountered in this enterprise were described as rival states, as if they were forces of a parallel order threatening the growth of Uganda itself.

The most obvious and most direct threat forms the centre-piece of our discussion in this book: the presence within the new, modern independent state of Uganda of an established, powerful and privileged state of Buganda. The schism between local and national government in the 1960s turned on the conflict between these two states, and persisted after the Buganda kingdom was overthrown, and its quasi-federal status in the constitution abrogated. As Doornbos has acknowledged from the perspective of the neighbouring kingdom of Ankole, 'Uganda's history has in a fundamental sense centred upon Buganda';² in 1966 Dr. Obote judged correctly that a reckoning with Buganda would imply a simultaneous reckoning with the other three kingdoms and with tendencies towards district autonomy in the country at large. It is largely for this reason that we have concentrated on circumstances in Buganda in this book. The 'revolution' of May 1966 was a major point of departure for Dr. Obote and Uganda. From it was born the Republic of 1967 and the pronounced ideological shift which Dr. Obote labelled 'The Move to the Left'. However, although Buganda was now administered as four of Uganda's eighteen districts, the established structures of Chiefship and administration persisted, albeit in weakened and attenuated form. The central authorities were unable to devise an entirely new system of local government — and were perhaps not very interested in doing so. Continuity with past arrangements proved inescapable, and such changes as were made at these humble levels of government only served to make the task of local officials more intractable. While new and elaborate plans were made for representation of the people in the national legislature there were no real local councils to articulate public interests and most districts continued to depend on a hierarchy of administrator chiefs modelled on the 'traditional' Ganda system.

The shift, during the course of the First Republic, towards policies of 'mobilisation' based on the Uganda People's Congress party did not disguise these discontinuities between central and local government. The concomitant shift from the notion of an a-political to a politicised civil service only served to emphasise the distinction. Socialist rhetoric brought into increasingly sharp focus another potent rival for the state of Uganda, the emerging middle class which was so closely connected with the upper levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy.

'We cannot afford to build two nations within the territorial boundaries of Uganda' Dr. Obote declared in his 'Common Man's Charter', 'one rich, educated, African in appearance but mentally foreign, and the other, which constitutes the bulk of the population, poor and illiterate'.³ It was becoming increasingly apparent that even the personnel of government were subject to such a schism: the local chiefs and administrators in the First Republic were poorly educated and poorly rewarded, with attenuated authority and meagre prospects, while the rapidly expanding offices of central government assured wealth, status and power to a growing middle class. Dr. Obote's efforts to curtail this schism met with only limited success, and were cut short by the coup d'etat of January 1971.

Dr. Obote's concern with ideology in 'nation building' brought him into increasing conflict with the intellectuals in their citadel, Makerere University. On the one hand, Makerere was evidently indispensable in providing qualified personnel for modern government, but on the other it provided privileged access to the rapidly expanding public service bourgeoisie. More immediately, it was irksome to Dr. Obote that his efforts to devise an authentically Ugandan socialist doctrine should be scrutinised and dissected from the sanctuary of Makerere hill by a largely expatriate community of academics. The discontinuity between this community and its ideologies and those of Uganda again evoked the imagery of a rival polity: 'Large sections of the public have complained that Makerere is...becoming a "State within a State"', complained the Visitation Committee, hand picked by Dr. Obote to make proposals for the reform of the University.⁴ The academics were taken aback by this assault on their 'freedom' and 'intellectual neutrality', but Dr. Obote was not inclined to underrate their influence. He had discovered something which more radical scholars were beginning to discover for themselves: the close connections between the ideas and institutions of academia on the one hand and of national and international politics on the other. If he was in error, it was to assert unilaterally the interests of government as against those of the University, to oblige Makerere to live and act by the new and as yet inchoate ideology of Ugandan socialism. Although, again, he was ousted before his programme for structural and curricular reform could be implemented, Dr. Obote must surely have suspected that stifling Makerere would not serve to stifle the flow of ideas from the world at large to which the Ugandan state, explicitly and implicitly, was profoundly subjected.

The evident importance attached to the ideas and interests of the University in the First Republic provides our cue for a more self-conscious approach to the composition of this book than might otherwise be deemed appropriate. In her first chapter Audrey Richards describes the two projects to which we refer, explaining the intentions behind 'East African Chiefs' and its present sequel, and the ways in which the data were collected. She then proceeds to an account of changing local government structure and policy during the period covered by the two studies, roughly 1950 to 1970. This is followed by her own more detailed account of the particular circumstances of Buganda, and their implications for both local and central government in the years of the First Republic.

The intention in both surveys was to accumulate and analyse a large number of individual career histories, and to look for a balance in interpretation between normative structures, statistical generalities and individual experience. We are therefore very fortunate to be able to include as Chapter 4 the autobiography of W.P. Tamukedde, whose life draws a series of threads through the themes with which this book is concerned: through chiefship, local administration and central government office; through his native Buganda and the regions of Uganda at large; through involvement as a civil servant and as a researcher at Makerere University; through the chiefly class of Buganda and the new elite of Uganda; and through thirty of the most interesting years of national development. We believe that his account of himself will compensate more than a little for our own efforts at self-conscious objectivity.

Our study would very evidently be incomplete if it were confined to Buganda alone. We are therefore fortunate to be able to include Suzette Heald's comparative study of Bugisu. Here we can see very vividly how local government evolved in a quite different area of Uganda. Bugisu owes its structure of chiefly authority to Ganda intervention early this century, but its own authentic patterns of local leadership have always been evident, not least in the remarkable responses to the collapse of civil order in the localities in the latter days of the First Republic.

Chapter 6 returns to the themes outlined in this introduction, exploring the construction of the First Republic and its relationship with chiefship and local administration. In abstracting what we believe to be the most salient themes we hope to gather up several threads from Uganda's past which may shed some light on a future which can only be described as gloomy.

Part II of the book presents a summary of the data collected between 1968 and 1970, comparing them with the 1952-3 survey. It includes extracts from certain documents and some additional statistical data, and each section begins with an introduction and commentary. Our intention is threefold: to provide illustrations for issues raised in Part I, to offer graphic evidence for the consequences of policies

pursued between 1950 and 1970, and to allow readers some opportunity to pursue their own interpretations of the development of local government in Uganda.

FOOTNOTES TO INTRODUCTION

1. The Guardian, December 12, 1980.
2. Martin R. Doornbos, Not All the King's Men: Inequality as a Political Instrument in Ankole, Uganda, The Hague 1978, p.5.
3. Dr. A. Milton Obote, The Common Man's Charter, Entebbe 1970, sec. 21, p.6.
4. Republic of Uganda, Report of the Visitation Committee to Makerere University College, Entebbe June 1970, sec. 14, p.6.

Part one:

Chiefs and Administrators

C H A P T E R I

'East African Chiefs' and its Sequel

Audrey Richards

This book has had a long history. It dates from 1952 when 14 research fellows then attached to the East African Institute of Social Research at Makerere College¹ were engaged on a series of basic ethnographic studies. The investigators were all anthropologists except one, a political scientist,² and the areas in which they were living and working were rarely more than a day's drive from Kampala, the headquarters of the Institute. However, the people they studied differed in a remarkable way as to their population size, social structure, language, and political ideas.

They included for instance three ancient kingdoms in south and west Uganda: Buganda, the main subject of this book, Bunyoro and Ankole. These had all achieved by the end of the 19th century an unusually centralised form of government compared with other East African societies. They had hereditary monarchs with long lines of descent, ministers in charge of special spheres of government, such as the legal, financial, military and religious, and also a senior official known in the English literature as the 'prime minister' (Katikkiro). These kingdoms also had centralised revenue collection and in the case of Buganda, the largest, a standing army in the days before British rule.³

Our selected peoples also included what we agreed to call "multi-kingdom" or "multi-chiefdom" tribes, since they were composed of people who spoke the same language and had cultural features in common, but who were divided into a series of small chiefdoms, with their own hereditary rulers, some of them claiming original descent from the same dynasty. Among our selected peoples the Soga of south-east Uganda, the Haya, Ha and Zinza of Northern Tanganyika fell within this category. Busoga in East Uganda had apparently been composed of 15 small states at the end of the 19th century. The Haya in North Tanganyika were divided into eight kingdoms when the British took over their administration from Germany in 1916, and there were six independent kingdoms in Buha in North Tanganyika when it became a British mandated territory in 1926. The most striking example of a multi-chiefdom tribe was probably the Sukuma on the southern shores of Lake Victoria; they were divided into 39 predominantly Sukuma kingdoms in the Kwimba, Mwanza, Maswa and Shenyanga districts and eight tribally mixed chiefdoms in the Geita area, until the British administration achieved some measure of amalgamation by setting up a Sukumaland Federal Council in 1947. In fact one of the main problems of the colonial governments in

areas such as these, which had long histories of warfare and fluctuating boundaries, was to create larger and more stable political and territorial units for more effective administration - in other words, to unite in order to rule. Busoga with its 15 small kingdoms was declared an independent political unit by the British Protectorate Government in 1896. Of the eight administrative 'counties' into which Busoga was divided when Fallers arrived to work there in 1950, five corresponded to the largest of the old Soga kingdoms, while 14 smaller kingdoms had been amalgamated to form the three remaining counties.

The political situation in Northern Tanganyika and to a lesser extent in Western Uganda was also complicated by the existence of a caste-like structure produced by successive waves of immigrants, mainly from the north, who had achieved a dominant position over the rest of the mainly Bantu population. The caste division was most marked in Ruanda where the Tutsi, tall people with light brown skins and aquiline features who were devoted to their cattle herds, held high status and occupied virtually all political offices as against the Bantu peasant agriculturists, who were virtually serfs. In Bunyoro and Toro the distinctions were less marked, with a royal dynasty of Bito (Lwoo) origin from the north, high class Hima clans with pastoral traditions and privileged access to high offices, and Iru 'peasants' beneath. In Ankole the same type of situation existed with a royal (Hinda) dynasty and lower status Hima and Iru clans. Buhaya also had three caste-like divisions with Hinda rulers together with some Nkango clans of similar origin at the top of the hierarchy, high status cattle keeping groups known as Nfura of Hinda and Hima origin beneath them, and at the bottom of the pyramid about 100 Iru agricultural clans. Such caste-like structures made a problem for the British administration when it became determined to introduce a more democratic system (see Chapter 2).

The peoples studied by our group of fieldworkers also included tribes organised on a basis of segmentary lineages without recognised heads - "tribes without rulers" as a current publication called them.⁴ Among them were the Gisu, a large and relatively prosperous tribe in eastern Uganda, described later in this book; the Lugbara living in the poorer part of north Uganda; and the Kiga on its western border. The Alur, a small tribe living north of Lake Albert, were hard to categorise since they had a segmentary structure but recognised hereditary chiefs and headmen; Southall called this a "segmentary state". Localised lineage groups, large and small, were grouped together by the colonial administration into convenient administrative units and were united under what the people sometimes called "Government chiefs".

The variety of the ethnographic material fascinated us. Comparative studies of political structures were the anthropological fashion of the day, and the E.A.I.S.R. was set up in 1950 when this interest was at its height. East Africa with its chiefdoms and segmentary societies provided us with a most stimulating area in which to do such comparative work.

The early fifties was also a time of rapid change in colonial policy on African local government, after the stagnant years of the Second World War. The philosophy of indirect rule had been abandoned and there was pressure to introduce British local government institutions as quickly as possible in the African colonial territories. The new plans envisaged turning the existing African chiefs into something more like a British-type civil servant, permanently employed, salaried, pensionable, trained and appointed on merit as judged by educational achievements, administrative experience, or loyalty to the colonial government. Such criteria were gradually to replace traditional hereditary rights to territorial chiefship, where these existed. The composition and duties of the tribal councils which had been recognised in the major territorial divisions set up by the British administration were to be changed. A majority of their members were to be elected rather than sitting by virtue of traditional rights or royal favour, and they were ultimately to take control over local social services such as roads, health, agriculture and eventually education. The "chief" was to become the elected council's agent or employee, somewhat on the pattern of the clerk of a British rural district council. The concrete steps taken to implement these new policies by the colonial administration in Uganda are described in Chapter 2 of this book.

Our Makerere group of anthropologists found themselves in the midst of these developments in the early fifties. Some of the changes outlined above had already been made. In all the three East African territories the senior chiefs were salaried and pensionable and might be described as local government servants. These territorial officials were all called "chiefs" but their method of appointment often remained the traditional one and thus differed from tribe to tribe. In the Bantu kingdoms of Uganda and Tanganyika, the kings or paramount chiefs were hereditary and often claimed long lines of descent. In the course of the years they had acquired the power to choose and appoint the territorial chiefs under them. These were what Fallers called "client chiefs",⁵ usually able and ambitious men competing for royal favour in order to win promotion from office to office in the kingdom, and in the old days fearing demotion or death when they forfeited this favour. In the Bantu kingdoms in which a caste structure was still recognised in the fifties, these client chiefs tended to be chosen from superior castes. For instance in one of our later surveys of chiefs' appointments it was found that in Ankole 40% of senior chiefs came from traditional royal clans; in Buhaya 80% and in Sukumaland 98% of senior chiefs belonged to Tutsi dynasties⁶ whereas in Buganda, Bunyoro and Toro chiefs generally owed their position not to hereditary privilege but to royal patronage or to the favour of the prime minister.

The term chief was also used for the leaders selected as local government officers by the British administration in areas where there had been no hereditary executive heads before, as in Bugisu in east Uganda or Kigezi in the west.

Some of these had been clan heads in earlier days; some were men who had been successful in economic activities and had been regarded as "big men" by their fellows; and some were promoted clerks trained in office routine or ex-servicemen accustomed to working under British superiors.

If the civil service chiefs of the early fifties were still being selected mainly on traditional grounds in Uganda and Tanganyika they also combined the modern techniques of administration taught them by colonial officials with many of their traditional functions. They were responsible for collecting and accounting for taxes on behalf of the central (colonial) government, and had to keep orderly records of revenue and expenditure. County and sub-county chiefs presided over legal courts and kept court records under British supervision but they decided most legal cases on the basis of local customary law, dealt with witchcraft and the breaking of ritual rules and had to adjudicate in disputes which could not be settled without a detailed knowledge of local history and personalities. They were often responsible for ritual duties such as the care of local shrines and in some cases, for instance in the land of the Alur, chiefs were considered responsible for carrying out magic rites for the production of rain. All East African chiefs I met personally were expected to know the history of local dignitaries, to use ancient forms of greeting and above all to fulfil traditional rules of hospitality. Tamukedde, himself a Ganda chief, describes these duties graphically in his life history in Chapter 4.

The new chiefs also formed a hierarchy which we described in our book 'East African Chiefs' (1960) in terms of four Classes. The most senior were based on their tribal headquarters, dominated their tribal councils, had frequent contact with the local British political officers, attended special training courses where these were available, had free housing, car and travel allowances, and had salaries which compared very favourably with those of headmasters and senior clerks. The most senior (Class I) were usually county chiefs, the sub-county chiefs being identified as Class II.

The lower chiefs, Class III, the parish or muluka chiefs in the case of Uganda, and Class IV, the village headmen and their assistants, lived in their own houses and were therefore locally based. They had low salaries or, in the case of village headmen, none at all; they had little chance of promotion and received no pensions on retirement. The political ideas of these locally based chiefs and their methods of keeping law and order and adjudicating in local disputes were very little altered by the reforms affecting the higher chiefs, although their duties had been much increased as local social services were expanded by the colonial administration. These duties are described in some detail in the following chapters.

The strength and vitality of traditional ideas and practices were very marked because, although the chiefs had many new responsibilities, the majority were still selected

according to traditional criteria and, at the village level in particular, continued to function very much as they had in the past. The colonial government had, in effect, to deal with a series of separate local government services, usually coinciding with tribal territories and staffed by indigenous officials. It was for this reason that the anthropological studies of tribal political structure were so relevant. In particular Buganda, the main subject of the present book, was more populous, more wealthy and more developed economically than the other tribal groups in the Protectorate; the development of local government services there was accordingly very different.

The East African Institute of Social Research (E.A.I.S.R.) was established at a time when the new Colonial Office policies were being introduced, and there was much controversy in Britain about local government in the colonial territories. Anthropologists working in British colonies at the time were naturally conscious of a good deal of conflict of mind over these administrative changes. Most of us were anxious that the peoples with whom we were living and with whose interests we had become identified should achieve independence, even though this seemed very far off in 1950. We tended to accept the fact that the introduction of up-to-date and "efficient" methods of local government was a necessary step towards the creation of a modern political state. Some of us, mainly I think the American anthropologists working with us, were rather shocked that so many hereditary elements remained part of the traditional territorial administration in 1950. Again, the African staff and students at Makerere College generally favoured the new plans and accepted the belief, long current in these circles, that chiefs were old, illiterate, corrupt and unable to lead their people to progress, whereas elected councillors would be free from corruption and would take a modern and enlightened view.

Nevertheless most anthropologists of the fifties had come to study how the political systems of their chosen society actually worked; how, for instance, village councils reached decisions, disputes were settled and joint activities organised. Most of us came to admire many of the institutions we were studying. In fact some of us had come to Africa determined to admire things African and convinced that the African way of doing things was the best; that it was not only the best for Africans but that it was superior to the ways of the so-called western civilizations. This attitude to which I sometimes succumbed myself in Zambia in the thirties was perhaps a side effect of the functional approach we adopted.

In Uganda and Tanzania in the 1950s we were living in the midst of these political and social changes: some of us attended the first elections to the new local government councils; some of us lived in or near the chiefs' houses and heard their critical views on the new reforms: all of us worked at some time in villages, where we observed the changes at what our American colleagues called the "grass-roots". It was no wonder that our first conference held at

Makerere in January 1952 was devoted to discussions on "the position of the lower chiefs".

It was at this conference that Fallers made the fruitful suggestion that we do a comparative study of the career histories of a sample of the chiefs in office at different levels in our 14 areas. Fallers had been much influenced by the work of Weber during his student days at Chicago, and he suggested that we had in East Africa a chance to test Weber's theories as to the evolution of true bureaucracies from patrimonial and directly hereditary forms of leadership. Political authority in Busoga where he was working seemed to him to be of a typically patrimonial kind.

We adopted Weber's definition of a true bureaucracy as a permanent corps of officials appointed on merit, regularly promoted, salaried, pensionable, existing to carry out its government's wishes, and we decided to ask ourselves how near the African chiefs in the different areas in which we were working had approached to these criteria after 50-70 years of British administration.

As a project for a comparative study the suggestion had many advantages. The objectives could be clearly defined, or so we thought at the time until each new field study raised further points for inquiry. Again the collection of career histories would not, we thought, demand the whole of a field-worker's time and the project could be combined with other research interests. This made Fellows of the E.A.I.S.R. much more ready to co-operate. We had few difficulties in launching the enquiry. It proved popular with the chiefs we questioned as they seemed to enjoy telling us of their progress up the administrative ladder. Our refusal rate was negligible and at least one field-worker, D.J. Stenning, who joined us in 1952, told me that he thought his initial journey from one administrative centre to another in Ankole proved a very useful way of choosing the area in which he wanted subsequently to work.

In Buganda, the main subject of the present book, the African administration units were as follows:

- 1) The county (Saza) with its county headquarters, its council, its court and its county chief (here identified as (Class I)).
- 2) The sub-county (Gombolola) with its sub-county headquarters, council, court, and its sub-county chief (Class II).
- 3) The parish (Muluka) with its parish chief (Class III). At this level there were no headquarters or court building formally recognised by the British government.
- 4) Below the parish chief came the village (Kyalo) headman (Class IV) and sometimes a sub-village head, not formally recognised or paid by the Colonial government.

We took, again on Fallers' suggestion, what he called a "vertical sample section", that is to say a selected county (Class I) chief; all the sub-county (Class II) chiefs in that selected county and all the parish chiefs in one of these sub-counties. In the event, however, co-operation with the tribal authorities was so good that it was possible to collect many more career histories, and we broke the strict canons of sampling technique to include them, as the tables published in our book "East African Chiefs" (1960) show clearly. The gain in case history material seemed to outweigh the difficulties we found in comparability between areas. As in many anthropological surveys the case histories often proved more revealing than the statistical count and we gained our most valuable information in general talks with chiefs and attendance at county and sub-county councils. The career histories finally collected were as follows:

	<u>Class I</u> <u>Chiefs</u>	<u>Class II</u> <u>Chiefs</u>	<u>Class III</u> <u>Chiefs</u>	<u>Class IV</u> <u>Chiefs</u>	<u>Total</u>
Buganda	20	128	19		167
Busoga	8	49	22		79
Bunyoro	4	25	41	18	88
Toro	7	23	122		152
Ankole	8	50	75	68	201
Buhaya	8	3	7	35	53
Buzinza	3	5	43	19	70
Buha	6	9	25		40
Busukuma	25	25†	(275*)		50
Bugisu	3	23	14	29	69
Kigezi	5	20	53	68	146
Alurland	2	8			10
Lugbara	5	8	10	8	31
<u>Totals</u>	104	376	431	245	1,156

† includes 13 deputy chiefs.

* partial information only.

Most of these career histories were gathered by interviewing the chiefs in office, but the records of the tribal governments were also consulted.

We used a common questionnaire asking for information on the following points:

1) The age of chiefs at all four levels. In Buganda the chiefs were not as old as they were thought to be: 47.9% were between 40 and 50 years old and 33.5% were between 50 and 60 years old. Class I chiefs only remained in office in their old age, 70% being between 60 and 70 years old.

2) Education. Educational standards were classified as primary, secondary or university though we knew that children and young persons in the fifties drifted in and out of school and often failed to complete courses. In Buganda the standard was high compared to that of other parts of East Africa. 63.9% of all chiefs had reached secondary education and 10.2% Makerere or overseas education. Class III (parish) chiefs at the village level had lower standards, 63.2% having reached primary education only.

3) Religion. Affiliation to Protestant, Roman Catholic, or Muslim faiths had considerable political importance, especially in Uganda.

4) Chiefs' tenure in their present post and their total length of service. This was an important point of the enquiry since it enabled us to answer one of the questions we had specially in mind, namely the degree to which chiefs formed a permanent local government service in the early fifties. In Buganda 35% of Class I chiefs and 26.5% of Class III chiefs had been serving as chiefs for 21 to 25 years.

5) Previous employment. In order to find out the training and experience chiefs had had we asked who their previous employers were and what jobs they had done. There was little formal training for chiefs in the early fifties; 44.9% of all chiefs had been clerks, 40.7% were employed by the central government and 34.8% by the African local government, 12.6% were teachers, 13.8% in the police or army and 28.2% were self-employed, usually as successful traders or business men. The variety of skilled jobs open to Baganda in the early fifties was very limited.

6) Relationship to other chiefs. The figures which Fallers and I collected in Busoga and Buganda respectively showed how closely chiefs were connected by birth or marriage. These were areas of client, not hereditary chiefship and it was clear that the educational and other advantages of the higher paid chiefs gave their sons a differential access to government posts and that there was emerging a ruling class: 55% of Class I chiefs in Buganda were sons of chiefs and 37.5% of Class II; 20% of Class I and 12.5% of Class II were brothers of chiefs, and 35% of Class I and 14.1% of Class II were brothers-in-law of chiefs. Tamukedde's family history in this book illustrates the position clearly as do the kinship charts in Fallers' 'Bantu Bureaucracy' (1956).

The results of our fourteen tribal studies were published as 'East African Chiefs' in 1960. The authors described the political structure of these peoples before the establishment of British overrule, and the changes in local government and administration up to the early 1950s. In the mid 1960s the

book went out of print and the Makerere Institute of Social Research, the successor of the E.A.I.S.R., asked me to prepare a new edition. This set me a difficult problem. There had been many changes, some of them dramatic, in the local government of both Uganda and Tanzania since 1952 when we had started to collect our chiefs' career histories. These changes had obviously affected the type of man recruited for the chiefship. The Colonial Office reforms of the fifties had altered, or attempted to alter, the position and method of recruitment of chiefs. Uganda achieved independence in 1962 and Tanzania in 1964, and political parties had emerged and were growing in strength and importance.

Was I to edit a new edition of "East African Chiefs" which would be of historical interest only, that is to say the original book improved perhaps in the light of the more detailed research of historians and political scientists during the past ten or fifteen years? Or was I to produce what would be virtually a new book, devoted to the study of the changes in local government that had taken place during more than ten years of Independent rule in Uganda and Tanzania?

My first solution, that is to say a new edition of the original book plus an epilogue describing recent changes, was a compromise. For this purpose we obviously needed new career histories, although there were many practical difficulties in arranging to collect these. The anthropologists who had worked on the original project had all dispersed and I myself would have to direct the new enquiries from Cambridge, not Makerere. However, I had enthusiastic support from two former members of the E.A.I.S.R. research staff, Augustine Mukwaya who had been with the E.A.I.S.R. since its creation in 1950, and W.P. Tamukedde, as well as from Simon Musoke, administrative secretary of the Makerere Institute, formerly a county chief in Buganda, who had worked with L.A. Fallers on the study of leadership in modern Buganda and on the original collection of career histories for "East African Chiefs". Suzette Heald, a Fellow of M.I.S.R. then working in Bugisu, agreed to undertake a study of chiefship in that area; Dr. Gingyera Pincycwa, a political scientist on the staff of Makerere University agreed to direct some Makerere students to collect chiefs' histories in the Alur district; and T. Mushanga, then a member of the Social Studies department of Makerere University undertook to collect career histories in Ankole. Finally Dr. T. Sathyamurthy, a political scientist then on the staff of the University, engaged on a history of local government in Uganda, volunteered to help us and arranged for the collection of data in Bunyoro, Toro and Kigezi.

The number of career histories finally collected in Uganda⁷ was as follows:

	<u>Class I</u> <u>Chiefs</u>	<u>Class II</u> <u>Chiefs</u>	<u>Class III</u> <u>Chiefs</u>	<u>Class IV</u> <u>Chiefs</u>	<u>Total</u>
Buganda	20	117	33		170
Bunyoro	5	26	88		119
Ankole	10	49	124		183
Toro	7	38	158		203
Bugisu	4	19	30	25	78
Kigezi	6	36	233		275
Alur	14	25	21		60
<u>Totals</u>	66	310	687	25	1,088

The number of tribes we covered was therefore reduced from the original 14 to 7 and the new data consisted of answers to questionnaires sometimes obtained from records at county headquarters and sometimes by interview, rather than by direct observation and personal contacts in the field.

Was it possible to compare the calibre of the chiefs in office in 1952 with those in 1970? We used the same questionnaire and were certainly able to compare such characteristics as age, educational standards, and religion (see Part II section 3) but as some of the county and sub-county boundaries had been changed comparison of figures from particular territorial units was difficult. Buganda, given federal status as a kingdom by the Independence constitution of 1960, had ceased officially to exist by 1967, though most of its original area fell into what was now called the Southern Province of Uganda. Lastly there was a new category of local government officials to interview, the Ugandans who had taken the place of the European District and Provincial Commissioners, or Residents and Assistant Residents in the case of Buganda.

As to our main lines of enquiry there was a shift of emphasis. We no longer felt it necessary to ask whether the chiefs formed a true civil service in the Weberian sense, but were interested in the question of whether the civil servant chiefs of Uganda had become a national service or whether each group was limited to its own ethnic and linguistic area. It is of some historic interest that having left Uganda in 1956 it did not then seem remotely possible to me that an Alur chief, for example, could be appointed to a Ganda county, but this was the idea voiced by senior men in the new Institute of Public Administration when I returned to the country in 1971. We collected figures specifically on this point.

We were interested also in finding out who had taken the place of the colonial officials who had held high posts in

African local government, as Provincial or District Commissioners for instance. Did these posts still exist? Were they filled by promoted chiefs of long experience, by University graduates or by politicians such as leading party members? We got career histories for 62 such district administrators for Buganda and 13 for Bunyoro.

Had new methods of appointing chiefs been evolved since the end of the colonial regime? Were they selected by different local governments of each ethnic group, or by the Central government? In the four kindoms which were abolished in 1967 chiefs had been appointed by the then monarchs or their ministers; what happened thereafter? In the segmentary societies like Bugisu, were chiefs elected by the local councils or appointed by the Central government, the Ministry of local government or even the President, (then Dr. Obote) himself? Was the dividing line between the lower parish or village chiefs (class III and IV) and the higher county and sub-county chiefs (class I and II) which we had noted in the early fifties, maintained?

What had happened to the ruling class which had acquired differential access to chiefly office in the fifties, the sons, brothers and other close relatives of chiefs who had enjoyed educational advantages? Was this class of men ousted in the late 1960s, perhaps by less well educated political appointees?

Finally, could it be said that the office of chief was still coveted in Uganda, or did the new economic opportunities which had become open to Africans attract the more able men away from local government and administrative service?

It was evident that the epilogue to 'East African Chiefs' was reaching the proportions of a book in its own right. We had accumulated substantial amounts of information from seven districts of Uganda, and could offer at least tentative answers to some of these questions. The group of scholars which collected data for the second survey was not nearly so closely knit as the group of E.A.I.S.R. Fellows and Associates who worked together in the 1950's; this, and political developments since 1971, presented many difficulties in producing a new book about Chiefs in Uganda. The most comprehensive collection of data related to Buganda, where the dramatic changes of the mid-1960's were felt most keenly. One intention in standardising and unifying local government and administration in Uganda was to eliminate the distinct and privileged status of Buganda, and the other three kingdoms. It therefore seemed logical to make Buganda the principal focus of this book, setting changes in local government and administration there in the context of changes in the Republic at large, as expressed in the survey data from the other six districts; these data are presented and discussed in Part II of this book. To provide a more detailed comparison, we have included Suzette Heald's account

of local government development in Bugisu, an area which lacked the centralized traditions of chiefship enjoyed by Buganda (Chapter 5). W.P. Tamukedde's biography (Chapter 4) gives an intimate picture, in the life of one man who has served as chief and administrator in Buganda and in Uganda at large, of the years of change which this book and its predecessor have sought to document.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. Since 1968 the Makerere Institute of Social Research.
2. J. Gus Liebenow.
3. Toro, the fourth kingdom in what is now Uganda, was of later origin. It seceded from Bunyoro in 1830 but fell again under its sway in 1889, only recovering its independence with the support of Lord Lugard in 1891.
4. J. Middleton and D. Tait (eds.) Tribes Without Rulers (2nd edn.) London 1964.
5. L.A. Fallers Bantu Bureaucracy, London 1956.
6. A.I. Richards (ed.) East African Chiefs, London 1960, Chapters VII and X.
7. I tried to get information on the areas in which we had previously worked in Tanzania, namely Buhaya, Buha, Buzinza and Unyamwezi. Goran Hyden, a political scientist then teaching at Nairobi University generously gave time and effort to organise an expedition of students to Buhaya, but as chiefship had been abolished in Tanzania and TANU party officials were in control, it was difficult to use his material for comparative purposes. Professor G. Liebenow offered to assist in the Unyamwezi area, but his research student (Mr. M. Matiko) was unable to get permission to do research in the district until it was too late for the present project. We therefore had to omit references to Tanzania from the second study.

C H A P T E R 2

Changing Local Government Policy 1950-70

Audrey Richards

The legislative and other changes affecting the work of Ugandan chiefs since our first survey can be divided into two series - those that took place between 1950-62 and those that followed 1962, the date when Uganda achieved independence. The first period is the epoch when the Protectorate government tried to implement the new post-war policy outlined in the Secretary of State's dispatch of 1947.¹ 1950 is perhaps an arbitrary choice of date since these changes were being discussed and put into effect throughout the early fifties, but this was the year when Sir Andrew Cohen was appointed Governor of Uganda after spending several years as head of the African department of the Colonial Office, where he tackled the subject of local government reforms with great energy, set up an African research department, and came out to Uganda determined to hurry the Protectorate towards Independence. 1950 was also the year when the E.A.I.S.R. was set up and the African chiefs project mooted.

The second period 1962-71 begins in the year in which Uganda was declared independent so that these dates include the important experiments and reforms initiated by the first President of Uganda, Milton Obote, who was ousted from office in January 1971. Our second list of career histories was completed by the end of 1970 and we have only been able to give a skeleton account of subsequent changes. We have no career histories for the years since 1971.

Both governments, colonial and independent, had to face some of the same difficulties when they attempted to reform local government. The most intractable was the heterogeneity of the ethnic groups described in Chapter 1, and the cultural distinction between the kingdoms with their hereditary monarchs and hierarchical type of government which had signed special agreements with the British guaranteeing the maintenance of their ancient constitutions, and the segmentary peoples to the north and east of them. This was a difference clearly recognised by the politicians of Uganda, who distinguished between the "kingdoms" and the "districts" during debates in the legislative assembly in the sixties. Most important of all was the predominance in size, wealth and economic development of one kingdom, Buganda, as against the other ethnic groups which made up the Uganda Protectorate. The presence of this ancient and highly developed society in South Uganda was at first an asset to the British administrators when a Protectorate over the country was assumed in 1894. The Ganda chiefs they found in

the country had a long tradition of territorial administration of a type which was at least comprehensible to the British officials then in charge. The Kabaka of Buganda and his chiefs were recognised in the Uganda Agreement of 1900 and some of the senior amongst them were placed in control of other tribal areas, including those in which the idea of a hierarchy of executive officials was quite unfamiliar. The role of the famous Ganda chief Semei Kakungulu and his agents in Bugisu from the beginning of the century till 1915 is described in Chapter 5. The same chief was also in control of Busoga from 1906 till 1915, and Teso from 1896 to 1904. Ganda chiefs were in a dominant position in Bunyoro till 1906 when they began to be replaced by Nyoro after a rebellion against their rule in 1906. Kigezi was administered by Ganda agents from 1909-10, having been occupied by the British from 1896 to 1902. Even when Ganda agents were not put in charge of the administration of another tribal area it was the Ganda political system which was used as a pattern whenever possible by the colonial government. It is therefore easy to understand the resulting dislike and jealousy of Buganda which bedevilled Uganda politics for so many years afterwards.

However, many years later when the British were trying to unite Uganda preparatory to granting it independence, the predominance of Buganda was a stumbling block since its leaders wanted independent status and not inclusion in a "unitary Uganda", the term the Governor, Sir Andrew Cohen, used at the time. The Kabaka of Buganda was in fact deported to England for refusing to recommend to his Great Council (Lukiiko) that it appoint representatives to the Legislative Assembly proposed in a new constitution for a United Uganda (1953). There is a good deal of truth in the statement that Buganda's long fight (1954-63) for independence or for a federal status in the new Uganda held up the achievement of Independence for at least two years.

The prominent position of Buganda was an even greater difficulty for the independent government which succeeded that of the Protectorate. The Colonial government had been tolerant of cultural and structural differences between the different regions of Uganda and had used their traditional institutions for the enforcement of law and order and the administration of the local social services such as health, education and agricultural extension which became such an important part of the colonial officials' activities in the post-war years. The new independent government of 1962 under its prime minister, Milton Obote, took a very different view. He was deeply critical of the cultural differences which divided Uganda and regarded them as archaic and unworthy of a modern state, a view shared by politicians in many of the new African governments. He was afraid of breakaway movements and secession, particularly of the kingdoms which had succeeded in establishing special constitutional rights, federal in the case of Buganda and semi-federal in the case of the other kingdoms, at the Independence Conference of 1962. An uneasy balance of

power had been established by the arrangement that Obote be prime-minister and Mutesa, Kabaka of Buganda, President of Uganda. But the subsequent political history of the new State and the development of its local government policy was affected at every turn by the dominant position of Buganda and the jealousy and mistrust of most of the other regions towards it. Development economists at one time wrote much of the problems produced by "advanced economic enclaves" in newly independent countries, and Uganda was certainly the victim of the advanced political enclave of the kingdom of Buganda.

Changes in Local Government Policy 1950-62

The first African local government ordinance designed to implement the new Colonial Office policy was passed in 1949. It had two main objectives. The first was the democratisation of traditional councils where such existed, as they did in the kingdoms, and the setting up of new district councils where they had not existed before. The second was the devolution of more social services to the district authorities on something more like the British pattern.

Buganda had a series of councils arranged in hierarchical order, the great council or lukiiko, the lesser councils at county (saza) level, and sub-county (gombolola) level, and below them the parish (muluka) councils. All these bodies had been in existence many years and though there is evidence that colonial officials very much influenced the functions and procedure of the great lukiiko from the earliest years of the Protectorate, as well as that of the subsidiary councils, the Ganda still considered their council system as authentically their own and no doubt similar attitudes existed towards the traditional councils in the other kingdoms.

In the Buganda of 1949 there were no elected members on these councils. The great lukiiko was dominated by the prime minister (Katikiro), assisted by two other officials, the ministers for finance and for justice. It had 89 members, the three ministers, the 20 county chiefs, three notables from each county and six appointed by the Kabaka. The power of the chiefs in the great council was thus supreme.

By the Ordinance of 1949 considerable changes were made, cautious though they may now appear to us. Thirty-one "unofficial" members of the great lukiiko were to be appointed by a kind of electoral college based on parish and sub-county elections.² Additional members were to be nominated, partly by the Resident³ and partly by the elected and official members. Formal committees of the great council were to be appointed (financial, standing and advisory), and the council was to have extended powers such as the right to pass its own bye-laws.

The kingdom chiefs felt their position to be threatened by this Ordinance and the more far sighted amongst them voiced their apprehension. How were they to enforce measures passed by a council on which they were no longer to be in the majority? (See Chapter 3) Nevertheless, the traditional council systems of the kingdoms continued to function very much as before, as anyone attending meetings of the Great Council, the county or the sub-county councils in the early fifties must have felt.

The position was very different outside the kingdoms. Here traditional councils had not existed and although the Protectorate government had attempted to introduce the Ganda system of chiefs and councils into the Eastern Province, the results were very different; there was an annual meeting of higher chiefs at District headquarters to alter native laws and fix penalties, and their functions were advisory rather than executive. Thus in the districts these new chiefs appointed by the British administration ruled autocratically, as Heald describes in the case of Bugisu (Chapter 5). In the mid-thirties what Burke describes as "a system of effective but completely autocratic chieftainship" prevailed in these districts, in contrast with the position in the kingdoms where chiefs were constrained by traditional authority.⁴

It is not surprising therefore that the 1949 Ordinance, which attempted to grant corporate powers and responsibilities to district councils where these had not formerly existed or had only had advisory functions, should have produced radical changes.

In 1951 new legislation was enacted to regularise the position of the lower councils, those at the parish (muluka) level in Buganda. Such councils had formerly met to give a preliminary hearing to court cases and to discuss matters of local interest. They had no fixed composition but older and more important persons in the parish attended and villagers who were interested in any issue under discussion could join in the meeting or look in through the unglazed windows in the walls of the wattle and daub buildings which were used for the council. Under the terms of the 1951 law the duties of the parish chief and the composition of the parish council were defined and brought into line with the new colonial policy for the democratisation of Uganda councils. The parish chief was to be an ex-officio member of the sub-county council, which was to meet at least once a month, and he was to act as chairman of the parish council which was also to meet once a month. This council was to be composed of the chief himself, his deputy, the major local landowners and their agents (batongole) who acted as chiefs' assistants, two members elected by popular votes, and up to six co-opted members. This lower council was to frame resolutions to be forwarded to the higher councils and ultimately, if approved, to the great lukiiko itself.⁵ The addition of two elected members to the parish council was a step along the path to democracy planned by the Colonial Office, and did not strike the outsider as a very

revolutionary, although it was considered to be so by the chiefs in office at the time.

By 1952 it had become clear that the 1949 Ordinance needed amendment and Governor Cohen appointed Mr. C.A. Wallis, an experienced administrator then in the Colonial Office, to make a survey of the whole system of local government in Uganda. It was hoped that it would be possible for him to devise a uniform system of local government, if not with the inclusion of all its practices. By British principles I mean here the elected district council with considerable local autonomy over social services, power to levy rates and to appoint its own executive officers.

Many of Wallis's proposals were embodied in the District Administration (District Councils) Ordinance of 1955. This was a radical measure which affected the position of the chiefs more than any previous legislation. For example, the judicial functions still performed by them and their councils were separated from the executive functions. Buganda was exempt from most of the provisions of the Ordinance because it had achieved its own federal constitution on the recommendation of the Namirembe Commission in 1955, and therefore had effective autonomy in its own internal administration. Nevertheless the Colonial government pursued much the same policies in such matters as the devolution of social services in Buganda as it did in the other kingdoms and districts.

The 1955 Ordinance provided that elected members should be in a majority over the official (chiefly) members on the district councils, and those who were still appointed on the terms of the 1949 Ordinance. The council was to have substantial control over its own budget and could levy its own rates, both powers being subject to the approval of the Central government. The district council was to have control over a number of social services such as primary education, dispensaries and environmental health services, water supplies and local roads. The devolution of these services varied according to the political development of the people concerned, but all districts with the exception of Karamoja eventually achieved most of the provisions of the Ordinance: West Nile, Acholi and Ankole in 1955; Bugisu, Bunyoro, Kigezi, Lango, Madi and Teso in 1956; and Bukedi in 1961.

Specific demands of the smaller kingdoms were also accommodated. Some of these were of a linguistic order; for instance the kingdoms had 'assemblies' and 'prime ministers' while the districts had 'councils' and 'administrative secretaries-general'. The kingdoms had 'public service commissions', the term used in the Buganda constitution of 1955, while the districts had 'appointments boards'. However, the districts were also empowered by the Ordinance to have constitutional heads, provided they were supported by a two thirds majority of the council and the Ministry of Regional Administrations approved. Although the distinctions between

the kingdoms and districts were often a matter of semantics, the desire of the former to retain their traditional institutions remained a problem for both the Colonial and the subsequent Independent government of Uganda.

The provisions of the 1955 Ordinance regarding the appointment, dismissal and control of chiefs, were perhaps the most important of the Wallis recommendations from the point of view of this book. By the new Ordinance, chiefs were to be chosen by a District Appointments Board, of which the Governor appointed only the Chairman, the remaining members being selected by the District Council often from its own ranks. The District Council had, according to Burke, "considerable autonomy to recruit, discipline and dismiss chiefs and other officials".⁶ The approval of the Central government was required only in the case of the proposed dismissal of higher chiefs. The power and status of the previously autocratic chiefs in non-kingdom areas was obviously threatened at once though in Buganda the traditional constraints on chiefship continued to apply.

However this provision of the 1955 Ordinance, presumably framed in the interests of the new democratic policies of the Colonial Office, caused difficulties. It was intended that the chiefs should become the agents of their District Councils, not their masters; that they should in fact be civil servants in the British sense, insulated from politics. "It is a golden principle in any country, large or small", wrote Sir Andrew Cohen in a memorandum in 1955, "that its civil servants — and the chiefs and their subordinates are⁷ the civil service of the central, the local governments and the public — should be isolated from politics and from nepotism." But this detachment from politics was not easy to maintain in a country in which political parties had reached a prominence and power unknown in 1953 when Wallis was touring the Protectorate.⁸ Moreover religious affiliation had been a source of political schism in Uganda since the turn of the century, starting in Buganda where Lugard had assigned the chiefships of certain counties to Protestants and others to Catholics and Muslims. In the 1950's members of the Democratic party (1954-56) were usually assumed to be Catholics while adherents of the Uganda People's Congress were generally Protestant. It became clear that political and religious pressures of all sorts would influence the appointment of chiefs if they were to be chosen as well as controlled by the elected District Councils. It must be remembered too that the very process of election was itself new in East African societies, a fact which many colonial administrators seemed to ignore, and elections to District councils predated those to the Central Legislative Council in Uganda. The idea of elected councils was alarming to those in authority and a source of political and personal ambition to the rest.

