

H.R.G. HOWMAN on

PROVINCIALISATION IN RHODESIA 1968-1969

and

Rational and Irrational Elements



edited by G.C. Passmore

CAMBRIDGE AFRICAN OCCASIONAL PAPERS 4

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The African Studies Centre was founded in July 1965 to facilitate interdisciplinary research and teaching in modern African studies in Cambridge. The Centre publishes the Cambridge African Monograph Series and the Cambridge Occasional Papers. The aim of these series is to make available occasional research reports, seminar papers, conference proceedings and bibliographies relating to African Studies.

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- It is difficult to decide how to criticise these RF proposals because they ignore so many economic, administrative, moral, cultural and political aspects in their narrow, short-term single-purpose concern to achieve separation of the races as a guarantee of European preservation and control...
- What political party was responsible for arousing ill feeling over the term "multi-racial" - a purely factual term apparent at every street corner? Yet now the term is not to be used, nor the facts faced...
- It is true to say that there is not a single chief who is capable of exercising such senatorial functions and no more than four or five who could adequately perform at provincial level...
- If these RF political values are to dominate then we must expect the emergence of two political African poverty areas or overcrowded subsistence slums...
- How close to a Plan for Chaos is this political thinking...
- What kind of Rhodesia do these political thinkers really think will be shaped by their plans? Brave words about preservation of the European's future but nothing about his standards and values, and still less about the morality of his actions...

*(From a Minute of the Deputy Secretary to the Minister of Internal Affairs
26.8.68)*

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G.C. Passmore

PREFACE


Roger Howman spent more than 40 years in the Rhodesian Department of Native (later Internal) Affairs, retiring as Deputy Secretary in July 1969. For a further 14 years he served in the Central Intelligence Office, the last three of these years under the African Government of Independence.

The memoir on Provincialisation was written in December 1984 as a contribution towards a much wider administrative history in course of preparation by the Editor. It serves as an illustration of the part played by public servants in African policy, particularly at the time of the *Fearless* proposals.

The paper is supplemented from contemporary research by Dr. G.C. Passmore who has prepared an introduction and annotations and selected the annexures from privileged access to the official records.

Studies of the recent history of Rhodesia and Zimbabwe are dominated by the conflicts between the Rhodesian and British Governments and between ethnic groups within the country. This material provides some indication of the conflicts and discussions within the Rhodesian Government which were of a kind, one may suspect, currently present in the government of the Republic of South Africa.

A.T. Grove



EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

Lord Robert Blake, in his authoritative *History of Rhodesia* (1977),¹ observed that civil servants had probably done more to influence the outcome of events than any other category. How far this influence in fact extended is revealed in a recent paper by a top policy maker in that country, H.R.G. Howman, former Deputy Secretary for Internal (previously Native) Affairs from 1962 to 1969. The content, annotated and reproduced here with supplements selected by the Editor, affords insight into the strong rational influence which functioned side by side with rank extremism in high office. What follows is an interesting revelation not only of the differences that existed, but the manner in which they were handled, both between civil servants and politicians, and between professional and "political" administrators. The struggle reached its peak in the crisis which developed in 1968 to 1969 over provincialisation, the euphemism for separate development in the last years before majority rule. So strong was the intention of the Rhodesian Government to entrench this provision in a new constitution, that the question might well be asked whether provincialisation did not play a hidden part in the failure of the talks on *Fearless*. Blake comments: 'How far Smith was serious in these negotiations remains a puzzle. We do not know what was in the relevant Rhodesian documents, if indeed there is anything at all to throw light on the matter.'² The background outlined in the following pages may suggest answers to this and other questions.

Whilst to the liberal observer there might seem to be little to choose between provincialisation and partition, since both involved the denial of human rights, there had been intense struggle over this issue within the Rhodesian Front Party (RF). Partition required the establishment of two autonomous states, each in its own consolidated area, one for whites and the other for blacks, strictly demarcated by race. Provincialisation implied the creation under one government of three parliaments, Mashona, Matabele and European, distinguished on cultural and ethnic rather than racial grounds, each presiding over scattered pockets of land. Strong pressure for partition from a large section of the RF had culminated in a Special Party Congress in September, 1968, at which Smith only narrowly achieved a majority for the

¹ Robert Blake, *History of Rhodesia*, 1977, 147

² *Ibid.*, 401

more "moderate" policy of provincialisation, which he asserted was the key to the future. In such circumstances it would hardly have been simple a bare six weeks later, to secure acceptance of the *Fearless* proposals, still based essentially on the 1961 Constitution.

The impression of heightened pressure upon Smith from within his own camp is strengthened by British observations made on *Fearless* concerning the "wholly uncooperative attitude" of a senior civil servant, W.H.H. Nicolle, Secretary for Internal Affairs, who was present as Smith's advisor.³ Although the *Fearless* proposals remained under negotiation, Nicolle on his return took the singular step of circularising senior officials condemning the political implications.⁴ He was in fact a proponent of partition and had recommended it to the Constitutional Commission in 1967, in the form advised by an ethnogeneticist, Lt. Col. Robert Gayre (the Laird of Gayre and Nigg) who had recently visited the country. This advocated two totally separate states for members of the "Negroid" and "more advanced Caucasian" stocks. Many people in Rhodesia had not thought that the Gayre proposals would be taken seriously, and some of the comments made by the Deputy Secretary in a memorandum requested by the Whaley Commission,⁵ would make light reading were it not for the grim intention behind the proposals made by the senior official responsible for African Affairs.

Gayre's ideas were in the end rejected, as were the Harper-Graham proposals a year or so later, named after their main sponsors, William Harper who had been Minister for Internal Affairs, and Lord Angus Graham, Minister

³ *ibid.*, 400

⁴ Note on the position of the Secretary for Internal Affairs: W.H.H. Nicolle was a firm admirer of the South African Bantustan system, which he hoped to see emulated in Rhodesia. Raised on a farm in Matabeleland, Nicolle had entered the service straight from school during the depression years. He rose to be Under Secretary in the Department of Native Economics and Marketing, being promoted to Deputy Secretary following the early retirement of A.E. Pendered. Although Nicolle had never been a native commissioner in charge of a district, he was chosen to be Secretary for Internal Affairs in April 1965 under W.J. Harper as Minister. The post of Secretary became vacant after the promotion, allegedly on political grounds, of S.E.M. Morris to the position of Chairman of the Public Services Board. Morris had been due to retire as Secretary in 1968 and Roger Howman a year later. It should be noted that S.E. Morris was Secretary during the period when most of the innovations described below were launched under the prime initiative of Roger Howman who describes the partnership as an ideal one. An assessment of Morris' leadership is contained in J.F. Holleman, *Chief, Council and Commissioner*, 1969, 229-231.

⁵ The Rhodesia Constitutional Commission (Chairman W.R. Whaley), 1967. See Supplement No.1 (Appendix A). Minute on Col. Gayre's Views.

of Agriculture.⁶ This set of proposals in which "expert advisers in the Ministry", notably Nicolle, were said to have played a major part (Howman dissociated himself), envisaged a white Senate and two Chambers, one for whites and the other for blacks. The latter involved the revival of "colonial" arrangements with a legislative council composed initially of white officials. The plan eliminated the principle of African representation in Parliament on which all prospects of settlement with Britain depended.⁷

The Harper-Graham proposals had come as a challenge to the official RF proposals for a new constitution, embodied in the so-called Yellow Paper,⁸ issued by the Executive and Divisional Chairmen in preparation for the Special Congress. Three provincial councils, later to become parliaments, were to be set up within five years, together with a Senate consisting of ten Europeans and ten chiefs plus three others. The national parliament during the interim period would be based on parity, but once provincialisation had been achieved would convert to an all-European parliament elected on a European roll. Following the decision of Congress to adopt provincialisation, the logistics of how this might be implemented were referred by the Cabinet to a working party of senior civil servants for investigation and the resolution of any unforeseen difficulties.

It is astonishing in view of the powerful pressures that existed for greater separation if not total segregation, to find that the Cabinet in the event was compelled by the sheer weight of administrative evidence (and diplomacy) marshalled against it, to abandon the plan for provincialisation as totally

⁶ See Supplement No. 2 (Appendix B). Minute on Harper-Graham Proposals.

⁷ Disagreement mainly on this principle had led to Smith's dismissal of Harper from the Cabinet in July 1968 and Graham's resignation later.

⁸ See Supplement No. 3 (Appendix C). Copy of the Yellow Paper.

impracticable.⁹ The leading part in the working party concerned, was played by the Deputy Secretary for Internal Affairs, H.R.G. Howman. Before studying his first-hand account of what took place in the run-up to these proceedings and their dramatic outcome, it is of interest to learn more about this man and the part he played in the wider context of African Administration.

Roger Howman has been acknowledged for his career's efforts at reform in African policy.¹⁰ His African name, *Macharangwanda* was 'received in succession from my father who made the name famous from back in the 1900's', roughly meaning one whose "flesh is stretched tightly across the bones, or of lean appearance". Born on July 9, 1909 at Fort Victoria, Roger Howman was the son of E.G. Howman, a former provincial commissioner, himself the scion of an old Norfolk family, the end of a long line of doctors and ministers of religion (six of whom were educated at Cambridge University). Roger went to the well-known Plumtree School, and describes his formative years as saturated with interest in "Native" custom, belief and history, as well as concern for "Native Affairs". He was raised amid discussions between his father and such figures as Wiri Edwards, Fritz Posselt, Bullock, Bazeley, the Jacksons, Carbutt and Oliver, from whom he learned 'the tremendous weight of importance given to race relations and the need for justice, goodwill and understanding - the great tradition to see fair play built up'.¹¹ It was the speculations of, and differences between such authorities that provided the motivation of his youth to turn to scientific study and the rational

⁹ Proposals for provincialisation were not again revived until 1972, and then in somewhat modified form with the introduction of the Regional Authorities Act, No. 50 of 1972. An official memo at this time, however, left no doubt as to the ultimate intentions of the RF administration: 'The establishment of Regional Authorities may really be said to be the first step in the implementation of the Government's policy of regionalisation which it is conceived, is the concept of having separate local government administration for the three principal racial groups in Rhodesia, namely the European, the Ndebele and Shona'. Whilst initially there were to be regional authorities for each of the existing eight "provinces", these were later to be amalgamated into larger units. (The memorandum headed "Regional Authorities" and carrying no date or other reference was obtained from the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1975). In April 1976, in a broadcast to the nation, Ian Smith announced a "New Initiative", to bring Africans into the Government - with the appointment of four Chiefs as Cabinet Ministers, with six additional posts of Deputy Minister. Two Ministers and three Deputies were to be assigned to the areas of Mashonaland and Matabeleland respectively, in what were later to be called Cabinet Councils. (Rhodesia. Ministry of Information, Immigration and Tourism, *For the Record*, 35, April 1976).