It is not surprising therefore that after four years' experiment and a good deal of trouble in Teso in 1957 it was thought necessary to change the system. This was done by the District Councils (Amendments) Ordinance of 1959 which set

up Appointment Boards in each District. These local Boards were to be appointed by the Governor from panels of names submitted by the District Councils. The Boards, once appointed, were under the control of the Central Government, that is to say of the new Ministry of Regional Administrations which had been set up in 1955. Thus chiefs who had been informed that they were now servants of their local councils, knew that they were also directly responsible to the Central Government in the persons of the District Commissioner and the Provincial Commissioner, both under the Ministry of Regional Administrations, and finally to the Governor himself. The conflict between the Central and the local governments which became such a feature of local administration in our second period 1961-69 was already in evidence. It is referred to in this book by both Tamukedde and Heald (Chapters 4 and 5).

It is not clear whether the chiefs chosen by the Appointment Boards and the Public Service Commissions of the kingdoms were of a different calibre to those chosen before the passing of the 1959 Act, and as our case histories were collected at a later period they do not throw much light on the question. Buganda had such a well established chiefly class, wealthy, landowning and usually educated at the leading boarding schools in Uganda, that it is difficult to imagine that higher chiefs did not continue to be drawn from this cadre whether in effect by royal patronage as of old⁹ or by the choice of its Public Service Commission.

The districts had no established chiefly class, since chiefship itself was not traditional in most of these areas, but the colonial administrators who had chosen them had generally selected the most educated men they could find and the salaries the chiefs received enabled them to educate their sons, so that something like a chiefly class was appearing. In both districts and kingdoms lower chiefs seem to have continued to function as before. The system of appointing parish chiefs and their assistants was particularly well established in Buganda and deeply rooted in political institutions.

Following the acceptance of the Independence constitution of 1962, the Local Administration (Amendment) Act was passed to deal with the administration of the districts, the position of Buganda, Busoga and the western kingdoms being defined in the constitution itself. The 1962 Act followed the 1959 Ordinance rather closely but it gave central government more control over the local government bodies, particularly over the appointment, tenure and functions of the chiefs. The powers of the Governor and the Provincial Commissioner to approve chiefs' appointments under the 1959 Ordinance were transferred to the Ministry of Regional Administrations. The councils, nine-tenths of whose members were elected, were to have no power over the recruitment of chiefs or administrative officials, although the latter were accountable to the councils. The powers of

the chiefs, especially in judicial matters, were very much reduced,¹⁰ but they continued to be responsible for tax collection. The responsibilities of the police in matters of law and order, hitherto entrusted to the chiefs, were increased. The lower chiefs, however, were still to be recruited locally, and their functions remained much as they had been before.

The senior local government officials were the Secretary General, the Treasurer and the Chief Judge, counterparts of the Prime Minister, the Treasurer and the Chief Judge in the kingdoms. These were officials of the Ministry of Regional Administrations. We have no data on these officials in 1962, but Burke thinks they were recruited in the first instance from the ranks of county chiefs and were subsequently drawn from central government departments.¹¹

Lastly, the local councils' powers over social services were increased under the 1962 Act. They were to take charge of secondary and technical education as well as primary.

It will be seen that the Colonial Office policy of 1947, enunciated in the Secretary of State's famous despatch of that date, was put into effect very quickly in Uganda compared to the slow pace of local government reform in Britain. Perhaps for this reason its history shows constant change and amending legislation. Yet the movement towards democratisation of kingdom councils, the institution of executive councils in non-kingdom areas and the extension of local control over social services continued, and Uganda reached Independence with a large cadre of local civil servants, chiefs and others who were experienced in the conduct of local government, in assuming financial responsibility and running social services.

The units of local government however remained with few exceptions traditional ones, five federal states and ten districts corresponding to the old tribal areas, and the lower chiefs continued their work almost unchanged.

Changes in Local Government Policy 1963-70

The constitution with which Uganda achieved Independence at the end of 1962 was based on difficult compromises reached after very protracted negotiations, two committees of inquiry, two commissions and two conferences.¹² The difficulties mainly concerned the relation of the Buganda kingdom with the rest of the country.

By the 1962 Constitution the country was divided into 13 administrative units: four kingdoms (Buganda, Bunyoro, Ankole and Toro) and nine districts (Acholi, Bugisu, Bukedi, Busoga, Karamoja, Kigezi, Lango, Teso and West Nile). Buganda had achieved a federal position; it had been virtually self-governing since 1955 and had its own system

of councils, including an urban council dealing with that part of Kampala which was the traditional capital (Kibuga) of Buganda. It also had its own budget to which the Central government was to make an annual contribution, a Chief Court of Law with appeal to the High Court of Uganda, and its own police. Hence one of the most important tasks of Milton Obote, the first Prime Minister of Uganda and leader of the Uganda People's Congress (U.P.C.), was to reach some kind of accommodation with Buganda with its well-established government, federal status and strong sense of its own superiority. The Independence Constitution was the result of an uneasy alliance between the U.P.C. and the Kabaka Yekka (K.Y.) the traditional party of Buganda, during the elections to the Central Legislative Assembly of Uganda in April 1962.

Obote also had to reach some kind of accommodation with the other kingdoms of Uganda which had been granted semi-federal status by the Independence Constitution. These remaining treaty states, Bunyoro, Toro and Ankole, as well as Busoga, were all envious of the autonomy Buganda had achieved and all wanted to have their own representative head, whether king or president. Wallis, in Uganda in 1953, used to comment with surprise that the smaller kingdoms wanted more kingship and not less, more preservation of feudal rights and not more democracy. Even the polities which were not kingdoms seemed to envy Buganda's political system and particularly her representative head.¹³ In order to win support for himself and his party, Obote therefore made a number of concessions to these separatist tendencies.¹⁴ Nevertheless, his party stood for a united Uganda and the end of "tribalism" and believed, according to Colin Leys that if "all these groups, and among them the majority of rural voters in the districts, could once be cemented to a single party by a consistent policy of meeting their particular demands, it might be possible to destroy for good the forces of separatism".¹⁵ The passage in 1963 of The Administrative (Amendment) Western Kingdoms and Busoga Act left these regions with their rulers and their own governments more or less intact, although they had the same general administrative responsibilities as the districts and were ultimately under the control of the central government.

Obote was also concerned to increase still further the power of the Central government over all local authorities. Nevertheless, as in the case of the smaller kingdoms with their individual desire for autonomy, he had to court the favour of local voters. Uganda was far from being a one party state in 1963. The votes cast at the 1962 election gave 37 seats in the National Assembly to the U.P.C.; 27 to the Democratic party and 21 to the K.Y. These two conflicting aims, the desire to build up a strong central government leading finally to single party rule and the need to pander to local interests, resulted in a series of Acts and Amending Acts as contradictory as those of the last years of the Colonial government. For instance the Local

Administration (Amendment) Act, 1963 gave the District Councils power to elect a Secretary General and a Financial Secretary who were to be chosen and, if necessary, dismissed by a simple majority vote. The Secretary General was the official in charge of administration; responsible to him was the new office of Administrative Secretary, the chief executive officer of the district council. The Treasurer, in charge of the Council's finances was responsible to the new Financial Secretary. However, only six months later an Amending Act was passed changing this pattern of authority, since the Minister of Regional Administrations thought it "intensified sectional conflicts". The appointment of the Secretary General and the Financial Secretary was once again to be the duty of the Minister. These were described as 'political appointments' since the Minister was of course drawn from the ruling party in the Central Assembly, then the U.P.C. The Minister was to select from six names sent him from the Council and the latter could only remove an office holder by a 2/3 majority vote. And so the tug-of-war between local and central government went on with the former ultimately at the mercy of the latter owing to the constant financial difficulties in which the local councils found themselves with the new responsibilities for the social services they were obliged to undertake.¹⁶

1966 was the year of triumph for Obote's government and his party, which had been rapidly growing in strength. In June 1966 his forces stormed the Kabaka's palace and the headquarters of the Buganda government. The Kabaka fled the country and the kingdom was effectively destroyed. By an Interim Constitution of 1966 Buganda was reduced to the status of the lesser kingdoms; chiefs were removed from the traditional councils or 'assemblies' in the kingdoms and Busoga, and the Minister of Regional Administrations was given power exercised through the Uganda Public Service Commission to appoint chiefs. It is doubtful, however, whether many chiefs in Buganda actually resigned or were dismissed in that year.

Obote declared Uganda a Republic in 1967 and it was then that the major changes in local government took place. His aims, and those of his party, were two-fold: to secure complete uniformity as regards the units of local administration and to obliterate all traces of tribalism. By the Republican constitution, which was apparently largely modelled on that of Tanzania, all the kingdoms were abolished and in Buganda only the four districts, East and West Mengo, Masaka and Mubende, were recognised. These were to be identical in local government structure to that of all other districts of Uganda. Uganda was to consist of 18 Districts (the existing nine, the four Districts of Buganda, the kingdoms of Bunyoro, Ankole and Toro whose kings had been pensioned off, and two new Districts, Madi and Sebei). These Districts were sub-divided into a total of 109 counties, 596 sub-counties now to be called 'divisions' and 3143 parishes. The salaries of all local government officials in these areas were to be equalised so that the great discrepancy between the stipends of higher chiefs in

Buganda and those in the poorer areas to the north, was to disappear. The effects of these attempts to homogenise the structure of local government in Uganda are discussed in Part II of this book, in the light of our 1969 survey of chiefs and administrators.

This determination to secure uniformity in the administration of areas of very diverse cultures went hand in hand with strenuous efforts to obliterate 'tribalism'. Tribal names ceased to be used in the literature and ethnic affiliations were not recorded in the 1969 census. English was evidently to be the official language since by an article of the constitution only people able to speak and understand English were eligible for election to District Councils. All these changes were to be made in the name of national unity. There is an almost lyrical quality in the many documents of the period stored in the Institute of Public Administration. The aim of the government, says one, is to secure "one people, one Parliament, one Government, and one Country". The "main aim of the constitution is not just to provide for a Republic but to provide for a strong central government as a platform for the task of fighting for national unity".¹⁷

Fear of the recrudescence of Buganda was no doubt one motive behind this drive to obliterate tribal differences but there was also, or so it seemed to me, an enthusiasm for the new, for doing what Ghana and Tanzania had done before and as one writer put it, for dispatching traditional institutions "down the gutter of history".¹⁸ The jealousy and fear of Buganda which the other people of Uganda had felt for many years fitted well with this philosophy.

The Local Administrations Act 1967 which was passed after the declaration of the Republic was evidently drafted with the aim of strengthening still further the powers of the Central Government over the local administration and of increasing the power of the Party organisation at all levels. The organisation as defined in the Act was complex. In each District there was to be, as before, two co-called political officers, the Secretary General and his Assistant, the office of Financial Secretary being now abolished. The Secretary General was to be appointed as before by the Minister for Regional Administrations from names submitted by the District Council but with the proviso that "when a single party with a clear majority exists" that party would choose the names. The important office of Administrative Secretary remained. He was to be appointed, in theory at least, by the President through his Public Service Commission or District Appointments Board. He was the chief executive officer of the council and head of the District civil service, and hence of course of the chiefs. The District Commissioner was also a career civil servant appointed by the President. It is interesting to note that whereas the pre-independence government sought to limit the authority of the 'D.C.' in favour of stronger local government, the 1967 Act greatly strengthened his hand in the administration of

the district. He was responsible for advising the council, particularly in financial matters, and was ex officio Chairman of the District Team and Planning Committee, which consisted of the senior officer of each central government department represented in the district and one representative of the local authority. He was ultimately responsible for the maintenance of law and order in his district. Tamukedde describes his work as a District Commissioner in Chapter 4.

The number of senior officials in the districts had therefore grown considerably since independence. They could be divided into political appointments, the Secretary General and his Assistant, under the Ministry of Regional Administrations, and the career officials. A retired Ganda chief of ability and long experience described the new situation thus: "Now each District has a District Commissioner and two Assistant District Commissioners in most districts, with four in Bunyoro. Then there is a Secretary General and an Assistant Secretary General; an Administrative Secretary and Assistant Administrative Secretary; a Treasurer and Assistant Treasurer; and a Works Supervisor. In addition there are at District level various civil servants in charge of, for instance, health education or vermin control - a very large increase in the number of administrators at local level as compared with 1952". Our sample for Masaka (Part II, Section 5 (e)) is the largest, comprising 11 statutory officials and 26 other civil servants, including 4 internal auditors, 4 education officials, 2 medical officials and 3 health officers.

Nor were these the only official personages touring the countryside. Besides the district councillors there were members of parliament trying to get additional financial or other help for their constituents by a direct approach to the relevant Ministry.¹⁹ During this period the organisation of the ruling Uganda People's Congress was greatly strengthened, involving a series of committees and conferences right down to the parish level. The Kebaka Yekka had been effectively silenced in 1966, and the Democratic Party was suppressed by 1969. In December of that year Dr. Obote published his 'Common Man's Charter', in which he sought to consolidate Uganda's 'move to the left'. This was followed by 'Proposals for new methods of elections of representatives of the people to parliament' (July 1970), which proposed a one-party state. Plans to implement this the following year were frustrated by General Amin's coup d'etat of January 1971.

What was the position of the chiefs in the large cadre of officials? Section 39 of the 1969 Republican Constitution defined a chief as "an officer of a District Administration in charge of a county, sub-county, division or sub-division".²⁰ A chief was under the orders of the Ministry of Regional Administrations and his District Council or District Court, that is to say he was responsible to both Central and local authorities.

In theory at any rate the functions of the higher chiefs were not changed materially by the terms of the new constitution. In pre-colonial as well as colonial days the chiefs at all levels were multi-purpose officials, responsible for the general supervision and promotion of local schemes and services. The chief, wrote M. Davies, head of the Institute of Public Administration in 1969 "is the administrator in full control of his area; the co-ordinator between the people and the local administration, the Central government and the Government departments"; a co-operator with the leading citizens of his area.²¹ As before he was to be responsible for law and order, keeping the peace, making sure that no offences are committed, directing and bringing offenders to justice, enforcing bye laws, and assessing and collecting graduated tax. But it must be remembered that since 1955 the chief no longer presided over the county or sub-county law-courts. He was supposed to find the criminals and bring them to court but not to judge or sentence them as formerly. He remained in charge of the local prisons.

This total of duties far exceeds those of any local government official in Britain. It is true that the multifarious duties of the higher chiefs (Class I and II) were made possible by the poorly paid or unpaid labour of the lower chiefs, whose status and functions were not defined in the terms of the Constitution. Nor was it clear how far these lower officials were continuing to function efficiently in the new administrative set-up in 1969-70. Their position in Buganda and Bugisu is discussed in Chapters III, IV and V. It must be remembered that the higher chiefs, in the kingdoms at any rate, were immensely helped in the days before the Republic by discussion of new measures in county and sub-county councils and at the informal village councils at the base of the hierarchy. By this means villagers were made aware of the nature of new schemes of development and welfare. By the 1964 Constitution, the elected District Council was the local deliberative and executive body, but chiefs were not members. In Buganda the series of councils at county, sub-county and parish level ceased to exist in 1966 and the members of the Councils of the four Districts in Buganda were directly appointed by the Minister. Villagers who were keen party members were presumably aware of policy changes and new schemes but for others their sense of participation in local administration must have been less than before.

How were the chiefs to be appointed? This is of course the important question in relation to our career histories of 1969, even though there had been only two to three years for changes in personnel to become apparent. Uganda chiefs of the first three Classes were described as civil servants during the final years of colonial rule and they already formed an established service with pay fixed, though varying from area to area; with pensions; government housing in the case of higher chiefs; and promotion possibilities

from Class III to Class I.²²

By the 1966 Interim Constitution chiefs, even in Buganda, were to be appointed by the Uganda Public Service Commission under the Ministry of Regional Administrations. However, Obote's government evidently had much more radical aims, namely the creation of a national civil service of chiefs. This would mean officials who would be transferable, not only from county to county within a District, but also from District to District, regardless of differences in culture and language (English or Swahili were to be used as administrative languages). Our career histories (Part II section 3) show how far this ideal had been achieved and whether it applied to the lower as well as the higher chiefs. The Class III chiefs who were poorly paid, and Class IV chiefs who were not paid at all, could not be asked to move from their home areas especially as the system did not provide them with official housing. Moreover their local knowledge would have been essential if the higher chiefs were strangers. If a completely national service had been achieved it would have meant in effect two strata of chiefs, the higher one mobile, and the lower mainly local.

Uniformity of policy and ideology was also obviously a prime objective for the Obote government. Chiefs received training at the large and impressive Institute of Public Administration, which was opened in Kampala in 1968 and replaced the small training school for chiefs of the colonial period at Nsamisi near Entebbe. The chiefs received instruction for periods of a week or a fortnight in technical subjects such as accountancy, but as the Institute training programmes were under the direction of the Ministry, the policy of the U.P.C. government was also inculcated. Potential Permanent Secretaries, senior officials marked for promotion, and specialists from different ministries, all received instruction for six months to a year at the Institute, and there were induction or diploma courses of 12 to 18 months for University graduates. Hence the chiefs became part of the whole administrative organisation and were not regarded as a class apart as they had been when they attended the old chiefs' courses. Higher chiefs in Uganda were as much local government officials as their counterparts in Tanzania who were called by new titles such as Area Commissioner, Divisional Secretary and Ward Development Officer. It was impossible for us to discover how many chiefs from our selected areas had received training of this sort since the tribal affiliation of entrants was not recorded and the Institute had only been in operation for a short time when our second survey was conducted.

The duties of chiefs were still a subject of controversy at seminars and other discussions in the Institute of Public Administration. Mr. M. Davies, the Director of the Institute, was an expatriate who had acted as Provincial Commissioner in Northern Uganda under the Colonial government, and was therefore a very experienced local administrator. He was

also full of enthusiasm, appeared to be in general sympathy with Dr. Obote's philosophy, and expressed the most radical views on the future of chiefs which I heard in Kampala in early 1971. He was in favour of a national local government service of which the members could be posted to any district. They would have no linguistic difficulties, he thought, since their work would be done in English. Davies hoped that vacant chiefships would be advertised and that applicants could apply for such posts as they did for other government jobs, such as clerkships. Questioned as to how such an applicant would have the necessary local knowledge to do the work successfully at village level, he admitted that the lower chiefs - Class III and IV - would have to provide this service and added that he hoped districts would be smaller in the future; he suggested that if the number of districts was doubled by 1976 this would make the jobs of chiefs easier. It is also clear that the demarcation of new administrative units which ignored traditional boundaries was a very important means of destroying cultural separatism, not only in Buganda. In the other kingdoms and in many districts there were also counties and sub-counties which had traditional names, chiefly titles, and historical associations which would be destroyed by a sub-division into much smaller units.

None of the proposals I read about or heard discussed in Kampala in May 1971 dealt in any detail with the problems of the village or hamlet. How was law and order to be kept without local resident leaders like the Muluka chiefs (Class IV)? How were disputes to be settled quickly in new courts situated 20 or 30 miles away and meeting fortnightly? How could local development schemes be supervised adequately by a stranger? It may indeed be possible for a developing country to have the advantage of a unified local civil service of well-trained higher chiefs while retaining unpaid or poorly paid lower chiefs in the village who work out of loyalty to traditional values.

However, what is quite certain is that the ideal of the politically neutral local government servant was to be abandoned in Uganda. Both District Commissioners and chiefs were now bound to support government policy. If they could not support new measures or philosophies in public they ought to resign, wrote M. Davies in 1968.²³ The anonymous writer of an Institute of Public Administration paper defends the 'politicisation' of chiefs and of the civil service in general on the grounds that "development and national unity" are more important and should be pursued with ambition and vigour; he quotes Nyerere as saying in Dar-es-Salaam that "neutrality is not very important. The emphasis is on loyalty, development and unity". The British model of the perfect civil servant without political views was thus rejected in Uganda, as it was in other developing countries.

In 1969-70 we were therefore dealing with a new kind of chief. Buganda, which we discuss in detail in the following Chapter, was particularly affected by these changes. The tables presented in Part II indicate the extent to which chiefs either retired or were ousted because they were not sympathetic to the new system, and give some picture of the kind of men chosen to replace them. If the administrative system still counted on the support of unpaid 'traditional' village chiefs and headmen, the latter for their part had no very good reason for remaining loyal to their new superiors. The disruptive consequences which were also evident in Bugisu are described very vividly by Suzette Heald in Chapter 5.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. Secretary of State "Despatch on Local Government" Colonial Dispatch, February 15, 1947.
2. A number raised to 60 in 1953.
3. Or by the District Commissioner in the case of the smaller kingdoms.
4. F.G. Burke, Local Government and Politics in Uganda, 1964, p.37.
5. Its functions differed from that of the parish judicial council (lukiko olw' emisango) composed of the parish chief, his deputy and the lower batongole chiefs which met weekly to hear local cases and to forward them if necessary to the sub-county court. M. Southwold gives an excellent account of the systems in "The King's Men" edited by L.A. Fallers, 1964, in the essay called "Leadership, Authority and the Village Community".
6. F.G. Burke, op. cit. 1964, p.40.
7. My italics.
8. The Uganda National Congress led by Obote, later prime minister of Uganda, dated from 1952 but came into prominence as the Uganda People's Congress in 1960. The Democratic party largely dependent on Catholic support came into power from 1954-1956 and a Buganda party the Kabaka Yekka (Kabaka only) came into being in 1955.
9. By Buganda 1955 Constitution the Kabaka appointed the members of the Public Service Commission.
10. See the Magistrates Courts Act of 1964, which finally ended the old Native Courts system in the districts.

11. F.G. Burke, op. cit. 1964, p.53.
12. The Constitutional Committee of 1959 (The Wild Committee); the Uganda Constitutional Conference, 1961; the Uganda Relationships Commission, 1961 (The Munster Commission); The Commission of the Privy Counsellors on a Dispute between Buganda and Bunyoro, 1962, (The Molson Commission); and the Uganda Independence Conference 1962.
13. Burke quotes a statement from an appeal to Obote's government from a non-kingdom in which the right to a hereditary leader was claimed "as a matter of equity, if not of indigenous tradition", op. cit., p.42.
14. See the Constitutional Heads (Elections) Act of 1963. It was inevitable that the setting up of District Councils should have a unifying effect on peoples which had not previously been conscious of a tribal identity and should have produced a new kind of 'tribalism'. Heald describes this effect in Bugisu and the outbreak of hostility between the Bugisu and the Sebei which resulted (see Chapter 5).
15. Colin Leys, "Politicians and Policies - An Essay on politics in Acholi, Uganda 1962-65", p.101.
16. Busoga for instance had to accept central control since it was in such heavy debt that it could not pay its teachers. M. Davies reckoned that 9 out of the 15 states had accumulated debts by 1964. "Aspects of Development since Independence", I.P.I. paper, 1964.
17. Picho Ali in a seminar paper to Under Secretaries given on July 4th, 1968. Here of course the strong Central government is viewed as being organised and led by the Party which would nominate candidates for higher posts in the state, form a Party group in the National Assembly and direct the government.
18. From an Institute of Public Administration paper entitled "Move to the Left", October 1969.
19. See Colin Leys, op. cit., p.18.
20. "Parishes" or "villages" were called divisions or sub-divisions in the Constitution although not in ordinary speech in 1971.
21. See M. Davies, I.P.A. Paper, 1969.
22. In Buganda 40% of Class III reached higher classes; in Busoga 64% and in Bunyoro 54%; in Toro 35%; in Ankole 8%; in Bugisu 73%; in Kigezi 67% and in Alur 40%. "East African Chiefs", ed. A.I. Richards, 1960, p.397.
23. M. Davies, "Channels of Communication within Government", I.P.A. August 1968.

C H A P T E R 3

Chiefs and Administrators in Buganda

Audrey Richards

By the end of the nineteenth century the kingdom of Buganda had become the most powerful political unit in East Africa. Its institutions were recognised by the British in the Uganda Agreement of 1900 and, as we have seen, the Ganda system of administrator-chiefs became a model for the other, less centralised areas of Uganda. After a prolonged fight Buganda secured the unique position of a federal kingdom in the unitary state of Uganda by the Independence constitution of 1963. In a series of determined moves, Dr. Obote's central government finally overthrew the kingdom in June 1966, and by the Republican Constitution of 1967 Buganda was administered as four of Uganda's 18 districts. Although organised resistance to these moves was apparently weak and ineffectual, there was sufficient resentment to warrant a state of emergency in Buganda which was renewed at six-monthly intervals until shortly after the 1971 coup d'etat which ousted Dr. Obote.

The kingdom, it seems, has gone for ever (President Amin resisted the re-establishment of the Ugandan monarchies) but the identity of Buganda has persisted. So too, it appears, have vital elements of the old systems of leadership and administration. In the past, Buganda has been regarded variously as a powerful traditional African state, the model for colonial over-rule, and the thorn in the flesh of both the colonial and post-colonial state. It has accordingly been very difficult for any government to accommodate it within the fabric of an independent unitary state.

Buganda lies along the northern shore of Lake Victoria, (see Map), mainly within the fertile arc which forms the basin of this great lake. The staple food here is plantain but the soil and climate proved suited to cotton which was introduced by the Government in 1904, and robusta coffee, a cash crop promoted vigorously by the Protectorate government from 1923 onwards. In 1959 the total cash income of Buganda was £35.5 millions, while Eastern Region with an African population of very similar size earned only £18.7; figures for Western and Northern Regions were £8 millions and £6.6 millions respectively. Per capita income in each region shows similar differences: £5.3, £5.4 and £10 in the case of Western, Northern and Eastern Regions respectively, and £19.3 in the case of Buganda.

The superior wealth of Buganda has been reflected in the higher local government budgets. The total revenue of the Buganda government was £2,226,500 in 1959/60 and this rose

steeply to £4,281,350 in 1964. This increase of 92.3% compares with a figure of 39.3% in the Eastern Region, where revenue was £2,043,150 in 1964.²

Buganda's population (see Part II section 2(a)) has been increased by immigrant labour from the poorer areas in the Northern and Western Regions of Uganda and from neighbouring Ruanda and Burundi. Immigrants have poured into Buganda since the late twenties, some of them to work as contract labourers on the few European and Asian plantations, or in industry in Kampala or Jinja, but the majority to work on Ganda farms, either as seasonal labourers, as share-cropping tenants or as permanent settlers working on their own farms. Buganda has been an importer of labour rather than an exporter for the last 60 to 70 years. According to the 1948 census about 64% of the population of the province were Ganda and the rest were immigrants; in 1959 the proportion of immigrants was even higher, i.e. 42% immigrants to 58% Ganda. Ganda, however, remained in control of the system of local government, accounting for practically all the chiefs at county and sub-county levels. Even at the parish level very few chiefs of immigrant origin were recorded in Busiro, Kyaggwe and Buddu counties in the 1951-2 survey.³

As well as its natural advantages of soil and climate Buganda has had superior economic and other opportunities due to its long contact with the outside world. Kampala, the site of the capital of Buganda, was reached by Arab traders as early as 1840. Speke visited Kampala in 1862 and described the well-kept roads which radiated out from the capital to the rest of Buganda. There was considerable trade across the lake and along its shores; the Kabaka had his own flotilla of some 104 canoes, the Arab dhows appeared on the lake in 1882. A European company imported a steamer in 1889 and the tonnage of goods carried on the lake was considerable before the Mombasa-Nairobi railway reached Kampala (1931).⁴

Buganda also became the educational and administrative centre of Uganda. Protestant missionaries arrived in the country in 1877 and Catholics in 1897. Both built cathedrals and schools in the Kabaka's capital.⁵ On Makerere hill in Kampala the technical school achieved the status of a University College in 1949, and University in 1962. The fact that the Ganda had the first opportunities to acquire European education is reflected in the calibre of the local government personnel. Many Ganda also had the economic resources to finance their sons' education in local secondary schools in the early part of the century and some were able to send them abroad to England and India for higher education. In 1952 10% of Class I and II chiefs had university education; 70% had secondary education; and 20% primary. Even in the case of the Class III chiefs, local men living in their own villages, 32% had secondary education. It was because of these advantages as well as their system of administration that the Protectorate government used the Ganda as its agents in other parts of Uganda like Bugisu (see Chapter 5). Before the

establishment of the Protectorate, the British East Africa Company, under Lugard, established a fort on one of Kampala's hills in 1890. The centre of the Protectorate government was Entebbe, a small, mainly European town 20 miles away on the shores of Lake Victoria, but there were administrative offices in both places and since Independence most of the major government departments have been located in Kampala. The Mombasa-Nairobi railway was extended to Kampala in 1931 and the town developed rapidly as the industrial and commercial centre of the country, the site of African markets, Asian shops and stores and European commercial and industrial concerns. Its population exceeded 150,000 in 1959. In the years immediately before Independence Kampala was clearly becoming the political centre of the country also. An impressive hall for the new National Assembly was built there in 1961, and with Independence in 1962, Kampala was designated the capital of Uganda.

The distinction between the Kibuga, the traditional hilltop capital of the Ganda Kingdom, and the Kampala municipality, was one of the many sources of friction between the central and Buganda governments. By the 1962 Constitution, Buganda won separate municipal status for Mengo, the part of Kampala where the Kibuga was situated. Mengo maintained its own urban magistrates courts and police, and vied with the Kampala municipality for prestige; the offices of the kingdom government (the Bulange) was at one time regarded as the finest building in the city. The proprietary interests and conflicting loyalties of the Ganda extended to the whole of Kampala: did it belong to the kings who had ruled there for over a century, or to the new state of Uganda? It is significant that the final act in the confrontation between the Kabaka and Dr. Obote in 1966 was a resolution by the Ganda parliament that the central authorities should quit the capital.

The Traditional Political Structure

Buganda had already developed a centralised system of government by the time it was first visited by European explorers in the second half of the 19th century. The then ruler, Mutesa I, traced descent to 29 predecessors. He had an imposing capital and he ruled with the aid of a powerful minister, the Katikkiro, and many titled officials, as well as a hierarchy of territorial chiefs. He had something like a standing army as well as military levies raised on occasion from the districts, and the collection of tax was centralised and regular. The Kabaka was attended by numerous court officials, messengers, pages and executioners, so that his Kingdom resembled that of the States more commonly found in West Africa. The Kabakas were not "divine kings" in Frazer's sense but many aspects of their lives were surrounded by ritual, and they became a symbol of the political aspirations of the Ganda, as was made evident during the troubled times which followed the deportation of Mutesa II by the British in 1955.

The political system of Buganda has often been described.⁶ In brief, by the middle of the 19th century the Kabaka of Buganda had all the positions of authority both central and local, civil and military, in his gift. The hereditary principle had been virtually eliminated except in the case of clan heads who had originally ruled over their own territories but whose power had been whittled away as the monarchy grew in strength. Princes of the blood in direct succession to the throne were killed on the accession of a new Kabaka, at any rate since the time of Suna (1836-56). The Kabaka appointed his own chief minister, the Katikkiro, by handing him the damula, or traditional staff of office, in ceremonial fashion. He was in direct control of the local administration, and was known as 'the Kabaka of outside'. He had his own large staff and private estates scattered through the country, and presided over a court of appeal. Beneath him were the governors of the counties (saza), ten in number in 1888 but subsequently increased to twenty. The county was the unit of administration for purposes of taxation, the raising of military levies and labour dues. The governors had sub-governors under them, ruling areas which corresponded in many cases to those of the modern sub-county. The Kabaka of the day would carve out estates in the counties with which to reward his office holders, military or civil, - his batongole. These officers or fief-holders were entitled to the labour and tribute of the peasants on their estates, although they were under the administrative orders of the governors of their district.

As a basis for the development of modern local government the following characteristics of the traditional system are significant. First, the ministers and the first three levels of chiefs were all directly appointed by the Kabaka and made a formal act of homage, prancing before him, brandishing spears and shouting that they were his men. They recited the names of any of their ancestors who were famous and who had also received office from former Kabakas. This ceremony was carried out until 1966 for all appointments of the Buganda government, even for medical officers and education inspectors.

Secondly, all chiefs at all levels were arranged in an order of priority with official titles based on traditional posts attached to the ancient kingship. Thus the senior county chief was officially addressed as Mumyuka, or second in military command; the second was Sabadu, 'head of those who serve', the third Sabagabo, 'head of the shield bearers' and so on. The sub-county chiefs in each county were similarly arranged in order of precedence by the use of the same set of titles, and so too were parish chiefs in each sub-county and the headmen below them. These official names linked the chiefs directly to the kingship even after their duties had become those of local government administrators.

Thirdly, a traditional system in which chiefs moved at the monarch's pleasure from one part of Buganda to another on promotion or demotion made for a mobility characteristic

of client chief systems but not of hereditary ones. A man might be promoted from the peasantry to serve some small local dignitary and proceed in the same service as client to the next highest patron until he became attached to the King's court, with the prospect of royal favour. This process of ascent, slow or rapid, was his training in the art of administration. The system offered high rewards for the successful: the less fortunate lost royal favour, suffered demotion, disgrace or even death. Similarly a Ganda notable might have received a fief in one part of the country (a kitongole) but be appointed as an administrative chief over a county or some smaller unit elsewhere, so that a tradition of mobility and multiple land rights was strong among the chiefs of Buganda and to some extent in the other kingdoms of Uganda as well. This should be emphasised because the very word 'chief' means to most English speakers a hereditary authority closely attached to an area of land. Ganda chiefs by contrast, were promoted by virtue of their intelligence and power of winning and keeping the favour of a patron in a highly competitive system. They were used to being moved from one county to another and apparently found no difficulty in administering peoples of other tribal areas when sent there by the Protectorate government.

Below these mobile higher chiefs were village heads who were sometimes clients of the nearest territorial chief and followed him when he was promoted elsewhere, although more often they remained permanently in one village working under each new authority. Some were small fief-holders and some were very important persons in the form of hereditary clan heads ruling over clan villages. This difference between the settled local authority at village level and the higher chiefs has been a persistent theme of local government in Buganda.

Following the 1900 Uganda Agreement, the Protectorate government sought to steer the political institutions of Buganda in even more formal, bureaucratically organised directions. In due course the kingdom government with its numerous departments, committees and sub-committees became a source of pride and a focus of nationalist sentiments for the Ganda people. The lukiiko, or great council, was given legislative and judicial responsibilities and was slowly 'democratised' by the addition of elected and appointed members. In the countryside the colonial administration sought to substitute a uniform hierarchy of administrative units for the patch-work of governorships, royal estates, fiefs and clan villages. The old county (saza) units with their historic titles, their councils and their courts of justice were recognised in the 1900 Agreement. Later some 128 sub-county (gombolola) units were defined, some of them corresponding to the old administrative sub-divisions or fiefs. These also had statutory councils and courts. Below these were over 900 parishes (miluka), new units composed of several villages, and below these again were village headmen.

The Protectorate government had also introduced in 1900 a system of quasi-freehold land-tenure largely in order to pacify warring factions and to stabilise the country. It had allocated land in large estates to Ganda notables then in office. For instance the Kabaka acquired a private estate of 350 square miles and members of the royal family 138 square miles. The ministers had large private estates, as well as official ones, and the 20 County chiefs 8 square miles of private property and 8 which went with their offices; the sub-county chiefs were each allocated 49 acres. Eight thousand square miles was divided among about 3,000 smaller chiefs and dignitaries. This not only created a class of wealthy land-owners in permanent possession of estates which could be transmitted to their heirs, but made administrative chieftainship a source of wealth since chiefs were entitled to the rents from their official estates, a privilege much resented latterly and abolished by Obote in 1967.

The land-holding provisions of the Uganda Agreement, afterwards known as the mailo system, also affected village administration. The term mutongole, which originally applied to a fief-holder of the Kabaka, began to be used for a land-owner, especially those with some ritual office, and finally for the steward of a land-owner who looked after the tenants in a village. Some of these batongole were selected by the parish chiefs to help them in collecting tax or enforcing law and order in the villages under their control, and they became a fundamental part of the administrative hierarchy. The term mutongole was even exported to Kigezi, Lango and other areas which had no such system of land-holding and was used for a village headman or Class IV chief. In Buganda, however, these headmen still considered themselves to be working for their Kabaka right up till 1966, and remained essential agents in the land-tenure system on which the Ganda set so much store. Both these facts affected their attitude to the new parish chiefs appointed by Obote in 1967.

The right of appointment of these four levels of chiefs was crucial in Buganda. From 1907 onwards the names of men chosen by the Kabaka and/or his prime minister were sent to the British Governor for approval. This remained a permanent cause of contention and any of the Protectorate government's efforts to influence the chiefs' appointments, to supervise their work, or to put them through courses of instruction, was resented by the Buganda government.

The system of appointment of chiefs which had developed over the years was as follows:

Until 1955 the Katikikiro (prime minister) was appointed by the Kabaka, but his name had to be approved by the Governor. The holders of this post have been men experienced in administration: Kawalya Kagwa came straight from military service as a lieutenant in the second world war; Paulo Kavuma, who held the post from 1950-55 had risen through the local government service and was promoted from the position of county chief of Kyaggwe; his successor, Michael Kintu, was also a county chief before appointment. Katikikiros had high

salaries (£2,600 per annum), pensions, official houses and rents from the 16 square miles of official estates associated with the office. They were thus wealthy as well as powerful.

The Minister of justice (Omulamuzi) and of finance (Omuwanika) were selected by the Katikkiro in consultation with the Kabaka and with the approval of the Resident of Buganda and the Governor. Ministers had salaries of £2,000 a year, pensions, official houses and rents from their official land.

The County and Sub-county chiefs were appointed in much the same way though the latter were approved by the Resident only. Both the Katikkiro and the British Resident in Buganda had confidential files on all Class I and Class II chiefs and the views of these two officials naturally did not always coincide. County chiefs had salaries of £1,083 - £1,213 according to their seniority, pensions, official houses and the rents from their 8 square miles of official land and sub-county chiefs had salaries of £558 - £600, pensions, official houses and rents from 49 acres of official land.

The appointment of the parish chiefs was of a different order, rooted in the mailo system and hence dating from the early part of the century. The big land-owners of the area concerned recommended candidates to the sub-county chiefs, who sent these names to the county chiefs. All the candidates in person appeared before a committee of the lukiiko composed of the Assistant Katikkiro and a panel of sub-county chiefs, one from each county. The candidates of the different land-owners announced their claims openly in both sub-county and county council, to the Katikkiro's committee and finally to the Kabaka himself if necessary. Thus, although there was no system of election of chiefs, there was competition between the interested parties at all levels. Parish chiefs in charge of about 1,000 people received salaries of £62 - £138 a year, without official houses or pensions. They had therefore to be local men, small landowners or tenant farmers like the rest of the population.

Village headmen (Batongole) were selected by the parish chief from among the bailliffs of the local land-owners. The names merely had to be referred to the sub-county chief. This lowest rung on the ladder of chiefship was the basis of the administration. Batongole shared the life of villagers and had the same problems and interests. They collected tax for the parish chief and passed on his orders to the village people. They kept law and order, arrested malefactors and took them to the informal parish court for a preliminary hearing of the case. Although their work was hard and continuous they received no official salary, though the land-owner might remit part of their rent.

The duties of chiefs at all levels of administration were multifarious. Higher chiefs were responsible for the tax collected by the parish chiefs and headmen; for implementing government measures on social welfare and prosecuting those who infringed agricultural or other byelaws; and for maintaining law and order in their areas.

They presided over the statutory councils held at the chief's headquarters. These councils were essential organs of rural administration, informing authorities of government policy, providing for discussion of difficulties in implementing such policies, and sending resolutions to the next higher council. The effects of their suspension in 1966 are discussed later.

Chiefs also presided over courts of justice, statutory in the case of the county and sub-county, and informally constituted in the case of the parish. Chiefs were also closely involved in the central government of Buganda: county chiefs were ex-officio members of the lukiiko and sub-county chiefs and parish chiefs served there in rotation until 1955, when elected representatives were introduced.

What class of men chose to become chiefs in Buganda? They were mainly land-owners, the heirs of men who received mailo estates in 1900 or men who had bought land since. The 1952/3 survey showed that 100% of Class I chiefs in Buganda were land-owners (53% inherited and 47% bought) and 97% of Class II chiefs (47% inherited, 25% bought and 28% not known).⁷ The first mailo-owners acquired a cash income either through the sale of portions of their land or from rents from their peasant tenants whose traditional tribute was commuted to a money payment of 10/- a year in 1927 plus 4/- an acre on crops.⁸ Hence the big land-owner was generally able to send his sons and daughters to mission boarding schools where they acquired knowledge of English and gained other qualifications which fitted them for administration. A sample of career histories of higher chiefs taken in three counties in 1951 showed that 14 out of 30 chiefs had been educated at the (protestant) King's College, Budo, the school described by Julian Huxley as the Eton of Africa; 9 at the Catholic Boarding Schools, St. Mary's, Kisubi, and St. Henry's, Kitovu; while 7 had attended Mengo High School, a protestant day school in Kampala. Their connections with other chiefly families through kinship and marriage helped them. There thus emerged a ruling class which provided the administrators, professional men, newspaper editors and politicians of Buganda, and indeed of Uganda as a whole.⁹ In the early fifties 55% of Class I and 38% of Class II chiefs were sons of chiefs of one level or another, but not usually of the same district; 20% of Class I and 13% of Class II were brothers-in-law of chiefs.¹⁰ The sons of chiefs tended to go into the service of the Protectorate or Buganda government before they themselves became sub-county chiefs. They thus started work not only from a tradition of chiefship but also with experience of administrative techniques.¹¹

Meanwhile peasants were also buying land and many parish chiefs were men who had gradually acquired holdings through their own savings. 72% of the Class III chiefs interviewed in 1952/53 were land-owners, often on a quite modest scale, and indeed it would otherwise have been difficult for these officials to function since their salaries were very low (see Part II section 3). The Class IV chiefs were also

closely connected with the system of land-holding, for the batongole chiefs were mostly bailiffs of the land-owners. The very name mutongole, traditionally used for an office holder of the king, seemed sufficient warrant for these humble village administrators to claim that they were working personally for the Kabaka or had been "chosen" by him.

Local Administration Before and After Independence

It is worth considering which features of the Ganda political system facilitated or obstructed the local government reforms of the post-war years. On the positive side was the fact that the Ganda system of chiefship had been long established. Its officers had acquired, under the tuition of British administrators, relatively sophisticated techniques of committee organisation, record keeping, accountancy, filing and other clerical skills. They were mainly professional civil servants or 'career chiefs'. For instance in 1952-3, 14 out of 20 Class I chiefs had been 20 years in government service. In the case of Class III chiefs as many as 31 years service were recorded.¹² Ganda chiefs were better educated and had acquired confidence based on long traditions which enabled them to rule over a province in which immigrants from very different areas and cultures accounted for more than a third of the total population. The more senior chiefs were appointed on merit, were mobile and were in a real sense 'bureaucrats'.¹³ On the other hand the authoritarian traditions of Ganda government, the high social status and wealth of the senior chiefs and the dominant role they played in politics, did not fit easily with the new ideas of local government introduced by the colonial authorities. Chiefs were told to become the servants of their councils not its masters, but they felt it was ridiculous for the elected 'unofficial' councillors to decide on measures which they, the chiefs, had to carry out. Another fact which made the introduction of a uniform civil service in Buganda difficult was the power of the monarch over the appointment of chiefs. All these officials were nominally appointed by the Kabaka and made a public affirmation of their loyalty to him. The Protectorate government influenced appointments very directly during the early years of its rule when the Kabaka Mutesa II was a minor, but by the 1955 Agreement which paved the way for his return from exile in England, it was intended that he should become a constitutional monarch and that the chiefs should be chosen by an appointments committee, although he, as Kabaka, was to nominate its members. An experienced Ganda commentator exclaimed on reading the new Agreement that it gave the Kabaka more power than any of his predecessors had had since the days of Mwanga (1884-1897). Mutesa II immediately appointed his uncle as Chairman of the Appointments Committee so that the palace influence over the choice of chiefs remained very strong. Chiefs who had remained in office during the Kabaka's exile were accused of 'treason' on his return, were demoted, insulted and even physically

assaulted, and the names of 43 chiefs said to have obeyed the orders of the Protectorate government were published in the vernacular press as 'traitors' to their king. Nevertheless, the new Appointments Board grew in confidence and made efforts to attract well educated young men into chiefship and to encourage experienced chiefs to remain in service.

The most fundamental difficulty was the determination of Buganda to retain the administrative status of which she was so proud, and the unique position in Uganda which she had enjoyed for so long. Buganda was more committed to modern progress than any other part of Uganda and yet more attached to traditional political structure and values, a combination of attitudes which Fallers has well described.¹⁴ The Independence Constitution gave her a large measure of fiscal autonomy, her own high court subject to appeal only to the High Court of Uganda, an internal police force, and control over most social services to which the Protectorate government seconded expert officers to give technical advice.

During the short period in which Buganda enjoyed this virtually autonomous position (1962-66) her relations with the government of Uganda deteriorated rapidly. Obote and his followers did not understand or believe in federal constitutions and were afraid of the secession of the wealthiest part of Uganda, as was indeed threatened in December 1960 and again in May 24th, 1966. The Central Government was afraid of Ganda domination and most of the other ethnic groups in Uganda hated them for their arrogance and also for their success. It is necessary to understand these facts if we are to account for the violence of the military action taken by Obote against the Kabaka's person and government on May 25th, 1966 and his determination to remove all the characteristic features of traditional Ganda government and to dismiss virtually all the Ganda chiefs then in office.

Political Parties and the Position of the Ganda Chiefs

The chiefs had been reared in the British tradition of a neutral civil service and were not supposed to be involved in party politics. Although they did not take part in organising parties or in openly supporting them, they tended to be hostile to the Uganda National Congress. The Uganda National Congress, led by Ganda intellectuals and wealthy farmers, campaigned in the years preceding Independence for universal suffrage, self-government for Uganda, African control of economic affairs and "education, health and justice for all".¹⁵ Though its main support was in Busoga, Toro, Bugisu, Bukedi, Acholi and Lango, its leadership was mainly Ganda. When the Kabaka was deported the U.N.C. joined actively in the fight for his return, yet later in 1958 it publicly declared itself against the chiefs in a statement saying that it would not 'tolerate autocracy or feudalism'. The Progressive Party, a largely Protestant party formed in 1955 by E.K. Mulira and mainly composed of old Budo and Makerere scholars, land-owners and farmers, was opposed by

the Buganda government and attacked the lukiiko's resolution to divide 154 square miles among those who had supported the Kabaka in his exile. The Democratic Party was founded in 1956 as a mainly Catholic response to the P.P.; it was also led by Baganda although it had strong support in the Catholic north. The Democratic Party had a larger membership in Buganda than any other party and, like the Progressive Party had moderate, thoughtful views and was in favour of a united Uganda with a democratically elected Assembly.

To the traditionalists in the lukiiko all these parties, and many others not here listed, seemed subversive in the sense that they threatened the continued existence of Buganda as a separate entity. In 1958 the lukiiko passed a resolution stating that 'political parties are new to this country, and they have never been officially recognised in Buganda',¹⁷ and the Governor was asked to negotiate constitutional matters with the lukiiko alone. This body dissociated itself from direct elections to the National Assembly in the same year and largely for this reason the Democratic party came into power in 1961, under Benedicto Kiwanuka, in the first directly elected National Assembly. The other main party was the Uganda Peoples Congress, a faction of the U.N.C. consolidated in Lango district under the leadership of Milton Obote, the future premier of the Independent Uganda.

The chiefs were in fact in opposition to all parties until the formation of a Buganda national party, the Kabaka Yekka ("the Kabaka, he alone") in June 1961. This party immediately won enthusiastic support in Buganda. Obote with his great astuteness made an alliance between the K.Y. and his own U.P.C., promised not to canvas in Buganda in the first direct election to the lukiiko in February 1962, and to support Buganda's application for a federal constitution during the Lancaster House negotiations which were pending. The K.Y. agreed in return to form a coalition government for Uganda with the U.P.C. should they be elected. There is no doubt that chiefs and the staffs of county and sub-county offices took part in organising the K.Y. campaign and that many wore the K.Y. badge. They doubtless felt they were merely supporting their king. The lukiiko election result showed a clean sweep in favour of the K.Y. (63 seats to 3). Without K.Y. support Obote would have been unable to oust the ruling Democratic Party or to persuade Buganda to become part of a united Uganda, but with this curious alliance the left-wing U.P.C. and the loyalist K.Y., an independent constitution was made possible in the summer of 1962.

In 1965, three years after Independence Obote felt secure enough to break his alliance with the K.Y. and started to campaign for U.P.C. support in Buganda itself. Many of the K.Y. members of the National Assembly crossed the floor of the house and joined the U.P.C., apparently in a strategy of subversive infiltration. On February 14th 1966 the Secretary General of the K.Y. and some members of Obote's own party charged him with corruption. Obote retaliated by

imprisoning five ministers (three from the kingdoms) and two days later he suspended the constitution and assumed Presidential power. On March 6th he locked the Kabaka out of the presidential residence. On April 15th he introduced a new interim constitution giving him executive power as President, virtually bringing to an end Buganda's federal position. On May 24th the lukiiko commanded the central government to leave the soil of Buganda, a gesture as futile as Canute's order to the waves. On May 25th Obote ordered troops to attack the Kabaka's palace. The Kabaka's guards fought back and casualties were heavy. He himself escaped in disguise to England but the palace was partly burnt and royal drums and other regalia destroyed. Subsequent disorders in the countryside were put down with violence by the army and the paramilitary Special Force, and by the central government police.

After the attack on the palace Obote and his supporters set energetically to work to dismantle the kingdom and its traditional system of administration. In June the Government announced that it would administer Buganda directly as a temporary measure. The lukiiko was abolished and those councils at the county and sub-county levels no longer met. The administrative building of the Buganda government, the Bulange, of which the Ganda were inordinately proud, was occupied by central government officials and the clan symbols moulded in bas-relief on its great doors were removed. The Katikkiro had already fled the country, but the other ministers were dismissed and some prominent Ganda were imprisoned. Buganda was administered as four districts (Masaka, Mubende, East and West Mengo) and the new district commissioners had powers to appoint, promote or dismiss chiefs on the spot or to arrest those whom they thought to be hostile to the new regime. They were naturally hated by sullen Ganda as agents of the Obote government and could only move about their districts with armed police guards. Some of the Ganda chiefs whom they appointed were equally disliked and were regarded as traitors to the Kabaka. They were afraid to meet their people, and as they often failed to collect tax, rural administration broke down for some time.

The position of the Ganda chiefs was altered drastically by the terms of the 1966 interim constitution. Even those chosen by the District Commissioners in the interim period of 1966 were dismissed and new chiefs were appointed at all levels by a special sub-committee of Obote's cabinet, reinforced by three Ganda who were strong supporters of the U.P.C. There has never been such a clean sweep of local government officials in the history of Uganda. Obote was determined to root out loyalty to the Kabaka at every level of chiefship. The figures collected by S. Musoke show that 95% of Class I chiefs, 85% of Class II and 79% of Class III were appointed in 1967 or later (see Part II, sections 3 and 4). The new chiefs were less educated than the old; 32% were traders or commercial farmers, among whom the U.P.C. had found its strongest support in Buganda. Few if any belonged to the old Ganda landowner class. Many loyal Ganda were

horrified to see a lorry-driver appointed as county chief of Busiro, in the heartland of the old kingdom. "It has been our tradition" one informant wrote, "to appoint a man of outstanding influence and a bit of wealth, i.e. one who owned land although not necessarily a large amount". The new chief might be "unknown or unmarried", a man without property or influence.

The higher chiefs apparently settled down to their posts surprisingly quickly, while the District Commissioners, aided by security forces, managed to control disturbances. The new chiefs' conditions of service were as similar as possible to those in other parts of Uganda and men from different regions were trained together. Salaries and conditions of work were made as equal as possible in the different districts (see Part II, section 3).

The role of the chief had of course changed under the U.P.C. government. Instead of being neutral in the British civil service tradition, the chief was expected to propound the philosophy and policy of the U.P.C. - often an unpopular task in Buganda. The duties of the chiefs were also changed in that they were no longer in charge of local services, such as agriculture and education, which were now administered by the Central government and controlled by a 'District Team' under the District Commissioner. The chiefs however remained responsible for law and order and had to assess and collect the graduated tax in their areas. According to a paper dated 1969 produced by the Institute of Public Administration, a chief was the 'administrator' in full control of his area; the 'co-ordinator' standing between his people, the Local Administration and the Central Government and the 'Co-operator', participating in activities in his area as its 'leading citizen'.¹⁸ This cannot have been easy in view of the number of new authorities at district and even sub-county levels, with complex, and overlapping functions (see Chapter 2). The proliferation of special police and informers also made the task of the chiefs increasingly difficult, and although they were still responsible for the maintenance of law and order there was much popular dissatisfaction about the administration of justice. There were long delays in the hearing of court cases because magistrates were often responsible for very large areas and were inadequately equipped with transport facilities.

However, as far as the day to day organisation of local government was concerned, the position of the lower chiefs remained crucial in the new set-up. It will be remembered that the parish and batongole chiefs had lived with the villagers and knew them well. They depended very largely on being acceptable to their people. If they were not trusted cases were not brought to them for arbitration, and the sub-county courts were often far away. If people did not attend their informal parish councils it was difficult to get government policy across and to articulate local points of view. Again, if people were hostile to the batongole or the parish chiefs, tax collection suffered.¹⁹ In these

circumstances it is not surprising that the new parish chiefs, many of whom were strangers to their areas, had a difficult time. Most of the old parish chiefs held some land, but the new men rarely had even houses of their own. 'The people did not know where to go to contact them whereas their predecessors who were land-owners were well established in their areas' - said one informant. With very inadequate salaries, no housing and few qualifications except their Party cards, it is not surprising that this new type of parish chief was so often accused of corruption and inefficiency. Many of them according to press reports were afraid to ask for tax in areas which had supported the K.Y. and were resentful of the destruction of the Buganda kingdom. After the Amin coup of January 1971 the local press came out into the open with these criticisms and accused Obote's chiefs of dishonesty, cowardice, inability to keep order and a standard of tax collection that was 'extremely appalling'.²⁰

In the months before the coup problems in the countryside were exacerbated by outbreaks of violent robbery. It was said that ineffectual chiefship and the breakdown of established methods of dealing with complaints had given the 'kondos' (armed brigands) a free hand. People were disinclined to travel long distances to seek redress from chiefs and magistrates whom they no longer respected or trusted.²¹ The growth of 'Kondo-ism' should also be seen in the light of declining coffee prices and increasing unemployment among youth, many of whom had returned to the villages after being frustrated in their search for work in the towns. As we shall see in Chapter 5, the breakdown in law and order was also felt very keenly in the Bugisu countryside, where the popular remedy was local vigilante corps.

It must also be remembered that the progress towards a one-party state and politicisation of the administration, along the lines which T.A.N.U. had achieved in Tanzania, was incomplete and only partly effective in Uganda by 1971. There was still considerable confusion about the responsibilities of the Secretary General and the District Commissioner, about the authority of the district councils as against the chiefs, and the duties of central and local government agents in the countryside. The new officials probably felt it was more necessary to aver loyalty to the party than to solve problems and ambiguities in the more mundane business of local government. For the individuals involved it may have been more important to wear a U.P.C. badge than to be assiduous about local dispute settlement or tax collection.

The U.P.C. parish chiefs of the late 1960's had no councils to assist them in communicating with the people, nor did they participate in the sub-county and county councils as they had in the past. Their relationships with the Class IV village chiefs were tenuous, and many of the latter had lost any incentive to perform their duties; it was generally believed that Obote meant to abolish the mailo landholding

system, thereby removing most of the privileges and perquisites of village chiefship. Some village chiefs resigned because they had no desire to serve Obote in the way that they had been pleased to serve the Kabaka. Others went into hiding, fearing retribution from the police and informers who were infiltrating the countryside. A proposed arrangement whereby the parish chief was to have one paid assistant to help extract taxes from the reluctant populace was not put into effect because of the military coup d'etat which ousted the Obote government in January 1971. The relief and enthusiasm with which this turn of events was greeted in Buganda is, perhaps, understandable.

It is difficult to gauge the effects of the great turnover in chiefs that took place in 1967. Detailed studies at the parish level would have been necessary in order to get any deep understanding of the ordinary villagers' points of view. Suffice it to say that shortly after the coup, complaints about conditions in rural Buganda were voiced publicly in the press and in conversation. Loyalty to Mutesa II, who had died in London in November 1969, was raised to fever pitch when his body was returned to Kampala and crowds stood in queues two to three miles long for the lying-in-state. The funeral celebrations in April 1971 revived traditional feeling but also soothed the emotions of the mortified Ganda for, as so many writers have pointed out, they have always glorified themselves by glorifying their Kabaka.

Mutebi II, the heir apparent then at school in England, was of course present, and there were some demonstrations of loyalty, but visitors from England²² heard little demand for the return of the old regime, although the Ganda elite in Kampala were delighted at the overthrow of the Obote government which had denied them the important places in administration which they felt entitled to hold. Thoughtful commentators realised that the federal position of Buganda and its rule by a separate parliament were almost impossible to maintain. Villagers were, however, still said to be hankering after the traditional system.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 3

1. Uganda Agricultural Census 1960 Appendix Table 65 Income of African Households by Districts 1959.
2. Source: The Government accounts of Uganda, 1959/60 and 1964/65. Uganda Government. Statistics Division, Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, Sept. 1966. (See Part II section 2(f)).
3. See A.I. Richards (ed.) Economic Development and Tribal Change, Cambridge 1954, pp.178, 179.

4. V.C.R. Ford, The Trade on Lake Victoria, E.A. Studies No. 3, Kampala 1955, p.18.
5. In fact Mutesa I, the monarch ruling in Buganda from 1856-1884, refused permission for missionaries to travel outside the capital.
6. See A.I. Richards 'The Ganda' in East African Chiefs, London 1960.
7. A.I. Richards (ed.) East African Chiefs, 1960, p.67.
8. By the Busula and Envujo Law of that year.
9. L.A. Fallers (ed.) The Kings Men, London 1964, Chaps. II, III & IV.
10. A.I. Richards (ed.) op. cit., 1960, pp. 65, 66.
11. A.I. Richards ibid, 1960, pp. 65, 66.
12. A.I. Richards (ed.) op. cit., 1960, p.63.
13. There were some bars to their free promotion from office to office as it had become the tradition since the early part of the century for the Katikkiro and the minister of finance to be protestants; for the minister of justice to be a Catholic; for certain county chiefs e.g. of Buddu and Mawokota, to be Catholic, and for the county chief of Butambala, for instance, to be a Moslem, whereas most of the others were Protestants.
14. L.A. Fallers in Fallers op. cit., pp. 6 - 11.
15. David Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda, Princeton 1961, pp.317-318.
16. Apter, op. cit., p.333.
17. Apter, op. cit., p.333.
18. Institute of Public Administration, Kampala, paper on 'The Powers and Duties of Chiefs', mimeo, 1969.
19. See Southwold's illuminating account of the work done by popular and unpopular chiefs, in Fallers, op. cit., Chapter 5.
20. The People, 27th April 1971.
21. The suspension of activities at the sub-county headquarters was certainly felt as a loss. The headquarters consisted not only of a large meeting hall for the council but also a court room, various offices for clerks, and the chief's house. Mail was delivered there for onward transmission to the villages and it was a familiar meeting place for the people in the sub-county area.
22. I visited Buganda for a short period in May 1971.

C H A P T E R 4

My Life as a Chief and a District Commissioner

W.P. Tamukedde

I was the second son of Mr. & Mrs. Joswa Serufusa Zake. I was born on 2nd June 1919 and was one of the first babies to be born at Namirembe Church Missionary Society Hospital, the first maternity centre in the country. My parents, who are still alive at the time of writing, are Christians of the Anglican Church of Uganda and I was brought up under that influence. I therefore belong to the second educated generation of the country as both my parents were among the first pupils of the first boarding schools in the country (King's College, Budo, and Gayaza High School for girls).

My younger brother, Joswa Luyimbazi Zake, went to Fort Hare in South Africa and graduated there. He was one of the first Ugandans to qualify as a lawyer at London University and to obtain a Ph.D. at Northwestern University in the United States. He helped in the drafting of the Uganda constitutions and was a Minister of Education in Obote's government. My elder brother became an agricultural officer.

But I also belonged to a chiefly family and was under traditional influences. My great grandfather, Tamukedde, after whom I was named, was a great warrior. He was the Sabawali or third in command to Kibuka Omumbale, and was in charge of the spears and shields of Nakabango, who was the deputy of Kibuka. The first Kibuka was revered so much that he was worshipped as the god of war. My grandfathers, on both the maternal and the paternal sides were chiefs. My father's father was among the first Christian converts and he fought very bravely during the religious wars against the non-Christians. He was nick-named Ngabu, "the fearless". After the wars he was appointed as chief of a large kitongole and after the Uganda Agreement had been signed, he was allotted eight square miles of mailo land. My father became saza chief at the end of his career and two of his brothers were also made chiefs but this might have been due to my father's influence. Two of my brothers married sisters of the Kabaka.

My father became a Gombolola chief when I was about four years of age and I still remember the journey when I was carried on the shoulders of porters and we passed through thick forests, swamps and of course wild animals to the new post, a distance of about 50 miles which took us two days on foot.

My parents told me that during my childhood I was very fond of playing at being a chief, making my young brothers

either my assistants or subjects and it was because of this characteristic that they encouraged me later to become a chief. When I was about eight years of age my father bought about 200 acres of land and gave it to me and this automatically made me a mutongole chief. As I was a minor, my father appointed a steward to look after the village but as I grew up I took keen interest in the affairs of the village and in the chieftainship as a whole. My father also wanted me to be well versed in the Ganda royal traditions so he sent me to live with my aunt who was married to Prince Suna, the younger brother of the late Kabaka Chwa II and I eventually stayed at the palace for about six months when Suna went to the United Kingdom on a study tour.

Education

Although I was a son of a chief and had many privileges I was strictly brought up and disciplined as were all chiefs' sons. All the sons of chiefs were expected to have exemplary characters and whenever they misbehaved they were rebuked and told that they were "behaving like peasants". Hence it was the general desire of peasants to send their children to live at chiefs' houses even as unpaid servants in order that they should be brought up well and possibly might become chiefs which happened often. The higher the rank of the chiefs the better were the opportunities of his servants.

I had the best of everything my parents could offer in my early days and this was true for all chiefs' children because the chiefs were much wealthier than the peasants and had free labour from either the prisoners or their labourers. These servants washed my clothes and did for me the arduous work which the children of peasants were doing even when they were too young, such as collecting firewood, fetching water often from long distances and digging. However the system of free labour was later stopped and when I became a District Commissioner, I was one of the people who campaigned against using prisoners as free labour.

Although we used to play together with the children of peasants without any distinction in the true spirit of sportsmanship, yet we still had an upper hand and as the playing grounds together with the footballs were provided by our fathers we practised more often. In fact the schools such as Budo, Kisubi, Nsambya and Mengo provided the best soccer players in those days. My father was a very keen supporter of football and he encouraged us to play it. I was not a good soccer player but four of my brothers were internationals and our clan team Nvubu (Hippopotamus) was later a formidable one when there were clan competitions. These stopped when the Sabataka (head of the clans, i.e. the Kabaka) was dethroned.

Even in education the sons of chiefs had better opportunities than those of peasants in those days. All

chiefs had to build schools near their headquarters and many had additional kindergartens in their enclosures which it was easy for us to attend. Also the peasants could not afford to pay higher fees for the better schools. These were some of the reasons why the sons of the chiefs became leaders in the country as shown on page 44.

I started schooling at the age of about seven, walking about eight miles a day without breakfast, lunch and often supper (perhaps this accounts for my size for I am still only 5ft. 4½ins. tall). When my father was promoted to the post of administrative chief of the royal capital (Omukulu w'ekibuga) with a higher salary he managed to send me as a boarder to King's College at Budo where I was from 1930 to 1937. At Budo I was chosen together with about ten young boys in the primary section, for special tuition by the late Canon H.M. Grace, who was then the headmaster of the school and I am glad to state that all of us became leaders in the country although some of my friends have since died. I was popular in the school and I played for the school teams in soccer, cricket and lawn tennis, the last two of which I played in the country's African teams.

Although Budo was claimed to be the Eton of East Africa and attracted students from all over East Africa and Rwanda Burundi, the life was very tough although very interesting. During the first two weeks of my arrival at the school I was bullied by the second years who "pulled my nose" almost to the bleeding point and made me work as their servant. When I became a second year I did the same thing to the newcomers. This custom was intended to toughen and bring the newcomers into line with "the rest" as our backgrounds were different. Some came from upper classes and others from the middle. (There were no lower class pupils at that time.)

There was no distinction in tribe or religion. Many Moslems attended this school but Catholics had their own. Also every student had to do everything as others did irrespective of his status. When I was a prefect for one year in the junior section I used to make the then Crown Prince Mutesa¹ sweep my cubicle.

We used to be awakened at 6 a.m. by a bugle and attended to our flower gardens or fetched water when the pump was out of order which was more often than not. The distance was about 1½ miles away on a steep hill. Whenever time permitted we swam in the school swimming pool, near the well. We had breakfast at 7.30 a.m. and then went to the compulsory morning Church Service. I was a member of the Choir throughout my schooling at Budo and sometimes read lessons from the Holy Bible to the congregation.

After the service we went directly to the classes. Before break at about 10 a.m. we did physical training after an inspection of our personal cleanliness. The physical training included Military drill, only without firearms. The school curriculum included a Bible lesson right from the

bottom to the top of the school and even Moslems had to attend.

The competition between classes was keen and towards the end of every three months term, we had examinations and the results of these were published according to merit. Those who did badly were given strokes and the punishments were often repeated when we took home bad reports. My Father also encouraged us by giving prizes to any of his children, either a boy or a girl, who produced the best results. I dare say I never got this prize as I was not very brilliant and was intellectually inferior to my younger brother, Dr. Luyimbazi Zake Ph.D. (Northwestern University, U.S.A.) who was a Minister of Education throughout Obote's regime. (He is now an Associate Professor in an American University).

When mixed schooling was first introduced after a big struggle between the missionaries and parents, we were very shy, especially as many parents had opposed the idea, not because they did not want to give equal opportunities to girls but they feared that we might get into bad habits by living so closely together. But in the end we proved to the contrary and the example was emulated throughout East Africa by Moslems as well. In fact we had healthy competitions in all school activities (except soccer and athletics) so we learnt right from the beginning to respect the other sex and to give credit where it was due. Incidentally this enhanced the Ganda tradition of offering equal opportunities to women and men. (Even before the British rule many women had the same influence as men and also during the allocation of mailo land many women got big shares or afterwards inherited land which automatically made them chiefs.)

When I left Budo my father got me a job in the office of the Provincial Commissioner of Buganda as a clerk/interpreter, as he wanted me to follow in his footsteps and this was the best type of training for administration that there was in those days, for there were no training institutes or special courses for chiefs as there are today. In addition to this experience and the background I had as the son of a chief, I was trained on the job. I attended a special course in Local Administration at the London School of Economics and Political Science, London University, and in 1963 I had special courses in Administration and Political Science at Syracuse and Michigan Universities, with the kind assistance of the USAID. I have also travelled in Asia and Europe and visited several African countries and so I have now a wide experience of local government problems in different parts of the world as well as of the administrative system of Buganda.

Clerk/Interpreter

The seven years I spent in the office of the Provincial Commissioner, Buganda, as clerk/interpreter gave me a unique experience as I had direct access to government regulations and instructions, and to the confidential correspondence between the Colonial and Buganda Governments, for the

colonial officials used to conduct their correspondence in English and I had to translate the letters into Luganda and vice versa for Buganda chiefs. The interpretation or translation work was not as easy as it may seem to be. If I made verbatim interpretations they did not convey the real meaning and also colonial political jargon often had many possible meanings or could be construed to suit the convenience of the person concerned so that if disagreement arose the colonial officer could easily turn around and say that he was misinterpreted. Worse still, I often found myself in a dilemma when dealing with political matters which were against my own interests and feelings, but I had to be honest. I particularly remember one occasion when the colonial government wanted to acquire land in which I had also some interests and a Senior Assistant Provincial Commissioner of Buganda convened a meeting of the landowners concerned and asked me to interpret for him. He was very abusive and tactless, and after a short discussion he said "I am giving you a few minutes to answer me as to whether you agree to the government acquiring your land for public purposes on compensation as the government will deem fit. If you refuse, the government will take it by force". This resulted in the 1945 Riots² and some people lost their lives! When this officer was asked by the Provincial Commissioner to explain why there was an uproar at the meeting he shifted the blame and said that I misinterpreted him and I pointed out that as he knew Luganda very well and had passed the language examination and received a cash bonus for doing so, he should have corrected me on the spot. Fortunately for me there were many Africans at the meeting who knew English and bore witness.

Gombolola Chieftainship

I got married at an age of 21 years to Miss Hilda Zavuga who also came from a chief's family. She died in a motor car accident after celebrating our Silver Jubilee, leaving eight children. According to the Ganda custom in those days a bachelor was not appointed to a Gombolola or higher chieftainship. This was perhaps due to the fact that chiefs' wives played a big role in the society of women and also because chiefs used to make frequent big feasts and entertained almost daily and their wives were responsible for preparing or supervising the preparation of food. In this respect the wives who were married to polygamist chiefs had at least the advantage that there were many cooks or supervisors while a single wife had to rely on her friends, sisters or her aunts, if she had any of these.

I became a Gombolola chief at the age of 24. This was considered very young at the time. Though nowadays there are young graduates appointed as Assistant District Commissioners straight from Makerere University at the age of 25 or so, at the time no-one had been appointed to a Gombolola chieftainship below 27 except John Baka who had been Kabaka Mutesa II's playmate since childhood. I got the job of

chief at this early age for two reasons. When I worked as clerk/interpreter in the Provincial Commissioner's office I was very popular with both the Protectorate and the Buganda governments. The P.C. appreciated my services so much that even though I had only worked for him for one year he refused to let me join the army in the Second World War. I had volunteered to join the Education Corps and was to be appointed a sergeant major but the P.C. stopped me going. Whenever I accompanied the European administrators they asked me to draft their tour reports, which they did not tell other interpreters to do and although I prepared for them "food on the plates", it gave me good training. When I realised that my services were appreciated I applied for promotion to the Protectorate Government service but the P.C. told me that it was not possible due to bureaucratic rules so I requested him instead to recommend me to the Buganda Government to become a chief, which he did. As I was already popular with the Buganda Government ministers etc., because I had been translating their confidential documents and my father was their colleague, and as I was also a friend of Kabaka Mutesa II and we were at Budo together for about ten years, I got the appointment very quickly.

In addition to the present chiefs' duties of tax collection and so on (see Chapter 3), we used to be responsible for all the social services in our areas because there was no trained technical staff to do this. We were in charge of communal work and presided over the legal courts and we superintended the prisons and so forth. All these duties incidentally made us more powerful than the present chiefs. After arresting or causing the arrest of a law-breaker, we tried him in our own courts and if he was convicted we sentenced him to serve in the prison we supervised and often made him work for our own personal benefit. Although this was allowed by law and tradition it was a bad thing and many people complained against it until it was stopped in the 1950s. However, we also played a 'paternal' role to all persons under our jurisdiction irrespective of whether they were much older or wealthier than ourselves, which certainly was often the case as far as I was concerned. People used to come to us with all sorts of personal problems including religious ones, even if they did not belong to the chief's own faith, and they brought family quarrels to be solved. A trip to the chief's house was also an economy since they got free meals which were much better than an ordinary person would have in his home. Some religious chiefs used to beat drums for daily evening household prayers in their enclosures and since the prayers were followed by dinner, the sound of the drum also meant that dinner was about to be served so that many people turned up. The people also used to give us many gifts of food, goats and sometimes heads of cattle and with these in turn we fed them and helped them in various ways. Also whenever there were money contributions to be made for any common purpose we were expected to make the highest donation. To be sympathetic and to listen patiently to genuine complaints helped in many ways even if we did not solve the problems brought to us, but on the other hand we

had to be firm over false complaints or malingering in communal work. Life was more or less communal, centred around the chief's enclosure whereas nowadays it tends to be individualistic. Some chiefs are not even known by their people and communal work has almost stopped.

To give you an idea of the varied work of a chief, I shall describe a day in my life. Normally I used to get up at about 6 a.m. and went to see my livestock which I used to keep near my official residence. It used to be the fashion for all chiefs to keep livestock not only as a sign of wealth but also for providing meat etc. readily. In those days a chief was not supposed to buy meat, chicken etc. from the markets, he was self-sufficient as far as provisions were concerned. My father started me off by giving me milking cows, goats, sheep and chickens and as I was a relatively poor chief I used to keep an average of about 50 head of cattle, 70 goats/sheep and 100 chickens, and in addition got many gifts almost daily. After seeing the condition of the livestock and pointing out which would be slaughtered for the meals, I went and inspected the prison at about 7 a.m.

I had to inspect the buildings and the prisoners, remands and convicts, lined up separately and every inmate was allowed to air his complaints. I assigned duties to each prisoner and instructed the warders to bring to my court those whose cases were due for hearing on that day. I went back to the house, had a morning bath and then breakfast at about 9 a.m. Many people used to be entertained to the heavy breakfast after which I received gifts, some of which smelt of corruption as they were presented by litigants in the cases which I was going to try later on in my court but it was strongly against the custom not to accept a 'gift'. However I was not bound or influenced by the gifts and if the case went against the one who had given a bigger gift he just regarded it as bad luck or perhaps appealed to higher courts with bigger gifts in addition to court fees and other expenses. This custom of giving 'gifts' to chiefs started a long time ago when there were no court fees and the chiefs had no fixed salaries but it continued even when salaries were introduced. (I was getting Shs. 200/- per month and keeping a car and other expensive properties) The unjust chiefs became very unpopular and consequently lost their posts. These 'gifts' have now stopped and the government is strongly against corruption.

After breakfast I used to hear personal or private complaints and to collect and communicate intelligence to my informers, many of whom were my subordinate chiefs, relatives, friends or volunteers. I used to receive them in my house as the public offices were too open and also it was more convenient to go to the office when I was fully aware of the general situation in my area. My intelligence network which I did not expose to the public, informed me of designs to commit offences, persons who were hiding after committing offences, hidden stolen property and unlawful assemblies threatening law and order in the area etc., as

there were no paid detectives or informers in those days.

I used to go to the office at about 10 a.m. After dealing with correspondence which was mostly in the form of instructions from the headquarters, and passing on information to higher authorities, I issued orders to my subordinate chiefs, to prevent the commission of offences and public nuisance, to detect and apprehend persons required by law and to explain complaints raised by the public. The correspondence was conducted in hand-writing with the assistance of only one clerk as I had no typewriter in my office.

I used to go to the court at about 11 a.m. which gave time for the arrival of the litigants and their witnesses who had to walk long distances to come to the court as there were no motor vehicles. The court was conducted in a mixture of Ganda Customary Law and English Penal Code, with written and unwritten laws for which I had to depend on the evidence of the elders. I presided over the court with two muluka (parish, Class III) chiefs as assistants and a clerk who recorded all the proceedings. The muluka chiefs rotated every month. The court adjourned at about 4 p.m. and everybody who wished went to my house for luncheon.

It should be noted that I had several other duties in addition to those explained above such as collecting or supervising the collection of taxes, attending meetings, addressing public rallies and supervising communal work. My assistant presided over the court whenever I was away and he had to make a report to me either in the evening or at breakfast time. With regard to the communal work which was intended for the improvement of the standard of living in the villages, each village had to make its own rough development plan, working on each Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday of every month without pay and any absentee without a good excuse was fined about 5/-. They worked alternatively on village water supply, village schools and roads, aid posts, soil conservation, cash and food crop campaigns and the muluka chiefs office (kitawulzi). I had to go round all the villages on a bicycle together with the technical assistant concerned to supervise or advise the villagers.

In the evenings I enjoyed my hobby hunting or playing tennis and sometimes visited friends or relatives. Supper was usually taken at about 10 p.m. and I went to bed at 11 p.m.

I started to specialise in administering difficult areas when I was a young gombolola chief of Sabadu, Bulemezi, and my area was not affected by the 1949 disturbances which spread throughout Buganda, so I got quick promotion. When the gombolola chief of Mumyuka, Busiro, was beaten and chased away by his subjects during the riots, I was posted to that area and I not only restored law and order but the gombolola became a model and both the Protectorate and Buganda governments arranged study tours of the other chiefs to see

our developments in raising the rural standard of living and the social services. Some of the schools which I started as kindergartens in my official compounds at Kapeka and elsewhere are now senior secondary schools and I also helped in building churches and mosques and rebuilt the shrines of the late kabakas (basekabaka) such as the one at Wakiso.

Changes in the position of the chiefs in Uganda were brought about when the local councils were introduced in 1948 when I was then the gombolola chief of Sabadu, Bulemezi. The Gombolola councils were first composed of the Gombolola Chief as Chairman, or his Deputy (musigire), together with all muluka chiefs in the area and two nominated members from each muluka selected by the gombolola chief. Naturally many chiefs did not like this change because they did not want 'bakopi' commoners to interfere in the chiefs' work. But there was a nucleus of educated young chiefs who had been given special training at Bukalasa (a course which was later transferred to Nsamizi Training Centre referred to in Chapter 2) who welcomed the change. However the nominated members were not very useful at the beginning as they had no experience and most of them did not dare oppose or criticise the chiefs who selected them. Some of them were aspiring to become chiefs themselves and so they regarded their nomination as a stepping stone in their career, and indeed many of them became chiefs sooner or later. But some of the unofficial members of the local councils gradually gained experience and acquired much influence especially those who were successful farmers and shop-keepers, as prosperity also contributed to their influence. Thus many chiefs, especially the old ones who had not been trained, started to suspect the unofficial members and in some cases the relationship was strained especially when some unofficial members were appointed to the post of parish chief (muluka) instead of the batongole who had worked for many years without pay. So even in other areas where unofficial members were not appointed chiefs, the local chiefs suspected them as their rivals. The introduction of the local councils was perhaps only successful in Busoga where it was started and where many chiefs had been trained. In Buganda, Toro and other district administrations very few chiefs had been trained or prepared for the system and of course Karamoja chiefs had no training opportunities and had different duties.

The biggest problem seemed to be due to the fact that the councillors' responsibilities were never clarified. The relationship between chiefs and councillors became even more strained when the election of the local councillors was introduced and the local elected members claimed that since they represented the people on the councils they were responsible for the tax payers' interests. As the chiefs also claimed that they were responsible for all social services and the interests of all the people in the area, there were clashes especially when party politics were introduced into the local councils in 1969; Obote's regime gave about Shs. 100,000/- to each parliamentary constituency for U.P.C. party members to utilise on social

services without necessarily consulting the chiefs, who naturally thought that the U.P.C. local leaders were taking over their work. The lower chiefs suffered most, as the local councillors were more informed, especially the local party leaders who had many opportunities of travelling and attending political rallies outside their areas and in many cases were given free transport through the U.P.C. party organisation, whereas the chiefs were not allowed to leave their areas without permission. Also the local political party leaders had more access to the M.P.s and Ministers in the Central Government than the chiefs because the Ministers used to be away from their constituencies most of the time attending meetings in Parliament and seeing to other duties so they had to keep close link through their local leaders in their constituencies. Even the District Commissioners were often embarrassed by the local U.P.C. leaders telling them government policy and in some cases merely pulling their legs or telling lies just to show that they were very important. I personally experienced many incidents of this kind when I was District Commissioner, Toro. As the local councillors and/or U.P.C. local leaders gained influence they sometimes used the opportunity to improve roads and other services in their own areas especially when the local chiefs' influence in councils weakened or they were not consulted.

At the time of writing (1972) the chief's role is getting less important and perhaps the change is for the better. All social services are now carried out by trained technical staff whom the chiefs accompany round their districts; their duties in maintaining law and order are being progressively taken over by the police. The gombolola chiefs are relieved of their magisterial duties but are still responsible for the running of the prisons where these exist. The old gombolola courts have been amalgamated into one magistrates' court which has meant long journeys for the magistrates and delays for the litigants, but the magistrates are now properly trained.

When the Press, Radio and Television become more popular in the villages they will undertake much more government propaganda than the chiefs especially as the public attendances at chiefs' meetings are declining and the councils or nkiiko have stopped. As regards graduated tax collection, it would be more economical to the district administrations if better methods were introduced instead of using road blocks for checking defaulters, or if the poll tax was transformed perhaps into indirect taxation - at least the number of chiefs of some grades would be reduced.

Work on an Urbanisation Scheme

In 1951 I was given unpaid leave in order to join the staff of the East African Institute of Social Research. I worked in the Institute as a Research Officer for about 3 years and helped several research projects. This was the

first Sociological Research of its kind in Buganda so we were sometimes suspected and accused of being spies especially when the questionnaires touched the feelings or were against the customs. For example, in the Fertility Survey which E.A.I.S.R. did for WHO we had to find out the number of children people had, but there was a taboo against telling the number of children a woman had to a stranger. Almost the same thing happened in the Economic Survey which E.A.I.S.R. did for the government. Many people were reluctant to tell us their income because they thought that we would pass on the information to their chiefs which could result in their paying higher graduated taxes. So we had to be very tactful and very friendly. Fortunately the European and American Research Fellows were very sympathetic, considerate and kind. There was no African Research Fellow in the Institute at that time but later on Augustine Mukwaya, with whom we were working on these surveys made the grade after obtaining a post-graduate diploma in England (I also worked as a Research Fellow in 1971 after my retirement from the Uganda Civil Service). The friendly approach of the Research Fellows accelerated the work of the juniors and the Research Fellows were so popular that many Africans named their children after them. The training and experience I gained at the Institute was very useful to me later in my administrative duties.

I thus got some experience of social survey methods. In November 1955 on my return from the course on local government which I attended in the United Kingdom, I was selected by the Protectorate Government to carry out a survey on an African Urbanisation Scheme at Entebbe and Kampala. After submitting my reports I was appointed to the post of Senior Executive Officer to the scheme and we started African housing estates with modern amenities at Ntinda on the outskirts of Kampala and Kitoro at Entebbe.

The people of Kitoro appreciated my work and they suggested to the Entebbe Town Board, as it was then called, that they should name after me one of the streets I helped to construct but I humbly refused as I had just started another phase in my career. However, as they insisted, I agreed that the street should be named after my son and the name is still there.

District Commissioner

In 1956 I was one of the first Africans to be appointed as an Assistant Administrative Officer in Uganda but was given the title of Assistant Protectorate Agent, East and West Mengo, because I was working in Buganda, where the title of District Commissioner had been abolished. I was appointed Administrative Officer in 1958 and District Commissioner in February 1st 1962.

I had mixed feelings about working in Buganda where I was first posted, because Buganda had already got a more or less federal government and there were strained relationships between the Protectorate and the Buganda

governments. My fellow Baganda called me a spy or traitor because I had transferred from the Buganda service to that of the colonial government and I was then the only Muganda holding such a high office under that government. I was also suspected by the colonial government if ever their secrets leaked out, although after promoting me to this high post I did not have any access to confidential files, the liberty I had enjoyed when I was an interpreter! On many occasions the Senior Assistant Resident Buganda who was equivalent to a Commissioner, was refused permission by the chiefs to tour in their areas or to hold meetings with the people due to the bad relationship between the two governments and I was used as a go-between. I recall a near riot in the gombolola of Mutuba V in Kyaggwe in 1959 when the expatriate district commissioner supported a European estate owner who wanted to close a village road which the people had used for generations and he did not provide an alternative one. The villagers rough-handled the District Commissioner and the European farmer took out his gun although he did not use it, and the situation nearly got out of hand. The gombolola chief told the District Commissioner not to visit his area again, and he was supported by the Kabaka. As I was now Senior Assistant District Commissioner I went in his place and settled the matter. Later on I accompanied the Governor when he toured this area instead of the District Commissioner and the chief and all the people were very happy to see me.

But my work as a Ganda district officer in Buganda also caused some embarrassments. According to Ganda custom every Muganda unless he was in uniform had to kneel down when greeting the Kabaka. But on an official occasion I put on my executive colonial uniform 'as a representative of the Queen' and the Kabaka had to salute me. I was so embarrassed that I stopped wearing the uniform in Buganda.

I was transferred to Busoga District towards the end of 1959, to avoid such feelings and embarrassments but I was unwelcome to the District Commissioner there whose first remark to me was that I would not be able to work in Busoga because the Baganda were hated in the district. But in spite of this observation he put me in charge of Bugabula county, the biggest and most difficult in those days, for the people were still hankering for their hereditary chief, Nadioppe, who had been deported a few years back. However, the D.C.'s remark gave me a strong impetus to fight these tribal rivalries and to bridge the gap between Buganda and the rest of the country and I served for about ten years outside Buganda.

After the disturbances in the Bukedi District in 1960/61 when the District Commissioner was assaulted and some chiefs killed, I was posted in Budaka/Bugwere and Palissa, the most affected areas, and lived in the troubled spots until law and order was restored and the new chiefs settled down. When a new district of Sebei was made in January 1962, I was appointed by the Protectorate government to be its first District Commissioner. The duties of the D.C. are not laid

down in any regulations but Part II, Section 5(b) in this book shows his routine work which consists more or less of co-ordinating the work of other departments in the district. The number of assistant D.C.s varies according to the size of the district and the D.C. allocates the duties according to his discretion. I had no assistant in Sebei so I did all the duties myself starting from scratch without District Councils and an experienced district headquarters staff. There was also no proper office and housing accommodation, and even the first district administration official cheques were paid into my personal bank account before the Sebei administration opened up its own account, and while the Treasurer was not yet appointed to sign the cheques. After starting off this new small district I was transferred to a big one in Teso, where I laid the foundation stone of the Independence Memorial on 9th October, 1962, and where I was awarded the Independence medal. I only worked for six months in Teso and Obote then transferred me to his home district Lango, when he was the Prime Minister, in order to help to develop his constituency and to stop the trouble which was starting between his own Oyam clan from Akokoro and other people who complained bitterly that he was practising nepotism in making appointments in the district administration. However this may have been due to the fact that Obote's clan had the advantage of having had an earlier education than the others.