¹⁰ See J.F. Holleman, *Chief, Council and Commissioner* (1969), 67n.

¹¹ *Personal Communication*

approach as the key to resolving the future of race relations in his country.

Although he had always wanted to go into the Native Department, as it was then called, Roger Howman's first appointment was to the Auditor General's staff, his father holding the view that Native Affairs was far too important and vital to the future of Rhodesia to be entrusted to officials who could not 'see beyond their noses'. A broad preparatory experience was required and this could best be provided by a period in the Audit Department which served all sections of government. Howman's secondment from here to the Native Education Department where he administered grants to missions, brought him into contact with one of the most formative influences in his life, Harold Jowitt, later Director of Native Development. Jowitt, he says, gave form to his youthful dreaming and commitment and encouraged him to go more deeply into the study of Native affairs. It was Jowitt who mapped out the selection of subjects intimately related to this field, which Roger Howman studied outside office hours, for an external degree majoring in social anthropology and psychology from the University of South Africa.

In 1935 Howman was awarded a Beit Fellowship and given leave to attend the London School of Economics for two years, where he elected not to follow a formal post-graduate degree, but instead pursue a special combination of studies relevant to what he called racial affairs. This choice was 'bedded in firmly based convictions arising out of an ideal of racial harmony and justice' that had launched him on his studies seven years previously. His work was first centred on Malinowski's anthropology and Lucy Mair's course in administration, but later he switched to sociology under Professors Ginsberg and Mannheim, the latter of whom persuaded him at the end of the two years to register for a Ph.D., with focus on race contact in Rhodesia. During university vacations Howman travelled extensively in Europe, visiting as many countries as possible where race was a problem. These included Hitler's Germany, Austria, Hungary, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. At the end of his fellowship he had six month's paid leave due to him and this he used to go to America, visiting universities and agencies in all parts of the country concerned with interracial problems, including the Southern Interracial Commission and the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured Peoples. He met such notable sociologists and educationalists as Drs Odum, Park, Burgess, Chas. Johnson, Faris and Hodding Carter, Linton and Ogburn, as well as Jesse Jones of the Phelps Stokes Fund, Will Percy the southern campaigner against the Klu Klux Klan, and the Chief Wizard of the KKK himself. Howman had visited the United States with three major studies in mind - 1) comparative study of the practical techniques of racial adjustment evolved in the U.S.A., 2) scientific methods of research in field work,

investigations and community surveys (seeking precision and objectivity), and 3) social welfare or education in its widest meaning among rural Negroes "come to town". The principal result of his contact with educated black men and women was to make him more conscious than ever of the role such people would one day assume in Rhodesia. In his *Report on Local Government* in the early 50's he wrote, 'we need that elite, the freely chosen leaders of the people. We need to harness its motive power in a constitutional form and direct it into a consciousness of citizenship, of civic responsibilities to form an organic community whole with the people whose will they embody'.¹²

Roger Howman returned to Rhodesia in 1938, intending to go back to London on his next long leave after several years of fieldwork, to complete the requirements for the higher degree. These plans were disrupted, however, by the outbreak of World War II. Debarred from military service he resumed the normal administrative routine of a district officer in the Native Department. Working in remote out-stations, he began the intensive study of Native custom and law in his spare time, which was to make him the country's foremost authority in this field. The same year his father, then Chairman of the Committee to investigate the Economic, Social and Health conditions of Africans employed in Urban Areas, called on his son's expertise to prepare the Committee's Report, handing him the evidence of 120 witnesses to analyse.¹³ Roger Howman's draft was adopted virtually without change and major recommendations of the Committee were later put into effect. In 1944, now an assistant native commissioner, he volunteered important testimony to the Native Trade and Production Commission.¹⁴ By 1949 Roger Howman had been made a full native commissioner and had begun to achieve remarkable success with the Wedza African Council into which an elective element had been introduced. In 1951, he was seconded to tour Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika and Zanzibar to make a study of African councils and courts as a basis for future planning in Rhodesia. His scholarly comparative work based on the findings from this investigation was published by the University of South Africa as *African Local Government in British East and Central Africa. A Report by R. Howman 1951-1953* (1962).¹⁵ It laid the

¹² *African Local Government in British East and Central Africa. A Report by R.H. Howman. Southern Rhodesia 1951-1953, 1962, Part III, para 179.*

¹³ *Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Economic, Social and Health Conditions of Africans employed in Urban Areas* (Chairman E.G. Howman), 1938.

¹⁴ *Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Native Trade and Production Commission* (Chairman W.A. Godlonton), 1944.

¹⁵ Howman Report, *op.cit.*

foundations for the whole future policy of local government and community development in Rhodesia over the next 20 years.

The setting up of councils had been considered as far back as 1927 and some elementary bodies had been established in 1938, consisting mainly of chiefs' appointed nominees, but these had been largely ineffectual. It was primarily through Roger Howman's work that elective representative councils on the Westminster pattern were effectively extended to African areas for the first time, by means of the Native Councils Act of 1957.¹⁶ He was awarded the MBE by Her Majesty the Queen in 1958 in recognition of his services. Howman visualised local government in Rhodesia as providing 'a widespread democratic structure on the ground ... to serve as a foundation and training ground for whatever might evolve as the whole political structure of the State', for, he said, an effective state could only be sustained and nourished by a responsible and informed electorate. 'We are in the throes of a process of evolution from traditional, inherited leadership to democratic leadership, and sound administrative planning now can mould to a considerable extent the nature and qualities of future leaders. That is why it is so important to foster the corporate life of the African and to design wisely the devices whereby leaders emerge and are moulded by the people and by the responsibilities placed upon them.'¹⁷ His Report foreshadowed the policy of community development in its finding that 'No definition of local government is more suited to or more urgently needed in Africa than that of a community-building mechanism...'¹⁸ 'We have more to fear from a demoralised human sand blown about by nationalistic or anti-European doctrines than from stable communities unifying the people by common loyalties, common responsibilities and communal purposes out of which enlightened and responsible leaders should spring. Genuine local government based on internal growth and common feeling should produce citizens, not demagogues.'¹⁹

Roger Howman advised caution, however, lest the tribal structure be disintegrated by too sudden and violent a change. 'our problem is one of constitutional reform, a working on something already formed ... we are

¹⁶ The Native Councils Act, No. 19 of 1957. Statute Law of Southern Rhodesia. The title was later changed to African Councils Act in terms of the Interpretation Act, No. 25 of 1962.

¹⁷ Southern Rhodesia. *Second Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Organisation and Development of the Southern Rhodesia Public Services* (Chairman T.T. Paterson), 1962, para.1.26, and *personal communication*.

¹⁸ Howman Report, *op.cit.*, Part II, para 198.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Part VI, para 36.

attempting to enrich and expand the field of leadership so that it conforms with new movements within the body of the community'.²⁰ The administrative problem, he said, was to catch up with the fast moving political currents of change, with soundly based organic institutions at the base where democracy as a way of life (not a counting of votes) could be inculcated.²¹ This approach was in sharp contrast to British Colonial policy in other parts of Africa where, under the system of Indirect Rule, the chief, assisted by traditional counsellors under the legal title of Native Authority, was made the hold-all of judicial, legislative, local government, financial, land and ceremonial matters. Here the chiefs were expected to do the impossible because they were assumed to have what was called "inherent power" to order their people to do whatever was required by government. Since a hereditary chieftainship was rooted in the past and usually confined to the aged, said Howman, the chief was, however, essentially a guardian of tradition, of ancestral spirits, law and order. His inherent power had nothing to do with innovations, reforms and finance. Efforts to channel these through the chief so pushed and distorted the functions of chieftainship that people failed to recognise it. No issue in Native Affairs, he declared, was more controversial and intricate. A survey conducted by Howman among native commissioners in Rhodesia showed that they were strongly at variance in their views. Twenty-four per cent were totally opposed to councils, 33 per cent considered that tribal and local government were inseparable and must be cemented together, whilst a majority, some 43 per cent, were in favour of the immediate and gradual withdrawal of chiefs from councils.²²

There would be no confusion or suspicion as to the relative influence of chief and council, Howman suggested, if their respective functions were well defined, a view later upheld by three governmental commissions (see below). In Rhodesia the solution to the relationship between the pre-existing tribal authority and councils was thus sought not in identifying the two, but distinguishing between them. Howman proposed a grand system of institution-building not only by legislation establishing councils, but by statutory recognition of chiefs' courts and tribal land authorities. The chiefs were to remain the exponents of native custom, the upholders of law and order and custodians of the land and tribal affairs, whilst local government was to be

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Part III, para 211.