I worked for only six months in Lango and was transferred to Bugisu District to deal with various problems. On my return from a study tour in the U.S.A. in 1964, I was promoted to be an Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Regional Administration and among other things I helped in starting a Correspondence Course in Local Administration Accountancy with experts from the U.N.O., and in the initial arrangements for the Institute of Public Administration in Kampala, of which Michael Davies, a senior British officer, became the first Principal.

Karamoja

I was promoted Permanent Secretary/Administrator Karamoja in 1965 with special powers⁴ in order to try to develop the most backward area in the country. The work was challenging and intriguing. The men were stark naked and the women's costumes were 'topless'. The men had no respect for human lives except those of their own tribes or clans. As Administrator Karamoja, I was empowered to make decisions and policies on the spot and I also made rules but I had no council to advise me on these matters although I was ably assisted by my Deputy, Luke Idro, and a dozen very hard working young officers most of whom got promotion afterwards. My sociological and anthropological research work at the E.A.I.S.R. at Makerere University College helped me a great deal in administering Karamoja (and later Bwamba/Bukonjo and the pigmies in Toro). I had to take into consideration the traditions and customs of the people concerned, the approach in implementing the new policies and the reactions of the

people. There was no telephone or direct radio communication with my headquarters and the mail used to take about five days to arrive. There were almost daily internal tribal clashes as well as external ones with Kenyan Turkana and Suk in the West and in South Karamoja. In these many people used to be killed and thousands of livestock stolen by both sides, while on the northern border, the Sudanese Civil War caused thousands of refugees to settle in Karamoja. Sudanese government forces often violated our territorial integrity either in hot pursuit of the fleeing refugees or on suspicion that the Anyanya rebels were using Uganda for subversive activities against the Sudanese government although in fact this never occurred. Sudanese often crossed the border merely for illegal hunting in the Kidepo National Park and killed our game wardens. All these problems made it very difficult to administer Karamoja and I had to be on the move all the time. I was responsible for an area of 10,511 square miles and travelled on very bad roads through a semi-desert full of wild animals. Some of the Karamojong themselves would have been happy to kill me, not only because I was affecting their economy by stopping stock theft and hunting, which had been made illegal on account of the wild animals conservation policy (this was especially important in the case of Kidepo National Park), but also because some of the Karamojong believed that if one killed a senior government official it enhanced one's prestige in one's own society. When a senior British colonial police officer was killed in North Karamoja shortly before my appointment, instead of reporting the murderer his tribesmen made a big feast for him, gave him several head of cattle and scarified his body, a mark of respect which they considered equal to a medal for bravery. They made these marks every time a man killed a person other than his own tribesmen or when a lion was killed, and the more marks a person had the more honour he was given by his tribe. It was very difficult, if not impossible, to convict the murderers in spite of the 'exhibits' of fresh body marks which they showed off proudly because the courts were not using traditional legal systems but were modelled on the English Criminal Procedure Code. Even the special Administration of Justice (Karamoja) Act⁵ was ineffective under the circumstances, as no-one ever gave evidence against his tribesman. Convictions were therefore very rare except in the case of a plea of guilty.

On one occasion when I was touring the district I came across a clash between Jie and Bolora tribes using modern weapons. Although I had a gun and an armed escort I could not help or take sides without getting full information as to which tribe had attacked first. So I fired several rounds in the air and fortunately the contestants dispersed and we rounded up the stolen cattle and handed them back to their owners after police investigations.

As I had tried in vain to stop tribal clashes by using armed forces, I resorted to the people's traditional methods. I convened a very big meeting of all the elders in the district and the neighbouring areas. I used motor vehicles to transport the elders who were living far away. At the

time of the meeting all the elders were in their 'birth suits' including those who had come by motor vehicles. As I was going to address them they asked me also to take off my clothes but I was too cowardly to do this! A traditional armistice was made by literally burying the bones of a chosen head of cattle, after the meat had been eaten at a feast, and clashes then stopped for about six months.

On another occasion about 200 Karamojong women got annoyed at not getting their famine relief food provided by the government, although the trouble was due to a delay in the supply from Kampala; when they heard that I was visiting the area they demonstrated against me by lying on their backs, absolutely naked, and blocking the road through which I was passing to Amudat, Upe County. Fortunately I was in a Land Rover and drove through the bush to get out of their way.

Before I introduced food crops suitable for the dry weather - sorghum seeds (nick-named Birahi after one of my enthusiastic assistants) and cassava cuttings, the people lived only on fresh blood taken from a vein in the neck of their livestock mixed with milk and cow dung supplemented with wild honey and fruits when in season. They used to have serious 'food' shortages in the dry season when their livestock could not produce enough blood or milk or had been driven far away in search of grass and water, so the government had to give them free food. This I issued to them after working on communal food crop plots in order to teach them to grow their own food. The government spent a lot of money in starting social services which had been neglected by the colonial government and there are now several schools including two at the senior secondary level, hospitals, dispensaries, a water supply and better roads. Also the late Sir Edward Mutesa II donated the whole of his salary as President of Uganda for two years towards the development of the district.

At the peak of my popularity in the district, the Karamojong believed that I was so powerful that I could make rain after it had not rained for several months and their cattle were dying. A big crowd, mostly composed of elderly women, came to my office in Moroto to petition for rain and when I explained to them that I had no such powers they said that at least if I gave them one head of cattle or a goat they would make an offering to their gods. Although many of them had thousands of cattle and goats they believed that the proper offering should come from me. I still refused and they threatened to beat me believing that if at least I cried the rain would come. I tried to run away and hide but they found me out and I told them again that I had no power to make rain, but that as a Christian I believed in God and that if we prayed to Him together, He would certainly give us rain. Thank God, it rained within about half an hour of our prayers!

After the rain-making, my assistants who were good Christians disclosed that they never closed their eyes

during the prayers but they were on the alert to run away for their lives as soon as they saw an alarm because when the Karamojong were angered they could easily go to the extent of killing people.

However this was not a miracle but pure coincidence or luck on my part. The Karamojong were good observers of rain-making clouds and it is possible that they had noticed one which had lingered behind Moroto mountain for some time but as it unexpectedly did not rain they suspected that their gods had stopped it and that the only way to appease them was to kill me or at least make me cry as I was the top-most person in the area. I was told that they tried the same exercise to my British predecessor but he was much stronger and athletic than myself so he ran away and hid himself until it rained.

This district was 'opened' after Independence as the colonial Government had declared it a 'closed district' and no one, including Ugandans who were not Karamojong, could go there without a special permit issued by a British senior officer or the District Commissioner. Even white Missionaries who worked vigorously to teach them Christianity and as usual started many schools and two hospitals had to get special permits. During my period of service there were two traditional rival Christian sects of Catholics headed by a resident Italian Bishop and Protestants led by an English Archdeacon. Also there were less influential Moslems introduced by Somalis who penetrated from Lake Rudolf and Turkana (Kenya) unnoticed by the colonial government. These religious influences were gradually changing some of the Karamojong characteristics and beliefs so I was probably the last so-called 'rain-maker king'! Incidentally my special powers and the high post of Administrator were abolished when I was transferred from Karamoja to headquarters in Entebbe in 1967.

What was the system of local government set up in Karamoja as the result of so many years of administration? The functions of the lower chiefs and of the councils differed somewhat from those in the rest of the country. There was no equivalent to the mutongole chief or assistant to the parish or muluka chief as in other parts of the country. They had a head of the manyatta (homestead) who was mostly responsible for clan and family affairs, planning for grazing their cattle and guarding them against raiders, or themselves planning counter-raids. They were not bound to carry out the chiefs' duties of batongole as these were understood in Buganda although they sometimes helped to implement some social service measures in their areas. They were elected by their clansmen to become leaders due to their social standing and valour in cattle raids. They did not get an official salary but they received a big share of livestock after a successful cattle raid and consequently they possessed a fairly large herd of cattle in many cases amounting to 1,000. There were sub-chiefs equivalent to parish (miluka) chiefs above the clan heads. They were poorly paid until Obote standardised all chiefs' salaries

in the country in 1967. They had no deputies (basigire) but their work was much easier than that of muluka chiefs in other areas because they covered small areas as the Karamojong built their manyatta very close for security reasons. However there were problems when the Karamojong moved from a permanent manyatta to take their cattle in dry seasons to new watering and grazing areas. I had to introduce a system for the parish chiefs to move together with their people in order to try to have someone in charge to stop mischief wherever the people moved.

I was transferred from Karamoja in 1967 after about two years' service which I enjoyed immensely. After I had left the district the people asked me whether I would agree to name one of the streets in Moroto Township after me in the memory of my service and I agreed, so that at the time of writing this book one of the streets in Moroto is called 'Tamukedde'. The Karamojong are making very rapid advances and if they keep it up with the government's help they will soon catch up to the level of the rest of the country.

Headquarters

From Karamoja I was transferred to Entebbe as Secretary for Administration in the Ministry of Public Service and Cabinet Affairs and in 1967 Obote's Cabinet selected me to be in charge of Buganda Affairs after the abolition of the kingdom and the Buganda government. I accepted the job hoping that I would be able to help the area. But I was opposed to Obote's policies about internal administration so I refused to sign a document dismissing en masse all chiefs. I argued that since they were civil servants and many of them were carrying out their duties well, especially those who had just been appointed by the District Commissioners, and were working at the risk of their lives, they should not all be dismissed; instead we should ask the District Commissioners to recommend the inefficient chiefs for dismissal, but those who had worked for more than 10 years should be given gratuities or pensions on termination of their appointments. I added that since this was a Presidential decision it should be signed by him or a Minister and not by myself as I was opposed to the idea which would weaken the whole Civil Service. Although Obote agreed to give gratuities to the chiefs with long service records, he was very angry with me and I was given forced leave and put under 'house arrest' for about 9 months although I was getting my full salary. Later on I was 'demoted' to the post of District Commissioner Toro, and Administrator of Bwamba/Bukonjo and Busongora Counties, but I again retained my salary of Permanent Secretary.

Toro District

My transfer to Toro was a blessing in disguise. The cool climate is one of the best in the country and the soil is very fertile and if properly utilised the district would be

one of the richest in the country. The people recovered very quickly from the shock of the abolition of their kingdom. This was because Prince Patrick Olimi had just succeeded his father, Rukidi II and had not yet gained the popularity which Sir Edward Mutesa II had in Buganda. Also the Batoro realised that since the kingdom of Buganda, which had been so much more powerful than their own, had been destroyed, there was nothing they could do to maintain their traditional system. Furthermore there was still hostility between the Batoro and Bakonjo who had been ruled for many years by Toro chiefs. As the Batoro were seeking the Central Government's support in this matter they did not want to oppose or antagonise Obote. As I was the chief central government representative in the area I had difficulties in dealing with the two clashing tribes, each trying to influence me against the other so that I may make favourable recommendations or reverses. However it made my position very easy when it was seen that I did not show favours. Apparently tribal conflicts also played a big part in other kingdom districts when the hereditary rulers were abolished and this made the process of settling down to the new conditions easier, for example the Banyoro required Central Government support for the 'lost counties' issue against the Baganda so they did not dare to oppose Obote who had just decided the matter in their favour. They also wanted financial assistance etc. from Obote to consolidate their gains.

I got on very well with the young deposed hereditary ruler, Patrick Olimi Kaboyo, and the majority of the people. I had among other duties the challenging task of putting down the Rwenzururu⁶ uprising by Bamba/Makonjo who were clamouring for a separate district. They complained that the Toro government was discriminating against them and they forced out of their areas all the chiefs appointed by the Toro administrative government. There was severe fighting between them and the Batoro in which a lot of people lost their lives and property. Mukirane made himself the ruler of the area, appointed his own chiefs and eventually rebelled against the Uganda Government which then declared Bwamba, Bukonjo and Busongora counties to be Disturbed Areas and took over direct administration under an Administrator with special powers, more or less as in Karamoja. I took over the administration in 1968 from a veteran officer, Jacob Inyoina, who had worked very hard at the beginning of the trouble. I continued with the struggle and after two years I managed to restore law and order. The self-appointed 'king' Mukirane disappeared or died and the special Administrator's powers and the Disturbance Decrees were revoked. The new chief appointed by the Toro District Appointments Committee were accepted by the Bamba/Bakonjo and the tribes were reconciled.

I also had to deal with Congo (now Zaire) border problems which arose from their domestic civil wars which spilled over into Uganda and caused refugee problems as well as the Congolese forces crossing the border in hot pursuit of fleeing refugees thereby violating Uganda territorial

integrity. Even when the Congolese active civil wars subsided, there remained a small force of rebels led by Pierre Mulele near the Uganda border, mostly consisting of the Congolese tribesmen who were of the same ethnic group and inter-married with Bamba/Bakonjo, and who had rebelled against the Uganda government at the same time. The situation was very delicate. In early 1966 when General Mobutu destroyed Tshombe's regime, the rebellious Mulele turned against Mobutu, who sent his forces within three miles of the Uganda border to fight against the Mulelists who were operating from a thick forest near my district. Whenever Mobutu's forces attacked Mulelists they ran and hid with Rwenzururu in Toro and vice versa when Obote's forces made operations, so we were moving in vicious circles until I initiated border meetings with my counterparts on the Congo border and made simultaneous exercises which were effective. The Uganda Government gave me full responsibility to deal with Congo border matters affecting Toro District as we had no Embassy in Congo at that time. I made missions and important decisions without prior consultation to the President's Office to which I was directly responsible. On one occasion the Congolese soldiers raided Toro villages but there were no casualties and I immediately sealed off the border by Special Force which was operating in the district under my command. This caused hardships to both the Congolese forces and the civilians as they were depending on Toro food supplies etc. I was approached by the Congolese army officers and when they apologised I re-opened the border. On another occasion about six Congolese soldiers hotly pursued alleged rebels into Uganda where they were arrested. The soldiers threatened to recapture them by force. I invited the officers concerned to meet me and we settled the matter over a glass of beer in Kasese Township about 30 miles inside Uganda, and I reported the incidents to the President's office after I had dealt with them.

I also had to help the diminishing number of pigmies in the Toro/Congo forests for humanitarian reasons. They seemed to be fighting a losing battle against their 'spoilt' natural habitat. They were not allowed to live in the gazetted forest reserves. They had not only lost their natural immunity against the usual tropical forest diseases, chiefly malaria, but they were also being attacked and often killed by new diseases to which they were an easy prey due to under-nourishment as their chief food had been wild animals, which the government had made illegal for conservation purposes. The only solution was to change their mode of living if they were to survive. So I had to persuade them to leave their traditional abode in trees and helped them to build huts, grow food crops. I taught them how to read and write and also encouraged handicrafts according to their traditional arts. These are now very popular with tourists and a very valuable source of income for the pigmies. We also provided them with clothes collected through voluntary organisations.

In general all the tribes in Toro made good progress and the district won nearly all the National competitions for

improvements in the rural standard of living in 1968/69.

My Work for the Nationalist Cause

When I first saw Europeans as a child, I was much impressed. They were mostly administrators and missionaries and they were very kind. They used to give me presents - sweets, breads and used tennis balls. Even my parents always spoke very well of them. As I grew up I was under missionaries' influences, especially as I was among the favoured boys in the missionary school. When I started working I was directly under Europeans as their interpreter and they gave me very valuable training in administration. In fact I owe to the Europeans whatever I achieved in life, in spite of my hatred of colonialism.

On the whole the Europeans were very careful and their characteristics were exemplary. They created a tradition which still exists; for example if a non-European did something very well it was not uncommon to comment that he had done it according to the 'European fashion or standard', or if an agreement was made verbally it could be sealed by the remark that it was a 'European agreement' as opposed to an 'Indian or Kiswahili agreement' which would only be observed when convenient. This attitude made many Africans copy the European customs, not merely because the Europeans taught or encouraged us to copy them as many people tend to think but we also admired some of them. The only big problem we had with Europeans was 'colonialism' but basically we liked Europeans and they are still very popular in the country which has never had serious colour problems.

I remember my first encounter with a European D.C. when I was about five years of age, when the D.C. toured my father's Gombolola. Arrangements were made about two weeks in advance. The grass-thatched houses were renovated, the compound specially cleaned, and presents were collected - hundreds of eggs, several chickens and sheep for the D.C. - goats and Ganda traditional food, beer and so forth for the general public. The D.C. arrived in great style in a motor vehicle - it was my first time to see one and most of the people had also not seen a motor car before. My father gave the D.C. tea together with his wife and two children of about my own age and we started playing together, as soon as the D.C. and my father went to the office and my mother was preparing food for the feast, and while the D.C.'s wife was arranging their personal effects and supervising the pitching of tents about 300 yards from our house. The D.C. stayed for two nights and there was feasting, dancing and wrestling contests, etc. in the D.C.'s honour but he came with his own food and did not take any meal with the public although he was invited. However they were very kind and had no colour prejudices - and I played with their children, even in their bedroom. I was so busy playing that I did not care to go and listen to what the D.C. was saying at the rally and in any case the crowd was very big and small children could not get near enough. On leaving, the D.C. was given free about 15 porters to carry his presents!

The second time I met a D.C. was during King George V's Birthday Ceremony when there was a big parade and we school children made a march-past following soldiers. I admired the uniform and his position and afterwards, when I became D.C. myself and inspected a guard of honour or march-past by school children, I remembered my own experience as a child.

But of course like other Ugandans I became a nationalist when I was quite young and used to attack and criticise the colonial government openly in the press while I was a junior clerk/interpreter in the protectorate government. For instance Africans were not allowed to see films in the public cinema halls and I quote below an excerpt from an article I wrote in the Uganda Herald of 10th February 1943: "On Saturday, 30th June, 1943, I went to the Central Picture House to see a picture 'Crime Over London'.....and I was refused admittance.....no African was allowed to see it.....was censored by the Board consisting of two European ladies and a Senior Administrative Officer.....Since no sound or convincing reasons are ever given for banning shows for Africans.....there only remains one thing to think of and that is colour prejudice.....it is a most undesirable treatment to the African and an offence against the race." It is interesting to note that the Senior Administrative Officer mentioned above was my immediate boss.

I also wrote to the Uganda Herald on subjects such as African standards of living and difficulties over housing (February 2nd, 1942), and the need for opportunities for Africans in industry and commerce (February 2nd, 1942). I wrote again to the press on December 15th, 1943, quoting Smuts when he appealed to Europeans not to break their trust as regards African advancement. I also wrote to the London press on the deportation of Mutesa II in 1954. As I was all this time a civil servant in the colonial government I was disobeying the regulations which did not allow the civil servants to criticise the government, especially in the press, but I was urged by the spirit of nationalism and fortunately the colonial government senior officers were sympathetic to our cause and so no disciplinary action was ever taken against me.

Although I criticised the Protectorate government more than thirty years ago, even some of the independent African governments are still neglecting some of these problems and instead of raising the standard of living they are wasting money on unnecessary things. Such leaders regretted too late when they were kicked out by the elements of their own creation. Whereas the developed countries are exploring the universe, we should explore the villagers and raise their standards of living.

I was also interested in trade unionism and was one of the founders of trade unions in Uganda in the modern sense in the 1950's (Joswa Kivu had started the movement in 1940's

but it was proscribed by the Protectorate government). As I was a Civil Servant I was not allowed to attend his meetings so I used to attend privately the meetings of a few selected people until I felt I had to come out openly. When the late Tom Mboya of Kenya approached the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions to help with trade unionism, they agreed to build and run an International Labour College in East Africa but as Mboya could not find land elsewhere, I took a risk and offered my six acres plot in Kampala for the purpose. But at that time the Protectorate government did not want trade unionism and I was summoned by the Governor and reprimanded. However he approved the land lease agreement I had already made with the international organisation as in any case the land was my personal property and although I was a senior civil servant, I could use it as I wanted so long as I did not break any law. Unfortunately the International Labour College was also disliked by Obote and he closed it down in 1968.

Though I was not as outspoken as I would have been but for the civil service regulations, nevertheless I have criticised both the colonial and independent Uganda governments, and my opposition to Obote's policies, especially on local administration about which I had acquired a considerable experience, put me out of his favour and caused my early retirement from the Uganda Civil Service at the age of 50 years. After retirement I was appointed to the Board of Trustees of the Uganda National Parks and was awarded the Second Republic Medal by President Amin.

Since my appointment as a Trustee in 1970, I have represented the country at several International Conferences and Seminars on Wild Life Conservation and had the opportunity of visiting most of the National Parks in the World.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1. Later the Kabaka Mutesa II.
2. See David Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda, Princeton 1961, pp.203-216.
3. See F.G. Burke, Local Government and Politics in Uganda, Syracuse 1964, pp.219-220.
4. See Administration (Karamoja) Act, Cap. 25 vol. 1. (It was repealed by Act 13 of 1966).

5. See Uganda Laws, Vol. II, Cap. 35, p.636.
6. See Tom Stacey, Summons to Ruwenzori, London 1965.

C H A P T E R 5

Chiefs and Administrators in Bugisu

Suzette Heald

Bugisu, with a population of almost 400,000, lies on the western slopes of Mount Elgon along the Ugandan border with Kenya. In the 1960s it was the most densely-settled rural area in Uganda, with as many as 1,500 people to the square mile in the fertile mountain regions. It was also one of the most prosperous agricultural regions. In addition to growing a wide variety of food crops, with millet and plantains as staples, over 70% of Gisu land-holders were estimated to be coffee farmers, growing the only high-quality arabica coffee in Uganda.¹ At lower altitudes where this variety of coffee cannot be grown cotton was the main cash crop. Both crops were marketed through Gisu-controlled cooperative societies whose headquarters were in Mbale, the major town and administrative centre for the District.

The Development of British Administration

The earliest British administrators in Bugisu were not, as they were in Buganda, faced with the problem of negotiating with the officials of a highly-developed and vigorous state. On the contrary, their problem was to identify political institutions of any kind on which to found an administration. To the first British officials, arriving direct from Buganda, Bugisu presented a picture of complete anarchy and, to some, prototype savagery. The people, according to one report, were "steeped in the lowest forms of superstition, sodden with native liquor and addicted to cannibalism" and had "no political system of any description".² It is tempting to see such reactions as conditioned in part by the previous experience these officials had had of Buganda; certainly, the Ganda administrative framework was to become both reference point and model for the creation of local administrations in many of the politically acephalous regions of Uganda. In Bugisu, this process of 'Ganda-isation' was furthered by the direct employment of Ganda as both administrators and punitive force. In this, the up-country British officials were following the lines of least resistance as much as explicit Government policy, for Ganda expeditionary forces had already established themselves in the area.

Bugisu, as many other areas of Eastern and Northern Uganda, was opened up for the British by the Ganda General, Semei Kakungulu.³ In 1900, Kakungulu was directed by the British to subdue the tribes to the west of Mount Elgon and by 1902, largely on his own initiative, had carved himself out a kingdom in the area, establishing himself as Kabaka

(king) with a 'royal capital' at Bugaka in what is now Bugwere. Kakungulu's territory extended from what is now Bukedi into the lower foothills of Bugisu, and was ruled by his men from a series of forts.

The Protectorate Government at Entebbe watched Kakungulu's growing power with misgivings and in 1902 a British official was sent to the area to report back on his activities. As a result of this Kakungulu was ordered to withdraw his troops to Lango but he refused, preferring instead to 'retire' from the services of the Government. He applied for and was given a grant of land in recognition of his past services. He chose to settle in Mbale and in 1902 he and his 5,500 followers built the first houses in what was to become Mbale township.⁴ In 1904, the Protectorate station which had originally followed Kakungulu to Badaka moved likewise to Mbale, partly to curtail his personal power.⁵ Yet if the Protectorate Government disapproved of Kakungulu's aggrandisement at the expense of British prestige and the resources of the tribes he had conquered, the succeeding British officials stationed in Mbale were convinced that pacification could only proceed with the assistance of the Ganda. It was decided as an interim measure, not without misgivings from Entebbe, to give the more reliable of Kakungulu's followers official positions as 'agents', and that they would then assist and train local chiefs, as and when these were appointed.⁶

In accordance with this policy the first Gisu chiefs were selected in 1906 but this shared administration was not introduced without opposition. The records of the District up to 1912 tell of frequent rebellions by the Gisu against their Ganda overlords and their own chiefs. The clans did not unite to fight and pacification proceeded piecemeal with one clan after another being subjected to the punitive expeditions of the Government forces. By 1911, the District Commissioner reported that only about one third of the tribe were under effective administration, namely the clans of the more accessible foothills and plains who had all 'learnt their lesson' and accepted the superior force of the British and Ganda.⁷ The mountain clans ensconced among their high ridges and deep valleys were more intractable, but after the punitive expedition of 1912 against the clans in what is now Manjiya County, the region as a whole quietened down.

That the Gisu chiefs' had no authority of their own account was frequently reiterated by the officials stationed in Mbale, and indeed provided the major justification for retaining the Ganda as agents. There were no hereditary positions of authority among the Gisu nor was the influence of their leaders backed by any ritual sanctions. Jean la Fontaine stresses the low level of political integration in the indigenous system, with a lineage of between 150 and 300 men being the basic political unit, each with its leader, the mukasya (literally, a man rich in cattle). Above this level collaboration for war was a matter of temporary alliance, not necessarily on the basis of patrilineages but also in terms of matrilineal and affinal kinship. It was

also through such links that a prominent man could extend his influence either as a peace-maker or war-leader, albeit temporarily, over a far wider area than that occupied by his own lineage. The administrative system crystallized around the more influential of these bakasya.

Perryman, who was District Commissioner in Bugisu from 1911 to 1918, and later Chief Secretary to the Protectorate, reports that at first each Chief had to be given equal status and allowed to exercise independent command whether he had a following of 500 or 5,000.⁸ These first 'sub-chiefs' were each assisted by a Ganda agent and his unpaid (but armed) followers. These chiefs later became sub-county chiefs with their own judicial court but it was many years before a series of administrative units on a modified Ganda pattern could be established in the area. The first sub-chiefdoms were grouped into counties with a Ganda agent as chief. By 1924, the number of sub-counties had been considerably reduced and two specific grades of chief were recognised below that of the sub-chief, that of the parish (muluka) and the village (butongole), named after their Ganda equivalents. Even with the rationalisation of such units (by amalgamation of the smaller units on the death of a chief) in 1929 the sub-counties varied in size from 500 to 3,000 adult men and the parishes from 200 to 500. The villages were all of between 100 and 150 men.⁹

Such an administrative structure was not altogether alien to the Gisu for to some extent it followed the pattern of the territorially-based patrilineal lineage system. The chiefships themselves, however, implied a radical transformation of authority patterns. Under the tutelage of the Ganda the first chiefs had almost despotic powers. Chief and agent each took 5% of the hut tax they collected, and labour tribute was exacted for work on their own property as well as luwalo labour for public works such as road-building and the clearing of paths. The tribute system led to wealth on a scale never before possible in Bugisu and, to judge from the District records, incited bitter resentment. When the early revolts failed, the Gisu took to non-cooperation, disappearing into the mountains or up trees as soon as the chiefs appeared, and even migrating out of the District altogether to avoid the compulsory labour service and taxes. Even as migrants they remained stubbornly anti-official, spurning Government labour recruiting agencies, preferring instead to travel and hire themselves out independently in Buganda or Kenya.

The autocratic rule of the chiefs was only one factor contributing to this exodus. As significant was the desperate poverty of the District. Land pressure was severe in the years up to 1920, and this was exacerbated by successive famines and epidemics. Men migrated out of the District in increasing numbers from 1912 onwards. In 1929, the number of men absent rose to the massive figure of 16,868, leaving the southern county severely depopulated.¹⁰ The remedy for this situation was seen to lie in cash-cropping, and in the opening up further areas for settlement.¹¹ Cotton had been

introduced as early as 1911, but it was not until much later that a suitable crop was found for the mountainous zones. In the 1920s the establishment of Government nurseries to raise the delicate coffee seedlings, together with the gradual appointment of agricultural field staff, led to a steady increase in coffee production.¹² After 1930, as these measures took effect, men began returning to the District.

The period up to 1930 thus saw the establishment of the crops on which the wealth of the District was later to depend just as it also saw the formation of a hierarchical administrative system and the consolidation of the powers of the chiefs. The initial aim of a rapid transfer of power from the Ganda to the Gisu was delayed for many years because of the difficulties of training the older chiefs and administering a district as mountainous and inaccessible as Bugisu, smitten with endemic plague. Nevertheless the steady dilution of Ganda influence began with the withdrawal of the agents acting as advisors to the sub-county chiefs, when these chiefs were recognised as 'competent'. By 1911, two chiefs had gained such recognition, and by 1914 most of the agents at the sub-county level had been withdrawn, the Ganda then acting only as county chiefs. Even after the first Gisu were appointed as county chiefs, the agents tended to remain in executive control and it was only in 1935 that the last Ganda agent, acting as county advisor, was retired.

During the 1920s, however, the system was brought more firmly under British control. The worst abuses of the tribute system were stopped and the chiefs were incorporated into an official bureaucracy, directed and disciplined by higher ranks whose authority was sanctioned directly by the District Commissioner. In 1927 the chiefships became secure posts, salaried and, at higher grades, pensionable. A Chiefs' Council was created to discuss administrative affairs and in 1925 was authorised to pass minor legislation in the interests of the district. The chiefs also controlled their own courts, jurisdiction being defined in the Ordinances of 1919 and 1925. In addition they had powers of arrest for all criminal offences under both Protectorate and customary law and were responsible for enforcing the decisions of the courts.

Thus by 1930 the chiefs in Bugisu had become the all-purpose authorities typical of British local administration throughout Africa. In the context of Bugisu it is, however, important to emphasise that the chiefs were never the traditional dignitaries found in some African societies. As Lord Hailey says generally of the chiefs in Uganda 'the basis of their authority lay not in their traditional status but in the place they occupy as part of an official or semi-official organisation, the District Native Administration'.¹³ From the beginning the chiefs in Bugisu were associated above all with the Administration and with 'Progress'. From 1920 onwards Gisu chiefs were not only more influenced by Ganda customs than the rest of the population but also better educated, education becoming a basic requirement for promotion to the higher grades. In

the early years they were the main agents for innovation. It lay with the chief to persuade their people to accept reforms in agricultural practice, health and general administration. Moreover they were not merely responsible for executing directives from the District Commissioner but their own Chiefs' Council was the medium for reform and innovation with regard to customary law.

Although indirect rule, as usually understood, was never characteristic of Bugisu, traditional values were here as elsewhere incorporated into the administrative structure. There is little evidence today of this process of assimilation. The foreignness of the chiefships is marked by the use of Ganda loan-words to refer to both the chief and many of his duties, which are now part of normal Gisu usage. Indeed the distinction between traditional leadership and the chiefships is vague with only a handful of old men retaining childhood memories of a time before the arrival of the Ganda. The great bakasya of whom they tell usually turn out to be those leaders elevated by the British to chiefships in the early years of the century.

It would thus be a mistake to see the chiefships as a peripheral institution superimposed upon the fabric of a 'traditional' social organisation. What stands out in retrospect is the rapidity with which, after the turmoil of the early years, the Gisu accepted the changing political and economic conditions within the District. The establishment of an administrative system consolidated what was a fluid political system in a very short period of time. Yet far from breaking down the lineage framework it tended to give it greater coherence by consolidating loyalty to a territory and a chief with extensive powers to support his position. While at higher levels the administration represented a political integration which had never existed before, it also extended downwards to the locality where the chiefdoms became a focus for lineage identity, each clan and lineage demanding its own chief.¹⁴

This was the situation up until 1950, the two decades following 1930 seeing little modification in the system of chiefships. However, in the 1950s as viable administrative and economic institutions were developed to serve the modern state, the chiefs had to adjust to a more modest place as the machinery of government became more elaborate. It is to an examination of these changes, as radical as those which gave birth to the Colonial Administrative system, and to their effects on the position of the chief and local patterns of authority, that we now turn.

Directions of Change 1950-1970

The Constitutional changes which led up to and followed Independence were rapid and far-reaching, as a more complex framework for government was developed at both national and District levels. In the districts the Protectorate Government concentrated on introducing a British model of local government; the Local Administrations Acts of 1949, 1956 and 1962 marked stages in the establishment of District Councils

with elected representatives in charge of their own 'civil service' (see chapter 2).

In the first place, the Acts established Local Government as distinct from the Central Government. In this process the powers of the District Commissioner were reduced and in 1956 the District Council became wholly responsible for preparing the estimates needed to run its own administration, and for raising the necessary revenue through local taxation. The local administration was put in charge of the chiefships, primary education and local prisons and, in addition, established subsidiary health and welfare services. However, the local administration was, and remained, the poor sister of the central government departments which operated independently within the district. Each of these (Education, Health, Agriculture, Works, etc.) was housed in an impressive building which overshadowed the series of cheaply-built offices which served as the headquarters of the local administration.

In the second place, these reforms transferred policy-making and overall responsibility from the civil servants to the 'political' authorities. To this end the old Chiefs' Council, where chiefs had sat together with nominated members and the District Commissioner in the Chair, was successively modified to become an assembly for making policy decisions, distinct in both function and personnel from the executive. The moves towards greater participation on the District Council created, as envisaged, a sphere for new representatives to emerge on behalf of the District. The first direct elections of 1956 saw the emergence of a powerful faction which was dominated by employees of the newly-formed Bugisu Cooperative Union (B.C.U.), whose Coffee Manager became the first chairman of the new District Council.¹⁶

The formation of the B.C.U. in 1954 marked the climax of more than a decade of agitation by the Gisu for fuller participation in the marketing of the all-important coffee and cotton crops. Previously this had been in the hands of a consortium of private companies closely supervised by the Government who held the profits in trust for the district. The huge reserves built up by these companies became a focus for discontent leading to the formation of the Bugisu Growers Cooperative Union in 1948. It was dissolved as a seditious organisation the following year but not before many local cooperatives had been formed more or less independently throughout Bugisu. However, Gisu rights to a greater control over the marketing as well as the processing of the cash crops were recognised soon afterwards and the B.C.U. was established as a coordinating agency for the local cooperative primary societies. The campaign to establish the Union coincided with the move towards more popular representation on the District Council just as it provided a core of well-known figures, allied through the cooperative movement, to stand for election. Once on the Council these men were able to raise their prestige through the use of the B.C.U.'s considerable financial resources, as

well as by challenging the Protectorate Government on both cooperative and tribal issues.

In 1956, this change in personnel together with the division in function between the District Council and its executive led rapidly to a schism between the chiefs and councillors. Even before this, the District Commissioner had had misgivings about the wisdom of Council reform, mainly because of the poor educational standards in the District and consequent dearth of well-educated men. Between 1941 and 1953 (which became known as the 'lost years') no Gisu had managed to get to Makerere University College and few had attended secondary school. This affected the calibre not only of the newly-recruited councillors but also the chiefs. In 1953 a sample of chiefs showed that 20% had attended only Baptist classes and as few as 8.8% had reached secondary school.¹⁷ The District Commissioner's first fear therefore was that the chiefs would be inundated by ill-conceived directives and that the standards of the administration would fall. It soon became apparent that the new power of the councillors constituted a radical threat to the authority and status of the chiefships.

The troubles that ensued were partly inherent in the 1956 Local Administrations Act. While the District Commissioner interpreted it in terms of the British Local Government model, the councillors saw it as a political take-over and as 'popular representatives' sought to pre-empt the chiefs' authority not only within the council chambers but in their areas of jurisdiction. The division of labour between political and administrative functions undoubtedly appeared arbitrary. As a member of the District Council, a councillor 'employed' the chiefs and 'directed' the administration, yet in the villages he had no right to interfere in the work of the chiefs and had to submit to the authority of even the lowliest of them. Not surprisingly many from the beginning found it difficult to accept such a limitation to their powers, and saw the chiefs as direct competitors for power and influence in the rural areas. As the District Commissioner reported in 1956, the councillors 'only recognise power in personal terms and hence think it must be wrested from the hands of those who now hold it'.¹⁸ In the villages some councillors sought to arrogate to themselves the powers of the chiefs, while others sought to supervise their work. With the Appointments Board set up under the aegis of the District Council in 1956 they had a potent weapon for intimidation. On the Council itself younger 'politicians' were elected to influential positions, overriding the claims of the 'elder statesmen' and senior chiefs who still sat ex-officio on the Council.

A further source of ambiguity was the dual responsibility of the chiefs themselves. On the one hand, the chiefs were employed by the District Council and were responsible for executing all its directives but, at the same time, they were still directly accountable to the District Commissioner for their wide and discretionary powers for maintaining law and order in their areas of jurisdiction. The overlap in the

authority of the District Commissioner and the Council was therefore considerable and a major source of friction which laid the chiefs open to charges of disloyalty. This bad relationship between the Council and its executive culminated in the crisis of 1960 which led to a Commission of Enquiry into the affairs of the District Administration.¹⁹

The main event leading up to this crisis was the severe rioting against the rate of taxation in the early months of 1960 in the neighbouring district of Bukedi. These riots spread into two adjacent sub-counties of Bugisu where, as in Bukedi, it was the chiefs who collected the taxes who bore the brunt of the crowds' anger, and not the councillors who set the rate.²⁰ Following these riots the District Council appointed a sub-committee to investigate the question of tax assessment. The committee sided with the rioters in Bukedi and recommended that a flat rate of 46/- should replace the graduated scale then in force for the majority of tax-payers. This was accepted by the Council despite advice from the District Commissioner that it would result in a huge deficit. In the event the Council's response was to balance the budget by a drastic reduction of all services and to cut the salaries of the grade 3 chiefs for ten months as a preliminary to abolishing them altogether. However, the grade 3 chiefships could not be abolished without the agreement of the Protectorate Government and, following the Commission of Enquiry, a compromise was negotiated. The grade 3 chiefs were reinstated and the village unit of the administration disbanded instead, with the number of grade 4 chiefs consequently decreased. A graduated tax scale was re-introduced the following year, but the financial crisis of 1960-61 was to have a lasting effect on the structure and manning of the chiefships.

The first fully democratic District Council was elected in 1963 and was to serve in the very different political climate of Independent Uganda. After Independence, with the rise of Obote's Uganda Peoples' Congress (U.P.C.) Government the political priority became the creation of institutions which could weld the kingdoms (with their federal or semi-federal status) and the districts together into a unified state. Reforms counteracting local allegiance were initially easier to put into effect in the districts with their more direct constitutional relationship with the Central Government. The reform of the Judiciary in 1964, creating a unified legal code and system of courts for Uganda, was part of this process, and the extension of party politics to the District Council another. Associated with these developments was the expansion of Central Government agencies operating in the local areas, each with a specialised staff to assist in health and agricultural reforms. In the space of a very few years the district autonomy, fostered during the Colonial era and expressed in the growth of independent Local Government, was thus curtailed with the reorganisation of government on a national basis.

Such reforms had to contend with tribal loyalties as evident in Bugisu as elsewhere in Uganda. It was the district and not the state which claimed the primary allegiance of the people. As Independence approached, Gisu political aspirations tended to accentuate such a commitment; the District Council provided a natural forum for parochial issues just as at the national level political manoeuvrings had promoted bargaining on a tribal basis. The status of the district became the all-important issue and this was coupled in Bugisu with the aggravation of border disputes between Bugisu and her neighbours. Bugisu and Bukedi launched rival campaigns to claim the town of Mbale and certain border areas, while the Sebei petitioned for separate district status. This latter was granted in 1962 but was followed by a direct outbreak of fighting between the Sebei and the Gisu living in Sebei. Here again it was the issue of coffee marketing which fostered tribal feeling. The Sebei determination to market coffee through their own cooperative society was blocked by the 13,000 Gisu living in Sebei who in fact grew most of the coffee crop. They continued to market as before through the Bugisu Cooperative Union and this provoked the bitter fighting in Sebei during 1964 and 1965, which eventually led to the mass exodus of Gisu from that District.

At the time of Independence, nationalist sentiments were focussed more on the Gisu tribal polity than on a united Uganda. Indeed the Gisu, outside the major political arenas of Uganda, played an inconspicuous part in the development of Uganda as a sovereign state.²¹ Opinion was slow to mobilise in party political terms; party labels were introduced for the first time in the 1961 General Elections and even then the seven Independent candidates polled more than one third of the votes.²² In both the 1961 and 1962 elections the U.P.C. had a majority of only one at Independence. Thereafter, with the progression towards a one-party state, the situation changed swiftly with a large swing on the Council towards the U.P.C. By 1967, when 14 teachers lost their seats because the legislation of that year defined them as civil servants, there were 37 U.P.C. councillors, 10 Democratic Party (D.P.) councillors and only one Independent, a man who had previously been dismissed from the U.P.C.

Resolution into party political groups was dictated by the new Council structure. The Secretary-General was directly accountable to the Minister for Regional Administrations, and was responsible for ensuring that the discussions of the Council were in line with national policy. To this end he received direct instructions from the Minister. The greater control exercised by the U.P.C. government was reflected in the proceedings of the District Council and, with expressions of tribal identity discouraged, many of the emotive issues of the previous decades subsided. For example, the Gisu had been noted for their militant attitude on any matter which might jeopardize customary land usage. Yet the sub-committee of the District Council set up just before

Independence to codify customary land tenure into bye-law, apparently never met. Outbursts of tribal chauvinism likewise became rarer as time went on. A District Council which, in the early sixties, could consider an official declaration of war on the Sebei, was by 1969 moved to censure songs celebrating the long-awaited decision that Mbale was to lose its neutral status as the administrative headquarters of both Bugisu and Bukedi and become an official part of Gisu territory. Perhaps as revealing of the Council's commitment to the U.P.C. was its vote to abolish the post of the Umuinga, the constitutional Head of the District, a post they had campaigned for prior to Independence; this vote was taken a year before the Republican Constitution of 1967 which put an end to such offices. To some extent, then, the activities of the District Council were controlled directly through party allegiance. Outside the Council, the District Commissioner, as the main representative of the Central Government in the area, remained the watch-dog for District affairs, his position being strengthened in 1967 when he was made the Inspector of the local administration.

The uneasy division of labour between the 'political' prerogatives of the councillors and the 'administrative' prerogatives of the chiefs and District Commissioner did however remain throughout the U.P.C. Government. The demarcation lines were further entrenched with the Republican Constitution of 1967 when civil servants of all kinds were debarred from party membership or from holding political offices. If Obote had remained in power it is possible that political representatives, along the lines of those in Tanzania, might have eventually replaced the chiefs as administrative officers, but the U.P.C. did not develop any effective party machinery in the rural areas until 1969. However, it is unlikely that a development of this kind would have given more power to the District Council itself, since the local U.P.C. branches were operated and financed independently of the Council.

Following the new U.P.C. party constitution of June 1968 there was an intense drive to develop local party organisation, with branches at the parish and parliamentary constituency levels. This new organisation by-passed the District which, because of its tribal identification, was seen as a major obstacle to national unity. The District Council was thus becoming outmoded by the new political turn of events and, despite the overall U.P.C. commitment of the Bugisu District Council, the Minister for Regional Administrations refused to allow it to sit for a period of over a year between 1969 and May 1970.²³ The Minister acted on advice from the District Commissioner who considered that the District Council was irresponsible and threatened the work of the administration. The most contentious issue was the Council's campaign to discredit the lower chiefs and headmen, described fully on pp.91-2. Added to this was the politically sensitive fact that the Secretary-General of the District Council had put himself up for the election as U.P.C. Constituency Chairman in the same area as the incumbent M.P., and the rival campaigns in this constituency

were accompanied by considerable threat of violence. The decade of the sixties thus ended as it had begun with the Council in disrepute both with its own administration and the National Government.

The Work of the Chiefs in Independent Uganda

As the Annual Reports of the District make clear, the chiefs reacted with bewilderment to the changes in the structure of district administration. Up until 1956 the line of command had been straight-forward and unequivocal: the chiefs had been responsible to the District Commissioner, he to the Provincial Commissioner, and he to the Governor of the Protectorate. In the space of less than ten years the monolithic powers of the chiefly hierarchy were abruptly curtailed. In the 1950s politicians replaced the chiefs on the district councils and in the 1960s magistrates replaced them on the courts. Not only did the chiefs suffer a corresponding loss of stature but these developments in turn created new domains for the exercise of power and influence which, as we have seen in the case of the District councillors in Bugisu, further challenged the authority of the chiefs, and left them uncertain as to the limits of their jurisdiction.

As demoralising for the chiefs was the introduction of the Magistrates Courts Act of 1964. This Act marked the unification of Ugandan Law and the separation of the Judiciary from the Administration. Up until this time there had been a bipartite judicial system in Uganda, the Ugandan Courts at the district level trying offences reported to them by the Police under the penal code, and the courts of the Native Judiciary operating at all other administrative levels, trying offences in accordance with customary law and local bye-laws. With the 1964 Act all the courts of the Native Judiciary, whose president had been a chief, were disbanded and replaced by Magistrates Courts at the sub-county, county and district levels.²⁴

With the disbanding of the Native Courts the chiefs lost what had undoubtedly been their most prestigious role and one which could be set favourably against their less popular duties in the eyes of their people. Just as indigenous leaders had been regarded primarily as peace-makers and judges, dispute settlement had become an integral part of the duties of the chiefs at all levels. Nor could the new system of Courts, immediately at any rate, be regarded as an effective substitute for those formerly presided over by the chiefs. The new magistrates were, by and large, young men and, in keeping with the nationalist policy of the Government, were rarely Gisu-speaking. Suspicion of the new magistrates, uncertainty as to the new forms of the law, expense, as well as the distance to the sub-county headquarters, all deterred people from making full use of the new courts. Thus the lower chiefs tended to remain important arbitrators in village disputes. However, they had no official powers to enforce their settlements and

even these informal functions were banned in 1967. Until this time however, the chiefs sifted cases on the old pattern, arbitrating in the minor disputes and referring the more serious cases to the Police or relevant court. It was this referring of cases, deriving from their overall responsibility for maintaining law and order in their areas, that provided the chief's most important source of authority in village disputes.

It is worth noting at this point that the main burden of police work, including the report of crimes, investigation and arrest, fell on the lower chiefs (Classes III and IV).²⁵ The higher chiefs (Classes I and II), stationed at the county and sub-county headquarters, were office-based administrators. The same was true of taxation. The tax assessment committee usually consisted of two chiefs (Class II and Class III) with two unofficial members. Collecting such taxes rested almost entirely with the lower chiefs, as did the daily collection of beer-brewing and other fees. Since the lower chiefs had no special security arrangements in their own homes, they had to make frequent journeys to the sub-county headquarters to deposit such monies. In some cases the sub-county headquarters were as far as ten miles from the chief's house and his only means of transport was his bicycle. In addition to these tasks, the lower chiefs were also expected to make checks on the movement of people and cattle through their areas, to ensure that paths and bridges were kept in repair, and to see that local bye-laws concerning health, sanitation and the planting of crops were complied with correctly.

The lower chiefs' efficiency in all these duties was undoubtedly diminished by their loss of control over the courts through which they had enforced their decisions. It was further curtailed by the drastic reduction in their numbers which followed the financial crisis of 1960-61, when, in an attempt to economize, the District Council abolished the village unit of the Administration. Thus in 1961 the parish of between 2,000 and 5,000 people replaced the village of between 500 and 1,000 people as the lowest official administrative unit. Thereafter the parish (Class III) chief was supported in most parishes by an official (Class IV) subordinate, still known as the 'village chief' (mutongole) although he no longer had responsibility for any particular area within the parish and served instead as a general factotum to the parish chief. The effect of this measure was to reduce considerably the ratio of lower chiefs (Classes III and IV) to the people. In 1961, before the abolition of the village, there had been one lower chief to 700 people, but by 1969 the ratio had increased to about 1:2,400. With these changes, the ties of the Class IV chiefs to their own lineages were severed. In 1954 La Fontaine saw them as the successors to the traditional leaders, elected by and representing the interests of their own people.²⁶ In the 1960s the Class IV chiefs were no longer elected, and no longer had jurisdiction over specific areas within the parish. Their ties with the local

people now rested solely on the fact that, in contrast to the higher chiefs, they were virtually all local men.

With this change in the organisation of the lower levels of chiefship and the decrease in the number of officials with local knowledge, the Class III chiefs were forced to rely to a greater extent on the unofficial headmen. In Bugisu such men were known by the Luganda term Uwe Kimitala, referring to their jurisdiction over a neighbourhood area varying in size from 50 to 200 taxpayers (in the past these would have been divisions of the village). The headmen provided the main lines of communication between the lower chiefs and the people. For the chief faced with the job of administering a large and often sprawling parish, of which he might have no first hand knowledge, they were invaluable as guides. In addition, they undertook many of the day-to-day administrative chores in their areas, keeping their own tax registers and collecting fees. They also assumed as part of their duties the same broad mandate as the chiefs themselves with regard to the keeping of law and order and powers of arrest.

The headmen could not however be regarded as direct substitutes for the old village chiefs. Unrecognised by Ordinance, they were unpaid and, as little more than the personal assistants of the parish chief, were not backed by the Administrative hierarchy to the same extent. Indeed the office of headman alone did not give enough authority to guarantee the holder a respected position in the area. This was particularly so after 1964 when the Magistrates Courts Act deprived the chiefs (and by implication also the headmen) of their most valued role. This, coupled with the onerous nature of the duties, meant that there was little competition for such posts. While the headmen always claimed to have been elected by the tax-payers of his area, in fact most appeared to have been more or less self-appointed as the only candidate who wished to take office.

During this time, however, the chiefships themselves remained prestigious offices and attracted men of high calibre (see Part II, section 3, table f).²⁷ While many of the duties of the lower chiefs were regarded as onerous, the chief in the countryside represented something more than the evils of taxation. It was in his powers to maintain order and peace that the Gisu still saw the justification for his office. To a large extent the ideals of good administration for which the chiefships stood were accepted alike by both government and villagers. Indeed the necessity of paying taxes was accepted by the Gisu to the extent that it was the mark of a good citizen to pay his taxes early in the year and those who defaulted attracted general odium as 'wastrels'. The standards which the Gisu expected of their chiefs were almost as high as those expected of the Administration itself, and there was considerable consensus concerning their status and role.

The conflict of loyalty inherent in the position of the chief or village headman has received frequent mention in the anthropological literature. Fallers, for example, sees it in terms of two contradictory ethics to which the chief is expected to conform.²⁸ On the one side, there is the bureaucratic ethic of the administration with its emphasis on universalistic criteria for both action and judgement, and, on the other, the particularistic ethic of the people, with the stress on the over-riding importance of kinship norms. Conflict in such terms was not marked in Bugisu, partly because there were no prior traditional offices associated with the chiefships which could express particularistic sentiment, as there were in Busoga or Buganda. As stressed previously, the chiefs in Bugisu derived their legitimacy essentially from their position in the governmental hierarchy.

Further, during the 1960s the chiefs were neither directly accountable to their people nor elected by them. Since 1959 all appointments, transfers and promotions were handled by an Appointments Board at the District level. Moreover, it was always the policy of both the colonial and independent Government to discourage the attachment of higher chiefs to particular areas, a policy initiated to prevent Kakungulu's agents acquiring excessive personal influence. Chiefs were transferred for many reasons, including promotion and discipline. The 1969 survey showed that none of the Class I chiefs and only 5% of the Class II chiefs had jurisdiction over their areas of origin, and the average length of time spent in a single posting at this level was only 1.7 years. At lower grades, where there was no provision of official housing and it was still thought desirable to have a local man, the situation was rather different. Even so, only just over half of the Class III chiefs worked within their own sub-county and only one fifth worked actually in their own parish. All of the Class IV chiefs were working within their original sub-county, two thirds in their own parish. Despite the recent changes in the roles of the Class IV chiefs there was evidently room for personal loyalties and lineage attachment.

However, it was an extremely unwise chief who showed such partiality. He was respected because he had the mandate to be impartial and could be seen to be motivated by the public interest. The Gisu stress egalitarian norms: all adult men are regarded as jural equals and each is expected to be economically independent and master of his own affairs. Lineage elders can only arbitrate in disputes with the consent of both parties and few are intrepid enough to attempt unsolicited arbitration; moreover, they have no powers to enforce their decisions. Chiefship, however, was to a large extent free from the constraints which operate between fellow villagers, and it was this which provided such a unique and valued role in dispute settlement. What would otherwise be regarded as unwanted and unjustifiable interference in a man's affairs was accepted as fulfilment of chiefly duty. A chief who jeopardized his role by showing favouritism could expect little popular support.

Gisu chiefs did not have to appeal to kinship factions at the village level to gain or maintain their position. Nevertheless they had to have community support and to the extent that community and government values diverge, their 'inter-hierarchical' position, as Gluckman terms it, was accentuated.²⁹ As La Fontaine puts it 'they must be loyal members of the community and not minions of the 'Guramenti' (Government)'.³⁰ If they were the 'first citizens' of their areas, they were expected to demonstrate this in their conduct among their people. As the Gisu put it, the chief must 'speak well', a phrase which sums up all the ideals of good conduct between people. A man who 'speaks well' treats all men as equals and without disparagement. Such a man is slow to anger, and while listening to contrary views finds out the facts (*mbola*) slowly and quietly, before coming to a decision. Such are the hallmarks of leadership in Gisu terms. Moreover, in doing his job the chief was expected to take account of the frailty of his fellow men and their economic hardships, and therefore to interpret the law leniently.

At the local level this resulted in a plethora of informal procedural rules. It was the way a chief pursued his duties rather than the duties themselves which was important and provided the means of evaluating him. In other words, he was expected to be selective in what rules he enforced and the way he enforced them. For example, the chief was obliged to be assiduous about tax collection, which provided the yardstick by which his superiors judge him, yet he was reluctant to use his powers of arrest and confiscation against defaulters. Most chiefs tended to abide by an informal rule that such harsh action should follow only when a man had defaulted for two or more years, and left any immediate action to the Police, who made periodic round-ups to check tax receipts. Chiefs were particularly indulgent when it came to enforcing such by-laws as those relating to distilling of the spirit *waragi* or growing *bhang* (hemp). No chief liked to get a reputation for putting men in prison for what were regarded as minor offences, and in any case the pressure of other work made it difficult for him to enforce systematically all such regulations. Furthermore, a certain lenience increased the chief's effectiveness in dispute settlement since a threat of arrest for such a violation could be used effectively to caution a recalcitrant member of the community.

However, by the mid 1960s, the authority of the chiefs could no longer contain the decline in law and order. Rates of theft, murder and other violent crime had increased rapidly. The extent of the problem can be indicated by the statistics for homicide. The average annual rate of death from homicide for the years between 1948 and 1954 was 8 per 100,000 of the population.³¹ Between 1964 and 1968 this had risen to 32 per 100,000. At the time of La Fontaine's study murder was largely the consequence of interpersonal violence at the village level, with fights erupting at beer parties and family land disputes. A large proportion of the increase was the result of the Gisu resorting to self-help

where theft and witchcraft were concerned.³²

This murder pattern and the insecurity it engendered was to have further repercussions in the 1960s. From 1965 onwards two novel forms of neighbourhood organisation, which I call the 'drinking companies' and the 'vigilantes', spread rapidly throughout Bugisu. Both arose specifically to combat the growing feelings of insecurity and mistrust in the rural areas by creating organisations capable of imposing more effective sanctions over behaviour. The drinking companies developed to provide a safe milieu for drinking beer; the vigilantes were in effect a self-appointed police force with the aim of eradicating thieves and witches from the community. While the two types of association developed contrasting organisation, they shared an emphasis on rules and discipline and the idea of a 'Gisu government' at the community level. Indeed the actions of both organisations were validated in terms of the necessity for authority, an authority with which the chiefs had long been associated.

These movements did not, however, specifically challenge the authority of the chiefs themselves. Indeed the drinking companies from the beginning tended to act as an informal wing of the chiefs, not only ensuring peace at beer parties but, as mutual aid societies, assisting their members to pay their taxes; in some cases they appointed a special official to take charge of this money. The chiefs' relationship with the vigilantes was necessarily more ambivalent, for these groups clearly operated outside of the law.³³ However, the vigilantes saw their role as supplementing rather than supplanting the existing administration and were usually careful not to alienate the local chief. The chief for his part had neither the power to suppress these groups, nor could he claim to provide a viable alternative to the community problems these groups were attempting to tackle.³⁴ Indeed these new organisations must be seen to some extent as a response to the erosion of chiefly authority. They gained momentum in 1967/68 when the District Council moved to abolish headmen, thereby further disrupting authority patterns at the local level.

It is worth examining the District Council's decision in some detail, as it vividly illustrates the kinds of problems which faced the chiefs, as well as the difficulties inherent in the position of headman. The problem arose through the unofficial status of the headmen, who handled tax money without the power to give official receipts. The time lapse between payment and receipt was thus often considerable and, not surprisingly, there were discrepancies. Even the lower chiefs (and occasionally the higher chiefs) came under such suspicion from time to time; they were, however, protected by the Administration and in the sixties, as in the previous decade, dismissals were rare. The Administration, ever wary of attempts to discredit its officials, preferred to discipline its chiefs in its own way - usually by transfer. The headmen had no such backing and the fact that they were unpaid served to encourage suspicion of theft. Their vulnerability on both these counts was shown up forcibly in

1967 when a pressure group within the Council was able to exploit the grievances of the people against a few headmen to run a campaign to 'abolish' them altogether.

Prior to this move the District Council had set up its own enquiries into embezzlement by a few chiefs and headmen. The Administration insisted that the Council had no right to run such enquiries as all matters of personnel were the responsibility of the civil service. The Council reacted to this by outlawing the use of headmen, defending their action on two counts: firstly, because of the opportunities the headmen had for embezzlement and secondly, because the Council was unwilling to be liable if such men were harmed during the course of their activities.³⁵ In the villages the move was explained in other terms: it was said that the whole affair was instigated by a prominent councillor after a headman had decided a land case against him in favour of a fellow headman. The District Commissioner's office took much the same view and considered that the main objective of the councillors was to discredit figures whose influence threatened their own in the rural areas.

The councillors' decision hinged on the interpretation of the Local Administration Act, which empowered the chiefs to delegate their powers.³⁶ The Council conceded this point but maintained that the Act did not provide for permanent delegation of responsibility and was only meant to cover such activities as raising posses. This decision aroused a good deal of hostility among the chiefs, who ignored the decision for a time and then seemingly complied to avoid an open confrontation. In practice headmen in various forms still operated despite frequent denunciation in the Council chambers.

In many areas the headmen continued to work under changed titles. Some were called 'lineage heads' (babikuka), others 'village heads' (bawalukongo) and others, reminiscent of the Ganda days, 'agents'. However, many headmen, in the face of the Council's censure, refused to work and very few of those who did would collect revenue. The burden of work on the lower chiefs and those headmen who continued to work was therefore greatly increased, the latter finding that their more unpopular duties were no longer justified in terms that they were 'only doing their job'.

In 1968 new types of headmen emerged in some areas, associated both with the lineage framework and with the U.P.C. party organisation which was being developed in the rural areas. The relationship between lineage and headmen in the old system took various forms. In most areas lineage elders were no longer recognised because lineages rarely extended beyond a geneological depth of three generations. The title 'uwe cikuka' was occasionally used as a courtesy title for the headman, but his jurisdiction was over a neighbourhood area which contained representatives of many lineages. In a few areas, however, lineage elders had retained a position distinct from that of the Administration. Such a pattern was most typical of the

mountainous regions of Central and South Bugisu where widespread ritual collaboration during the biennial circumcision ceremonies was still maintained. Here, occasionally, a lineage hierarchy existed parallel to that of the chiefs, with the lineage elders recognising one of themselves as head of the parish. These lineage elders, although they assisted the chiefs informally, were mainly concerned with specifically lineage matters - ritual, land disputes and marriage. Where the Class III chiefs did decide to abolish the headmen, new representatives whose position was tied to their lineage framework were sometimes volunteered as replacements. In some places they were known as the 'vice-chairman' of their lineages, which indicates that they were not regarded simply as the successors to traditional positions of influence. In the first place, their authority had been redefined by taking over some or all of the responsibilities of the old headmen. More significantly, however, it appeared that some at least were representatives of the new branches of the U.P.C. which had begun operating in the parishes as a response to Obote's 'move to the left'. In the area of Central Bugisu, which I knew best, six out of seven of these lineage headmen were active members of U.P.C. parish branches.

While it is difficult to generalise on the basis of such a small sample, the move to depose the old headmen does appear to have given an opening for the emerging U.P.C. branches to be incorporated into the system of Administration at this level. It is noteworthy that the chiefs themselves were likewise pledged to the ideals of the U.P.C. When interviewed in 1969, all the chiefs in the sample claimed to be U.P.C. supporters, and almost 30% claimed to have been party members prior to their appointment. It is difficult to judge how far such claims were a matter of expediency in the political climate of the time, for party affiliation was unquestionably a criterion for selecting chiefs. However, Bugisu was to be known as a U.P.C. stronghold and following the military coup the chiefships were subject to severe purges.

The abolition of the status of headman thus triggered off a variety of responses at the local level. The vigilantes became more active and more generally accepted by the Gisu villagers, as did the drinking companies. Nor were the Gisu alone in taking such measures of self-help. Throughout Uganda one of the preoccupations of the day was the rising rate of crime, particularly violent robbery, which was made a capital offence in 1965. Vigilante groups spread out from Bugisu into the surrounding Districts, and according to newspaper reports similar groups were prevalent elsewhere, particularly in Lango and Acholi.

The reduction in the powers of the chiefs undoubtedly created a hiatus between the overarching institutions of government and the local community, just as it accentuated the lack of any indigenous groupings which at a time of rapid social change were capable of acting as any check to

interpersonal violence. With the demise of the chief in the local areas, people were faced instead with a multiplicity of governmental agents working in the sub-counties, from councillors and magistrates to the officials of both Local and National Government departments whose work was not directly co-ordinated with that of the chiefs. One important effect of this was to undermine the channels of communication between the local people and those who governed and served them. The local chiefs' identification with the communities they served, as well as their dependence on the support of the people in order to carry out day-to-day administrative tasks, had made them responsive to local pressure. The decrease in the number of chiefs to a large extent destroyed the close working relationship between them and the people, which had been particularly characteristic of the small village units of 100 or so households.³⁷ While there was supposed to be informal consultation and consensus among chief and people within the parishes in the 1960s, the size of the parish and the short periods of service prevented the chief from acquiring the intimate knowledge of the people which the old village chief had possessed. The new separate agencies of Central Government were seen neither to represent community interests nor to allow, either directly or indirectly, the community any say in their programmes. This was particularly evident with regard to the courts. Under the old system of Native Courts, the chief had sat in judgement with the help of two local men as assessors. In the new Magistrate's Court, the single magistrate was never a local man and rarely even Gisu. He had, in other words, neither knowledge of the people nor knowledge of customary values and procedures.

It is in this respect that the lopsided development of institutional change was most apparent; at the National level change was directed by policy decision, but the local communities were left with few institutional resources to cope with its effects. 'No one will help us now unless we help ourselves' said a Bemba convert of the Bamucapi cult to A.I. Richards in the 1930s.³⁸ A similar spirit of reform and self-reliance asserted itself in Bugisu. The vigilantes and the drinking companies provided no immediate panacea for the problems that assailed the community, but they did initiate new and alternative frameworks of co-operation at the local level. To the extent that they did so they served to bridge the gap which had developed between the lower levels of the administration and the community. As a pragmatic, popular response, they also appear to have survived the drastic political changes which have overtaken Uganda since 1971, and which have superseded the picture of local administration given here.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 5

1. Uganda Census of Agriculture, 1963/64.
2. Letter, 1.6.1911, from the District Commissioner, Mbale, to Jackson, Acting Chief Secretary to the Protectorate. (Entebbe Secretariat Archives).
3. There are a number of detailed studies of Kakungulu's activities as both a British agent and freebooter, and of the historical circumstances which gave rise to the distinctive political compromise between Ganda and British Protectorate interests in Eastern Uganda. In particular, see H.B. Thomas, Capax Imperii - the story of Semei Kakunguru, Uganda Journal, vol. 6, 1939, pp. 125-126; Sir J. Gray, Kakungulu in Bukedi, Uganda Journal, vol. 27, 1963, pp.46-47; D.A. Roberts, The sub-imperialism of the Ganda, Journal of African History, vol. 3, 1962, pp.435-450; M. Twaddle, The Founding of Mbale, Uganda Journal, vol. 27, 1966, pp.25-38.
4. M. Twaddle, op. cit.
5. Kakungulu was finally transferred to Jinja in 1906.
6. The policy of employing Ganda agents met with criticism from Entebbe at various times. As early as 1904, following a Government inspection of the region, specific instructions forbidding the use of Ganda were sent to Mbale. These were waived only after vigorous representations from the local District Officer. In 1911, when the policy again came under attack, it was the Acting Chief Secretary's opinion that it was "doubtful if (it would not) have been better to leave people to occasionally kill each other than employ aliens who are admittedly difficult to control and... have...to all intents and purposes assumed the position and authority of local chiefs. This is just what we don't want. We want to rule the people through their own chiefs". (Letter, 26.6.1911, to the District Commissioner, Mbale. Entebbe Secretariat Archives). The other side of this correspondence from the District Commissioner, Mbale, is quoted at several points in the text.
7. Letter, 1.6.1911, op. cit.
8. Perryman: The Development of Native Courts in Bukedi (Entebbe Secretariat Archives).
9. Report on Chiefs' Salaries, 1925 (Entebbe Secretariat Archives).
10. Annual Report of Bugisu District, 1929.
11. The Sirokho valley to the north of Mbale was freed from tsetse fly by 1920 and attracted settlers from the central and southern regions of Bugisu.

12. History of the Bugisu Coffee Scheme (Department of Agriculture, Mbale).
13. Lord Hailey, Native Administration in British African Territories, Part I, London 1950.
14. J.S. La Fontaine, The Social Organisation of the Gisu of Uganda with Special Reference to their Initiation Ceremonies, unpublished doctoral thesis, Cambridge University, 1957.
15. In 1969 the Local Administration employed 622 staff of whom 225 were chiefs.
16. In the Council of 1956, 43 of the 77 seats were filled by direct election. The remaining seats were filled, along the lines set down by the 1949 legislation by nomination from the county councils (17), the District Commissioner (4) and the District Council itself (6). In addition the 7 senior officials of the local administration (the Secretary-General, the Chief Judge of the Native Courts, the Treasurer and the 4 county chiefs) sat ex officio. The District Commissioner did not retain a seat on the Council although he remained the official advisor.
17. J.S. La Fontaine: The Gisu, in A.I. Richards, ed., East African Chiefs, London 1960, p. 275.
18. Annual Report for Bugisu District, 1956.
19. Uganda Government: Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Bugisu District Administration, 1960.
20. Uganda Government: Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Bukedi Riots, 1960.
21. There was no Gisu minister in Kiwanuka's Government and only one, Wakholi, in Obote's. When Amin came to power Wakholi fled to Tanzania to join Obote and was killed in the abortive invasion of Uganda in 1972.
22. Crawford Young: unpublished manuscript.
23. I am grateful to S. Bunker for this information. As a preliminary to the general elections projected for 1971, U.P.C. Constituency Chairmen were elected in 1970. Once elected the Constituency Chairmen had considerable powers of patronage and were given grants of 100,000 sh. out of Treasury funds to finance local development projects.
24. There were also changes in the law administered by these courts. For example, some criminal offences under customary law could now only be tried under civil law (thus the plaintiff had to pay a registration fee) while others could now only be tried under the relevant clause of the penal code where the set penalties often differed from those that had held previously.

25. The main body of the Police were stationed in Mbale and investigated only serious crimes, such as murder, in the rural areas.
26. J.S. La Fontaine: The Gisu in A.I. Richards, ed., East African Chiefs, London, 1960.
27. In comparison with the 1953 sample the chiefs in the 1960s were well-educated, and the posts attracted men from a wide variety of occupations. Work on the management committees of the primary cooperative societies is of special significance as it provides the training ground for many of the chiefs, 30.4% of the higher chiefs and 40.5% of the lower chiefs. Since these societies handle all the payments made to the growers, this would seem to imply a high degree of local confidence in their honesty and capabilities. It is also worthy of note that the chiefships seem to have held their ground with respect to Council positions, with 7 of the chiefs included in the sample having previously served as District Councillors.
28. L.A. Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy, London, 1956.
29. M. Gluckman, Inter-hierarchical roles: professional and party ethics in tribal areas in South and Central Africa, in M. Swartz, ec., Local Level Politics, London 1969.
30. La Fontaine, in Richards, op. cit., p.269.
31. J.S. La Fontaine, Homicide and suicide among the Gisu, in P. Bohannan, ed., African Homicide and Suicide, Princeton, 1960.
32. S.S. Heald, Homicide among the Gisu of Eastern Uganda with special reference to their initiation ceremonies, unpublished doctoral thesis, London University, 1973.
33. The model for the organisation of these groups seems to have come initially from the army, the vigilantes seeing their role as analogous to the use of the army to quell civil disturbances. The first groups chose names for themselves such as Bamajonisi, from the English word 'emergency', or Bajooni, from the colloquial expression for a common soldier 'Johnny', or portola, patrol. Later other names became more favoured, particularly Bugisu Security Council, Bugisu Government, Night Security and Banalukoosi, agents of peace.
34. Space precludes any further examination of these groups and their relationships to the chiefs. See Heald, op. cit.
35. A headman had sued the Busoga Administration for damages after being injured in the course of his duties. There had been no such case in Bugisu itself.

36. The Local Administrations Act 1962, section 46, reads:
A chief may require any person subject to his jurisdiction or employed by the Administration employing the chief to assist him in carrying out his duties imposed upon him under the provisions of this Part of the Act and any person so required may carry out and give effect to any lawful order given by a chief.
37. L. Fontaine in Richards, op. cit.
38. A.I. Richards, A Modern Movement of Witch-Finders. Africa, vol.8, no. 4, pp.448-461.

C H A P T E R 6

Conclusion:

Chiefs and Administrators in Uganda's First Republic

A.F. Robertson

Our main intention in this book has been to give an account, in the light of survey data, of a theme and a period in Uganda's history which have so far not been well described: local chiefship and administration during the years of Milton Obote's First Republic. As we suggested in the preface, after the demise of the Second Republic it may also be appropriate to look back at the last coherent phase of Uganda's constitutional development and to consider whether it is possible to gather up any threads from that period which might illuminate the country's future. This retrospective view raises some interesting questions of interpretation; since the 1960s there have been significant changes in styles of analysis, and we may now ask whether the social science of 1980 leaves us better advised about the recent history of Uganda.

The relationship between the development of Uganda and developments in social science is one of the main themes of this concluding chapter. The 1970s brought something of a revolution to western sociology, a pronounced shift away from functional views of 'modernisation' towards structural interpretations of underdevelopment and dependency in the poorer countries of the world. This shift has a strong ideological component, and in one of the more aggressive formulations the liberal 'bourgeois sociology' prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s has been described as 'the emperor's clothes which have served to hide his naked imperialism'. Andre Gunder Frank offered the poor people of the world the alternative of persistent underdevelopment or revolution. This revolution was intellectual as well as economic and political: 'rather than fashion the emperor a new suit these people will have to dethrone him and clothe themselves.'¹ Already, much of what has been learned from a radical appraisal of the expansion of capitalism in Latin America has been applied to East Africa² and there can be few observers of Uganda in the 1960s who have today failed to modify their analytical views in some salient respects.³ The resurgence of Marxist interpretations has produced some dogmatic, even liturgical writing but it has also identified many shortcomings in the earlier functional interpretations, notably the vague teleology in which 'tradition' and 'modernity' were crudely contraposed. It has also drawn attention to the close relationship between social theory and political practice, insisting that the former is not simply the disinterested observer of the latter. ⁴

When Milton Obote declared his intention to 'Move to the Left' in November 1968⁵ he was quite consciously parting company with many of the social scientists on Makerere hill. Two years later he was actively insisting that the University should yield to the ideological will of the state - an explicit move against 'academic freedom' aimed at the large numbers of expatriate members of faculty. Some of them doubtless discovered later a radical interest of their own in the patterns of development in Mao's China, echoing Obote's sinister declaration in 1968 that Uganda was 'leaning towards the East'.⁶

In the 1950s and 1960s the close relationship between social science and development policy in countries like Uganda was not often remarked upon, but it was neither casual nor accidental. It was part of the post-war economic expansion of the industrialised countries and their growing preoccupation with the fate of 'the Third World'. The growth of aid and trade, of international consultancy and development planning, led to a parallel expansion of institutions of higher learning, at home and abroad. In a world which was very evidently divided ideologically⁷ social scientists were closely involved in developing the rationales for development policy - conspicuously the doctrines of 'modernisation'. Like so many leaders of his time, Dr. Milton Obote began his political career with considerable academic enthusiasm; in the later years of his Presidency this enthusiasm waned considerably. In the early 1960s there was much faith in the prevalent view that there were technical solutions even to the political problems of development, but towards the end of the decade the oracular powers of social science were being regarded with increasing scepticism, both by academics and frustrated politicians.⁸ In the period of anxious introspection which ensued it seemed that social science could be assured only of its own lack of assurance. The most conspicuous casualty of this period was political science: by the early 1970s several African countries had proscribed research in anything approximating this field.

There was another bond of a rather different kind between politicians and academics, deriving from the fact that educational qualifications in a very generalised sense were a central feature of the expansion of government bureaucracy. The tendency to hand out honorary doctorates to heads of state seems to draw an equation between high political office and high educational qualification. This authorising quality of academic life also began to turn sour during the course of Uganda's First Republic. Until it was finally brutalised by the Amin regime Makerere seemed to lead a charmed life amid the political turmoil around it, protected in large measure by the international esteem in which it was held. It was striking that after the May 1966 crisis Makerere hill was exempted from the curfew restrictions which applied throughout Buganda. By 1970 the government could protest with some justice that Makerere was not merely an ivory tower, but something much more potent: it was 'becoming a "State within a State"'.⁹

These tensions were expressed in relationships at a personal level, for example the consultations between Obote and Mazrui in the late 1960s, and between Audrey Richards and Andrew Cohen a decade earlier. The confidential nature of these encounters makes them very difficult to describe and analyse, but their importance - by all informal accounts - should not be underrated. In more general terms, there is no doubt that the wide variety of research conducted under the aegis of the East African Institute of Social Research at Makerere greatly influenced government policy before and after Independence. The enthusiastic interdisciplinary collaboration, and the sense of involvement epitomised in the compilation of East African Chiefs, served as an inspiration for similar institutes elsewhere in Africa and the developing world.

Uganda Versus Buganda

In the 1950s and 1960s the name of the political game in Uganda and in many other developing states was integration, a term rationalised and explicated in the language of evolutionary functionalism. It is striking that much later the problematics of dependency and underdevelopment involved another set of functional premises;¹⁰ however it may be construed, the political integrity of Uganda remains the central political issue. As late as 1969 and notwithstanding his 'Move to the Left', Dr. Obote could declare to Makerere students 'that the most important political trend that had emerged in Uganda since independence was the constant effort for integration'.¹¹ As the earlier chapters of this book have reiterated, the irreconcilability of the 'traditional' kingdom of Buganda within the 'modern' independent state of Uganda was at the heart of this quest. In the social science of the 1960s this could readily be construed in terms of structural-functional incompatibilities, constitutions and institutions which did not fit, and could perhaps never be made to mesh. In May 1966, Obote exercised the power vested in him by the 'modern' state to subjugate the 'traditional' order, in the interests of Ugandan national integration. Thereafter, the disease which lingered in the body politic might be blamed either on the resilience of Ganda political institutions or on the intransigent 'traditionalism' of the Ganda people.

Although important features of the conflict may still be described in these terms, social scientists today might take a rather different view of the state, in its two different representations in Uganda and the Kingdom of Buganda. Rather than seeing these in monolithic terms as representations of generalised sets of interests they might see 'the state' in each case as the instrument of particular groups of people. After the elapse of a decade or more one thing which emerges from an examination of these narrower interests dominating the growth of the Ugandan state is that they were not neatly divided on ethnic or even regional lines - although it was common to apologise for political problems

in these terms. If many wealthy and influential Baganda did not have some overriding interests in the independent state of Uganda, it is unlikely that the state of Buganda could have been extinguished with such ease. Likewise, it is fair to assume that these concerted interests in the Ugandan state had some influence on the emergence of the institutions of central and local government, which are the subject of this book.

At the time of independence, it was abundantly clear that the central political issue was the presence within Uganda of the well-developed, coherent state of Buganda. As we have seen in Chapters 2 and 3, compared with other parts of Uganda, Buganda was well-endowed with natural resources, wealthy and heavily populated. Its early contacts with the outside world had given it an eminence which even led to the adoption of the Swahili version of its name for the wider territory of the Protectorate. It had developed a monarchic political system with a hierarchy of territorial chiefs and patterns of office-holding which were symptomatic of emerging bureaucracy. These patterns were selectively consolidated under colonial rule and, as we have seen in the case of Bugisu (Chapter 5) became the model for administration in other regions, by the agency of Ganda 'sub-imperialism'.¹² As part of this process a ruling class (a term which Audrey Richards uses quite insistently) was established in Buganda and the surrounding territories under British tutelage. From the 1900 Agreement which distributed freehold land to an arbitrary list of 1,000 chiefs and officials arose the landowner 'class' of chiefs and administrators in Buganda. In turn, the ruling elite of Uganda was drawn from this class and from much smaller cognate groups in other districts. This elite inherited Uganda, a construction of remarkably diverse elements united under the British flag. It is commonplace to remark on the zeal with which independent African governments have sought to preserve the boundaries constructed for them by the Imperial powers. If ordinary people in the localities of these new countries take less cognisance of international boundaries it is perhaps because they are neither the direct heirs of the agencies which constructed them, nor are they the immediate beneficiaries of the international ententes which perpetuate these boundaries.

Ordinary people might understandably take greater interest in the geo-political limits of Buganda, or Bunyoro, or Ankole; if they did so, it was largely because their minds had been focussed by their involvement in a complex set of long-standing, centralised political institutions. In fabricating the new state of Uganda the colonial authorities, as we have seen in this book, devoted a great deal of energy to developing a further series of uniform institutions, reaching down from the government of the Protectorate to the most distant localities. True, there were vast areas like Karamoja where, as Tamukedde discovered, central authorities had established no more than a tenuous presence, and where the special Administrator was obliged to depend on a glib tongue or sturdy legs. At Independence, the government of

Uganda still differed considerably in its manifestations in the various regions and districts, and the fragility of new institutions on the periphery contrasted awkwardly with the solidity of government in Buganda.

Territorial integrity was as potent an issue to the Buganda state as it might have been to any other modern, independent nation. Indeed it was the specific issue of the 'Lost Counties' claimed by Bunyoro which drove a wedge between Mutesa's role as Kabaka and his role as President of Uganda, and which helped to precipitate the crisis of May 1966. However, when Uganda handed over to Kenya 2,000 square miles of the distant Karapokot territory on September 2nd 1970, it is unlikely that the ordinary Ugandan had any inkling of what was happening and why.¹³ To put it mildly, the citizens of Buganda were more informed and more distressed about the return of two outlying and thinly populated sazas to that old enemy, Bunyoro, in 1965.

Compared with Uganda, Buganda was a well-rehearsed reality in the minds of a million and more of its people. In this generalised sense, it was conspicuously 'more integrated', and it seems absurd to dismiss the greater maturity of Buganda as a state, and the greater public comprehension of this, as 'mere tribalism' or 'inveterate traditionalism'. Although it might have been a matter of devout wish-fulfilment in the minds of its rulers, public comprehension of Uganda as a state was much more tenuous, exacerbated by erratic political and constitutional development.¹⁴ In these circumstances it is remarkable that, once it had been launched, the enterprise of an independent Ugandan state acquired a potency which Buganda, regardless of its wealth, population and traditions of centralised authority, could not rival. In spite of the progress it had made towards 'modernisation', a syncretism of 'traditional' and 'modern' institutions, the dilemma of being a 'state within a state' remained. This was a political issue which went beyond the viability of governmental structures and functions.

It is significant that Ganda resistance to colonial rule should have provided the main thrust towards Independence; in the process many Ganda nationalists discovered an identity as Ugandan nationalists, no doubt enticed by the prospect of falling heir to the British. It was not, after all, very likely that they could fall heir to the Kabaka. It is important to note that 'Uganda's achievement of independence was not...the result of a mass movement. It was the work of an elite, aided and encouraged, particularly in Cohen's time, by a few able officials'.¹⁵ The Uganda National Congress was led by Ganda intellectuals, and the Progressive Party was established in 1955 by a group of Budo School and Makerere College graduates. The Ganda chiefs remained hostile to the emerging political parties until the Kabaka Yekka gave them a royalist voice in June 1961. A coalition between the KY and the Uganda People's Congress, a splinter group of the UNC, brought Milton Obote to power in the Independence elections of February 1962. This awkward

marriage of convenience lasted only until 1965, when the UPC had greatly strengthened its membership in the legislature. The strength of nationalist sentiment is evident in Tamukedde's narrative (Chapter 4): he raised his voice, notwithstanding the restrictions of his role as a civil servant, against the inhibitions of colonial rule, and he represents himself as a devoted and very professional Ugandan administrator. His loyalty and sentimental attachment to Buganda remain, but do not displace his commitment to the new Independent state of Uganda.

Buganda was a valuable instrument of colonial over-rule; it was also a valuable instrument for the nationalists seeking independence for Uganda. In an obituary notice The Times could declare of the Kabaka that when he returned on the 7th October 1955 from two years of political exile, he was 'an anti-colonial hero, as well as a traditional monarch who had maintained his position'.¹⁶ However, to the heirs of the colonial state, the Kabaka and his kingdom soon became an encumbrance. After a short honeymoon period, in which newspapers liked to photograph the children of the President (Mutesa) and the Prime Minister (Obote) playing happily together, the two men became bitter enemies. If Buganda had been a thorn in the flesh of the colonial government, the awkward federal status it had acquired in the Independence constitution was intolerable to Obote and his colleagues. Ideologically, however, he held one vital trump card: while the new Ugandan state was definitively modern, a legitimate member of a global community of modern states, the kingdom of Buganda could be stigmatised as traditional. This polar distinction, indicative of relative progress and development, was amply reinforced by the social science of the day.

One branch of social science which was less enthusiastic about this distinction was social anthropology which, by way of the EAISR, had gained a firm foothold on Makerere hill. In the least flattering representations, anthropologists were regarded as ardent traditionalists, myopic partisans of small, backward communities. The subject was regarded with little enthusiasm in many newly-independent countries, and in both university departments and the study and practice of 'development' it was subsumed under the ostensibly more progressive label 'sociology'. Some credence is still apparently attached to the notion that anthropologists invented the bogey of tribalism to facilitate colonial over-rule. However, the anthropology practised under the aegis of EAISR was undoubtedly progressive, breaking important new ground in the fields of comparative politics, medicine and nutrition, and in the study of migration. In a world much preoccupied with change, the anthropological offence was to insist on the importance, *de facto*, of continuity. When the world grew disillusioned with 'modernisation' in the 1970s, there was some nostalgic re-evaluation of 'tradition' - readily equated with the simple life and smallness of political scale. Anthropologists might feel that neither representation does justice to the objects of their enquiry.

The falseness of the traditional/modern dichotomy was not exposed until later in the 1960s when, for example, the ¹⁷ Rudolphi insisted on 'The Modernity of Tradition' in India.

The belief that it was possible to dispose effectively of the iniquitous 'traditions' of Buganda, to dispatch them 'down the gutter of history' (see page 30), was misconceived; 'tradition' and 'modernity' simply did not resolve themselves into discrete and manipulable categories. As we have seen, like so many other features of Ganda political organisation the 'traditions' of chiefship necessarily survived, because the modern state could offer no effective alternative. Discontent among the chiefs and people of Buganda likewise persisted. Indeed, the strength of the Ganda state rested in large measure on the extent to which 'traditions' (clear political continuity with the past) and 'modern institutions' (bureaucracy) had become intermingled. With its strong identity and trappings of modern government it was at least as viable as other small colonial territories pursuing independent statehood in the 1950s and 1960s. However, the Kabaka's ultimatum to the central government to quit Buganda territory by the end of May 1966 was ridiculous, in the eyes of the UN Secretary General to whom the Kabaka addressed his final plea and to the 'modern' world at large. At this time, action against the Ganda state was focussed on the person of Mutesa, and in retrospect he stood as an incongruous epitome of tradition; suave, educated and cosmopolitan, he presented a curious contrast to Obote, who liked it to be known that he was once a herdsboy in his native Lango district. Nevertheless, Obote could berate the former for 'apparently living in the stone-age',¹⁸ confident that he himself represented the spearhead of modernisation in Uganda. Coming from a region which was geographically central, but which lacked centralised political institutions, Obote was certainly a more plausible leader for the integrative revolution than most of his rivals, notably the hapless first Prime Minister of Uganda, Benedicto Kiwanuka, who despite his commitment to the new state carried the stigma of Ganda ethnic identity.

However potent the symbolism of tradition and modernity may have been at the time, it is now clear that the Ugandan state did not simply draw its strength from ideology. It prospered because it was the central link with the metropolitan centres of capitalism which purchased its cotton and coffee and financed its 'development' in the form of aid programmes. These links were forged by the colonial state, and sustained by the new corps of indigenous leaders. In this chain of relationships Buganda was dependent on Uganda, and had very little opportunity to establish direct bonds of its own with the wider world. Although for many decades it had been the major zone of economic expansion within Uganda, drawing labour and other resources from the surrounding regions, its economy was mediated by Ugandan officials - a cardinal source of resentment within Buganda. Control of national wealth, in the name of the state, was a matter of acute concern to dominant interests in Kampala,

from which the internal links of dependency extended. The hand of the Buganda state was correspondingly weakened by the alacrity with which wealthy and influential Baganda sought to ally themselves with the Ugandan elite.