²¹ Southern Rhodesia. *Second Report*, *loc. cit.*

²² Howman Report, *op.cit.*, Part III, para 191.

built up as the mechanism for secular development.²³ As an interim measure chiefs were accorded nominal positions of honour as *ex officio* vice-presidents (without a vote) and headmen as members of councils in their areas. It was intended that chiefs would gradually withdraw from the councils once their authority in the tribal courts and land matters had been legally established and they no longer felt their status and influence threatened. Passage of the two statutes needed to complete this trilogy of legislation took a further 12 years to achieve. The Act establishing Tribal Land Authorities was passed in 1967,²⁴ and the African Law and Tribal Courts Act shortly before Roger Howman's retirement in 1969.²⁵ This final demarcation and confining of the chiefs' role left development in the hands of local government and, in principle, the way to modernisation was paved.

In order to embody his ideas on councils in a formal statute, Howman had studied local government legislation from all parts of the world, drawing particularly on Kenya, the Sudan and Eire (then acknowledged for its legislation in this field). The crucial purpose of the African Councils Act was specified in *Section 53(2)* that, in determining the functions with which a council might be empowered, regard should be paid to whether an act or thing done by a council was likely to 'a) foster the sense of community and citizenship of the inhabitants of the area, b) promote initiative and a sense of responsibility, or c) promote the development and economic progress of the area with the active participation of the inhabitants'.²⁶ Local government in these terms had a dual purpose, not merely the provision of public services but the education of a civic collective self.²⁷ Such an education started at the base of social life in the everyday affairs of the area. It must be concerned with the felt, tangible needs of each community, its vital interests, if organised self-help and a clear acceptance of responsibility, both moral and financial, were to result. Councils for this reason were only to be established on the express wish of the people concerned. In stressing local services which met priority needs, the Report drew on the distinction made by educational psychologists between so-called *felt* needs, with their superior motivating power, and *real* needs or

²³ The policy is fully outlined in G.C. Passmore, "African Involvement in Development in the Tribal Areas of Rhodesia" (Unpubl. University of Rhodesia thesis, 1978), Ch.7.

²⁴ The Tribal Land Act, No.9 of 1967. Statute Law of Rhodesia. This Act was later repealed and substituted by Sect 47, 48 and 49 of the Land Tenure Act No 55 of 1969.

²⁵ The African Law and Courts Act, No. 9 of 1969. Statute Law of Rhodesia.

²⁶ Act No. 19 of 1957, *op.cit.*, Sect 53 (2).

²⁷ Howman Report, *op.cit.*, Part VI, para 44.

goals which some outside agency such as government thought good for you. If councils were to perform functions vital to the interests of the community (and without such functions they would flag and die), the statutory framework within which services were devolved to local government must be designed accordingly. The Report early predicted the need for a redefinition and reorganisation of central government functions and finances so that appropriate services might be devolved to local authorities, a process which would demand action at the highest level of responsibility.²⁸ In later years Howman played a leading role in the interministerial exchanges which finally culminated in 1968 in a Prime Minister's Circular, spelling out in detail the future division of functions between local and central government.²⁹

Education for local government meant training in the use of the vote, in 'the solution of argument by majority decision ... the dawning appreciation of public finance, and awareness that leaders can be held accountable both for their promises and their actions'³⁰ Such innovation brought confrontation with all the problems, hesitations, ignorance and distortions with which a tribal society met new and western institutions. The ramifications affected the whole web of society with its established lines of authority and power patterns. Political argument at the remote national level for the right to vote, spared hardly a thought for the intractable groundwork involved in such education for change. It was for reasons like these that council warrants under the Act of 1957 permitted alternative methods of election, progressing in successive stages from the *traditional* where voters expressed a preference for their tribal leaders, to *acclamation* where they announced their wishes as a group, *decision by view* where they indicated their wishes by assembling behind nominees, *decision by poll* or a counting of heads, and finally the *secret ballot*.³¹ A fundamental feature of the Act inspired by the legislation of Eire, was the distinction in law drawn between the deliberative and the executive. To the council itself were accorded questions of policy, decisions as to what should be done, the raising of funds and making of by-laws, but independent responsibility was statutorily assigned to the officers it employed for overall administration and management.³² The aim was to build up an efficient local

²⁸ *Ibid.*, paras 27-42.

²⁹ Rhodesia. Prime Minister's Office, Circular No. 1 / 1968, *Division of Functions between Central Government and Local Government*, 24.iv.68.

³⁰ Extracts from a 1961 Memorandum on African Local Government prepared for Constitutional discussions, 18.i.72, 2.

³¹ African Councils General Regulations, 1957. Southern Rhodesia Government Notice No. 529 of 1957, Sect. 10.

³² Howman Report, *op. cit.*, Part IV, paras 97-100 and 105-106.

government service on the hypothesis that a poor council served by a good executive was much more efficient than a good council with a poor staff.

Implementation of the African Councils Act was obstructed by the strict priority accorded in the late 50's to the African Land Husbandry Scheme, to which all other aspects of administration were officially subordinated. The failure of this scheme, the violent reactions evoked by destocking, reallocation of land, and the landlessness to which it gave rise, added to unemployment and the general frustrations of the African population, finally threatened the stability of administration and district commissioners warned of "rebellion". The ensuing Emergency pointed the urgent need for a complete reappraisal of policy. Diehards in the Native Affairs Department urged heightened powers of control for the chiefs and a Chiefs' Council and other measures reinforcing their powers were introduced. More rational counsels finally prevailed, however, for the substitution of non-authoritarian policy for the measures of compulsion which had been used.³³ The new approach highlighted the scope afforded by the councils legislation for popular participation in democratic institutions for development. The change in emphasis was strongly reinforced by the findings of three important enquiries appointed at this time, the Mangwende,³⁴ Robinson³⁵ and Paterson³⁶ Commissions, and led finally in 1962 to the formal announcement of community development as precursor and adjunct to the policy of local government.³⁷ The principle of community building, fostering responsibility and self-reliance, was by no means new to policy in Rhodesia, but it was now given fresh definition by technical assistance requested from the United States Agency for International Development, in the person of an international consultant sociologist, Dr James Green who spent four years in Rhodesia as an advisor in a team of officials. 'We were implementing community development sanctioned by the Councils Act,' said Howman, 'and the chance to give it precision and the benefit of the

³³ The crisis resulting from the Land Husbandry Scheme and the re-appraisal of policy which followed are fully outlined in Passmore, "African Involvement", *op. cit.*, Chs. V-VII.

³⁴ Southern Rhodesia. *Report of the Mangwende Reserve Commission of Inquiry* (Chairman James Scott Brown), 1961. paras 383-384.

³⁵ Southern Rhodesia. *Report of the Commission Appointed to Inquire and Report on Administrative and Judicial Functions in the Native Affairs and District Courts Departments* (Chairman Victor Robinson), 1961, para 165.

³⁶ Southern Rhodesia. *First Report on the Commission of Inquiry into the Organisation and Development of the Southern Rhodesia Public Services* (Chairman T.T. Paterson) 1961, 91-96.

³⁷ Southern Rhodesia. *Debates*, Speech by Sir Edgar Whitehead, 28.vi.62., Cols. 262-264.

latest sociological study by using AID and Jimmy Green was seized. Besides,' he added, 'the time was come to re-arrange the activities of other Ministries and so we had to seek higher authority. One morning in 1962 I got a message that the Prime Minister wanted to see us at his house and there, just after breakfast, Sir Edgar Whitehead asked us to tell him about this Community Development ... A day or so afterwards the PM announced in Parliament a policy of Community Development which he urged as "almost a new science".'³⁸ The Prime Minister could see in this the hope of great modernisation of the whole of the administration and a completely new approach to district administration.³⁹ The policy of local government and community development (LG-CD) was now given a high political profile and attention.

In 1963, a permanent Cabinet Coordinating Committee on LG-CD was set up, one of its first tasks being to consider a draft Prime Minister's Directive giving instructions to all ministries regarding their role in district administration, local government and technical development at the local level. However, in December 1962 there had been a change of Government with the shock return of the RF at the General Election. A major obstacle was now raised to the formulation and clarification of policy in terms of the draft Directive, which had referred to 'all the people living in a community area irrespective of race or colour or creed or economic or social class' One of the new Ministers, Lord Graham, Minister of Agriculture, demanded that a racial definition be given to the concept of "community". The ensuing wrangle over the question of definition dragged on for fully two years, exacerbated by resistance from the Ministry of Agriculture to the threat which it perceived to its extension services. Finally, in 1964, desperate to get things moving without, however, compromising the policy, Roger Howman deleted the offending phrase at the same time permitting no wording which would confine a "community" to the members of one race.⁴⁰ As the result of these delays the Prime Minister's Directive, although essentially little changed, was not finally issued until July 1965 under the Smith Government.⁴¹ The object of policy remained as originally stated, 'to assist people to acquire the attitudes,

³⁸ *Personal communication*

³⁹ Southern Rhodesia. *Debates, op. cit.*, 28.vi.62.

⁴⁰ (The circumstances of this confrontation and the consequences to which it gave rise are discussed more fully by Howman himself on p.7 below.) See also Passmore, "African Involvement", *op.cit.*, 274-277.

⁴¹ Rhodesia. Prime Minister's Office, *Local Government and Community Development: The Role of Ministries and Coordination*, Statement of Policy and Directive by the Prime Minister, July 1965.

knowledge, skills and resources required to solve, through communal self-help and organisation, as wide a range of local problems as possible in their own order of priority'.⁴² The policy was to operate at two levels, each reinforcing the other: at the level of the community through the agency of informal groups and community boards, assisted by a new category of field workers known as community advisers; and at the local government level, where the district commissioner was charged with primary responsibility for assisting and promoting local government councils. Specialist assistance from the various Ministries was to be made available through formal council committees. Whilst every Ministry retained its own autonomy, the district commissioner was to be responsible for the approach as a whole of all Ministries in so far as they impinged on local communities. He was to use his powers of guidance and coordination primarily through the medium of a standing district conference. Every Ministry was directed by the circular (published as a Government White Paper) to redefine and organise its functions and finances for the appropriate devolution of local services to councils - the process finally formalised in 1968. The administration of African primary education, maintenance of local roads, minor water supplies, preventive health services, ambulance services, dipping of stock, marketing facilities, milling, pounds and vermin control, were among major functions devolved on a permissive basis. Of these primary education was of greatest importance, representing the most compelling felt need of the African rural population.