However, the obverse of this particular coin was that Buganda as an economic unit was indispensable to Uganda. At the height of the 1966 crisis, Dr. Obote made the obvious remark that the secession of Buganda was out of the question: 'the Uganda government and the Uganda parliament are here to stay. Buganda will be a part of both.'¹⁹ Deprived of the former kingdom, Uganda would be economically and politically unviable. Dr. Obote undoubtedly recognised that the compliance of the Ganda farmers was essential and that further alienation of their interests was not profitable. It is probably for this reason that his approach to them was one of appeasement during the years of the First Republic, rather than reprisal.

The Structures of Reconciliation

In contrast with the departing European officials, the African leaders of Uganda were proud to think of themselves as a part of the native population. In this respect, Dr. Obote's allusions to his relatively humble origins in Lango were a useful expression of popular solidarity. At the time of Independence, 'integration' and 'nation-building' were seen in terms of reconciling the diverse segments of the Ugandan population, and much less in terms of reconciling leaders to led. However, the very act of characterising 'tribalism' or 'regionalism' as the evils of the day served to bring other categoric identities into play. Religious identities were endemic in the politics of the country, but during the course of the 1960s even they were quite successfully played down in national arenas. Instead, fostered by the socialist rhetoric of the First Republic, images of class were evoked and this in turn focussed attention on the increasing disparities between dominant groups in Kampala and the people in the rural districts of Uganda.

The instruments of government acquired from the British did not lend themselves to a mobilisation of public sentiment in the interests of a united Uganda. At the time of Independence the new government sought to come to terms with its people largely by way of institutions imported from Westminster and Whitehall by the departing colonial officials. One of the most insistent principles, referred to in the earlier chapters of this book, was the disengagement of civil servants from politics; a man like Tamukedde clearly took a pragmatic view of this and does not appear to have been strongly censured for making his opinions known. Party politics, as an instrument of popular mobilisation and government, was also constrained: in the legislative assembly parliamentarians struggled to express themselves in the English language, and sought to reconcile the 'mathematics of democracy' with their constituents' more parochial claims for

patronage.²⁰ At the cost of appearing 'more traditional' and therefore less progressive, the government of Buganda operated under fewer constraints of this kind. Business was conducted in the vernacular, and the political engagement of officials was clearly expressed in the presence of the *saza* chiefs as 'representatives of the people' in the *Lukiiko*, the Ganda parliament.

The eminent functionalist and analyst of political modernisation in Uganda and elsewhere, David Apter, has provided a useful label for the kind of integrative strategy adopted by Ugandan leaders immediately before and after Independence: 'reconciliation'.²¹ Implying an attempt to achieve national integration through democratic participation in increasingly elaborate bureaucratic structures, an approach which Apter saw epitomised in India, this contrasts with 'mobilisation', the pursuit of loyalty among the masses mainly through the agency of political parties. Ghana in the heyday of Nkrumah's Convention People's Party provided a good example of this second integrative strategy. Both Mittelman²² and Mazrui²³ have suggested that this contrast distinguishes the successive policies pursued by Milton Obote during the 1960s. There are many traces of a reconciliation strategy in the earlier chapters of this book, particularly in the degree of formality and uniformity achieved in the units, personnel and processes of local government. On the recommendation of the Wallis report in 1952, the colonial government sought to 'reconcile' Uganda in terms of British institutions of local administration and government. The consequent efforts to circumscribe chiefly office and to extend public participation by way of elected councils are described in Chapter 2. The effects were very uneven in the various districts: while in the kingdoms chiefs quite successfully resisted the influence of the councils, in areas like Bugisu where chiefs were themselves relatively new, the councils soon gained the upper hand. The reflex action of central government, expressed in a somewhat erratic series of amendments to Ordinances and Acts, was to assume greater control over local affairs. The appointment of chiefs, tentatively entrusted to the district councils, was eventually vested in the Ministry of Regional Administrations.

Protected by its quasi-federal status, Buganda was largely exempted from these manoeuvres. Expatriate observers of Dr. Obote's actions to remedy this in the months leading up to the crisis of May 1966 were astonished by his audacity. He sacked Mutesa from the Presidency, suspended the constitution on the 24th February, offered a new one on the 15th April, banned public meetings on 1st March, and finally resorted to a sharp show of physical force on 24th May. In retrospect, we may ask whether these acts were really so hazardous. By all accounts, after the reckoning with Buganda the new moves were accepted in other parts of Uganda with little demur.²⁴ Those trappings of centralised authority acquired by the districts in emulation of Buganda, (for example the ceremonial heads such as the *Kyabazinga* of

Busoga and the Umuvinga of Bugisu) were quickly forgotten. Opposition and disaffection in Buganda evidently remained, and the official state of emergency there was renewed at six-monthly intervals by the central government as a contingency measure, until shortly after Amin's coup d'etat in January 1971.

In many parts of Buganda the popular call to arms on 23rd May 1966 was rapid and painfully effective. There is insufficient documentary evidence to construct a general interpretation of this response, either as the effective mobilisation of party branches of the royalist Kabaka Yekka, or as some kind of public reflex to the threatened decapitation of the Ganda civil order. Events in the particular locality of Kangulumira, Bugerere saza, suggest it was a bit of both: new immigrants to the area obeyed, with obvious misgivings, the call to arms as a civil instruction, but lagged behind the Ganda enthusiasts.²⁵ The attitude of the local gombolola chief was ambivalent: he was 'neatly suited and standing in the background. He had played no part in organising the defences of the town. "The people have chosen...now I can only watch and wait. I pray for no trouble."²⁶ Physical violence was met with prompt responses in kind by the army, and thereafter Dr. Obote had to contend with little more than grumbling disaffection. Stern measures were taken against the Kabaka himself and his Katikkiro, Mr. Mayanja Nkangi. Both took refuge in Britain but it is notable that they were not accompanied by a wave of Ganda political refugees. Ganda public figures, particularly those working outside the framework of the kingdom government, were no doubt anxious as Dr. Obote pursued his showdown, but they were also largely mute. Some may have winced to see the 'traditions' of Buganda assaulted, but there was more concern about the alleged destruction of the ceremonial drums than the dismantling of the apparatus of the Kabaka's government. There seems no doubt that serious opposition from this elite quarter would have weakened Dr. Obote's hand considerably, but apparently he knew he could count on their silence, if not their complicity. Western observers, with their high expectations of some vague tribal or traditional solidarity, may have simply overrated the interest of the most influential and wealthy Baganda in the perpetuation, after Independence, of the Ganda state.

As this book has documented, the most stern reprisals were directed against the Ganda chiefs (see table 3b, Part II), that 'class' of public officials who had their roots in the agricultural wealth of the kingdom. As Audrey Richards has emphasised in Chapter 3, their political roots were no less important, and no matter how strenuously the new wave of party appointees sought to identify themselves with the UPC and central authority, in local terms they lacked the vital qualifications of established patronage and wealth. Insofar as the ejected chiefs represented the political cohesion of Buganda, they were obvious victims of Dr. Obote's efforts to suppress the Ganda state. Insofar as the chiefly class, more than any other grouping, had direct interests in the

perpetuation of the Ganda state, they could be expected to offer resistance to the central government.

After May 1966, evidence of the active disaffection of the Baganda is unimpressive. The most significant act of civil violence was the attempt on Dr. Obote's life on 19th December 1969, as he was leaving the annual Delegates Conference of the UPC. Injured in the face, he spent a week in hospital; a nationwide state of emergency was declared and the Democratic Party and other political organisations were banned. The membership and motivations of this conspiracy are not clear, but 26 people were detained, most of them Baganda. A motley crew, they included a relative of the Kabaka, a defrocked priest and a motor mechanic. Five of them were given life sentences.²⁷ For some observers, this event provided Dr. Obote with the cue for a shift to a sterner and more repressive style of government, and an effective opportunity to proscribe the opposition parties. Other minor political gestures were certainly used as a pretext for keeping a tight political rein on Buganda. The Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions said of the only other Ganda conspiracy of any significance 'that the plot had no real chance of success and that the plotters' resources were "pitifully small"'.²⁸ Six men and one woman were committed for trial in August 1968, accused of plotting to overthrow the Ugandan government with Southern Sudanese assistance, to arrest Dr. Obote, and to keep him for public display in a zoo.

Two other incidents are worthy of mention. The first was the defection during 1967 of a number of Democratic Party and former Kabaka Yekka Members of Parliament to the ruling UPC; on 5th September eleven of them were expelled from the UPC, Dr. Obote alleging that they had infiltrated the ranks of the party with a view to subverting it.²⁹ The second involved the MP and lawyer Mr. Abu Mayanja who, with the Asian editor of the journal 'Transition', Mr. Rajat Neogy, was arrested on charges of sedition. Mr. Mayanja had complained that Africanisation of the Uganda High Court was being delayed because the President was reluctant to confirm the appointment of the most qualified candidates, who happened to be Baganda.³⁰ Neither of these incidents can be regarded as an appeal for the re-establishment of the Ganda state, although they might conveniently be made to appear as such. Mr. Mayanja's complaint was quite specifically about Dr. Obote's apparent failure to play fair with the allocation of high office within the Ugandan state. On 1st February 1969 both men were acquitted, but immediately rearrested under the new Emergency Powers Act; Neogy was released a month later but Mayanja remained in detention.³¹

Having eschewed tribalism, and regarding its very mention as a threat to public order, Dr. Obote was understandably 'deeply offended' by Mr. Mayanja's insinuations.³² Although his influence on the distribution of public funds and public offices later brought charges of tribalism on Dr. Obote's own head, he could perhaps declare with feeling that some of his best friends were Baganda. Until he resigned in May 1967

ostensibly on grounds of poor health, Mr. Godfrey Binaisa, a Muganda, was Dr. Obote's Attorney General. Although his position made him one of the most conspicuous Ganda 'traitors' he was certainly not alone in his complicity with the ruling UPC government. After the 1966 showdown Dr. Obote took great care to co-opt dominant Ganda interests at the highest levels of government and administration. Tamukedde's autobiography (Chapter 4) illustrates this well: in 1967 he was summoned back from Karamoja where he had been the government's special Administrator, and was appointed Secretary for Administration in the new Ministry of Public Service and Cabinet Affairs.³³ This former Ganda chief and troubleshooter for both the colonial and postcolonial governments was given special responsibility for Buganda Affairs. His refusal to co-operate fully in the purge of chiefs aroused Dr. Obote's wrath, but after a spell of house arrest (on full salary) his talents were soon redeployed in the Western region. Nominally demoted to District Commissioner but continuing to draw his Permanent Secretary's salary, he was in charge of the increasingly delicate problems of insurgency and border incursions in that region. There can be no doubt that Tamukedde fared a great deal better than dissident civil servants in other states around the world, just as there can be no doubt that Tamukedde was an administrator of very great courage, integrity and ability. He was prepared to apply his energy and talents to the reconstruction and modernisation of Karamoja, Toro, or Buganda, a fact which clearly did not escape Dr. Obote. In this regard it is important to note that his objection to the purge of chiefs was on bureaucratic rather than tribal grounds: efficient chiefs were being victimised along with the inefficient. Tamukedde's reputation as a devoted Ugandan was later recognised by his award of the Second Republic Medal by President Amin.

Mobilisation and the Discovery of the Bureaucratic Elite

On 2nd February 1967 the Uganda High Court, sitting as a constitutional court, ruled that Obote's interim constitution of 1966 was the valid and legal consequence of a revolution or coup d'etat. The ruling came as part of a judgement on an application for a writ of habeas corpus in respect of Mr. Michael Matovu, a former Ganda saza chief who had been detained under the emergency regulations. Chief Justice Sir Udo Uduma declared that 'it is beyond question that the series of events which took place in Uganda last year, as a result of which the then Prime Minister was installed as President, could only be described in law as a revolution. The decisive characteristic of a revolution was the overthrow of an order and its replacement by a new order not previously envisaged under the old order.' He continued to remark that the judges were of the opinion that the new President had been accepted by the people of Uganda and was firmly established; the fact that Uganda had been formally recognised abroad was of considerable importance.³⁴

His jural designation as a revolutionary leader had a decisive effect on Dr. Obote's construction of his role in

the future of Uganda. Taking the initiative he propelled the new Republican constitution through parliament, convened as a constituent assembly, in a mere three months. Two weeks after it came into force on 8th September 1967, the new Local Administrations Bill discussed in Chapter 2 had passed into law. With these moves Dr. Obote intimated a shift from strategies of 'reconciliation' towards a more direct mobilisation of the Ugandan people. Ali Mazrui has observed:

"Milton Obote had won his place in history by ending the old order. But the task of creating a new order had only just begun. And the Baganda had to be full and willing participants in any new order. This desire to create a new order may well have been one of the reasons behind Obote's renewed interest in the techniques of mobilization. The national service scheme, The Common Man's Charter, the partial nationalization of industry in May 1970, and the new one-party system for Uganda were all indications of an Obote who wanted to move from reconciliation to mobilization. They symbolized his ambition to move from issues of national survival to questions of national transformation."³⁵

In the process an awkward dialectic emerged between politics and administration, between the upper and lower echelons of government, and ultimately between rulers and ruled. In efforts to 'modernise' government, both the British models of central authority and the 'traditional' Ganda models of local authority had been viewed with increasing suspicion. From 1967 the issue of what other models of government might be more appropriate to an independent Uganda was submerged in the shift from constitution-building to nation-building, and from a concern with structure towards a preoccupation with ideology.³⁶ This was expressed in Dr. Obote's search for an authentic brand of socialism of the kind proposed by Kyerere, Nkrumah and Sekou Touré.

On 1st November 1968 Dr. Obote intimated his 'Move to the Left'. Developing this theme at the opening of the third session of the new National Assembly the following February, he spoke of 'giving assistance to the majority of our people' and of the dangers of 'looking after only those persons who had already bettered their position'.³⁷ The revolutionary rhetoric was more precise in 'The Common Man's Charter - First Steps for Uganda to Move to the Left', published in October 1969. Adopted at the next annual delegates conference of the UPC, this eleven-page document dwelt at length on the disparities of income and wealth in Uganda;³⁸ in so doing it focussed attention on the emerging middle class in whose hands the government and administration of the country rested. Having just disposed of the state of Buganda, Dr. Obote's choice of words is very revealing: 'We cannot afford to build two nations within the territorial boundaries of Uganda: one rich, educated, African in appearance but mentally foreign, and the other, which constitutes the majority of the population, poor and illiterate...Conditions must be created to enable the fruits of Independence to reach each and every citizen without some citizens enjoying privileged positions or living on the sweat

of their fellow citizens.³⁹ This new integrative theme was reiterated on numerous occasions; for example at a UPC meeting on 19th December 1970 Dr. Obote insisted that 'the biggest of us all, the richest of us all, and perhaps the highest educated of us all cannot stand without the support of the Common Man'.⁴⁰

A consequence of this rhetorical shift was that the problem of Buganda was no longer described as one of tribalism, but as feudalism. At the time of Independence 'the then privileged positions of the feudalists were a barrier to the full and effective participation of the common man in the Government of Independent Uganda. The feudalists wanted to continue to rule as they used to before the coming of the British and they did not want the common man to have a say in the shaping of the destiny of an independent Uganda. That situation, however, is no longer with us. Uganda is now a Republic.'⁴¹ 'Feudalism', it might be said, was a piece of intellectual cant, no more reliable in exploring the 'avenues of reality'⁴² than was the vocabulary of 'tradition' and 'modernity'. Dr. Obote was not unaware of this, as one section of The Common Man's Charter, quoted here in full, indicates:

"The emergence and growth of a privileged group in our society, together with the open possibilities of the group assuming the powers of the feudal elements, are not matters of theory and cannot be disregarded with a wave of the hand. Nor should the same be looked at from a doctrinaire approach. It is for this reason that in this Charter we do not intend to play with words, even if those words have meanings, such as 'capitalism' or 'Communism'. We are convinced that from the standpoint of our history, not only our educational system inherited from pre-Independence days, but also the attitudes of modern commerce and industry and the position of a person in authority, in or outside Government, are creating a gap between the well-to-do on the one hand and the mass of the people on the other. As the years go by, this gap will become wider and wider. The Move to the Left Strategy of this Charter aims at bridging the gap and arresting this development."⁴³

Although it could not make a direct appeal to tribal sentiment, the socialist rhetoric, as Mazrui has noted,⁴⁴ was still intent on securing the loyalty of the Baganda. As early as June 1966 Dr. Obote was insisting that 'it was a rebellion by the top which had caused the trouble and not by the masses in Buganda. What we are trying to do is punish the top and serve the masses'.⁴⁵ However, as we have seen, rooting out the 'feudalists' in the form of the Ganda chiefs did nothing to improve the effectiveness of local government, nor did the new UPC appointees endear themselves to the Ganda 'masses'.

Dr. Obote's efforts to mobilise the people of Uganda were not, of course, bent on promoting class war; he was, however, concerned to place some very specific political

responsibilities on the heads of all public officials. Laying the foundation stone of the new UPC headquarters ('Uganda House') in Kampala on 8th October 1967, Dr. Obote forecast that in future civil servants would be 'associated closely with the Party'. Anyone who was not 'should be exposed so that the whole country should be aware of his selfish and perhaps subversive aims'.⁴⁶ This theme was developed in Dr. Obote's 'Communication from the Chair of the National Assembly...on the Occasion of the Ceremonial Opening of Parliament on 20th April, 1970'.⁴⁷ He insisted that:

"In practical terms it will no longer be possible for any Public Officer anywhere in Uganda to tell any member of the public that he (the officer) does not know how a particular Government policy and direction came to be adopted and issued, and to thrust upon that member of the public, in a carefree manner a retort that the issue of his or her complaint was adopted by the Government elected by that member of the public, a Government to which the Officer does not belong and is a mere functionary. All officers in the Public Service are from now onwards truly part of the Government, and anyone who may be found either not to be serving the Government in his true capacity, or undermining the interests of the public, or adopting the attitude of being outside the executive branch of the Government, yet at the end of every month is all too desirous of getting not only his basic salary but also other fringe benefits, will be meted only one disciplinary measure, namely, dismissal from the Public Service."⁴⁸

There is no doubt that many administrators, particularly those schooled in British civil service mores, found this new commitment to let their political left hands know what their administrative right hands were doing, very disconcerting. To a considerable extent they were protected by a number of institutional compromises. In this book we discussed in some detail the dual structure of district administration established in 1967, in which the 'career civil servant' and the 'political' officials were distinguished (see Chapter 2, and Part II figure 1b). Here it could be said that a 'reconciliation' solution of bureaucratic division of labour was substituting for the intention of 'mobilisation' in which political and administrative roles were supposed to be fused. Only in this way could the tasks of local administration be performed efficiently and continuously. It has been remarked that the (civil servant) DC was probably more powerful during the First Republic than during the colonial period;⁴⁹ in this and in many other respects Obote's Uganda resembles very closely the experience of Nkrumah's Ghana.⁵⁰

If organising the politicisation of the civil service proved intractable, even less progress was made towards establishing formal structures and procedures for the representation of the people. In the interim it was crudely supposed that the instrument of mobilisation, the UPC, could also serve as a means of articulating public interest. Party

branches were reckoned to be a reasonable surrogate for local councils, now it was assumed that UPC interests were cognate with every conceivable kind of legitimate interest. In 'Document Number Five' of 'The Move to the Left' in April 1970, new and complex procedures for representation of the people were proposed, seeking 'to link the political intelligentsia with the voting peasantry in all four corners of the nation'⁵¹ by obliging candidates to stand for election in four constituencies simultaneously, one in each of Uganda's regions. Plans for a general election were cut short by the coup d'etat in January 1971.

The new political expectations of chiefs and administrators only served to weaken the already attenuated authority of local government, not only in Buganda. This in turn emphasised the discontinuity between local officials and the burgeoning ranks of the national bureaucracy. Suzette Heald describes local government as the 'poor sister' of the central authorities in Bugisu (see page 81). In the 1950s a great deal of effort was expended on the development of local administration, and men like Tamukedde could aspire to promotion from the lower ranks of chiefship to the exalted status of District Commissioner. In the 1960s the focus of expansion shifted as a new group of well-qualified bureaucrats was drawn in to replace the departing colonial officials. This group developed in a centripetal fashion, filling out the offices of central government and filtering down into senior administrative positions in the regions. As we have seen in the earlier chapters of this book, 'reconciliation' strategies concentrated on the ramification of central government structures, while reform in local government was more subtractive, attenuating functions and authority, and diminishing the privileges and career prospects of chiefs and local officials. For them the prospects of promotion, an established feature of the Ganda system, were increasingly blocked off by the countervailing expansion into the districts of the central government bureaucracy and its younger, university-qualified officials.

While chiefship came to offer mediocre rewards for mediocre qualifications, the interests of the rising middle class in Uganda were focussed on the proliferation of central government offices and institutions. It seems clear that during the 1960s the elite conception of chiefship, and by association local government, was of something discrete from the structures and processes of modern government; in the pervasive dichotomy of the time, it could be regarded as essentially 'traditional'. 'Traditions of chiefship' may be viewed very differently by the residents of comfortable suburban villas in capital cities, whose encounters with local officials in the countryside are often no more than childhood memories, and by the chiefs themselves and the people in rural villages.⁵² For them, chiefship may be a complex feature of contemporary social and economic life, not just a set of vague and rather otiose ceremonial functions. It might not be too cynical to suggest that for the sophisticated urbanite a 'tradition' which does not earn its keep (for example as 'airport art') is expendable,

unless it serves as symbolic cover for some cogent material interests. Today, one does not have to be an anthropologist to recognise that the same 'tradition' may have saliently different connotations for the people who actually perpetrate it, whether they are an urban Kabaka protesting about the 'desecration' of his kingdom⁵³ or a village headman attempting to muster sufficient judicial authority to settle a difference of opinion between two neighbours.

Uganda Versus the Academic Elite

These distinctions between the upper and the lower echelons of government, and more generally between the leaders and the led, inevitably return us to the relationship between class and state - a relationship which, as we have seen, became an increasing source of vexation to Dr. Obote in the construction of his Republic. However it may be identified, the rising 'elite', 'middle class' or 'bourgeoisie' in Uganda was very closely involved in the elaboration of the institutions and offices of central government. A coherent description of this dominant class has yet to be proposed, and tentative efforts to date are undoubtedly coloured by strong doctrinal preferences.⁵⁴ The interests which undoubtedly did emerge during the 1960s have been labelled variously as the 'governing bureaucracy',⁵⁵ the 'colonised African elite',⁵⁶ and the 'government political clientele'.⁵⁷ Major commercial interests were still largely in Asian and European hands, and co-opted Africans only as a matter of strategic advantage. According to Mamdani, in the years following Independence the 'government bureaucracy' was rapidly becoming the core, rather than just a fraction of the emerging bourgeoisie.⁵⁸ Economic reforms like the nationalisation of major enterprises promoted this tendency, bringing the economy much more within the grip of the African central government officials.

The assertion that the 'public service bourgeoisie' was a creation of the colonial authorities⁵⁹ is perhaps another way of saying that the colonial administration was concerned to select and enculturate a cadre of Africans to assist its own officers and, as Independence approached, to replace them. So long as British officials monopolised the upper echelons of the administration the involvement of Africans was largely confined to clerical offices and local government.⁶⁰ Tarsis Kabwegyere has remarked that Makerere College was founded in 1921⁶¹ to produce 'artisans to occupy low positions in the administrative structure at lost cost'.⁶² With the post-war move towards Independence there was a pronounced shift in the role of Makerere towards supplying officials for the highest echelons of government. In 1950 Makerere College started preparing students for London University external degrees. By the 1960s Makerere was a constituent college of the University of East Africa and bright young graduates were being placed almost immediately in senior civil service posts. There seems little doubt that further unimpeded development would have distributed increasing numbers of

graduates at progressively lower levels of the civil service hierarchy - perhaps as part of an interesting transformation of the offices of chiefship.

The role of higher education as a bridge into the senior ranks of the civil service, and thereby into the emergent middle class, became another source of vexation to Dr. Obote. It was increasingly apparent that by gaining formal qualifications, often in subjects which were not obviously related to the performance of civil service roles, the offspring of relatively wealthy chiefs and farmers acquired a privileged place in Ugandan society. Thereafter they were rewarded directly by the state but, as in many other developing countries, they were inclined to invest back into land and agricultural enterprise. Their privileged access to state-supplied capital, goods and services enabled them to operate farms on quite a different scale to those of their parents; in the 1960s many of them had become the proprietors of substantial ranches, market gardens and agricultural estates.⁶³ There were observers who doubted that these capital intensive enterprises, financed indirectly at the expense of peasant agriculture, were the most sensible use of national resources. It is interesting to reflect that land grants and a direct involvement in farming had for long been an institutionalised feature of chiefship in Buganda, a 'feudal' privilege much resented and acted against by Dr. Obote at the time of the 1966 crisis.

The economic interests of a 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' are, of course, rarely a matter of public record, and it is notoriously difficult to distinguish fact from innuendo. It is certainly not fashionable to ascribe altruistic motives to civil servants, although such motives are not incompatible with consolidation of class interests. It is not easy to detect such interests in Tamukedde's autobiography, or to fault his perception of his career in terms of bourgeois 'false consciousness'. In the very particular case of Dr. Obote, subsequently a pensioner of the Tanzanian government, there is no clear evidence that he used his high office for his material advantage; indeed in his later days as President there are signs of genuine alienation from the expanding middle class, its powers and privileges. If these things remain a matter for speculation it is largely because class identities and class interests were still, like the state itself, in a relatively early, formative phase during the years of the First Republic.

Dr. Obote was outspoken in his criticism of the expanding interests and the declining enthusiasm of civil servants; in his April 1970 'Communication from the Chair' he initiated some stern action against their apparent preoccupation with the perquisites of office and secure promotion up the bureaucratic hierarchy. Increments, allowances and principles of seniority were curtailed, and the way cleared for the engagement of new 'bright young men and women'.⁶⁴ The result, according to Mazrui, was not an

access of enthusiasm and efficiency in the civil service, but the onset of a process of 'destabilization'.⁶⁵ As Dr. Obote redoubled his efforts at mobilisation he was met increasingly with anxiety and a lack of political enthusiasm which Nelson Kasfir has labelled 'departicipation'.⁶⁶

In his crusade for the Common Man it was not long before Dr. Obote turned his attention to that 'hotbed of elitism', Makerere College. Having already called at the 1968 UPC delegates conference for a determined move towards more freely available, technical and vocational patterns of higher education, he appointed a Visitation Committee in January 1970 to report to him on the ways in which Makerere could be made to serve the needs of the Ugandan people and the 'Move to the Left'. The Visitors spoke of 'the dissatisfaction which had arisen in the recent past when large sections of the public had complained that Makerere was an "ivory tower" or was becoming a "State within a State"'.⁶⁷ They spoke of the 'University we recommend' in these terms:

"The new University must be a completely different institution in its character, composition, role and outlook from Makerere University College. The College was born out of a colonial era when capitalism, feudalism and foreign domination were the order of the day. The new University, however, is being born in a revolutionary socialist era when a united, coherent and homogenous society with equal opportunities for all is being created. Thus the University must not be an "ivory tower"; it must not be an institution to which the lucky few go, to obtain an education to entitle them to further privileges; it must not be an institution where foreign ideologies and foreign ways of life are perpetuated; it must not be a sanctuary where intellectuals can indulge in all sorts of pursuits regardless of the wishes and needs of society. The University must be a Ugandan institution. It must be a University of the people of Uganda."⁶⁸

With its large international community of expatriate scholars Makerere was almost as well known in the world at large as Uganda itself. For Dr. Obote, it had developed a mind of its own which did not accord well with his pursuit of an authentically Ugandan species of socialism. Local and expatriate members of faculty alike looked in some dismay at the curricula prescribed by the Visitors, wondering how they might sustain an entire course on 'Uganda Musical Instruments and how they are played', or how they might contrive to give equal emphasis to 'Ancient Political Thought' and 'The Common Man's Charter - Dr. Milton Obote'.⁶⁹ Predictably, the reforms proposed for Political Science and Public Administration were the most sweeping:

"We are firmly of the view that Political Science and Public Administration is vital to the achievement of the goals of the socialist course of development Uganda has opted to take. The teaching of Political Science at the University level can become a vehicle of political subversion and brainwashing if it is placed in the wrong

hands, and more so in the hands of non-nationals. It is therefore imperative for the State to scrutinise what is taught and who teaches it. Political science should be taught with Uganda as the springboard. Immediately after being introduced to the general principles of this subject based on the concept of the 'State' as contrasted with other organisations, a student should be made to have a firm grasp of the origin and political development of Uganda as a State. With this as the basis, the student proceeds to the study and the understanding of African political ideas and problems and then relates them to those of the rest of the world."⁷⁰

The desire that academia should bend to the ideological will of the state was understandable, but the suggestion that Ugandan ideology was an established and coherent basis for intellectual discourse was, to say the least, optimistic.

The End of the First Republic

It is not easy to assess what Dr. Obote's zealous efforts to Move Uganda to the Left, and the alienating effects of these on the expanding middle class, contributed to his own downfall. There seems no doubt that the immediate reasons for the coup d'etat in January 1971 rested in mounting personal tension between President Obote and the leader of his armed forces, General Amin. The dawn broadcast on 25th January complained of many things, including 'the principle of a wealthy class of leaders who are already talking of socialism while they grow richer and the common man poorer'.⁷¹ While averring that it wished to end tribal and regional disparities, in planning and economic development the outgoing regime had shown a preference for Dr. Obote's own Lango district. A further cause for concern was the breakdown of law and order in the countryside, which was in turn a product of the collapse of local administration. Politics had interfered with the orderly running of the state; in May 1971 General Amin declared that his government had no room for chiefs who thought of themselves as politicians, and insisted that they must 'see that law and order is maintained by working hand in hand with the security forces...and fully to support our policies and implement them'.⁷²

The rapprochement of the new regime with the Baganda extended to the spectacular 'act of reconciliation' of the state funeral for the Kabaka Mutesa on 4th April 1971. In August of that year a group of Ganda elders led by the former Katikkiro, Mr. Myanja Nkangi, petitioned the new President for the re-establishment of the monarchy. General Amin was discouraging, and in his Independence Day speech on 10th October 1971 he declared 'I want to take this opportunity to state clearly and categorically that kingdoms will not be introduced and Uganda will not go back to the 1962 constitutional set-up'.⁷³ His relationship with the civil service after a brief period of appeasement, was not much more encouraging. In an early gesture he reversed some of the restrictions of Dr. Obote's 'Communication from the

Chair', but in the following year a serious pattern of attrition began, with the pensioning-off of 22 senior civil servants.⁷⁴ The army had already tripled its pre-coup strength of around 6,500 men⁷⁵ and the way was paved for the establishment of what Mazrui has called the 'Military Ethnocracy' in Uganda.⁷⁶ Battalion commanders assumed responsibility for regional administration and the appointment of chiefs and initially at least Amin continued the national integrative quest with his own version of 'detribalising the administrative system'.⁷⁷

However, it was not long before Idi Amin's eight-year reign of terror began in earnest. The caprices of the new dictator ranged from elaborate public executions to a ban on hot pants and mini skirts. In June 1974 the International Commission of Jurists, alerted by reports of pogroms in which many thousands of Ugandans had died, condemned the regime for massive violations of human rights. The depravity continued year after year, vouchsafed by international guarantees of sovereignty and funded by states whose desire for some political influence in this part of Africa outweighed scruples about the heinousness of the regime. Ultimately, Amin succumbed more because of his decreasing capacity to control his army than because of external threats.⁷⁸ Largely to galvanise the army he embarked on a campaign of territorial aggrandisement, signalled by a bizarre treatise published in 1976 in which he laid historical claim to a large swathe of East Africa from Juba in the Sudan to Nairobi in Kenya.⁷⁹ At the end of October 1978 Ugandan troops invaded North-west Tanzania and occupied the Kagera salient. The reprisals which this inevitably invited led, over a five month period, to military defeat and the dictator's hasty departure to Libya, and thence to Saudi Arabia.

In January 1979 Milton Obote broke eight years of silence imposed on him by political exile in Tanzania to urge Ugandans at home and abroad to fight for the overthrow of Amin. It was widely assumed that he would have much to gain from the Tanzanian intervention, but at the time he was constrained to declare that he had 'no personal office in Uganda to gain or regain'.⁸⁰ As Tanzanian troops, including a small force of Ugandan exiles, closed in on Masaka, a 'Save Uganda Movement' was mobilised within the country to assist them. After the capture of Kampala by the liberation army on April 11, President Nyerere convened a meeting of the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) at Moshi which elected Dr. Yosef Lule as its chairman. Dr. Obote, who had ousted Lule from his office as Vice-Chancellor at Makerere in 1970, was conspicuously absent from the meeting, but was reportedly at work with a small group of radicals in the University of Dar es Salaam on an updated version of 'The Common Man's Charter'.⁸¹

As the last of Amin's strongholds in the north fell in May 1979, Dr. Lule assumed the office of President. Notwithstanding the mood of jubilation, Uganda was indeed a 'broken-backed state'.⁸² Civil disorder was heightened by

the flood of returning refugees and new waves of reprisals. The economy was almost entirely 'black' ('magendo'), with inflation running at more than 1,000%. 'The administrative structures were also in ruins...at liberation Uganda was in some respects a country without a bureaucracy'.⁸³ Lule made conscientious efforts to reorganise the administration, but it seems that these only contributed to his downfall. Reverting to the 1960s model, he replaced the 10 Provinces and 38 Districts of the Amin regime with 23 Districts and four Regions: Northern, Eastern, Western and Buganda. As a Muganda himself this at once exposed him to charges of partisanship, and to speculation that he might be intending to re-establish the monarchy. Lule sought to focus attention on local government, and ultimately national elections, but this served to revive party political schisms with their regional, ethnic and religious undertones. In an attempt to counteract criticism from within the UNLF he reshuffled his government in May 1979. The younger generation leftists he had ousted went to Tanzania to complain to President Nyerere and Milton Obote; meanwhile their UNLF colleagues evicted Lule and appointed in his place Godfrey Binaisa.

The reappearance of this renegade Muganda and erstwhile minister from the UPC government of Dr. Obote, strengthened fears in Buganda that the return of Dr. Obote himself was imminent. President Nyerere continued to be evasive about this eventuality, insisting that a united and popular government in Uganda took priority over the reinstatement of an old friend and ally. Moreover, his intervention in Uganda was, at this time, a matter for remonstrance at the annual meeting of the Organisation for African Unity: Kenya, in particular, was alarmed at the buildup of Tanzanian troops to the West, and at the prospect of being hemmed in by a bloc of socialist states. In July 1979 Kenya temporarily closed its borders and repatriated some 4,000 Ugandan exiles.

Binaisa sought to allay fears of a takeover from the left or from the Baganda, and to concentrate attention on the promised national elections. He scrapped Lule's four Regions and increased the 23 Districts to 32, to diminish 'sectionalism' and 'tribalism'.⁸⁴ A General Assembly of 127 delegates met in October 1979, 61 of whom were elected by the District Councils; 10 were selected from the UNLF army by the Defence Minister Yoweri Museveni, while 30 of the remainder were original members of the National Consultative Council. According to Cherry Gertzel, a 'sizeable number of the new Councillors were in fact recently returned exiles who belonged to Uganda's educated middle class'. The academics returned in force: no less than 27 Councillors held doctorates.⁸⁵

As a curious kind of afterthought, Binaisa dismissed Field Marshall Idi Amin Dada 'with disgrace' from the Ugandan army in February 1980 - perhaps in response to mounting apprehension that the deposed dictator was mustering his supporters in southern Sudan for a counterattack. For six months there had been increasing violence throughout the country, much of it involving the ragged UNLF army and some

of it the hungry Tanzanian soldiers. In April President Nyerere began withdrawing his men and in an effort to regain some purchase on the UNLF and its forces, President Binaisa announced the dismissal of the army chief of staff, Brigadier Oyite-Ojok. The latter's response was swift and authoritative: he arrested President Binaisa and detained him - under Tanzanian guard - at State House, Entebbe.

Among the initiators of this coup were Binaisa's Labour Minister, Paulo Muwanga, and his Defence Minister, Yoweri Museveni. The latter insisted that their move was to oust a corrupt and tribalistic President and was not intended to clear the way for the reappearance of Milton Obote.⁸⁶ The new military regime advanced the date of the proposed national election to December 1980, and concentrated its efforts on trying to minimise the rising tide of violence.

Dr. Obote had declared in March that he would come back to Uganda to run for President as soon as the election date was announced. Seventeen days after Brigadier Oyite-Ojok's coup he made a triumphal return to Bushenyi in the West of Uganda. He had already been working to revitalise the Uganda People's Congress and in November, only a month before the election, he was formally elected its president. In great haste other parties, old and new, sought to establish themselves: the resuscitated Democratic Party was led by Paul Ssemogerere, and Yoweri Museveni launched his own Uganda Patriotic Movement. Seeking to assuage the very vocal fears in Buganda about his return to power, Dr. Obote insisted 'I have no quarrel with the Baganda'; of his previous administration he conceded: 'It is possible that some mistakes were made - that here and there we over-reacted'.⁸⁷

There were more over-reactions to come. The elections on December 10 brought a highly contentious victory to Dr. Obote and the UPC, with accusations of gerrymandering, ballot rigging and other vices, mostly levelled against the leader of the military government, Mr. Muwanga. When Dr. Obote was sworn in as President five days later the country was plunged into chaos. While the DP with 48 seats against the UPC's 70, struggled to maintain a coherent and constitutional style of opposition in the Assembly, Museveni became the leader of a new alliance, the Uganda Liberation Front, dedicated to overthrowing the new regime by force if necessary. The government responded with brutal reprisals, very largely in Buganda; Dr. Obote had promised stern action, but confronted with all-too-familiar reports of army atrocities he explained somewhat lamely that they were the work of 'terrorists who wear army uniforms'.⁸⁸ Critics pointed out that his release of most of Amin's detained soldiers can hardly have contributed to the re-establishment of civil order.

Towards the Next Republic

In contemplating the future of Uganda idealism must be very severely constrained by the limited compass of what is practicable in a very debilitated and demoralised polity. Two rival images of Uganda's development, expressing ideological divisions in the world at large, have already been mooted: the first sees a reconciliation of ethnic differences within the rubric of a liberal democracy while the second envisages mobilisation of the masses for the construction of a socialist state. Both trajectories imply some kind of integrative revolution; the liberal strategy would accept as much aid as was offered by the wealthier countries of the world in the hope that prosperity might buy a measure of consensus and political stability. For the socialists this would only serve to consolidate the interests of a ruling class and to forge debilitating relationships of external and internal dependence from which poor countries elsewhere have been struggling to escape. An autonomous construction of a socialist state in Uganda would, however, depend on a degree of consensus which is wholly lacking at the moment, and which would probably be achieved only by some potent, pervasive, and at the moment very improbable social revolution.

Part of the predicament of Uganda is that while its future as a state is quite securely guaranteed by international treaty, its good government is subject to no such assurance. Uganda is there and will probably remain there for some time to come. The only salient questions at the moment are who will take possession of the state and what they will do with it. These are questions which the Ugandan people must now view with despondency and pessimism: the recent past has offered them little assurance of any continuity between their own very diverse interests and those of their rulers. It is curious that the solution which ordinary citizens might well propose as the most humane and most rational is also the least respectable in international terms. The suggestion that Uganda should now be ruled (dismembered or intact) by a cadre of foreign officials would be regarded as an indecent violation of that de jure sovereignty which has proved de facto to be so susceptible to abuse. There is more than a little logic to the suggestion that the re-establishment of some form of civil order in Uganda today could best be achieved within a protracted period of tutelage to another state or group of states. The intervention of Tanzania in 1969 elevates this from the level of mere conjecture. During the 1960s researchers in Ugandan villages were apt to be embarrassed by demands for the 'return of Queen Elizabeth' as an antidote to Dr. Obote's government, and even the Baganda might happily have traded the Amin regime for a stern and uncompromising period of colonial domination. Precisely why such opinions should be regarded as disreputable is worthy of serious historical and political contemplation. Until very recently the vices of colonial overrule have been taken very much for granted from almost every political standpoint, and it is thus surprising to discover a positive appraisal of

imperialism emanating in recent years from the left.⁸⁹

The possibility that another military 'ethnocracy' might fall heir to the Ugandan state seems much more real and very much less inviting than the possibility of some external hegemony. The only alternative form of domination which seems both preferable and realistic is the emergence of a new Republic around a bourgeoisie whose core would almost inevitably be reconvened from the elite of the First Republic. If the Ugandan state must be ruled by somebody, its possession by such a bureaucratic middle class seems the best of a severely constricted range of alternatives. Proponents of such a trajectory for Uganda would doubtless argue that throwing open the doors to international capital would provide the material resources to nourish this class and to consolidate their control over the state apparatus - including the military. In such circumstances, 'exploitation' of the rural masses could be preferable to the appropriations of a smaller oligarchy or to not being exploited at all; there seems little doubt that it would be preferable to the misery and anarchic brutality of the present.

The history of Uganda's First Republic suggests that the national bourgeoisie is the only reasonable medium through which diverse regional and ethnic interests can be convened at the level of the state. It is a fantasy of the international media that 'tribalism' will always vitiate the development of the modern state in Africa: it ignores the example of so many strong states which have managed the affairs of populations at least as diverse as that of Uganda. It is, after all one of the functions of any state to moderate social pluralism.⁹⁰ We hope that our account has made clear that political integration in Uganda depends very much less on the sacrifice of sub-national identities than on the establishment of a unified governmental hierarchy which provides a durable and reliable means of communication between the people and their rulers. As a precedent, as an idea and as a structure, that hierarchy remains, albeit vestigially, as a framework for future development. It is significant that the ephemeral governments of Lule and Binaisa both devoted serious attention to reviving local government; it would be sad if their frustrations served to defer further efforts. To be effective, this hierarchy must be reconstituted in a manner which stresses continuities, and avoids the false dichotomies of 'centre and periphery' or of 'tradition and modernity'. A conflict which was exacerbated in the First Republic was that between images of the future of the Ugandan state and its own problematic history. It would be a grave delusion to imagine that socialism, liberalism, or any other internationally-available doctrine will guarantee a cure for Uganda's ills. Insistence on one modernising rhetoric tends to displace other kinds of discourse whose political salience persists. The history of Buganda and its complex meaning for the people who have been born there cannot be exorcised by pejorative allusions to 'tradition' or 'feudalism'; in the same way, national solidarity cannot be guaranteed by the assertion, however vociferous, of the rights and equality of Common Men.

The most plausible promises for a coherent relationship between the Ugandan people and their rulers are those which are plainly intelligible in terms of popular understandings of the present and the past. This undoubtedly populist perspective on the future of Uganda may help to explain why we have accorded quite a prominent place to intellectuals and academics in our discussion. If the construction of a new republic in Uganda is to be a rational affair, there must be a place in it for thinking men; insofar as they are educated men they will be an important part of the fabric of the new national bourgeoisie. In the First Republic, conflict between politician and academic was very largely conflict between native and expatriate, but as the 27 PhDs in Binaisa's General Assembly indicate, a substantial cadre of politically available Ugandan intellectuals has developed during the 1970s. If we have sufficient optimism to believe that an orderly framework of democratic government will serve to moderate the vices of a ruling class, we may also hope that a new generation of students and researchers will monitor critically the progress of the new Republic. It is unlikely that this relationship will always be comfortable and congenial, but it is even less likely that Uganda's rulers will be able to find a more rational and authentic appraisal of its own progress through any medium more reliable than its own university.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 6

1. Andre Gunder Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution, New York, 1969, p. 78.
2. See, for example, E.A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa, London 1973; R.M.A. Van Zwanenberg, An Economic History of Kenya and Uganda 1800-1970, London 1975.
3. For example, in a footnote to Chapter 4 of his admirable study of Ankole (Not All the King's Men: Inequality as a Political Instrument in Ankole, Uganda, The Hague, 1978) Martin Doornbos confesses that 'In the essay [dated 1970] from which these paragraphs are adapted, I described protest as a concomitant of the process of "modernization". This was perhaps rather less than critical acceptance of this magic word on my part'. (p.214).
4. The isomorphism between a regime and the social science which purports to describe and analyse it certainly warrants serious contemplation; see for example A.F. Robertson, Paper Lion: a note on some recent writing on Ethiopia, Journal of Development Studies, vol. 13, no. 4, 1977, pp.433-436.
5. Uganda Argus, 2nd November 1968.

6. Ibid.
7. See Dudley Seers and Leonary Joy, Development in a Divided World, Harmondsworth 1971.
8. See M. Faber and D. Seers, The Crisis in Planning, London 1972.
9. Republic of Uganda, Report of the Visitation Committee to Makerere University College, Entebbe June 1970, sec. 14, p.6.
10. See Henry Bernstein's excellent critical essay: Sociology of underdevelopment vs. Sociology of development, in David Lehmann (ed.) Development Theory: Four Critical Studies, London 1979, pp.77-106.
11. Uganda Argus, 17th March 1969.
12. Andrew Roberts, The sub-imperialism of the Baganda, Journal of African History, vol. 3, no.3, 1962, pp.435-450.
13. East African Standard, 3rd May 1970.
14. See for example J. Dunn and A.F. Robertson, Dependence and Opportunity: Political Change in Ahafo, Cambridge 1973, pp.34-39.
15. Kenneth Ingham, The Kingdom of Toro in Uganda, London 1975, p.168.
16. The Times [London], 24th November 1969.
17. Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India, Chicago 1976.
18. Uganda Argus, 26th May 1966.
19. Uganda Argus, 26th May 1966.
20. Cf. A.F. Robertson, Community of Strangers: A Journal of Discovery in Uganda, London 1978, p.211.
21. David E. Apter, Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization, Englewood Cliffs 1968.
22. James H. Mittelman, Ideology and Politics in Uganda from Obote to Amin, Ithaca 1975.
23. Ali A. Mazrui, Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda: the Making of a Military Ethnocracy, Beverly Hills 1975.
24. See Ingham op. cit., chapter VI; Doornbos op. cit., pp. 5ff.
25. Robertson op. cit., p.222.
26. Robertson op. cit., p.223.

27. Africa Research, vol. 6, no. 10., November 1969, p.1563; and vol. 7, no. 5, June 1970, p.1759.
28. Uganda Argus, 7th October 1968.
29. Uganda Argus, 6th September 1967.
30. Mazrui op. cit., pp.19-20.
31. Africa Research, vol. 6, no. 1, February 1969, p.1300.
32. Mazrui op. cit., p.20.
33. On 1st May 1967 Obote reshuffled his cabinet, and the former Cabinet Office and the Ministry of Public Service were amalgamated as the Ministry of Public Service and Cabinet Affairs.
34. Uganda Argus, 3rd February 1967; Africa Research vol. 4 no. 2., March 1967, pp.717-18.
35. Mazrui op. cit., pp.28-29.
36. Mittelman op. cit.
37. Africa Research, vol. 6, no. 2, March 1969, p.1323.
38. Dr. A. Milton Obote, The Common Man's Charter, Entebbe 1970, secs. 22 ff.
39. Dr. A. Milton Obote op. cit., sec. 21, pp.6-7.
40. Daily Nation [Nairobi] 21st December 1970.
41. Dr. A. Milton Obote op. cit., sec. 9, p.3.
42. Dr. A. Milton Obote op. cit., sec. 21, p.7.
43. Dr. A. Milton Obote op. cit., sec. 22, p.7.
44. Mazrui op. cit., p.28.
45. Uganda Argus, 11th June 1966.
46. Uganda Argus, 9th October 1967.
47. Dr. A. Milton Obote, Communication from the Chair of the National Assembly on 20th April 1970, published as Appendix II of the Common Man's Charter, Entebbe 1970, pp.23-39.
48. Dr. A. Milton Obote op. cit., p.33.
49. See for example A.F. Robertson, The development of town committees in Ahafo, in Audrey Richards and Adam Kuper, Councils in Action, Cambridge 1971, pp.130-170.
50. Vide supra note 49, and Dunn and Robertson op. cit., Chapter 4.

51. Dr. A. Milton Obote, Document No. 5: Proposals for New Methods of Election of Representatives of the People and Parliament, Entebbe 1970.
52. See for example Dunn and Robertson, op. cit., pp.221-222.
53. The Kabaka of Buganda [Edward Mutesa], The Desecration of my Kingdom, London 1967.
54. See Mahmood Mamdani, Politics and Class Formation in Uganda, London 1976; Tarsis B. Kabwegyere, The Politics of State Formation: the Nature and Effects of Colonialism in Uganda, Nairobi 1974.
55. Mamdani op. cit., pp. 272 ff.
56. Kabwegyere op. cit., p.153.
57. Peter M. Gukiina, Uganda: a Case Study in African Political Development, Notre Dame, Indiana 1972, p.168.
58. Mamdani op. cit., p.6.
59. Kabwegyere op. cit., pp.144 ff.
60. Opinions about the proportions of Africans in the higher levels of the civil service on the eve of independence vary: according to Mamdani (op. cit. p.204) 28% of offices in the higher grades of the civil service were held by Africans in 1961, and according to Kabwegyere (op. cit. p.197) the figure was only 16% for the 'Top' and 'Middle' grades in the same year. This provides an interesting indication of the different ways lines may be drawn on the same data.
61. 'Makerere started as a trade and technical school founded by the Colonial administration in Uganda in 1922 on the site of the present University College'. Uganda Government op. cit. sec. 1, p.3.
62. Kabwegyere op. cit., p.143.
63. Audrey I. Richards, Ford Sturrock and Jean Fortt, Subsistence to Commercial Farming in Present-day Uganda, Cambridge 1973, p.322.
64. A. Milton Obote op. cit., p.32.
65. Mazrui op. cit., pp.240-244.
66. Nelson Kasfir, The Shrinking Political Arena: Participation and Ethnicity in African Politics, with a case study of Uganda, Berkeley 1976.
67. Republic of Uganda (Report on the visitation Committee..) sec. 14, p.6.

68. Republic of Uganda op. cit., sec. 8, p.5.
69. Republic of Uganda op. cit., sec. 39, p.14, and sec. 44, p.16.
70. Republic of Uganda op. cit., sec. 43, p.15.
71. Africa Research, vol. 8, no. 1, February 1971, p.1993.
72. Uganda Argus, 22nd May 1971.
73. Uganda Argus, 11th October 1971.
74. Mazrui op. cit., p.242.
75. Africa Research, vol. 8, no. 6, July 1971, p.2138.
76. Mazrui op. cit.
77. Mazrui op. cit., p.243.
78. Cherry Gertzel, Uganda after Amin: the continuing search for leadership and control, African Affairs, vol. 79, no. 317, October 1980, pp.461-489.
79. Al-Hajji Field Marshall Dr. Idi Amin Dada, V.C., D.S.O., M.C., President of the Republic of Uganda, The Shaping of Modern Uganda, Entebbe 1976.
80. Africa Research, vol. 16, no. 1, January 1979, p.5119.
81. Africa Research, vol. 16. no. 4, May 1979, p.5223.
82. Gertzel op. cit., p.461.
83. Gertzel op. cit., p.469.
84. The words of the Minister of Local Administration, Dr. Bidandi Sali; Africa Research, Vol. 16., no.7, August 1979, p.5340.
85. Gertzel op. cit., p.476.
86. Africa Research, vol. 17, no. 5, June 1980, p.5683.
87. Africa Research, vol. 17, no. 11, December 1980, p.5858.
88. Africa Research, vol. 18, no. 11, December 1981, p.6256.
89. Bill Warren, Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism, London 1980.
90. Cyril S. Belshaw, The Sorcerer's Apprentice: an Anthropology of Public Policy, New York 1976, p.97-8.

Part two:

Tables, Documents and Notes

Introduction


The second part of this book summarises and comments on the survey data collected in Uganda between 1969 and 1971, the last two years of Milton Obote's short-lived Republic. The material is grouped into five sections, the first of which is introductory. It includes an extract from a correspondence course on Government, prepared by the Extra-Mural Department of Makerere University and published in the national newspaper 'The People' in October 1967. The People was the principal organ of the Uganda People's Congress (U.P.C.), and the Correspondence Education Supplement was a project 'made possible by a grant from the Adult Education Department of the Milton Obote Foundation'. Published quite soon after the appearance of the new Republican Constitution and the Local Administrations Act, the section entitled 'Relations between Central and Local Governments' states very clearly and concisely the ruling party's public rationale for local government reform. The structural implications of this reform are summarised in figures (1a) and (1b).

The subsequent sections trace the effects of local government and administrative reform in Uganda at large and in Buganda - the principal target of Milton Obote's reforming zeal. Section 2 deals with the spatial, demographic and economic aspects, illustrating how the central authorities chose to modify administrative units outside Buganda rather than dismember Buganda itself. While the internal subdivisions of Buganda remained more or less intact, efforts to construct a uniform pattern of administration throughout Uganda were concentrated at the level of the district. The four existing Buganda districts (Masaka, Mubende, East and West Mengo) were brought into line with the remaining fourteen districts of Uganda (see figures (1a) and (1b)) and section 5 shows the extent to which 'career' civil servants were drafted in from other areas to take charge of Buganda. However, within the districts 'Ugandanisation' had only limited effect; section 3 illustrates how efforts to transform the chiefly hierarchy did not extend much further than the Class I county chiefs, leaving the lower levels to continue very much as before or to atrophy as their formal functions were reduced. One of the most pronounced effects of reform in Buganda was the vast turnover in chiefs, recorded in sections 3 and 4. If the kind of men who took office in Buganda (detailed in section 4) were more acceptable to the U.P.C. regime, they were not necessarily acceptable to the people; they evidently had neither the background in terms of wealth, education and experience, nor inducements in the form of clearly specified functions and career prospects to perform an effective role in local government. The contrast between the men at these lower echelons and the professional Ugandan civil servants in charge of the districts is made sharply evident in the details of administrative personnel which comprise section 5.

As the prefatory article from 'The People' intimates, the relationship between national political expedients and the exigencies of routine public administration posed a


major dilemma for Uganda's First Republic. It was most evident in the potentially conflicting roles of the District Commissioner (the 'civil servant head') and the Secretary General (the 'political head'). If this dilemma could not be resolved adequately in the context of the 18 districts of Uganda, it was optimistic to suppose that it might be resolved in the 3,500 parishes.

(1a) The structure of local government in Uganda immediately before the 1966 crisis.



[* trial elected councils
in 4 sazas]

(1b) The structure of local government in Uganda, 1967-1971.



(1c) Relations between Central and Local Governments

(From the Correspondence Education Supplement of 'The People', No. 23, Saturday October 28th, 1967. Item 23 of a series on Government, prepared by the Extra-Mural Department of Makerere University.)

So far in this course we have been concerned with the activities of the CENTRAL GOVERNMENT of the State. But there are in many countries "local governments" which have powers to run certain activities.

The term local government can be misleading since it in fact covers a whole range of different authorities. In Uganda the term is used to cover the 18 local district governments. Under the 1962 Constitution there were 11 Districts and 4 Kingdoms listed as local governments. But now there are 18 districts.

In the U.K. the term local government covers everything from the GREATER LONDON COUNCIL which is responsible for running the affairs of a city of 11 million people down through county councils, town councils, urban and district councils, all of which are elected by votes in the area and all of which are responsible for carrying out certain duties.

In the UNITED STATES there are 35,000 city and town councils. In addition there are the 50 State Governments which together form the United States of America. These are also "local" governments.

Let us begin by looking at the issue of the relationships that exist between the Central and local government. There are a number of factors which have affected the relationship between Central and Local Governments in Uganda.

HISTORY - The British introduced a system of local government into Uganda. Britain had a powerful system of local government. The local governments had been responsible for many of the early efforts at providing welfare services - piped water, light, sanitation systems and schools were all provided by local authorities in the U.K. - before the Central Government felt any responsibility for welfare schemes.

Secondly the British local government system was regarded as an opportunity for citizens to defend their interests against the Central government.

Thirdly the British regarded the local government system as an excellent training ground for politicians who would later move into the central government politics. BUT Britain was a colonial power and in Uganda wanted to ensure that CENTRAL government was really in control. So Provincial Commissioners and District Commissioners helped to run Regions and Districts.

The results of the British transferring the local government system to Uganda were that:-

a) The local governments controlled the main tribal groups in the country. From 1900 onwards Buganda had a system of local government which administered the whole of Buganda. Naturally other tribes sought the same advantages and there were demands for separate district status from areas like Bwambe and Busongora which came under Toro Kingdom GOVERNMENT. The Baganda success in controlling their own affairs even encouraged other areas to demand constitutional heads of their own, as Busoga did. The Local Government system in Uganda therefore encouraged tribal feeling.

b) The politicians in Uganda first got their opportunity to run affairs at the local level. This greatly affected the growth of Parties. Even the U.P.C., which was a national party, was essentially an alliance of local interests and the Central leadership had to give more advantages to local interests than would have been their wish. This again encouraged tribal feelings and worked against Unity in Uganda.

c) The local governments provided jobs and services so that people looked to them rather than to the Central Government for help and this weakened a sense of loyalty to the Central Government - especially when the Central Government was British and not Ugandan. The local governments in Uganda have therefore presented the Central Government of Uganda with an acute problem since 1962.

d) The British system in Uganda was a DUAL control system. There were local Prime Ministers or Secretaries General and D.C.s for each Kingdom or District.

PROBLEMS

In the first place it weakened the unity of Uganda and encouraged people to think in tribal terms. The Lost Counties issue saw the President of Uganda refusing to sign an agreement returning 2 counties from Buganda to Bunyoro.

Secondly the local government system was inefficient and, because inefficient, unfair. The weaknesses were pointed out in the Budget Speech of 1966 when it was observed that the local governments did not have adequate systems of financial control. Money was wasted and accounts were inadequate. The local governments also spent large sums on prestige projects like new council chambers and new palaces for Constitutional heads.

Finally local governments were poor administrators because there were not enough skilled men to go round both Central and local government administrations.

THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REACTION

There have been a number of changes brought by the Central Government in its relations with local governments. The basic desire has been to make Central Government's

contact more direct with the individual citizen in Uganda. These changes have been summed up in the 1967 Constitution and the new Act governing Central and Local District Council relationships.

LOCAL DISTRICTS

Uganda is now divided into 18 districts. The Minister of Regional Administration is responsible to parliament for the Districts. Parliament under the 1967 Constitution has to see that Councils are provided for each District or nominated by the Minister. Certain officers are to run the District.

The POLITICAL head is the SECRETARY GENERAL. 3 names are submitted by a District Council to the Minister as candidates for the Secretary General's job and he selects one. The Secretary General is assisted by an Assistant Secretary General and an Administrative Officer. Previous posts of Prime Minister and Ministers in the former kingdoms are abolished.

The civil servant head of a District is the DISTRICT COMMISSIONER who has the power to examine expenditure and check on estimates of Local District Councils. He is also responsible for maintaining law and order in his District. The D.C. receives his orders direct from the Minister of Regional Administration. Recently the Minister of Regional Administration dealt with the problem of the relationship between the Secretary General and the District Commissioner by explaining that one dealt with political matters while the other was a Civil Servant. We can come back to this relationship next week.

THE EFFECT OF THE CHANGES

The Central Government has now got much greater control over the Local Districts.

1. a) Parliament can dissolve a Council at any time through the Minister.
 b) The President can act immediately to take control of a District if an emergency situation arises.
 c) The Minister of Regional Administration's direct representative, the District Commissioner, now has greatly increased powers, especially over finance.
2. The Central Government now has a uniform system of local government to deal with and is much better placed to ensure that all districts are developed. A district's development will be less dependent on the ability or inability of the local administration.
3. People in the District will see that the Central Government is the main provider of jobs and welfare services. There is now a direct line of

communication between the Central Government and the people.

4. There is still a dual system of control in local districts with a local Political Secretary-General and a Civil Servant Central Government representative.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Local governments in Uganda in the past have promoted tribalism and been too inefficient to govern effectively. Both problems have been tackled by the abolition of the kingdoms and the establishment of a uniform system of district administration, and by giving the Minister of Regional Administration much greater control over the District Councils.
2. The Central Government has to maintain the contact between governed and government which existed when local people saw the local district council as THEIR government. This is a very real problem. The Secretary General as political head of a District will spend much of his time on this question.
3. The D.C.s and Secretary Generals have between them the task of providing efficient administration and the sense of local participation in Government plans for development.

CORRESPONDENCE EXERCISES (to be sent for marking)

1. State briefly the reasons why Uganda has changed the relationship between the Central and local governments.
2. If a Government policy statement was issued which said that it was necessary to begin a SELECTIVE campaign to teach people to read and write instead of wasting resources on a country-wide campaign:-
 - a) Who would be responsible at the local level for explaining and justifying the Government's decision? Explain your choice.
 - b) Who would be responsible at a local level for helping the local C.D.O. with financial staffing problems? Explain your choice.

SECTION 2

Administrative Units in Uganda

Introduction and Notes.

The report of the 1969 population census of Uganda, published in 1971, warns that a series of administrative boundary changes make comparisons with the 1959 census very difficult. For the purposes of this book, however, these changes are of considerable interest in that they provide a geographical and demographic expression of the policy changes outlined in chapter 2. The tables in this section reveal something of the progress which had been made by 1969 towards standardising the local government units in Uganda. This exercise was carried out in the face of pronounced regional inequalities in population distribution, wealth, transport and communications facilities, etc. The explicit intention was to remove the difference between low-calibre officials administering small but widely dispersed populations on the northern and eastern periphery, and highly qualified and highly paid officials responsible for small but densely populated areas in the southern 'heartland' of Uganda. It is interesting that reorganisation should have been directed primarily towards raising the demographic strength of administrative units in the peripheral areas to something like the levels in Buganda and the other southern districts, rather than fragmenting the latter. Table (2c) indicates a reduction of nearly 5% in the number of parishes in Uganda over the 1959-1969 intercensal period, and a reduction of over 4% in the case of sub-counties (divisions), in spite of a national population increase of 46% over the same period.

The demographic expression of the responsibilities of senior local officials perpetuates the system whereby payscales were related to the number of taxpayers in an administrative area; by the same token, increasing uniformity must have diminished the geographical mobility implied by promotion, particularly at the level of the sub-county chiefs. If administrative units did not proliferate during this period, administrative personnel certainly did; in this regard population expansion was more than matched by expansion of the civil service, particularly at the district and regional headquarters.

The major re-groupings expressed in the tables in this section are as follows:

Karamoja district was part of the Northern Province at the time of the 1959 census, and after Independence it was included in Eastern Region. In table (2a) Karamoja is listed under Eastern Region, to avoid confusion, but the figure of 30.6% representing the population increase in Northern Region between 1959 and 1969 takes account of the loss of Karamoja - some 11% of the region's population.

The sharp increase in the population of Bunyoro is accounted for by the cession of Buyaga and Bugagazi

counties from Mubende District, Buganda, under the terms of the 'Lost Counties' settlement of 1964. Mubende, depleted to a single county, was reinforced by the transfer of Busujju and Singo counties from West Mengo district in Buganda, causing a drop in the population of that district of nearly 25% (An account of the 'Lost Counties' dispute can be found in F. Burke, Local Government and Politics in Uganda, Syracuse 1964, pp.77-85.) This change was not occasioned by administrative reform so much as by local political action; so too was the split between Sebei and Bugisu in 1962, in which the former was established as a district in its own right. The circumstances of this schism are described in Chapter 5.

Table (2c) disguises a change in the number of counties in Bugisu; following the elevation of Sebei county to the status of district, south Bugisu county was divided into Bubulo (with 6 sub-counties) and Manjiya (4 sub-counties). Central Bugisu was renamed Bungokho county and North Bugisu was renamed Budadiri.

In 1967 the Ganda county of Buddu (with 16 sub-counties the most populous in Uganda) was split into 3 new counties, Bukoto, Kalungu, and Kyotera; this is the only instance of the sub-division of a county in Buganda during the period with which we are concerned, and was of course interpreted by some as the 'abolition' of a long-established segment of the Ganda kingdom. It is striking that the name 'Buddu' was revived as a district title in the Amin regime (see table (2g)).

Two other districts in Uganda were increased by the addition of a new county: by 1969 Bukonjo had been added to Toro district, and Padyere to West Nile district.

At the level of the sub-counties (divisions in the post-1967 nomenclature) table (2d) makes the reduction in population variation evident: while the mean size of sub-counties increased by more than a half, the standard deviation from the mean in 1969 was not much more than half the 1959 figure. The most drastic pruning of sub-counties took place in West Nile, where the total number was reduced to 33 from 44, doubling the average population of the sub-counties. Two sub-counties were removed from Rwampara, one from Nyabushozi and one from Bunyaruguru county in Ankole district, but a sub-county was added to Buheju county.

Allowing for the 'Lost Counties' reorganisation, the number of sub-counties in Buganda remained very stable; the population of sub-counties in the less densely settled Mubende district was on average about one third of those in East Mengo district, but the addition of Busujju county, with an average of 5,559 per sub-county, served to bring the average for Mubende more into line with other districts.

At the level of the parish, there is evidence in table (2e) of similar efforts to reduce population variation. Although parishes were on average a third larger than in

1959, the variation from district to district was almost halved. The increased responsibilities of parish chiefs in this respect should be set against their declining authority, described in Part I. Again, the effect of including Busujju in Mubende district has a pronounced effect on the average figures for parishes in that district.

Comparing the Regions, the most marked demographic differences were between Buganda and Northern Region. With 21.6% of the land area of Uganda, Buganda had 27.9% of its population in 1969; Northern Region had 40.6% of the land area but just 17.1% of the population. Nevertheless, Northern Region has shown population increases consistently higher than the national average, the growth rate in Madi being the highest in the country.

Karamoja was the least densely settled district, Bugisu the most; population growth in Bugisu and Kigezi is significantly affected by emigration. Reduction in emigration rates is most evident in Northern Region, Ankole and Toro, probably because of economic developments in these areas during the 1960s. The region with the highest overall rate of population growth is Western, which is largely attributable to the influx of refugees from Ruanda, Burundi and the Congo during the 1959-1969 intercensal period.

Western Region was also the poorest in the early 1960s in terms of gross per capita local authority revenues (2f). Revenues increased much more slowly there than in Northern Region, hitherto regarded as the poorest and most dependent economically. Consonant with its greater economic prosperity Buganda raised the most revenue; the loss of its privileged constitutional status in 1966 increased significantly central government control over the expenditure of funds raised in Buganda, but thereafter the decline of local chiefship made the collection of revenues there extremely difficult.

Parliamentary constituencies are more malleable than local government boundaries. Throughout the First Republic there was no general election although in August 1970 the National Council of the ruling UPC approved proposals for a new and complex electoral system (see Chapter 6). In an effort to reduce regionalism in the electoral process, two or three candidates were each to seek election in four constituencies, one in each of the four regions of Uganda. For this reason one constituency in Teso, two in Buganda and two in Bunyoro were regrouped in the Northern Region, to allow a balance of 24 constituencies in each Region. This did not affect the structure and processes of local government, and serves to underline the persisting discontinuity between administrative and parliamentary political boundaries.

This section concludes with a chart comparing the administrative units in Buganda in 1969 with those devised by the Amin regime. The introduction of a new sub-district level is a conspicuous change, and the further segmentation

of the populous East Mengo district (now divided into Kyaggwe and Bulemezi districts) is also notable. An appraisal of these changes is beyond the scope of this book but it is likely that they represent little more than cartographic and demographic manipulations - perhaps reflecting the military organisation on which local administration such as it was depended - rather than reform in the structures and functions of local government.

Although Dr. Obote's reforming zeal cannot be compared fairly with the malign neglect of President Amin, chart (2g) leads one to reflect that tidying up the map of local government is largely a symbolic exercise, a gratifying representation of progress, standardisation and national integration which may say very little about the actual processes and personnel of local government.

Table (2a) Population of Uganda: General Statistics

Sources:

Uganda Government, Statistical Abstract, Statistical Division, Ministry of Economic Planning and Economic Development, Entebbe, 1966.

East African Statistical Department, Uganda: General African Census 1959, Vol. 1, Nairobi 1960.

Republic of Uganda, Report on the 1969 Population Census, Vol. 1, Kampala 1971.

(2a) POPULATION OF UGANDA: GENERAL STATISTICS

	Land Area (sq. miles)	Total Population 1969	Population Density: persons per sq. mile 1959		% Population Increase 1948-59	1959-69
BUGANDA +*	16,138	2,667,332	117	165	40.9	41.8
East Mengo +*	5,101	851,583	120	167	48.0	39.0
West Mengo +*	4,588	513,498	158	112	40.5	-29.2
Masaka +*	3,781	640,596	117	169	38.6	44.3
Mubende +*	2,668	330,955	37	124	16.7	233.0
EASTERN REGION	10,935	2,817,066	174	258	24.2	48.1
Teso	4,306	570,628	106	133	12.6	24.6
Bugisu +*	931	397,887	327	427	31.1	30.9
Bukedi	1,575	527,090	254	355	19.3	31.6
Busoga +	3,443	896,875	197	260	30.5	32.4
Sebei	671	64,464	74	96	57.2	30.7
Karamoja	9,230	284,067	16	31	36.9	64.8
WESTERN REGION	18,930	2,432,550	87	129	28.7	61.8
Kigezi +*	1,902	647,988	260	341	24.8	31.0
Ankole +*	5,928	861,145	90	145	32.1	62.1
Toro +*	4,745	571,514	74	120	34.2	63.6
Bunyoro +*	6,355	351,903	27	55	17.1	174.5
NORTHERN REGION	30,341	1,631,899	39	54	32.0	30.6
West Nile +*	4,147	573,762	93	138	28.7	49.0
Madi	1,717	89,978	30	52	34.1	77.0
Acholi	10,783	463,844	27	43	32.4	61.7
Lango	4,464	504,315	79	113	32.7	42.3
UGANDA TOTALS	74,712	9,548,847	87	128	31.2	46.1

+ = tribes surveyed in 1952-3 study.

* = districts surveyed in 1968-9 study.

(2b) CHANGES IN THE POPULATION OF BUGANDA AND SIX SELECTED DISTRICTS, 1959 - 1969

	Population:		% Change 1959-1969	% of Total Population:	
	1959	1969		1959	1969
BUGANDA	1,834,128	2,667,332	+45	28	28
East Mengo	606,694	851,583	+40	9	9
West Mengo	688,185	513,498	-25	11	5
Masaka	440,180	640,596	+45	7	7
Mubende	99,069	330,955	+234	2	4
BUNYORO	126,875	351,903	+177	2	4
ANKOLE	529,712	861,145	+63	8	9
TORO	347,479	571,514	+65	5	6
KIGEZI	493,444	647,988	+31	8	7
BUGISU	352,885	397,889	+13	5	4
WEST NILE	383,926	573,762	+49	6	6
UGANDA TOTAL	6,449,558	9,548,847	+48	(100)	(100)

Source: East African Statistical Department, Uganda: General African Census 1959, Vol, I, Nairobi 1960; Republic of Uganda, Report on the 1969 Population Census, Vol, I, Kampala 1971.

(2c) COUNTIES, SUB-COUNTIES AND PARISHES IN BUGANDA AND SIX SELECTED DISTRICTS, 1959 AND 1969

	Counties		Sub-Counties		Parishes	
	1959	1969	1959	1969	1959	1969
BUGANDA	20	20	134	120	1,021	796
East Mengo	5	5	38	38	330	277
West Mengo	7	5	45	29	363	198
Masaka	5	7	33	33	224	192
Mubende	3	3	18	20	104	129
BUNYORO	4	6	25	35	74	117
ANKOLE	10	10	55	52	348	308
TORO	7	8	37	40	185	189
KIGEZI	6	6	33	35	159	233
BUGISU	4	4	30	25	120	107
WEST NILE	9	10	44	33	142	200

Source: East African Statistical Department, Uganda: General African Census 1959, Nairobi 1960; Republic of Uganda, Report on the 1969 Population Census, Kampala 1971.

(2d) AVERAGE POPULATION OF SUB-COUNTIES IN BUGANDA AND SIX SELECTED DISTRICTS OF UGANDA 1959 & 1969

	Total	<u>1959</u> % Deviation from mean	Total	<u>1969</u> % Deviation from Mean	% Change 1959 - 1969
BUGANDA	13,688	+29	22,228	+35	+62
East Mengo	15,966	+51	22,410	+36	+40
West Mengo	15,293	+44	17,707	+8	+16
Masaka	13,339	+26	19,412	+18	+46
Mubende	5,504	-48	16,548	+1	+201
BUNYORO	5,075	-52	10,054	-39	+98
ANKOLE	9,631	-9	16,560	+1	+72
TORO	9,391	-9	14,288	-13	+52
KIGEZI	14,953	+41	18,514	+13	+24
BUGISU	11,763	+11	15,916	+3	+35
WEST NILE	8,726	-20	17,387	+6	+99
mean	10,586		mean	16,421	
Std. dev.	± 2,174		Std. dev.	± 1,468	

Sources: as for table (2c).

(2e) AVERAGE POPULATION OF PARISHES IN BUGANDA AND SIX SELECTED DISTRICTS OF UGANDA, 1959 & 1969

	Total	<u>1959</u> % Deviation from Mean	Total	<u>1969</u> % Deviation from Mean	% Change 1959-1969
BUGANDA	1,796	-20	3,351	+9	+87
East Mengo	1,838	-18	3,074	0	+67
West Mengo	1,896	-15	2,593	-16	+37
Masaka	1,965	-12	3,336	+8	+70
Mubende	953	-57	2,566	-17	+169
BUNYORO	1,715	-23	3,008	-2	+75
ANKOLE	1,522	-32	2,796	-9	+84
TORO	1,878	-16	3,024	-2	+61
KIGEZI	3,103	+39	2,781	-10	-10
BUGISU	2,940	+31	3,719	+21	+26
WEST NILE	2,704	+21	2,869	-7	+6
mean	2,237		mean	3,078	
Std. dev. \pm	654		Std. dev. \pm	343	

Sources: as for table (2c).

(2f) ANNUAL TOTAL REVENUES FOR LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN BUGANDA AND THE REGIONS OF UGANDA

1959 - 1960 AND 1964 - 1965

	Total Population (1959 Census)	Total Revenues 1959-60 £	Revenues Per Head of Population 1959-60 £	Total Revenues 1964-65 £	% Increase In Total Revenues Between 1959-60 and 1964-65
BUGANDA	1,834,128	2,226,500	1.21	4,281,350	92.3
NORTHERN REGION	1,244,971	1,077,250	0.86	1,935,200	79.6
WESTERN REGION	1,497,510	1,268,150	0.85	1,882,900	48.5
EASTERN REGION	1,872,949	2,043,150	1.09	2,845,500	39.3
UGANDA TOTALS	6,449,558	6,615,050	1.02	10,944,950	65.5

Sources: Uganda Government, The Government Accounts of Uganda, 1959-60/1964-65, Statistics Division, Ministry of Planning and Development, September 1966.

East African Statistical Department Uganda, General African Census 1959, Vol. 1, May 1960.

(2g)

ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS OF BUGANDA, 1969 and 1976

1969			1976			
PROVINCE	DISTRICT	COUNTY	COUNTY	SUB-DISTRICT	DISTRICT	PROVINCE
BUGANDA	East Mengo	Kyaggwe	Mukono	Majo	Kyaggwe	NORTH BUGANDA PROVINCE
			Buikwe			
			Nakifuma			
		Bugerere Buvuma	Bugerere Buvuma	Kayunga		
	Bulemezi	Nakaseke	Nakasongola	Bulemezi		
		Kitikamu				
		Wabusana				
	Buruli	Buruli				
	Mubende	Singo	Buwekula	Miyana	Mubende	
			Mityana			
			Kasanda			
	Kiboga					
	Busujju	Busujju				
	Masaka	Mawogola Bukoto Kalungu	Mawogola Bukoto Kalungu	Semabule	Buddu	SOUTH BUGANDA PROVINCE
Kyotera Kabula Koki			Kyotera Kabula Koki	Lyantonde	Kyotera	
Ssese			Ssese	Ssese		
West Mengo		Kyaddondo Mawokota Butambala Gomba Busiro	Kyaddondo Mawokota Butambala Gomba Busiro	Buwama	Mengo	
			Kampala			
			Entebbe			

Sources: 1969: Republic of Uganda: Report of the Population Census, Vol 1, Kampala 1971

1976 Amin, Al-Hajji Field Marshal Dr Idi, The Shaping of Modern Uganda, Government Printer, Entebbe 1976, pp. 5-7.

SECTION 3

Chiefs in Uganda

Introduction and Notes

Two particularly striking effects of the policies to standardise chiefship in Uganda's First Republic are evident in the tables presented in this section. The first is the degree of uniformity, one might even say 'professionalism', achieved in the higher echelons; the second is the neglect which is evident in the case of the lower chiefs. Although, as we have seen, the Class III chiefs are responsible for larger parishes than in the 1950s, they are still paid relatively little, they are recruited without much regard to educational attainments or previous experience, they have few prospects of promotion and they serve in the localities in which they were born. The higher chiefs are better paid and in terms of qualification, career mobility and other features, more closely resemble their civil service colleagues. Mobility is a significant index: in Bugisu, for example, all four Class I chiefs were serving in areas outside their county of birth in 1969, compared with 58% of the Class II chiefs and just 6% of the Class III (parish) chiefs. None of the Class IV (village) chiefs were serving outside their counties of birth.

Nevertheless, it is notable that efforts to standardise local government and administration in the First Republic did not extend to appointing chiefs to districts where, in terms of tribal identity, they did not belong. This is most evident in the case of Buganda, examined in detail in the next section, where after the May 1966 crisis one might have expected to see non-Ganda chiefs drafted in to take charge of certain sazas and gombololas. It is a reflection of Dr. Obote's intention not to alienate the Baganda more than was necessary that all 20 Saza chiefs in 1969 were Ganda, and only 8 of the Gombolola chiefs (7%) were non-Ganda, (see section 4 table (b)).* This is all the more striking if one reflects that nearly one third of the male population of Buganda in 1969 was born in other districts.

Table (3b) makes evident the major turnover in chiefs in Buganda between 1967 and 1969-70, the period of the survey. The extensive replacement of men who were sympathetic to the Ganda monarchy with men loyal to the ruling Uganda People's Congress was undoubtedly at the expense of experience and efficiency. In Ankole district, not greatly affected by such changes, it is striking that in 1969 the chiefs were older, longer-serving and better educated. In other districts like Bugisu, the effect of local government reform is most marked in the turnover in higher-level chiefs.

Comparison with the figures for 1952-3 indicates that at that time there was considerable mobility among senior chiefs.

* A further 2 chiefs in Bugerere county are listed as Nyala, a group indigenous to this area.

However, in the case of Buganda there is a marked difference between Class III and the more senior chiefs: nearly half of the former (parish) chiefs had held their posts for more than 16 years (table (3c)). The relatively short periods of service of the Bugisu chiefs may be related to the somewhat hectic changes in that district described in Chapter 5. The turnover in Bunyoro during the 1962-6 period is a consequence of the 'Lost Counties' settlement, in which all the offices in Buganzazzi and Buyaga counties were turned over to newly-appointed Nyoro chiefs (see table (3b)).

Uneven survey data has made it impossible to tabulate the previous employment of the chiefs. However, relatively complete lists for Ankole district indicate that Class II and Class I chiefs were recruited mainly from among schoolteachers, clergymen and junior civil servants, while the Class II chiefs were formerly soldiers, policemen, skilled labourers, farmers or traders. A similar pattern is suggested by information available for other districts. In all cases there is little evidence of promotion from Class III to Class II.

An examination of remuneration suggests that qualified and ambitious men were unlikely to take up the responsibilities of chiefship for the salary alone. Patronage and other perquisites were doubtless an inducement, especially at the lower levels; for the village chiefs this was virtually all the job had to offer. The removal, under the terms of the 1967 Constitution, of the estates which went with the Class I and Class II offices was supposedly compensated by higher salaries. All the salaries listed in table (3d) compare very favourably with the 60 shillings or so paid to agricultural labourers, but are not conspicuously generous when compared with official rates of pay for secretaries (840-1,000 shillings per month), registered nurses (790-1,000 shillings) or police inspectors (1,100-1,700 shillings).*

In 1970 the median salary in the central government 'Administration and Miscellaneous' category of the public service was 365 Shs. per month, compared with 162 Shs. in the local government service. Only a third of those in the 'Administration and Miscellaneous' category earned as little as the Class III chiefs, and their salary range extended considerably beyond that of the Class II chiefs.**

In 1952-3 the differences in the median salaries of chiefs in various districts was considerable (table (3d)). This was adjusted by increases of as much as 400%, notably in West Nile district. The senior Ganda chiefs were still comparatively well paid in 1969 but it is striking that the median salary for Class III chiefs in Buganda is the lowest of those listed in table (3d). The salary gap between Class II and Class III increased slightly while that between Class II and Class I was substantially reduced; rates for Class II

* Government of Uganda, Sessional Paper no. 6, 1963.

** Government of Uganda, General Statistics, Entebbe 1970, p.8; Government of Uganda, Enumeration of Employees, Entebbe June 1969. Appendix VIII.

were one-third to a half those of Class I, while rates for Class III are only a quarter to a third of those for Class II.

The post-1966 purge of the chiefly hierarchy in Buganda had a marked effect on the age and educational standard of the new chiefs (tables (3e) and (3f)). The contrast with Ankole district where the average age of chiefs has increased since 1952-3, is striking: the median age of Class I chiefs is about 15 years more than in Buganda. The increase in the number of Class I and Class II chiefs in Buganda with no more than primary education is matched by a very marked improvement in the educational standards of chiefs in Toro, Kigezi and Bugisu. Whereas there were 17 chiefs in Buganda with University education in 1952-3, there were only two in 1969. This reflects the absorption of men with higher educational qualifications into the rapidly expanding central government civil service in the years immediately before and after Independence; table (5c) indicates that the offices of D.C. and A.D.C. were almost exclusively manned by graduates in 1969. There were very few chiefs with no education, with the interesting exception of Class III in Kigezi. Bearing in mind that educational opportunities and facilities were improved very considerably throughout Uganda since the Second World War, it seems that by 1969 chiefship, particularly at the lower levels, provided occupational opportunities for the less well educated.

A pronounced increase in the proportion of Moslem chiefs is evident in all districts, particularly in Buganda (table (3g)). There is no very obvious reason for this other than improving educational facilities for Moslems. In terms of the population of the country as a whole they were certainly not over-represented in administration and chiefship in the First Republic, as they later became in the Second. Chiefs identified as 'Pagans' were virtually eliminated by 1969, although the proportion of 'unknown' cases leaves room for doubt. Moslem, and to a lesser extent Catholic gains have been at the expense of the Protestants, with the exception of Kigezi. Although religious and party political allegiances are closely related in Ugandan history, the declining significance of this relationship in the 1960s is indicated by Catholic and Moslem gains in chiefship and the administration, notwithstanding the ruling UPC's association with Protestant interests.

In the 1960s clan or family relationships seem to have played a smaller part in the appointment of chiefs than they had previously. Explicit attempts to get rid of the caste connotations of chiefship in areas where this form of stratification prevailed are illustrated in the case of Ankole in table (3h). At all levels of chiefship the representation of the dominant Hima clans has been greatly reduced since the first survey in 1952-3, when the Iru were largely confined to the lower 'client' Classes of chiefship. Electoral processes are mainly responsible for this change, giving the upper hand in appointments to the more numerous Iru. Since 1948 the post of Enganzi (prime minister) was held by an Iru, elected by

the predominantly Iru Eishengyero, district council, of Ankole.*

Nevertheless, the proportion of chiefs who come from chiefly families, in Ankole and in other parts of Uganda, remains significant. This is perhaps most surprising in an area like Bugisu, where chiefship is a relatively new institution: in 1969, 75% of the Class I chiefs, 58% of Class II, 33% of Class III, and 28% of Class IV chiefs were the sons of chiefs; 10% of all the chiefs had brothers, and 18% brothers-in-law, who were chiefs. This is certainly indicative of the way in which chiefly office becomes associated with a distinct 'class' in such an area. One final, general observation about these tables: the chiefs are, without exception, men, a bias which President Amin was apparently at some pains to rectify.** Likewise, there were no women in the lists of administrative officials collected in our surveys.

The tables are preceded by an extract from the Local Administrations Act, no. 18 of 1967. It is quoted here mainly to indicate the growing concern of the government with problems of law and order, not only in Buganda, and its stress on the police functions of chiefs. Under section 39 of the Act a 'Chief' is described as an officer of a district Administration in charge of a county, sub-county, division or sub-division. He is regarded as the executive officer of the district Administration and, thereby, the central government. The responsibilities of chiefs with respect to assessing, collecting and accounting for tax are spelled out in the Districts Financial Regulations no. 159 of 1966, which apparently continued to apply under the terms of the 1967 Constitution.

* This subject is explored in detail in Martin R. Doornbos, Not All The King's Men: Inequality as a Political Instrument in Ankole, Uganda, The Hague, 1978.

** President Idi Amin Dada, The Shaping of Modern Uganda, Government Printer, Entebbe 1976, includes a photograph of a local government training 'passing out parade, Chiefs, (women) 1973'. We are grateful to Dr. Michael Twaddle for bringing this book to our attention.