The policy of LG-CD in Rhodesia was thus enunciated in terms of the Prime Minister's Directive of 1965, not as the separate development of distinct racial communities as in South Africa, but rather as the means of promoting local democracy.⁴³ The Paterson Commission in 1962 had described the policy as 'potentially the greatest experiment since Athenian democracy'.⁴⁴ It was especially commended by the Head of the Community Development Group in the United Nations for its fusion of local government with community development, which latter process had encountered difficulty in other parts of the world for lack of back-up in the form of permanent structural growth.⁴⁵ A

⁴² *Ibid.*, para 7.

⁴³ See W. Eiselen, "Harmonious multi-community development", reprint from *Optima*, March 1959, for the S. African definition of community development as the development of separate racial communities. Although Roger Howman had realised that this concept or theory might have serious repercussions on policy in Rhodesia, he later commented that insufficient attention had been given to combating the shadow it cast. *Personal communication*.

⁴⁴ Second Report, *op. cit.*, para 6.34.

⁴⁵ *Personal communication*.

Ministerial Statement in 1968 spelled out the policy with greater precision, re-emphasising the distinction between developing the environment (creating the conditions for economic growth) and an approach which made the people in a functional community the object of development.⁴⁶ This embraced government responsibility for providing the appropriate statutory power and financial grants-system to enable community development processes to flower in a self-reliant, responsible local government with trained staff under procedural and financial disciplines. 'If this focus is lost or obscured in a mass of plans or programmes devised by government for the improvement of social, technical, educational, agricultural and health conditions, then we are not dealing with community development as such but with Government planning seeking to use community development, or extension techniques to get participation and understanding by the people being planned for (.)', said the statement.⁴⁷

The object was not material growth *per se* but development of the capacity to promote such growth. Some idea of the volume of such capacity built up at the height of the policy after 10 years, may be inferred from the fact that 176 elected councils were putting R\$8 1/2 million per annum into the local infrastructure of the African rural areas.⁴⁸ They had assumed responsibility for administering with grant aid, hundreds of primary schools, clinics, roads, dams, business centres, mills, piped water and other schemes. Thousands of people were given employment by the councils system, which provided local elective representation for more than half the rural African population. A survey carried out by the University of Rhodesia in 1968 had suggested that the volume of community effort at lower, less formally organised levels was also significant.⁴⁹

The policy of LG-CD, in Howman's terms, aimed at saturating the mass not only with the practices and procedures of democracy, but with its spirit and principles, with democracy as a way of life rather than an occasional rite associated with a polling booth. Against such background the notion of provincialisation introduced in 1966, with the specific intention of separating

⁴⁶ Statement on Community Development made for the Minister of Internal Affairs. (L.B.S. Smith, M.P.) after a meeting of the Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara, held in Luanda, 13.viii.68.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁴⁸ The figures obtained in 1973 from the former Ministry of Internal Affairs are for the year 1971-1972, the last before changes in policy began materially to affect the representative nature of the councils.

⁴⁹ See G. Passmore, *The National Policy of Community Development in Rhodesia* (University of Rhodesia, 1972) Ch. V.

the races, and introducing a wholly appointed upper-tier body consisting largely of chiefs to control and "coordinate" local councils, was an anathema to which the rational element in the administration was opposed on the strongest pragmatic grounds (as evidenced in the minutes by Howman as Deputy Secretary, reproduced below). The policy of LG-CD had been conceived by Roger Howman as the prelude to a nobler vision of the future of Rhodesia. He visualised 'a Rhodesian nation coming together for the good of the whole made up of interdependent self-responsible and self-regulating local governments, ... a Rhodesia founded on the right of small communities, whether rural or urban, tribal or individualistic in nature, to organise themselves into local government units [regardless of race] and build up from below the kind of life they wished to live ... It is a freedom to retain their values and culture, to redefine them, to adapt them to this modern world, within their overall duty to the nation', he said.⁵⁰ In personal evidence given to the Whaley Commission in 1967 Howman offered two alternative solutions to the Constitutional problem. The first was representation on cantonal lines, permitting local governments to elect their own representatives direct to the national parliament. The second was the bi-cameral system in which one House was elected on a qualified numerical franchise and the other consisted of local government representatives, as in Switzerland. Either system would have afforded the natural progression of LG-CD to the highest levels of the state.

After the change of government in December 1962, in a backlash against Whitehead's desegregation plans, the RF's approval of community development as a plank in its election platform conferred the kiss of death politically on what was essentially an administrative programme. Liberals and nationalists condemned it as *apartheid*, conservatives and right-wingers as dangerously radical. We have seen, nevertheless, how implementation of the policy of LG-CD proceeded doggedly under Roger Howman and his staff, gaining steady ground in spite of resistance from many quarters. These included certain government agencies and the strong traditionalist faction within Internal Affairs itself. It was this latter element which ultimately conspired with RF extremism to bring about transmogrification of the policy after Howman's retirement as Deputy Secretary in 1969. There had been renewed moves within the Ministry in recent years to elevate the chiefs to greater positions of power. These included the suggestion that councils be given a "tribal nucleus", and that their decisions be subjected to veto by the

⁵⁰ Memorandum offered to the Rhodesia Constitutional Commission 1967, by Roger Howman in his personal capacity.

tribal *dare*.⁵¹ But such moves had tended to be corrected by Howman as the misconceptions of individual administrators in attempting to adapt policy to the peculiar needs of their districts. A definite step was taken, however, in the 1969 Republican Constitution which made provision for chiefs to be represented in a new Senate.⁵² The essential feature of policy had been to retain the chiefs in the surviving traditional functions in which their role was still respected by the people. The new policy would exalt chiefs beyond all conception of their original powers, much less their abilities. In his farewell speech to the Ministry, widely publicised in the press, Roger Howman made plain his strong disagreement with the provisions of the Constitution saying, 'Of course chieftainship is important ... but why overdo it, why fall into the error of exaggeration by having chiefs only to speak for Africans and in a Senate whose credentials have a party political bias ... I want to make it quite clear ... that I disagree with the proposals'.⁵³

Within a week of Howman's departure, planning was begun in a back-office at headquarters for the dismantling of the elective councils legislation. The process was delayed until after the next Election, when a brief Amendment in 1971 gave chiefs the right of veto over council candidates and a delaying power in council decisions.⁵⁴ In the latter half of 1972 councils became officially known as "chiefs' councils", and regarded as the arm of the tribal authority.⁵⁵ By 1973 another short Amendment had given chiefs the right to act as council executive officers, and tribal authorities access to council revenues.⁵⁶ The final and most drastic change, brought about with minimum publicity by administrative action which amended the regulations, led to the councils being converted from mid-1973 to appointed rather than elected

⁵¹ *Dare* - the chief or headman's counsel place. For further discussion of the moves to convert elected councils to tribal bodies see Passmore, "African Involvement", *op. cit.*, 291-321.

⁵² Constitution of Rhodesia, 1969.

⁵³ See Supplement No. 5 (Annexure E) Retirement Speech, 54 below. *NADA*, the Journal of the Native (Internal) Affairs Association refused to publish the speech, as had been suggested by the Minister, unless the critical paragraphs were omitted. This Howman refused to do.

⁵⁴ The African Councils Amendment Act, No. 57 of 1971. Statute Law of Rhodesia.

⁵⁵ Rhodesia. Legislative Assembly. *Debates*. Minister for Internal Affairs 28.vi.73, Col. 556.

⁵⁶ The African Councils Amendment Act, No. 50 of 1973. Statute Law of Rhodesia.

bodies.⁵⁷ Indeed, district commissioners were now instructed to discourage the continuation of any kind of elective body in African rural areas, and general action was taken to entrench control in tribal authorities under the provincial commissioners, as bulwark against the mounting guerilla activity.

An immense amount of study, investigation by government enquiries and working parties of the Cabinet, as well as international consultation, had accompanied the implementation of LG-CD. The Prime Minister's Directive of 1965, still in operation and used in training, had been the first and only White Paper published in Rhodesia to enunciate policy and bind Ministries to its principles. By contrast the reversal of policy had taken place with little more than a few strokes of the pen from the reactionary element now in administrative power. The switch in approach had been initiated in total disregard of the Directive, the Cabinet Coordinating Committee, or any obligations as to inter-Ministerial or other consultation. Roger Howman observes, 'If ever there was a grim and arbitrary appropriation of policy by civil servants without thought to previous commissions, and in disdain of any enquiry or outside expertise, this was it. Only officials convinced of political approval if challenged would so dare ...'⁵⁸ Viewed in the light of Mannheim's theory elaborated by Howman in the paper below, it was a clear case of the irrational intruding into the rational and making a coup.

The evolution of policy down the years from the 1920's up till this time had culminated in a distinctive type of development administration. 'Commenced in the Jowitt days, with focus on developing the sociological or functional community as distinguished from primary development or direct government planning in district affairs, and featuring the vital significance of disciplines over financial matters and the calibre of staff services, there emerged a special form of Rhodesian administration, with the district commissioner required to assume the role and training of a modern top executive, directing the operations of a composite multi-functional team of officials. Looking back,' says Howman, 'I wonder if we expected too much!' Of his own part in building up this model for development administration, he concludes, 'I find that the noteworthy feature is that paths opened up to me and no-one obstructed me in my pursuit of such long-held objectives ... until after I retired'.

⁵⁷ African Councils Act. Election Regulations. RGN No. 640 of 1973. See also Ministry of Internal Affairs Circular No. 280 "AR" of 1.xii.71 and Council Handbook 1973, Chap. 1, Part 2.

⁵⁸ *Personal communication*

Soon after his retirement as Deputy Secretary Roger Howman was invited by the Director-General of the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) to join him in a special "African Affairs" sector, and he found himself as a Desk Officer with responsibility for intelligence concerning every country in Africa, with the exception of Rhodesia's immediate neighbours. This opened up a fascinating new field given the experience he had already acquired in East and Central Africa, and his comment, 'I exchanged African Affairs for the Affairs of Africa' condenses the change. He served in that capacity on occasions taking in the Middle East as well, for nearly 14 years, over three years of which were with the new African Government of Independence. In July 1983 when he had reached the age of 73 years and it was time for his post to be "Africanised", Roger Howman retired a second time with the endorsement 'Your dedication and devotion to duty throughout your service has been an example to all and let me assure you it has been greatly appreciated, Director-General CIO'.⁵⁹ During this time he gained inside knowledge of the application of socialist ideology by African states and studied the Marxist-Leninist doctrines espoused by some leaders; as he put it, a kind of retracing of the steps he had learned as a student 40 years before under Dr. Karl Mannheim.

Roger Howman had served his country for 56 years, striving in the cause of racial harmony and democratisation. His method of approach had been to see what the human sciences had to offer and attempt to associate them with practical administrative experience in evolving policy which had sound non-political roots in scientific disciplines. His outstanding contribution stands alongside that of administrators who went before him, men like his father E.G. Howman, Fritz Posselt, Charles Bullock and others whose philosophy and outlook, in the natural evolution of ideas, might be said to have contributed towards the policy of local government and community development. He would also emphasise the team-nature of decisions taken in his work, the role of frequent staff discussions and the all-important nod of assent from above. This is not to overlook or minimise the dichotomy which existed in the Native Department and its successor the Ministry of Internal Affairs, between two opposing factions, those who might be called traditionalists, administrators seeking to preserve the status quo in a (mainly fallacious) tribal system, and the rational, more progressive element who believed in democracy. In the last years before majority rule bureaucratic and political reactionarism combined to destroy whatever institution-building had been achieved on democratic lines. Nevertheless the record of Roger Howman and his kind should help to counterbalance modern political assertions of a wholly oppressive colonialist

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*


system which not only neglected but deliberately halted development and repressed or denigrated African culture. His dedication commemorates the work of all those who made development administration their life's task in the early stages of culture contact when cultural hostility, resistance and suspicion of anything new were awesome barriers to progress - and finances were always dismally short.

The paper on Provincialisation is written in two parts, a micro-history of events and a theoretical examination of the respective roles played in the policy by politicians and civil servants. It is a tribute to Howman's stoicism that after RF mutilation of the results of his life's work, he should still possess the detachment to review policy in the light of socio-historical theory. He does this in terms of the Rational and Irrational, the last appropriate to political activity and the first to administration, propounded by Karl Mannheim in his *Ideology and Utopia* (1936).⁶⁰ Whatever the irrational category of thinking it is the function of the rational to translate it into order, shaping it to conform with established patterns of control, or evolving appropriate new ones. In Rhodesia the crisis over provincialisation represented a confrontation between the two, greatly exacerbated by racial tension. Ultimately the pressure of nationalist trends led to a new political system, where in turn it became necessary for ideology to be translated into administrative order.⁶¹ The paper concludes with a brief review of the implications of scientific socialism for the rationalising role of the public sector (as the civil service is now known) in Zimbabwe.

It should be noted that annotations to the paper on Provincialisation are by the Editor and not by Roger Howman himself.

⁶⁰ Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, 1936.

⁶¹ See African National Council. *The Rhodesian Front Policy of Provincialisation*, Commentary by Rev. Canaan Banana, ANC Deputy President, n.d., in Zimbabwe National Archives, 2, for African nationalist reactions to the policy and its alleged contribution to "systematic revolt against European rule".



H.R.G. HOWMAN ON

PROVINCIALISATION IN RHODESIA 1968-1969

HISTORY OF EVENTS

Political Background

The extensive discussions which took place between the Rhodesian and British Governments between November 1965 and December 1966 reached a climax with the *Tiger* proposals for a settlement being acceptable to the Rhodesians as a basis for a new constitution. Agreement was stalemated in the end, however, by Prime Minister Wilson's insistence on a condition that there be a return to constitutional legality in the shape of a dissolution of Rhodesia's Parliament and the appointment of a Governor with vague powers.¹ Such a condition, involving surrender, was wholly repugnant to the Rhodesians under Prime Minister Ian Smith who suspected a Wilsonian trap and considered that acceptance of the content and shape of an independence constitution was all that mattered. To ask them to give up their existing constitutional position under the 1965 Constitution for the shadow of a mythical, unchartered

¹ The British Government had laid down the following principles for granting independence to Rhodesia:

- (1) The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed.
- (2) There would have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution.
- (3) There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population.
- (4) There would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination.
- (5) The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.
- (6) It would be necessary to ensure that, regardless of race, there would be no oppression of the majority by the minority or of the minority by the majority.

Quoted in Elaine Woodrich, *The Rhodesian Problem*, 1975, 205-206, 212.

constitution yet to be evolved was irresponsible and simply not on.²

In spite of British arguments that a return to legality was a basic principle and not a trivial matter of protocol - Britain could not make illegal action legal - and that it provided a guarantee that the minority Smith regime would honestly carry out the agreement as a test of good faith and good behaviour, it seems evident historically that Wilson permitted his suspicions of Rhodesians and his definition of "abnormal conditions" too much scope. Allowing his legal advisor undue weight he overplayed this condition, because five years later in 1971 the British proposals from Sir Alec Douglas-Home made no attempt to introduce the question nor concept of a prior return to legality.

At *Tiger* the Rhodesians found themselves confronted with a calculated political artfulness: a battleship setting, relegation to inferior quarters, inadequate business space and an assertion of imperial power by Wilson whose oratory was calculated to humiliate his opponents and induce deference from this tiny British relic in Africa. Some consternation was sparked when, after a particularly ardent advocacy of some point on the agenda by Wilson, Smith briefly replied, 'I don't think much of that. What's next?' A more conciliatory tone infused the proceedings towards the end when Wilson softened his demand for total abdication of power to a British-appointed Governor, saying he envisaged such a Governor appointing Smith as Prime Minister, heading a broad-based interim government. (The impression of emotional politics at work on *Tiger* is confirmed by what happened at the *Fearless* talks when the whole decor on a battleship changed, discussion was an interchange between equals and Wilson expressly said he had no wish to humiliate. The formal proposals wrote in Mr. Smith as Prime Minister. The Governor envisaged would be Sir Humphrey Gibbs remaining in office. The transition from humiliation as a tactic, through partial humiliation inherent in surrender, to no vestige of humiliation, culminated in the third round of British Proposal talks in 1971, with Sir Alec Douglas-Home.)

A further complication in the British position on *Tiger* was that Wilson had made an 'irrevocable commitment' to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers

² The British conditions on *Tiger* prescribed that the Rhodesian legislature must be dissolved before any test of opinion could take place, and an interim (legal) government on the basis of the '61 Constitution at UDI, established by the Governor. If the test of opinion which followed failed to approve the Constitution agreed on *Tiger*, the RF Government would have had to surrender its control, and determination of the final Constitution would have had to be effected by negotiations between the interim government and Great Britain, a situation which the Rhodesians could not accept.

at their Conference in September 1966 to end the illegal regime: if the rebellion was not ended the British Government would sponsor economic sanctions in the Security Council of the United Nations before the end of the year. How any British Prime Minister could have allowed himself to operate within such an absurd time-schedule as twenty-six days, including Christmas - an intolerable humiliation, said Wilson, if he failed - is unbelievable.³ Viewed historically, it seems that the Rhodesians rightly rejected such a digest of irrational politics, salted with threats that the United Nations, the whole world, would act if Britain defaulted. In doing so they were deemed by Wilson to have rejected the whole document in its entirety, a case of throwing the baby out with the bath water.⁴ The situation appeared to justify the later Rhodesian conclusion that the British had no wish to negotiate a settlement which was not preceded by unconditional surrender. However the British put out their interpretation that Smith was playing for time and a political change in Britain, or that he was spinning out the talks to avoid being branded by his Party if he agreed.

The existing constitutional position the Rhodesians were asked on *Tiger* to abandon was the 1965 Constitution, drafted by the Rhodesian Front (RF) Government with no other intention than that of eliminating any elements of influence from the British Government which had appeared in the UK-approved 1961 Constitution, drawn up by Sir Edgar Whitehead's Government. After the *Tiger* talks RF pressure for constitution-making increased and in his New Year message for 1968 Prime Minister Ian Smith referred to his having incurred the wrath of certain sections and promised that, having held the talks in abeyance while trying to reach agreement with the British, he would get on with the finalisation of a new constitution.

With the demise of the *Tiger* proposals, and Rhodesian participation in mutually agreed constitutional arrangements knocked out by Wilson's legality conditions, the Smith Government, after much discussion in Cabinet, decided to appoint a commission to investigate the complex plural society of Rhodesia, to advise on a constitution calculated to protect the rights and freedoms of all persons and communities, and ensure harmonious development having regard

³ The *Tiger* talks took place from 2 to 4 December 1966.

⁴ Agreement had in fact been reached on such contentious issues as the composition of the legislature, a senate, the franchise, delimitation, amendments to the Constitution and the appointment of a Royal Commission without delay to study and make recommendations on the problem of racial discrimination, in particular land apportionment. These met five of the six principles. It was the Return to Legality, the fifth point, that was the stumbling block. However, this was to prove decisive.

to social and cultural differences and different systems of land tenure. It was also to report on economic problems.