(3a) Duties of Chiefs

(From the Local Administrations Act no. 18 of 1967)

Section 40 (1) It shall be the duty of every chief:

- (a) to obey and execute promptly all orders and warrants lawfully issued by any court or other competent authority responsible for law and order;
 - (b) to collect and communicate intelligence affecting the public peace;
 - (c) to prevent the commission of offences and public nuisance; and
 - (d) to detect and bring offenders to justice and to apprehend all persons whom he is legally authorised to apprehend and for whose apprehension sufficient grounds exist; and for any of the purposes mentioned in this section, without a warrant, enter at any hour of the day or night any place in which he has reasonable grounds to suspect that illegal drinking, or gambling is taking place or to which dissolute or disorderly characters are resorting.
- (2) A chief knowing of a design to commit a cognisable offence within the local limits of his jurisdiction may arrest or direct the arrest of any person so designing if it appears to the chief that the commission of the offence cannot otherwise be prevented.
- (3) Every chief receiving information that a person who has committed a cognisable offence for whose arrest warrant has been issued by a court within the local limits of his jurisdiction shall arrest or cause such a person to be arrested.
- (4) Every chief receiving information that stolen property is within the local limits of his jurisdiction shall cause such property to be seized and shall forthwith report such seizure to the nearest police station.
- (5) Persons arrested under powers conferred by this section unless earlier released must be taken to a court of competent jurisdiction within 24 hours.
- (6) In exercise of his powers under this section a chief shall be subject to such directions as may be given by the Minister.
- ...
- (9) It shall be the duty of every chief to implement the policy of any bye-law made by the Administration and for these purposes every chief shall obey and execute any lawful order issued to him by a competent Authority.

Section 41 Without prejudice to the generality of Section 39 of this Act and subject to any law, a chief may from time to time issue orders to be obeyed by persons residing within the local limits of his jurisdiction to secure the enforcement of any law made,

- (a) by the Government, or
- (b) by the Council or any local authority to whose jurisdiction any such person is subject.

Section 42 Whenever a council resolves that, for the proper administration and good government of the area in which any chief has jurisdiction, it is necessary or desirable that any order should be issued for any of the purposes referred to in Section 41 of this Act, it may with the approval of the Minister direct the chief, through the Administrative Secretary to issue and enforce such order.

Section 43 Penalty imposed for any person who without lawful authority fails to comply with a lawful order issued under Section 41 of this Act liable for a fine not exceeding 200/- or imprisonment 3 months.

Section 44 A chief may require any person subject to his jurisdiction or employed by the Administration employing the chief to assist him in carrying out the duties imposed upon him under this Part of this Act. Any person so required may carry out and give effect to any lawful order given by the chief.

(3b) DATE OF APPOINTMENT OF CHIEFS IN FOUR DISTRICTS IN UGANDA (1969)

<u>Date of Appointment</u>	<u>CLASS I CHIEFS</u>				<u>CLASS II CHIEFS</u>				<u>CLASS III CHIEFS</u>			
	BUGANDA	BUNYORO	KIGEZI	BUGISU	BUGANDA	BUNYORO	KIGEZI	BUGISU	BUGANDA	BUNYORO	KIGEZI	BUGISU
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1967-1969	95	20	50	100	85	27	25	84	79	19	40	57
1962-1966	5	60	17		7	62	25	16	12	56	33	33
Before 1962		20	33		7	8	50		9	19	27	10
No information					1							
Actual totals	20	5	6	4	117	26	36	19	33	88	233	30

(3c) DURATION OF APPOINTMENT OF CHIEFS IN THREE DISTRICTS IN UGANDA (1952-3)

<u>Number of Years In Office</u>	<u>CLASS I CHIEFS</u>			<u>CLASS II CHIEFS</u>			<u>CLASS III CHIEFS</u>		
	BUGANDA	KIGEZI	BUGISU	BUGANDA	KIGEZI	BUGISU	BUGANDA	KIGEZI	BUGISU
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Up to 5 years	65	60	100	88	65	83	11	70	64
6 to 10 years	5	20		9	30	4	26	25	
11 to 15 years		20		3		4	16	6	21
16 to 20 years					5	4	26		
More than 20 years							21		7
No information	30					4			7
Actual Totals	20	5	3	128	20	23	167	53	29

(3d) MEDIAN MONTHLY SALARIES (IN SHILLINGS) OF CHIEFS IN FOUR DISTRICTS OF UGANDA
1952-3 AND 1968-9

	<u>CLASS I CHIEFS</u>				<u>CLASS II CHIEFS</u>				<u>CLASS III CHIEFS</u>			
	BUGANDA	BUNYORO	BUGISU	W.NILE	BUGANDA	BUNYORO	BUGISU	W.NILE	BUGANDA	BUNYORO	BUGISU	W.NILE
1952-3	750	445	511	266	255	149	203	172	60	45	92	53
1968-9	1500	1550	1261	1365	652	612	587	471	158	240	179	179
% increase 1968-9/ 1952-3	100%	248%	147%	41.3%	190%	311%	189%	174%	163%	433%	94%	237%

(3e) CHANGES IN THE AGES OF CHIEFS IN SIX DISTRICTS OF UGANDA
BETWEEN 1952-3 AND 1968-9

	BUGANDA	BUNYORO	ANKOLE	TORO	KIGEZI	BUGISU
<u>CLASS I</u>						
1952-3, N=	20	4	8	7	5	3
1968-9, N=	20	5	10	7	6	4
Under 30	+10					
31-40	+45		-12	-14		
41-50	+15	+10	+5	+28	-7	0
51-60	-65	-10	-3	-14	+7	
60 and over			+10			
<u>CLASS II</u>						
1952-3, N=	128	25	50	23	20	23
1968-9, N=	117	26	49	38	36	19
Under 30	+6	+4		-4	-5	
31-40	+35	+3	-14	+23	-26	-10
41-50	-20	+30	-5	-30	+16	+16
51-60	-20	-25	+19	-9	+15	+12
60 and over	-1	-12	+8			-4
Not known			8	21		13
<u>CLASS III</u>						
1952-3, N=	19	41	75	122	53	14
1968-9, N=	33	88	124	158	233	30
Under 30	+9	+6	-2	+7	+5	-4
31-40	+50	+10	-25	-15	+11	+2
41-50	-29	+1	-9	-9	-20	-3
51-60	-26	-15	+32	+1	+3	+2
60 and over	-2	-1	+7	+1	+1	+3
Not known	2	1	3	15		

The increase (+) or decrease (-) in the proportion of chiefs in each category in 1968-9, when compared with 1952-3, is expressed as a percentage.

I.e., in 1968-9 the proportion of Grade I chiefs in Buganda who were aged between 31 and 40 had risen by 40% when compared with the same category of chiefs in 1952-3.

(3f) CHANGES IN THE EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF CHIEFS IN
SIX DISTRICTS OF UGANDA BETWEEN 1952-3 AND 1968-9

	BUGANDA	BUNYORO	ANKOLE	TORO	KIGEZI	BUGISU
<u>CLASS I</u>						
1952-3, N=	20	4	8	7	5	3
1968-9, N=	20	5	10	7	6	4
None	-5				-43	
Primary	+15	-25	+7		+10	-33
Secondary	-5	+25	-7	+14	+33	+33
Advanced	-5			-15		
<u>CLASS II</u>						
1952-3, N=	128	25	50	23	20	23
1968-9, N=	117	26	49	38	36	19
None				-4	-15	-4
Primary	+20	+2	+5	-39	-7	-15
Secondary	-17	-2	-5	+38	+22	+19
Advanced	-8					
No information	5			5		
<u>CLASS III</u>						
1952-3, N=	19	41	75	122	53	14
1968-9, N=	33	88	124	158	233	30
None	-5	+1	+1	-10	+43	-29
Primary	+1	-6	-4	-19	-41	+12
Secondary	-4	+5	+3	+25	-2	+17
Advanced						
No information	9			4		

The increase (+) or decrease (-) in the proportion of chiefs in each category in 1968-9, when compared with 1952-3, is expressed as a percentage.

I.e., in 1968-9 the proportion of Grade I chiefs in Buganda with only Primary school education had risen by 15% when compared with the same category of chiefs in 1952-3.

(3g) CHANGES IN THE RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF CHIEFS IN
SIX DISTRICTS OF UGANDA BETWEEN 1952-3 AND 1968-9

	BUGANDA	BUNYORO	ANKOLE	TORO	KIGEZI	BUGISU
<u>CLASS I</u>						
1952-3, N=	20	4	8	7	5	3
1968-9, N=	20	5	10	7	6	4
Protestant	-15	-20	-28	-58	+27	0
Catholic	-10	+20	+28	+44	-27	
Moslem	+25					
'Pagan'						
Unknown				14		
<u>CLASS II</u>						
1952-3, N=	128	25	50	23	20	23
1968-9, N=	117	26	49	38	36	19
Protestant	-19	-19	+16	-34	+17	+10
Catholic	-8	+11	0	+26	-12	-12
Moslem	+21	+8	+4	+3	-5	+1
'Pagan'						
Unknown	6		20	5		
<u>CLASS III</u>						
1952-3, N=	19	41	75	122	53	14
1968-9, N=	33	88	124	158	233	30
Protestant	-14	+1	+2	-9	+11	0
Catholic	-28	-4	-3	-1	-4	+1
Moslem	+22	+3	+1	+3		+6
'Pagan'				-1	-7	
Unknown	18			8		7

The increase (+) or decrease (-) in the proportion of chiefs in each category in 1968-9, when compared with 1952-3, is expressed as a percentage.

I.e., in 1968-9 the proportion of Grade I chiefs in Buganda who were Moslem had risen by 21% when compared with the same category of chiefs in 1952-3.

(3h) CLAN AFFILIATION AND KIN RELATIONSHIP OF CHIEFS IN ANKOLE DISTRICT, 1952-3 AND 1972

	<u>1952 - 3</u>			<u>1972</u>		
	CLASS I	CLASS II	CLASS III	CLASS I	CLASS II	CLASS III
	%	%	%	%	%	%
<u>CLAN AFFILIATION</u>						
Hima	62	34	17	20	18	9
Iru	25	62	79	80	71	89
Other	13	4	3		10	2
 <u>RELATIVE * OF A CHIEF</u>	88	53	59	40	20	27
 <u>Actual Totals</u>	8	50	75	10	49	124

* Present incumbent the son or grandson of chief.

SECTION 4

The Chiefs in Buganda, 1969

Introduction and Notes

This section provides detailed information on chiefs in Buganda in 1969. Table (4a) deals with the 20 saza (county) chiefs, table (4b) with the 117 gombolola (sub-county) chiefs, while table (4c) describes a sample of 33 muluka (parish) chiefs drawn from four gombololas in West Mengo, East Mengo, and Masaka districts.

The previous section has outlined in comparative terms the characteristics of the chiefs in Buganda. A more detailed display of these characteristics by Class and by area in the following tables provides a somewhat perplexing picture of the kind of men who were appointed to chiefly office in the years following the 1966 crisis in Buganda. The volume of new appointments is clearly evident: all the saza chiefs, 87% of the gombolola chiefs, and 76% of the muluka chiefs were appointed in 1967 or later. The greatly reduced age and educational attainments of the new chiefs have already been described. The declining attraction of chiefship to better qualified people is suggested by the fact that in these lists there is no significant relationship between age and level of education: table (4b), which describes the 117 Class II chiefs indicates that the average age of those with no more than primary schooling (38.5) and those with secondary schooling (37.6) is almost the same. In the context of increasing educational opportunity in the post-war years one would have expected a much larger proportion of better-educated younger chiefs. In fact, the educational attainments of chiefs at all levels are very varied, suggesting that this was by no means the most important criterion for appointment. The education of the saza and gombolola chiefs ranges from basic primary to university level, and the muluka chiefs are not conspicuously less qualified than their Class II superiors.

Although the information about the gombolola chiefs (table (4b)) may be incomplete and even incorrect, there is still considerable evidence that significantly different kinds of men were appointed to chiefly office in each of the four districts. If these lists are similar to those forwarded by the district officials to the cabinet sub-committee responsible for appointing gombolola chiefs, then it would seem that the central authorities were much less concerned to maintain uniformity at this level (Class II) than among the saza chiefs and the district administrative personnel (see section 5). The least adequate information in table (4b) concerns the previous occupations of chiefs: there are no data for Masaka, and it seems odd that the new chiefs in Mubende were, without exception, 'traders'. The more varied and more precise list for East Mengo seems more credible in that a substantial proportion of the chiefs were drawn either from administrative posts or from the chiefly hierarchy itself. Although it is quite possible that officials in other districts were prejudiced against such candidates, it is not unlikely that the more neutral labels 'farmer' and 'trader' (occupations

to which a very large proportion of the Ganda population could lay claim) were thought to be more discreet when forwarding names to prior authority in 1967-9.

The uniformity among the West Mengo gombolola chiefs (table (4b)) is particularly striking: all were appointed in 1967, all received the same salary in 1969, and 24 out of 29 had no more than primary education. In the other districts the remuneration of gombolola chiefs was so variable that it is difficult to detect any rationale. Comparing the Mumyuka gombolola chief from Kalungu saza in Masaka district with the Sabawali chief from Singo saza in Mubende district, it is notable that the former received only 423 shillings per month and the latter 768 shillings, although both were aged 30, educated to primary 6 and appointed in 1967. The discrepancy is all the more puzzling when one discovers from the 1969 population census that the lower-paid chief had 34,589 people in his gombolola, 47% more than his colleague in Sabawali, Singo saza.

There is evidence of a more orderly relationship among age, qualification and responsibility in the reported salaries of the saza chiefs (table (4a)). The size of the saza in terms of its gombolola sub-units appears to be the most important determinant of remuneration: the chief of Kyaggwe saza, with 13 gombololas, received 1,955 Shs per month, while the chief of Gomba saza, with only 4 gombololas, received 1,100 Shs.

On the limited evidence of table (4c), it seems that muluka (Class III) chiefs had certain modal characteristics in particular districts, as did their gombolola superiors: there appears to have been a clean sweep of muluka chiefs in Sabadu gombolola, Kalungu saza, and the virtually uniform rates of pay in Mumyuka gombolola, Busiro saza, appear to have little regard to the length of service or educational attainments of the chiefs. Such data suggest that the district administrators' view of the chiefs in Classes II and III was very arbitrary. They certainly do not indicate a concern for the establishment in Buganda, in the years following the 1966 crisis, of a uniform and well integrated 'bureaucratic' hierarchy of local chiefs.

(4a) THE SAZA CHIEFS IN BUGANDA, 1969

KEY

Title: This refers to the official status of each Saza chief in the Ganda state. The Sazas of Bukoto, Kalungu and Kyotera were created out of the former Buddu Saza in 1967, and have no traditional titles.

Tribe: All the Saza chiefs are Ganda, signified here as G.

Education: abbreviations are as follows:

P = Primary, classes 1-6 [Grades I-VI]
S = Secondary, classes 1-6 [Grades VII-XII]
JS = Junior Secondary, classes 1-3 [Grades VII-IX]
SS = Senior Secondary, classes 4-6 [Grades X-XII]
PSQ = Post Secondary qualification
TTC = Teacher training course
U = University

Religion: Abbreviations are as follows:

Ca = Catholic
M = Moslem
Pr = Protestant

Monthly salaries are expressed in East African Shillings.

<u>District and Saza</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Clan</u>	<u>Education</u>	<u>Religion</u>	<u>Monthly Salary</u>	<u>Date of Appointment</u>	<u>Previous Occupation</u>
WEST MENG0									
<u>Mawokota</u>	Kaima	36	G	Nyoni	JS	Ca	1100	1968	Chief of Busujju
<u>Butambala</u>	Katambala	40	G	Musu	P	M	1100	1967	Buganda M.P.
<u>Gomba</u>	Kitunzi	48	G	Mamba	U	M	1100	1967	Teacher
<u>Busiro</u>	Sebwana	40	G	Ngeye	P	Pr	1100	1967	Chauffeur
<u>Kyadondo</u>	Kago	50	G	Nte	P	M	1100	1968	Buganda M.P.
EAST MENG0									
<u>Bulemezi</u>	Kangawo	46	G	Mamba	P3	M	1890	1967	Buganda M.P.
<u>Kyaggwe</u>	Sekibobo	46	G		SS	Ca	1955	1967	Post Office Clerk
<u>Bugerere</u>	Mugerere	35	G		SS	Pr	1435	1969	Teacher
<u>Buvuma</u>	Mbubi	51	G	Mamba	SS	Pr	1245	1969	Gombolola chief.
<u>Buruli</u>	Kimbugwe	29	G	Nkima	JS	Ca	1245	1969	Gombolola chief
MASAKA									
<u>Bukoto</u>		31	G	Nte	TTC	Ca	1452	1966	
<u>Kalungu</u>		30	G	Kobe	JS2	Pr	1145	1967	
<u>Kyoterā</u>		31	G	Fumbe	PSQ	Pr	1145	1969	
<u>Mawogola</u>		48	G	Ngabi	JS2	Pr	1473	1967	
<u>Kooki</u>	Kamusaaga	35	G	Nkima	SS	Ca	1145	1967	
<u>Kabula</u>		37	G	Ngabi	JS3	Pr	1145	1967	
<u>Ssese</u>	Kweba	44	G	Mamba	P5	M	1145	1967	
MUBENDE									
<u>Ssing0</u>	Mukwenda	38	G	Lugave	P5	M	1900	1967	Buganda M.P.
<u>Buweekula</u>	Luweekula	40	G		S	Ca	1200	1967	
<u>Busujju</u>	Kasujju	45	G	Ngeye	P5	M	1100	1967	Trader

(4b) THE GOMBOLOLA CHIEFS IN BUGANDA, 1969

KEY

Rank: Chiefs at each level of the Ganda political hierarchy are arranged in the following order of seniority -

1. Mumyuka
2. Sabaddu
3. Sabagabo
4. Sabawali
5. Musale
6. Mutaba I
7. Mutaba II
8. Mutaba III
9. &c.

Tribe: abbreviations are as follows -

- G = Ganda
S = Soga
L = Lugbara
T = Teso
SA = Samia
A = Acholi
N = Nyoro
NA = Nyala
R = Ruanda

Education: abbreviations are as follows -

- P = Primary, classes 1-6 [Grades I-IV]
S = Secondary, classes 1-6 [Grades VII-XII]
JS = Junior Secondary, classes 1-3 [Grades VII-IX]
SS = Senior Secondary, classes 4-6 [Grades X-XII]
PSQ = Post-secondary qualification
TTC = Teacher training course
U = University

Religion: abbreviations are as follows -

- Ca = Catholic
M = Moslem
Pr = Protestant

Monthly salaries are expressed in East African Shillings

<u>District and Saza</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Clan</u>	<u>Education</u>	<u>Religion</u>	<u>Monthly Salary</u>	<u>Date of Appointment</u>	<u>Previous Occupation</u>
WEST MENG0									
<u>Mawokota</u>	1	50	G	Mbogo	P	Pr	399	1967	Muluka chief
	2	32	G	Butiko	P	Pr	399	1967	Muluka chief
	3	50	G	Mbogo	P	M	399	1967	Trader
	4	40	G	Nkima	JS	Ca	399	1967	Teacher
	5	30	A		P	Ca	399	1967	Policeman
	6	45	G	Ngeye	JS	Pr	399	1967	Muluka chief
<u>Butambala</u>	1	35	G		P		399	1967	Farmer
	2	32	G		P		399	1967	Farmer
	3	30	G		P		399	1967	Trader
	4	41	G		P			1967	Trader
	5	43	G	Fumbe	P		399	1967	Trader
<u>Gomba</u>	1	42	G	Mpologoma	P	Pr	399	1967	Trader
	2	39	G		P	Pr	399	1967	Farmer
	3	36	G		P	Pr	399	1967	Farmer
	4	40	G	Mbogo	P	M	399	1967	Farmer
<u>Busiro</u>	1	35	G		JS	Pr	399	1967	Teacher
	2	45	G	Njaza	SS	Pr	399	1967	High Court interpreter
	3	48	G	Lugave	P	M	399	1967	Trader
	4	41	G	Nkima	JS	M	399	1967	Trader
	5	40	G		P	Pr	399	1967	Trader
	6	38	G	Nkima	P	M	399	1967	Trader
	7	38	G		P	Pr	399	1967	Trader
	8	33	G	Kobe	P	Pr	399	1967	Trader
<u>Kyadondo</u>	1	Vacant							
	2	40	G	Fumbe	P	M	399	1967	Trader
	3	38	G	Lugave	P	Pr	399	1967	Trader
	4	35	S		P	M	399	1967	Trader
	5	45	G	Nkima	P	M	399	1967	Clerk
	6	35	G	Ngabi	P	Ca	399	1967	Farmer
	7	40	N		P	Pr	399	1967	Farmer

<u>District and Saza</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Clan</u>	<u>Education</u>	<u>Religion</u>	<u>Monthly Salary</u>	<u>Date of Appointment</u>	<u>Previous Occupation</u>
EAST MENGO									
<u>Bulemezi</u>	1	43	G	Mamba	P3	Pr	447	1967	Nursing orderly
	2	41	G	Mamba	JS2	Pr	423	1967	Local govt. cashier
	3	35	G	Ngeye	JS3	M	447	1967	Teacher
	4	34	G	Fumbe	SS	Pr	423	1968	Farmer
	5	52	G	Fumbe	P6	Pr	423	1967	Muluka chief
	6	51	G	Kobe	JS1	M	769	1967	Driver
	7	45	G	Ngeye	P6	Pr	447	1965	Muluka chief
	8	34	L		JS3	M	694	1967	Games teacher
	9	37	G	Ngabi	SS	Pr	694	1967	Teacher
	10	50	G	Mamba	JS2	Pr	471	1967	Muluka chief
	11	51	G	Mamba	JS1	Ca	447	1967	
	12	40	G	Ngabi	P6	Pr	447	1963	Muluka chief
	14	vacant							
<u>Kyaggwe</u>	1	41	G	Kobe	SS	M	620	1967	Farmer and trader
	2	53	G	Njovu	U	Pr	804	1967	Registry supt.
	3	39	G	Nsenene	JS3	Ca	731	1967	Teacher
	4	43	G	Ngabi	JS3	Pr	447	1967	Muluka chief
	5	38	G	Butiko		M	471	1967	Clerk, cashier
	6	35	G		JS	Ca	471	1968	Deputy Saza chief
	7	37	G		P6	Ca	471	1967	Dep. Gombolola chief
	8	37	G		JS	Ca	423	1967	Filing clerk
	9	46	G	Mamba	JS3	Pr	592	1967	Clerk
	10	51	G		SS	Ca	694	1967	Clerk
	11	57	G				471	1967	Dep. Gombolola chief
	12	43	G		SS	Pr	957	1967	Salesman
	13	32	G			Pr	471	1969	
<u>Bugerere</u>	1	37	G	Ngo	JS	Pr	447	1967	Clerk
	2		G	Kobe		Ca	423	1968	Dep. Gombolola chief
	3	44	NA		P6	Pr	447	1966	Local govt. clerk
	4	39	NA		JS3	Ca	520	1959	Dep. Gombolola chief
	5	46	G	Nsamba	P6	M	447	1967	Farmer
	6	vacant							

<u>District and Saza</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Clan</u>	<u>Education</u>	<u>Religion</u>	<u>Monthly Salary</u>	<u>Date of Appointment</u>	<u>Previous Occupation</u>
EAST MENG0									
<u>Buvuma</u>	1	54	G	Ngabi		Ca	471	1967	
	2	31	G	Mamba	JS	M	620	1967	Farmer and trader
	3	34	G	Nte	TTC	Ca	520	1967	Teacher
<u>Buruli</u>	1	33	G		SS	Pr	995	1964	Reporter
	2	50	G	Fumbe	TTC	M	568	1967	Teacher
	3	50	G	Mamba	P6	Pr	471	1967	Clerk
	4	40	G		P6	M	423	1967	Trader and farmer

<u>District and Saza</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Clan</u>	<u>Education</u>	<u>Religion</u>	<u>Monthly Salary</u>	<u>Date of Appointment</u>	<u>Previous Occupation</u>
<u>MASAKA</u>									
<u>Bukoto</u>	1	44	G	Mpindi	TTC	Pr	806	1965	
	2	29	G	Mamba	SS	Pr	520	1967	
	3	54	G	Ngeye	P4	M	447	1946	
	4	39	T	Mpewo	JS3	Pr	447	1967	
	5	40	G	Ngonge	P6	M	357	1968	
	6	30	G	Njovu	SS	Pr	357	1968	
<u>Kalungu</u>	1	30	G	Tinvuma	P6	Ca	423	1967	
	2	39	G	Nte	JS3	M	447	1967	
	3	33	G	Mpologoma	JS3	M	882	1967	
	4	33	G	Ngeye	JS3	Ca	727	1967	
	5	27	G	Ngabi	SS	Ca	447	1967	
<u>Kyotera</u>	1	33	G	Ngabi		M	620	1967	
	2	28	G	Mpologoma	SS	Ca	768	1967	
	3	41	G	Mamba	JS3	Ca	564	1948	
	4	35	G	Mbogo	P6	M	657	1967	
	5	43	G	Nsenene	JS3	Ca	447	1967	
<u>Mawogola</u>	1	39	G	Ngeye	JS3	M	520	1967	
	2	43	G	Nte	JS3	Pr	544	1967	
	3	41	G	Ngabi	JS3	Pr	423	1959	
	4	33	G	Nkima	JS2	Ca	420	1959	
<u>Kooki</u>	1	31	G	Ngabi	JS2	Ca	544	1967	
	2	30	G	Ngabi	SS	Ca	657	1967	
	3	35	G	Mamba	P6	M	390	1964	
	4	31	G	Mamba	SS	M	520	1967	
	5	35	G	Ngo	PSQ	Ca	544	1967	

<u>District and Saza</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Clan</u>	<u>Education</u>	<u>Religion</u>	<u>Monthly Salary</u>	<u>Date of Appointment</u>	<u>Previous occupation</u>
MASAKA									
<u>Kabula</u>	1	48	G	Mamba	JS3	Pr	520	1937	
	2	31	G	Mpologoma	JS2	M	399	1962	
	3	33	G	Lugave	JS3	M	544	1967	
	4	45	G	Nkima	P5	M	544	1967	
<u>Ssesse</u>	1	28	G	Katinvuma	JS3	Pr	544	1967	
	2	47	G	Mamba	P6	Ca	658	1967	
	3	33	G	Ngabi	JS3	M	657	1967	
	4	47	G	Mamba	P6	Pr	399	1948	

<u>District and Saza</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Clan</u>	<u>Education</u>	<u>Religion</u>	<u>Monthly Salary</u>	<u>Date of Appointment</u>	<u>Previous Occupation</u>
MUBENDE									
<u>Ssinga</u>	1		G	Mamba		Pr	806	1967	
	2	41	N		P5	Ca	806	1967	Trader
	3	36	R		P5	Pr	544	1967	Trader
	4	30	SA		P6	Pr	768	1967	Trader
	5	33	G	Butiko	JS2	Ca	399	1967	Trader
	6	32	S		SS	M	520	1967	Trader
	7	40	G	Ngo	JS1	Pr	471	1967	Trader
	8	52	G		JS2	Pr	957	1942	Trader
	9	48	G	Ngonge		Pr	471		Trader
	10	36	G		JS2	Pr	471	1967	Trader
<u>Buwekula</u>	1	39	G		P6	Ca	620	1969	Trader
	2	vacant							
	3	vacant							
	4	40	G	Mpewo	P6	Ca	568	1967	Trader
	5	40	G	Nkima	JS3	M	447	1967	Trader
	6	41			P6	Ca	544	1967	Trader
<u>Busujju</u>	1	35	G	Lugave	JS	Ca	657	1965	Trader
	2	34	G	Ngeye	SS	Ca	919	1967	Trader
	3	32	G		JS1	Pr	471	1967	Trader
	4	44			JS3	Pr	768	1967	Trader

(4c) MULUKA (PARISH) CHIEFS IN A SAMPLE OF FOUR GOMBOLOLAS IN BUGANDA, 1969

KEY

Rank: See table of Gombolola chiefs.

Tribe: G = Ganda
Nu = Nubian
An = Ankole

Education: See table of Gombolola chiefs.

Religion: Ca = Catholic
M = Moslem
Pr = Protestant

Monthly salaries are expressed in East African Shillings

DISTRICT, Saza, and Gombolola	Rank	Age	Tribe	Clan	Education	Religion	Monthly Salary	Date of Appointment
WEST MENGO	1	43	G	Fumbe	SS	Pr	158	1963
<u>Busiro</u>	2	38	G	Mbogo	JS3	M	158	1968
Mumyuka	3	34	G		SS	Pr	158	1969
gombolola	4	40	G	Lugave	JS1		235	1965
	5	34	G	Lugave	P6	Ca	158	1969
	6a	33	G	Mpologoma	P6	Ca	158	1959
	6b	31	G	Njovu	JS3	Ca	158	1967
	7	38	G	Ngonge	JS2	Pr	158	1963
	8a	40	G	Ngeye	SS	M	158	1968
	8b	62	G	Mamba	P6	Ca	158	1967
WEST MENGO	1a	48	G	Kobe	P6	M	158	1968
<u>Busiro</u>	1b	44	G	Fumbe			158	1969
Mutuba III	2	33	G	Fumbe	P6	Ca	172	1967
gombolola	3a	40	G	Ndiga	JS1	M	270	1963
	3b	30	G				158	1969
	4		G	Nte			158	1969
	5	50	G				158	1969
	6	31	G	Butiko	JS1	M	158	1967
	6b	34	G	Nkima	P6	Ca	159	1957
EAST MENGO	1	47	G	Mamba	P6	M	322	1958
<u>Kyaggwe</u>	2	34	Nu		P6	M	172	1967
Mutuba VII	3	32	An	Nte	P6	Pr	273	1967
gombolola	4	39	G	Mamba	P6	Pr	172	1969
	5	54	G	Ngonge	P6	Pr	322	1961
	6	55	G	Mamba	P6	Pr	322	1949
	7	48	G	Mamba	P6	Pr	172	1967

DISTRICT,
Saza and
Gombolola

	Rank	Age	Tribe	Clan	Education	Religion	Monthly Salary	Date of Appointment
MASAKA	1	30	G	Nte	JS3	M	158	1969
Kalungu	2	vacant						
Sabaddu	3	29	G	Mutima	JS2	Pr	158	1968
gombolola	4	35	G	Ngabi	P5	M	158	1968
	5	46	G	Ngeye	P5	M	158	1968
	6	37	G	Mbogo	JS3	Pr	158	1968
	7	24	G	Ngabi	P6	M	158	1968
	8	42	G	Mpologoma	P6	Pr	158	1968

SECTION 5

District Administrative Staff in Buganda, 1969

Introduction and Notes

This section begins with a list of the main functions and methods of appointment of the two principal categories of official in the Ugandan districts in 1967-1971, the 'career' civil servants and the 'political' appointees. Their position in the structure of local government after the 1967 Local Administrations Act is outlined in section 1, figure (1b), and their inter-relationship is discussed both in Chapter 2 and in the extract from The People newspaper which appears in section 1.

The distinctions between the personnel in these two categories emerge quite clearly in tables (5b) to (5e). At the higher levels particularly, the career civil servants are conspicuously better educated: with two exceptions the D.C.s and A.D.C.s all have university education, while the 'political' Secretaries General and their Assistants have no more than secondary education (table (5b)). The former are also, on average, much younger.

The fact that the senior career officials include only one Ganda is very clear evidence of efforts to 'Ugandanise' the administrative profession at this level in Buganda. By contrast all the political appointees are Baganda, as are most of the more junior 'career' officials represented in the lists for Masaka district (table (5d)). At this level there appears to have been little attempt to 'reshuffle' officials to other districts, and it may be assumed that their lengthy terms of office in particular localities helped to counterbalance their superiors' relative unfamiliarity with local conditions.

The professionalisation of these levels of administration is suggested by the greater consistency in payscales compared with the Chiefs. Apart from being younger and better educated, there is one other striking difference: only 6% of all the district officials (both 'career' and 'political' are moslems, compared with 30% of the chiefs described in section 4 - a figure roughly representative of the proportion of moslems in the Ganda population at large. It may be that these figures reflect the greater educational and occupational opportunities for Catholics and Protestants, at least during the period (1930-1955) in which most of the men concerned were being educated.

If the qualifications and experience of the incumbents of the 'career' posts are what one might expect of professional

administrators, the backgrounds of the 'political' appointees are very varied - businessmen, teachers, chiefs and Ganda politicians. Precisely how certain men were selected for such influential offices as District Council Chairman, or Member of the District Public Service Sub-Committee, is not recorded; the senior officials who provided most of the information in these tables tended to describe appointees simply as 'staunch supporters of the U.P.C.'

(5a) District Officials in Uganda, 1967-71

(See section 1, table 1b)

<u>OFFICE</u>	<u>FUNCTIONS</u>	<u>APPOINTING AGENCY</u>
<u>(A) The civil service 'career' officials:</u>		
District Commissioner & Assistant D.C.	Supervisory, advisory (see sec. (1c)).	Central government, Uganda Public Service Board.
Administrative Secretary & Asst. Administrative Secretary.	Chief executive officer of District Council; i/c local authority personnel	District Service Sub-Committee.
District officials of central government departments	Specific supervisory &c. responsibility for education, health, prisons, &c.	Central Government departments (seconded to Districts, supervised by Admin. Secretary).
Officers of District Administration	Treasurers, accountants, works supervisors &c.	District Service Sub-Committee.
The Chiefs: Classes I, II & III	Responsible for tax collection, law and order, &c. in particular areas (see table (3a)).	District Service Sub-Committee
<u>(B) The 'Political' appointees:</u>		
Secretary General, & Assistant Secretary General	Overall charge of District administration (see sec. (1c)).	Minister of Regional Administrations, from shortlist of names submitted by District Council.
Chairman and Members of District Public Service Sub-Committee	Recruitment of local government officials (as above) subject to approval of Uganda Public Service Board and the President.	Minister of Regional Administrations, from shortlist submitted by District Council.
Chairman and Members of the District Council		In Buganda and (initially) elsewhere, appointed by Minister of Regional Administrations; otherwise elected every 4 years.

(5b) DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS SENIOR STAFF IN BUGANDA, 1969: AGE AND EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENTS

	CAREER POSTS		POLITICAL APPOINTEES	
	[A] D.C.s. and A.D.C.s	[B] Admin. Sec. & Asst.; Treasurer & Asst.; Auditor	[C] Sec. Gen. & Asst.; Chairman of Dist. Council	[D] Public Service Sub-Committee Members
	<u>T = 12</u>	<u>T = 16</u>	<u>T = 12</u>	<u>T = 10</u>
AVERAGE AGE	39	42	47	58
EDUCATION				
Primary			3	3
Secondary	2	12	7	7
Post-Secondary and University	10	3	1	
Not known		1	1	

(5c) THE SENIOR DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS STAFF IN BUGANDA, 1969

KEY

Education: abbreviations are as follows

S = Secondary [Grades VII-XII]
JS = Junior Secondary [Grades VII-IX]
SS = Senior Secondary [Grades X-XIII]
TTC = Teacher training course
U = University [Makerere, unless otherwise indicated]

Religion: abbreviations are as follows

Ca = Catholic
M = Moslem
Pr = Protestant

Monthly salaries are expressed in East African Shillings.

*Political appointees are:

3. Secretaries General
4. Assistant Secretaries General
10 District Council Chairmen.

OFFICE	DISTRICT	AGE	TRIBE	CLAN	EDUCATION	RELIGION	MONTHLY SALARY	DATE OF APPOINTMENT	PREVIOUS OCCUPATION
1. District Commissioner	W. MENGO	51	Teso		U	Ca	3,000		D.C. Moyo
	E. MENGO	50	Soga		U	Pr	3,000	1969	D.C. Bunyoro
	MASAKA	34	Kede		SS	Ca	2,500		A.D.C. Karamoja
	MUBENDE	60	Soga		U	Ca		1969	Sec. Gen. Busoga
2. Assistant District Commissioner	W. MENGO	32	Ankole		U[USA]	Pr	1,400		Ministerial Ast. Sec.
	W. MENGO	50	Kede		SS	Pr	2,500		A.D.C. Bugisu
	E. MENGO	38	Toro		U	Pr	1,400	1964	Salesman for B.A.T.
	E. MENGO	36	Toro		U	Pr	1,300	1968	University Student
	MASAKA	33	Ganda		U	Ca	1,400		A.D.C. Bugisu
	MASAKA	32	Toro		U	Pr	1,400		A.D.C. Sebei
	MUBENDE	28	Lango		U	Pr	1,300	1967	University Student
	MUBENDE	27	Gisu		U	Ca	1,300	1967	University Student
3. *Secretary General	W. MENGO	43	Ganda	Fumbe	JS	Pr	1,600	1968	Saza Chief, Gomba
	E. MENGO	65	Ganda	Ngo	S	Pr	2,666	1967	Minister Buganda
	MASAKA	35	Ganda	Ngo	SS	Ca	2,666	1967	/govt.
	MUBENDE	40	Ganda	Ngeye	U[Cairo]	M	1,600	1967	Teacher
4. *Asst. Secretary General	W. MENGO	40	Ganda		SS	Ca	1,200	1968	Saza Chief
	E. MENGO	55	Ganda	Mamba	S	Pr	1,450	1967	Businessman
	MASAKA		Ganda	Nkima		Pr	2,417	1967	
	MUBENDE	34	Ganda		S	Pr	1,000	1967	

OFFICE	DISTRICT	AGE	TRIBE	CLAN	EDUCATION	RELIGION	MONTHLY SALARY	DATE OF APPOINTMENT	PREVIOUS OCCUPATION
5. Administrative Secretary	W. MENGO	38	Ganda		SS	Pr	1,100	1968	Admin. Sec.
	E, MENGO	48	Ganda		S	Pr	2,625	1967	Saza Chief Kyaggwe
	MASAKA	46	Ganda Fumbe		U	M	2,583	1959	
	MUBENDE	55	Ganda Nkima		S	Ca	2,400	1967	Admin. Sec.
6. Asst. Administrative Secretary	W. MENGO	35	Ganda Nkima		SS	Ca	1,000	1968	Finan. Asst.
	E. MENGO	45	Ganda		S	Pr	1,500		Deputy Chief
	MASAKA	32	Ganda Nyonyi		TTC	Ca	1,145	1969	
	MUBENDE	38	Ganda		S	Ca	1,200	1967	Admin. Sec.
7. Treasurer	W. MENGO	38	Ganda Fumbe		SS	Pr	1,300	1968	Finan. Asst.
	E. MENGO	42	Ganda Lugave		S	Pr	2,330	1967	Accts. Clerk
	MASAKA	38	Ganda Mamba		SS	Pr	2,330	1955	
	MUBENDE	38	Ganda		S	Ca	1,450	1967	Accountant
8. Assistant Treasurer	MASAKA vacant								
	MUBENDE	36	Ganda			Ca	900	1967	
9. Internal Auditor	W. MENGO	50	Ganda Ngeye		U	Ca	1,400	1968	Finan. Asst.
	E. MENGO	55	Ganda Nte		S	Ca	1,417	1967	Auditor, Buganda Government.
	MASAKA	37	Ganda Fumbe		SS	Pr	1,305	1965	
10. *District Council Chairman	W. MENGO	35	Ganda Mpologoma		SS	Ca	600	1968	Trader
	E. MENGO	70	Ganda Nkima		P	Pr	700	1967	Asst. Prime Minister Buganda
	MASAKA	48	Ganda Nsenene		P6	Pr	700	1967	
	MUBENDE	55	Ganda Butiko		P	Ca	700	1967	Police constable

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>AGE</u>	<u>TRIBE</u>	<u>CLAN</u>	<u>QUALIFICATIONS</u>	<u>RELIGION</u>	<u>MONTHLY SALARY</u>	<u>DATE OF APPOINTMENT</u>
Accountant	50	Ganda	Nvubu	S - grade IX	Pr	1,890	1940
Assistant Accountant	35	Ganda	Njovu	S - grade X	Pr	1,245	1963
Assistant Accountant	45	Ganda	Ndiga	S - grade X	Pr	844	1960
Internal Auditor	37	Ganda	Fumbe	SS	Pr	1,305	1965
Internal Auditor	41	Ganda	Ngabi	S - grade X	Pr	1,305	1965
Internal Auditor	45	Ganda	Mamba	S - grade IX	M	957	1958
Internal Auditor	26	Ganda	Ngabi	2 accountancy diplomas	Ca	844	1965
Tax Officer	42	Ganda	Mpologoma	S - grade IX	Ca	788	1967
Internal Auditor	31	Ganda	Mbogo	Co-operatives Certificate	Pr	568	1967
Market Officer	41	Ganda	Nvubu	S - grade IX	Pr	860	1965
Education Officer	45	Ankole		University Degree	M	1,881	1957
Asst. Education Officer	45	Ganda	Nte	Teacher, Grade III	Pr	1,435	1963
Asst. Education Officer	48	Ankole		Diploma in Education	Pr	1,370	1965
Asst. Schools Inspector	36	Hororo		Teacher, Grade III	Pr	1,145	1968
Works Supervisor	Vacant					2,332	
Ag. Asst. Works Superv.	44	Ganda	Nkima	Certified Surveyor	Ca	1,145	1969
Medical Officer	58	Ganda	Mamba	Diploma in Medicine	Pr	3,315	1935
Health Inspector	40	Soga	Nvubu	Diploma in Public Health	Pr	860	
Senior Health Inspector	53	Toro	Mbwa	Diploma in Public Health	Ca	1,630	1940
Senior Health Inspector	49	Ganda		Diploma in Public Health	Pr	1,370	1943
Health Inspector	46	Ganda	Mamba	Diploma in Public Health	Pr	1,245	1945
Health Inspector	44	Ankole		Diploma in Public Health	Ca	1,300	1952
Vermin Control Officer	28	Ganda	Nkima	Professional hunter	Pr	1,245	1965
Prisons Officer	31	Ganda	Fumbe	S - grade IX	Pr	1,245	1957
Urban Officer	36	Ganda	Nkima	Cambridge School Certificate	Ca	1,095	1969
Establishment Officer	30	Ganda	Mamba	Cambridge School Certificate	Pr	1,095	1967

(5d) ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF, MASAKA DISTRICT, 1969
[Staff in the most senior grades appear in Table (5c)]

(5e) MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE (APPOINTMENTS) SUB-COMMITTEES, WEST AND EAST MENG0, 1969

KEY

Religion: abbreviations are expressed as follows

Ca = Catholic
M = Moslem
Pr = Protestant

Monthly Salary is expressed in East African Shillings

<u>District</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Clan</u>	<u>Education</u>	<u>Religion</u>	<u>Monthly Salary</u>	<u>Date of Appointment</u>	<u>Other Occupation</u>
W. MENDO	Chairman	48	Ganda	Nkima	P	M	1,000	1968	Teacher (Moslem)
	Member	61	Ganda	Mpologoma	SS	Ca	610	1968	Former Saza chief
	Member	70	Ganda	Ngeye	P	M	610	1968	Trader
	Member	55	Ganda	Musu	S	Pr	610	1968	Ex-Minister Buganda
	Member	36	Ganda	Ngabi	S	Ca	610	1968	Farmer
	Member	40	Ganda	Nsenene	P	Pr	618	1968	Businessman
E. MENDO	Chairman	70	Ganda	Ngabi	S	Pr			Ex-M.P., Buganda
	Member	70	Ganda		S	Ca			Ex-Saza Chief
	Member	75	Ganda		S	Ca			Ex-gombolola chief
	Member	60	Ganda		S	Ca			