The commission, popularly known as the Whaley Commission, was appointed on 1 March 1967 and promptly invited any person or body, anywhere inside or outside the country to contribute evidence, ideas and views. Over nine months this flow of facts and opinions continued until public channels were closed and the Constitutional Report was published in April 1968.⁵

This Report, and probably the realisation that the Smith Government was certainly in earnest about a new constitution, galvanised the Wilson Government into renewed activity. Secret missions were sent to Salisbury (in the persons of Sir Max Aitkin and Lord Goodman) which initiated a fresh round of talks. Smith again met with Wilson, this time aboard another battleship, the *Fearless*, from 10 to 13 October 1968 and with his emissary George Thompson (Minister without Portfolio for Rhodesian Affairs), in Salisbury for continued discussions from 4 to 16 November.

While the politicians managed to settle or assuage their constitutional fears and aspirations an eccentric spanner was thrown in the works by an official obsessed by apprehensions of educated Africans. Smith's advisor at *Fearless* was the Secretary for Internal Affairs, Hostes Nicolle, and whether his spanner was harmless or not, his views evoked the comment from the British of 'a surprisingly prominent and wholly uncooperative participation'. Nicolle's bureaucratic role took an even more ostentatious turn when on his return to office he issued a departmental circular minute to his officials decrying the British and denying the possibility of a settlement - this before his Prime Minister had formally decided to end negotiations. Such aberrant behaviour in a senior official can be regarded as manifestation of the depths of fear and insecurity permeating Rhodesian society at large.

When the *Fearless* discussions also broke down, principally on the question of appeal to the Privy Council as an external guarantee of good behaviour, there followed a natural progression in Rhodesia towards the formulation of a new constitution in the light of the Whaley Report. Letters and articles in the press abounded during 1968 and 1969, and a Pandora's box of politics was opened. Every nutcase had his say and the RF Party had a field day. Somewhere out of the welter of survival sentiments the notion of

⁵ Rhodesia. *Report of the Constitutional Commission* (Chairman W.R. Whaley), 1968.

"Provincialisation" was born, nurtured and moulded into a political concept which came to assume a dominant significance in Party thinking.

Smith refused to give the lead to public opinion, being content to give everyone his head in a spate of constitutional fears and solutions. Meanwhile he and his ministers sought out the views of the civil service on the Whaley Report and pondered the merits of Whaley's basic concept of ultimate parity in a unitary system, not separation, not *apartheid* on the South African pattern, nor majority rule on a mass voting system.⁶ The publication of the Whaley Report provoked political uproar. A new Rhodesian National Party for complete racial separation came into being to rekindle 'the old fighting spirit of white rule - we will not make the constitution an instrument of our destruction'. A former Deputy Chairman of the RF resigned in April with a full blast against the Whaley 'racial integration proposals'. The press reported such a sharp division between Cabinet and the RF Parliamentary Caucus over the report, and also within both bodies, that a special caucus sub-committee comprising two Cabinet Ministers (Lardner-Burke and Musset) and five M.P.s was set up to collect evidence from caucus members and report back in May. *The Rhodesia Herald* (leader of 11 April 1968) described the Whaley Report as 'a monument to possible black and white cooperation aimed to create confidence'. RF headquarters, in a public climate of cautious comment, deferred judgement, outright rejection, even claims of betrayal by an RF appointed commission, decided to call a special Party Congress and Jack Cary (a founder member of the RF from the old Dominion Party) created a sensation when he publicly described the Report as dead as the dodo and contrary to RF principles.

From the vantage point of history the amazing feature of this political tumult in Rhodesia is that constitutional problems of an internal or racial nature were declared to have been resolved in the arrangements agreed to on the battleships by Smith and Wilson. The discussions broke down on legal issues - on the *Tiger*, the symbolic 'surrender after rebellion' by return to legality, a sop to the Commonwealth; on the *Fearless*, appeal to the Privy Council. A rational perspective would pose the question: if racial problems had attained such a degree of accord in the inter-government arena why was the free-for-all emotional combustion allowed to continue in Rhodesia? Why was the constitutional pattern agreed to on the battleships not introduced by Smith,

⁶ The Whaley Report recommended an ultimate system of parity between European and African representatives in Parliament which would, if adopted, have eliminated all prospects of majority rule. This had at least been theoretically possible under previous constitutions. (Constitutional Commission, *op. cit.*)

using his own legal machinery? Could the answer be that the rising concept of "Provincialisation", unmentioned on the ships, was Smith's 'key to the future' as he expressed it later?

Rhodesian Front Politics in 1968

Before the Party Congress met, RF Headquarters, in conjunction with their Provincial Chairmen, drew up at an executive committee meeting their own set of constitutional proposals which became known as "The Yellow Paper" (from the colour).⁷ In essence this was a Republican constitution structured on three Provincial Councils, which would in time grow into parliaments, one for each of the three main ethnic groups, the Mashona, the Matabele and the Whites, with an over-all national parliament and a Senate comprising 10 whites, 10 chiefs and 3 appointed members. An interim government, called Stage 1, would function pending the establishment of the Provincial Councils within five years. This would be a Parliament of 68 members, being 34 whites and 34 Africans elected on the tripartite division recommended by Whaley. These proposals were circulated on 16 July 1968 accompanied by a directive that they were to be considered from the lowest branch level upwards in preparation for the Party Congress and all views, amendments, resolutions or alternative proposals were to reach headquarters by 7 September.

Further party political disturbances followed when Lord Graham (Minister of Agriculture), finding his personal views overridden in the executive meeting, next day put out his "personal proposed amendment", urging a complete change of approach from that of the Yellow Paper. Lord Graham's counterproposals were for outright separation into White and Black Chambers of a Lower House, each with its own civil service and functions, and a Senate comprising 13 whites only with power to review all legislation. Certain functions he assigned to the Black Chamber, all other functions remained with the White Chamber which in addition was to have power to decrease or increase powers of the Black Chamber. Later, at the Party Congress Lord Graham defended his proposals by asserting that 'provincial matters are all that the Africans are presently capable of doing', and he stocked up his Black Chamber with 15 officials, 16 chiefs, two Purchase Area farmers and four representatives from the African Urban Areas (elected on a "B roll" until such time as the officials were phased out by "B roll" elections).

⁷ See Supplement No. 3 (Appendix C). Copy of Yellow Paper.

These Graham proposals, popularly referred to as the "Harper-Graham Paper" (without elucidating the alleged contribution of Bill Harper as Minister of Internal Affairs at the time, or of his permanent Secretary of Internal Affairs, Hostes Nicolle, his "expert on African Affairs"), were criticised by RF headquarters itself as creating a facade, giving no status to Africans and being wholly racialistic in failing to allow for ethnic differences between Mashona and Matabele. Lord Graham in fact was an avowed racial biologist, armed with statistics, intelligence tests and theories on racial stocks - Nordic, Aryan, Negro and so on, emanating from certain geneticists. (He had expounded on these theories when, as the only member of the Cabinet remaining with objections to drafts of the Prime Minister's Directive on Community Development of July 1965 I had to interview him, though it had nothing to do with Agriculture, in connection with the definition of "community" as 'all the people living in an area regardless of ... race ...'.)⁸

The challenge thrown out by the Harper-Graham proposals and the deep cleavage within the RF as to which direction to take, prompted Nilson, the Party Chairman, to circulate on 25 July, a paper expressing the Party's deep concern at the turn of events and 'the suspicions and charges arising therefrom after all the efforts by Divisional Chairmen over the past 18 months to evolve a political system suited to our plural society'. He reiterated the goal as being 'no Black majority rule'; and claimed that this was acceptable to the traditional tribal leaders (chiefs) yet gave some representation to the "small" proportion of detribalised Africans. Provincialisation *must* be completed, he said, within five years.

⁸ Roger Howman enlarges on this point in a *personal communication*: 'I had to interview him in a last effort to obtain Cabinet unanimity. I found his objection had nothing to do with Agriculture, or its extension role in developing communities. He objected strongly to the definition of "community". To avoid an undue focus on the land holding, materialistic aspect of Dr. Green's definition for the territorial delineation of communities exercise, I had offered a split definition in the draft, namely that of "community area" as a relatively small geographical area, and a "community" referring to all the people living in a community area regardless of "race or colour or creed or economic or social class". Indeed he was taken aback when I brought up the racial theories of Gobineau and Chamberlain as the prelude to Hitler's fancies on biological group inferiorities and similar notions adopted by the Ku Klux Klan. Nevertheless he remained adamant and I suggested, desperate by this time to achieve finality with the Directive without sacrificing its principles, an alteration of the words to a less explicit level ... 'the people living in a community area' and no more. This he accepted. One wonders now how free of crippling ambiguities and political distortions grounded on "racial communities" the future career of Community Development would have been if Lord Graham's influence had been squashed ... After all it was the Prime Minister's Directive, not a Minister of Agriculture's.'

Nilson went further and attached a paper expounding the philosophy and conclusions underlying the proposals in the Yellow Paper, explaining in some detail that a "Central Province" (white) would include all the non-African land and that Matabele and Mashona Provinces would include all the tribal trust lands, the African Purchase areas and African urban areas. (No-one totted up the number of such distinct patches of land in a "province", more a collection of black currants in a cake!) In each of these Provinces the interests of Whites, Mashona and Matabele respectively would be paramount and in each local affairs would be governed according to the custom, way of life and will of the inhabitants.

This was the most explicit statement on "Provincialisation" to be made in a effort to remove or allay fears and rally the Party, presumably with the sanction of the Party President, Ian Smith. It seems to have emerged from European concern over 'the heritage of our children being in the balance', and alarm in substantial quarters over the idea of sharing power with Africans. The RF Yellow Paper with its stress on the role of chiefs both in the Senate and an electoral college for 16 African Members of Parliament was referred to me by my Minister and I criticised it in a minute dated 26 August 1968.⁹

Parallel with the political moves of 1968 to 1969 described above, the Civil Service became involved when Cabinet, losing no time after the publication of the Whaley Report, decided on 23 April that the Ministry of Internal Affairs should set up a committee to report to Cabinet on how the Report might affect Africans, how it might clash with the tribal system. The committee, comprising the Secretary (Hostes Nicolle) and his three Deputies (Roger Howman, Noel Robertson and Dick Powell) reported in May that it was unable to agree as to the role of the chiefs and political objectives. This was mainly due to differences between those who felt that the presence of irreconcilable, hostile races would make a "fairyland" out of Whaley's concept of an integrated unitary state, and those who considered that the proposals offered reasonable and morally defensible hope for the future, a starting base as it were. (The same cleavage of official opinion, or better, personal visions of the future, had manifested themselves much earlier when these officials were called for evidence by the Whaley Commission and three of them had supported the proposals for the "Separation of Ethnic Stocks" propounded by Gayre of Gayre).¹⁰

⁹ See Supplement No. 4 (Appendix D). Minute on RF Papers on Constitution.

¹⁰ See Supplement No. 1 (Appendix A). Minute on Col. Gayre's Views.

In May 1968 when opening the Bulawayo Trade Fair the Prime Minister, probably voicing Cabinet concern at the rise of public sentiment over "partition and Bantustans", drew a very clear distinction between partition which was a practical impossibility and "separate development", adding that 'within that framework we have got to produce a constitution'. This, it was said, had the effect of cutting down the more stupid ideas being formulated at the time.

In September 1968 something like a dramatic pitch was reached in the concurrence or confrontation before Cabinet of two powerful sources of influence. The RF Party Congress was summoned to a special meeting on 5 September to decide on the Yellow Paper proposals for a constitution. The Civil Service as a whole, all its relevant ministries, was called upon to examine and report on the Yellow Paper to a Cabinet Committee.

The precise minutes of the Party Congress - which the Prime Minister described the following year as 'That famous Congress last year when people tried to push me to accept a constitution which was unacceptable to me, something that enshrined racialism' - reflect a situation in which every Division of the Party rejected or amended the structural features of the joint proposals before Congress as the substantial notion. It was formidable antagonism.

One after the other the Divisions proposed that Stage I be deleted and replaced by their own amendments, each slightly different but all generally directed against the idea of an interim government which was based on ultimate parity or integrated the races. They sought separation into Black and White Chambers, or immediate provincialisation, as envisaged for Stage II, their anxiety being that the second stage might never be achieved if the unitary first stage was introduced.

The Prime Minister, as Party President in proposing the motion relating to Stage II, urged that provincialisation was the key to political security, enabling Africans to deal with their own affairs in their own areas, a natural progression

of the Party's community development policy already in action.¹¹ It was the most likely form of government to ensure that control was retained in civilised hands. It was a complex exercise and would take at least 5 years to implement. The aim should be a unified system with overall control in the national parliament.

The various divisional amendments were tested in three ballots and finally one survived which sought to eliminate Stage I with its new integrated government, strongly supported provincialisation, and submitted that the White Provincial Council could be eliminated by having the national parliament sit as a provincial body when necessary. Separate voters rolls were advocated for Asians and Coloureds. After some heated acrimony and appeals to the President to accept the expressed wishes of the vast majority for the elimination of Stage I's interim parliament, some minor changes were made and the adopted amendment was finally arrayed against the motion before Congress.

At this stage more Ministers intervened and thought was given to wider implications such as: the ascendancy of the white man could only be achieved by retaining the goodwill and cooperation of the Africans; to win the economic war outside support must be retained; an interim period was unavoidable as provincialisation could not be implemented immediately; to take away political rights already enjoyed by Africans was immoral; 'we must keep our heads and accept the proposals if we are to survive on foreign exchange'; and so on. A suggestion that the debate be adjourned till the morrow because emotion was running too high was rejected by the Chairman who, at the request of members, invited the Prime Minister to close the debate. The Prime Minister opposed the amendment, saying he believed that it deviated from the Party's principles in that merit was not the deciding criterion, 'It would seem that the colour of one's skin was to be the deciding factor'.

A vote was insisted upon and 217 delegates were in favour of the motion (the Yellow Paper) and 206 for the amendment. The Prime Minister had just scraped home by 11 votes. But next day, when he was reelected Party

¹¹ This was a distortion of community development as outlined in the Prime Minister's own Directive (Rhodesia, Prime Minister's Office, *Local Government and Community Development: the Role of Ministries and Coordination*, Statement of Policy and Directive by the Prime Minister, July 1965, para 8). This stressed that community development was a process essentially operated by the people themselves which led to their own plans and programmes within the law. Provincial councils were to function under external imposition from officials and were thus the antithesis of community development.

President, he called on all to go forward together, believing that there was no great difference of opinion as to the end result, that the right choice had been made and that although the interim period was the controversial issue it was a means to an end, 'enabling us to follow the course of our ultimate destination, provincialisation'. He assured Congress that work on the provincial councils would commence immediately and go ahead with all speed.

Ian Smith had, in spite of the odds, carried the day in favour of the Yellow Paper and gained the credential of his Party for provincialisation, but, possibly with some relief, he lost his Minister for Agriculture, Lord Graham, who resigned on 12 September even though he had been, five days before, elected a Deputy President by Congress. In July Bill Harper had resigned so Smith found himself free of the alleged right-wing opposition of the Harper-Graham proposals. But he still had to reckon with his Public Service to which Cabinet had submitted provincialisation for examination, analysis and calculation.

Participation of the Civil Service

In calling upon the Civil Service to examine the Yellow Paper Cabinet decided to establish a Cabinet Constitutional Committee comprising the Minister of Justice (Lardner-Burke) as Chairman, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Jack Howman) and the Minister of National Resources and Wildlife (Phil van Heerden), together with Working Parties of officials to investigate different aspects of the constitutional proposals. These Working Parties were -

- (1) Land Tenure: With Director of Lands as Chairman, Nicolle of Internal Affairs, and a member of Local Government and Housing.
- (2) Provincialisation: With Secretary of Justice Ade as Chairman, Muir of Treasury, Howman of Internal Affairs and Garmany of Local Government.
- (3) Electoral Laws and Delimitation: With Foggin of Internal Affairs as Chairman, Registrar of Voters, Surveyor General and Local Government members.
- (4) Procedure in Parliament of two Houses: Various experts.

The records of Working Party No. 2 are the most relevant to the subject under discussion. The Working Party was provided with "A Guide to matters to be investigated - Provincialisation", and provisions to be included in the constitution with the intention of establishing a provincial form of government.

It was instructed to 'expose and resolve unseen difficulties' in regard to provincial council boundaries, composition, growth into parliaments, finances, costs, difficulties due to land fragmentation, powers and degree of autonomy, delegated legislation and sites of provincial capitals - but the Guide did not raise the possibility of matters being found impracticable or unwise and their possible rejection.

The Working Party held its first meeting on 30 September 1968 and having been advised by the Attorney General that it must be specific for purposes of constitution drafting, and that the Prime Minister had suggested only a general provision for dividing Rhodesia into provinces, each with a parliament, discussion centred on the problem of seeking statistics and priorities for the next meeting, including special studies to be made by ministries. Meetings were to be held weekly.

At the second meeting the functions of every Ministry were scanned for possible devolution. Only two were deemed safely allocable to a provincial council, namely Vermin Control (subject to baboons, etc. not crossing jurisdictional lines!) and Exemption Orders under the Lotteries Act. Even the Chiefs and Tribal Courts should not become subject to the authority of elected local bodies. The choice between local authorities deriving their authority direct from central government, with direct access for guidance, authority and financial aid (as in the UK), or being subordinate to a provincial tier in a hierarchical system (as on the Continent), was ventilated. It was agreed to refer back to the Ministers for guidance, particularly because provincialisation, at this stage of contemplation, could only be seen to be achievable at the expense of local councils, depriving them, not central government of their functions and services.

At the third meeting attention was given to preparing a preliminary report in the form of a memorandum-questionnaire to Ministers, as a matter of urgency, since further investigations could not proceed without clarification. At the fourth meeting a final draft was agreed and dated 30 October 1968 for submission to Ministers. This set out the following problems (abbreviated) -

- a) Can the Working Party assume that Government does *not* propose any major consolidation of land categories, nor resettlement of inhabitants of the existing patchwork of land? (This would ignore the Tomlinson Commission of South Africa which found that a scattering of Bantu areas could form no foundation for community growth and that such a geographical dispersal would make socio-economic development impossible. Thus any policy of provincialisation must aim at consolidation of the areas as a prerequisite.)

b) Is the boundary between Mashona and Matabele to be that of the Whaley Report, an arbitrary choice perhaps suitable for electoral purposes only and derived from historical improvisation? Such a choice is open to condemnation both as a modern ethnic category and as a basis for allocating permanent governmental functions; or is it envisaged that a provincial sphere will somehow comprise an aggregate of numerous small ethnic pockets of land scattered among other councils?

c) Being aware of the suspicions, aversions and prejudices of tribesmen we ask if the Yellow Paper's objective of Mashona and Matabele political bodies is to over-ride criteria as to the probable functional ineffectiveness of such alleged tribal bodies?

d) Are the Chiefs and Headmen to be supported as in the past so that the mystique, ritualism and judicial attributes of the institution of chieftainship are protected, or are they to be brought into a political body and exposed to the cut and thrust of the political arena.

e) The Yellow Paper mentions functions being "decentralised", not devolved, and "parliament" evolving, as if to envisage both unitary and federal concepts. The difference between devolution and decentralisation is basic and the Whaley Report is relevant to both. What basis is to be followed and are the councils to be regarded as autonomous?

f) Having regard to the work of the Cabinet's Community Development Working Party, as reflected decisively in the Prime Minister's Circular No. 1 of 1968¹² we conclude that the number of functions which could be devolved to provincial councils is negligible. Guidance is sought as to how far and in what Ministries should intensive investigations be pursued?

g) Considering that the educational capabilities of these three councils will be completely different for some time, is the Working Party to assume that the extent of devolution should be kept the same for each council, in order to avoid accusations of discrimination and jealousy between provinces? Educated Africans could be antagonised by not

¹² Rhodesia, Prime Minister's Office, Circular No. 1 of 1968, *Division of Functions between Central Government and Local Government*, 24.iv.68 - was the product of months (if not years of wrangle over the question of devolution.

doing so, yet this would negate the effectiveness and progress of the more advanced White Council.

h) Since Community development policy is based on evolution of responsibility from below upwards to whatever functional tiers the future may prescribe and provincialisation as a political concept is to be imposed from above, what does Government intend? Are we to consider removing functions and responsibilities from the local councils in order to give provincial councils something to do? If so, how far is enquiry to go in depriving community development of its dynamic?

i) Since many Africans live in the European areas and the economy there is an expanding one, so their numbers will increase and their living stabilise. They will include the most educated, sophisticated and skilled persons. The Yellow Paper gives no thought as to the position of these enormous conglomerations of Africans in the "white province". What political machinery and expression is contemplated for the urbanised African? If economic conditions in urban areas provide the source of trade unions and political discontent, how are such feelings to be expressed if their only instrument of expression is through a Mashona or Matabele Council? Will the urban African be content to exercise political rights in a rural or ethnic body of an area he or she has never or seldom visited, and if urban discontent is projected into such councils what measures are possible to counter their politics on these ready-made platforms for anti-European activities?

j) (A question posed but suspended for the moment asked if it was proposed to break up the present unitary planning bodies such as the Grain Marketing Board and Cold Storage Commission, located in the white area, into provincial planning bodies which would in effect make the Tribal Areas burdensome appendages to the white area?)

k) Finally do Ministers consider that the Yellow Paper's Statement - that the provincial system is to be completed within five years - is realistic, or can this be extended in the light of the problems found to arise?

(Behind the gravity of these questions was the comical awareness that they were unanswerable except in terms of discarding the proposed policy of provincialisation - which

put the Ministers on the spot. Looking back, the situation would have been worthy of a script in the British TV series, "Yes Minister".)

At this stage of progress with the Civil Service's enquiries the British Government published their latest constitutional proposals for the *Fearless* talks on 15 October 1968. These drew comment from the Prime Minister that there was 'a distinct possibility' of a settlement if the proposal regarding the Privy Council appeal provision was removed. Whether or not Ian Smith was aware of the new situation in which "Provincialisation", and in fact "Separation" found itself we do not know, but the psychological pincer-movement surrounding him and his Cabinet was emphasised by the publication on almost the same day of the RF headquarter's "Final Approved Draft by the Caucus Sub-Committee and Divisional Chairmen's Committee, 16 October 1968". This again insisted on a White, Mashona and Matabele Provincial Council (to grow into Parliaments) under a National Parliament.

Subsequently Working Party No. 2 was summoned to a meeting on 4 December 1968 with the three Ministers of the Cabinet Constitutional Committee. After close on an hour and a half's discussion on particular points, Lardner-Burke the Chairman eventually threw up his hands in a gesture of mock submission that the whole idea of provincialisation was knocked on the head. The minutes of the meeting demurely recorded that without specific functions 'provincial councils would be a waste of time and money (.) with disastrous effects on local authority functions', and that the Committee agreed that the Working Party's paper be referred to the Prime Minister who should be asked to convene a special Cabinet meeting on the subject in January 1969.

The full Cabinet duly met on 13 January 1969 and agreed to hold matters over while all Ministers examined in detail the question of what functions could be devolved to provincial councils. For Internal Affairs Howman was asked by his Minister to comply and knowing that Messrs. Nicolle, Robertson, Powell and others were not only in favour of, but enthusiastic for racial and tribal provincial councils, having even advocated "Partition" before the Whaley Commission, he asked them through Powell to take advantage of the opportunity to set out in detail exactly what functions and what legislation under African Affairs in the statute book they would wish to assign to a Mashona and a Matabele Council.

Their response, how they construed the problem, was an interesting example of how civil servants with political objectives, ardently and sincerely believed to be survival imperatives, could switch into the irrational sphere

described below, and turn off or dull their administrative acumen and experience. The gist of the argument they put up was the allocation to provincial councils of the general functions of coordination, approval of finances and control of grants over the lower councils. These were to be exercised in certain listed services, provided there was adequate European control in the form of representation on the Mashona and Matabele Councils and the same powers were not delegated to all three councils. They considered that no statutory "African Affairs Legislation" could be allocated.

In Howman's report back to his Minister dated 11 March,¹³ he used his colleagues' conclusions to draw the distinction between genuinely representative local government bodies and those no more than a facade, a sham so controlled by officials or nominees that it did not really matter what functions were handed over, *that* was not a problem. A fresh and real problem arose if provincialisation was decided upon because there would be a shift from "Functions" to the effects on national life of introducing a middle tier of nominal, irresponsible bodies serving as "post offices" and the question was asked whether any educational influence or sense of responsibility in uplifting African civic life could be expected.

The Working Party was never called to meet again and no more on the subject of "Provincialisation" was heard from the Cabinet. (Howman retired in July 1969 and the protagonists of provincialisation and Tribal Authorities had the field to themselves). A historian with access to Cabinet papers of the time and subsequent events could complete the story accurately but it would seem as if the civil service analysis - if it did not end Cabinet aspirations in this field - certainly inserted doubts and curbs, and left the Prime Minister stressing the dangers of precipitate and premature action in his tactics when he met his RF Congress in October 1969. Congress, however, continued to demand provincialisation and the issue of such councils never ceased to engage the attention and zealous support of Party officers. Chairman Frost was still criticising the Government years later, in the 1973 report, for laxity in implementing Party Policy as planned in 1968 for provincial separation, and even in 1976 Congress relentlessly pursued the issue after Smith had accepted the Kissinger-Vorster concept of majority rule within two years. (See introduction - note 8)

¹³ See Supplement No. 7 (Appendix G). Minute on Provincialisation.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

The Irrational and the Rational

Valuable insight may be gained into the unfolding of events if the outline which has been given above (not hitherto available to the politico-social historian) is examined in terms of the Irrational and Rational sphere of the state, the one proper to politics and the other to administration, as expounded by Karl Mannheim in his *Ideology and Utopia* (1936).¹⁴

In society with its intricate divisions of labour and responsibilities certain spheres become charged with calling up past experience and precedents, analysing the present and its rules, and anticipating or assessing the future. When in this sphere an institution with its traditions, disciplines and organised attitudes of thinking is established as a civil service, it assumes a very influential role in the life and prospects of the people. Since purpose is inherent in organisation, leaders of the service are always groping for a purpose round which to organise activities lower down. This is the essence of rationality, a service dominated or guided by the pursuit of the rational (even if it is never achieved).

In contrast to this concept there is the wide sphere where impulses and emotions gather together in sentiments and public feelings; where anger, fears, devotions, loyalties, commitments, group identities and special interests dominate, all pursuing goals of infinite variety. Here the manipulation of responses through slogans, propaganda, posters, advertisements and mass demonstrations has been brought to a high pitch of expertise. This is the essence of irrationality, that incomprehensible flux, ever changing, of the irrational in human life.

Placing these two concepts in contra-distinction does not mean that in actual life, and in the individual, they are not found inextricably mixed and operating in an intricate web of interaction. In historical retrospect they simply stand out more clearly and add more meaning to the cumulative events.

In his elaboration of the different styles of thinking as they derive from the many segments of society, Mannheim expounds on the incalculable realm of irrationality, which is the proper sphere of politics and cannot be managed by administration; and the rational where administrative thinking tries to hide all

¹⁴ Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, 1936; see also his *Man and Society*, 1940.

problems of politics under cover of calculable established patterns, failing to see that behind every law there lies the special interest or outlook of specific social groups.

In the ceaseless, ever changing movement of social life there is a flow of events which occur in set patterns which can be managed by state routines, prescribed rules and administration. There is also a flow of unpatterned events which give rise to unique problems, unknown results, rising and falling expectations, conflicts of values and collective energies, even threats of revolt and strikes, which direct tensions on political leaders. The one flow belongs to the rational, and requires administrative examination, skill and thinking, the other to the irrational. It requires political thinking characterised by that indefinable intuition (and charisma) which can comprehend the situation, grasp when the time is ripe for various responses, and cope with political behaviour - so different from other human activities. The ingenious combination of a political minister heading a ministry with a permanent secretary provides for the interpenetration of the irrational and the rational in an advantageous structure. One consequence is that, say, 90 per cent of the decisions are compiled by the official and there is always a 10 per cent where the minister has to resolve the issue in the absence of any valid rational assessments.

The confrontation between the irrational and the rational is the dramatic feature of the Rhodesian situation set out above. The motivating force of racial attitudes in a plural society infuses a particular intensity into the political arguments. Before examining the context and unfolding of the idea of provincialisation as it passed from politics to administrative thinking, it is instructive to recall briefly the nature of the irrational heritage which history bequeathed to Ian Smith when he assumed the responsibility of integrating and defining the collective will of white Rhodesians.

Racial Attitudes and Politics in Rhodesia

The Census of 1956 revealed that less than 15 per cent of white Rhodesians over the age of 20 were born in the country. The great bulk of immigrants - many only moving in after World War II - identified themselves as British, with some 14 per cent as Afrikaners. The most important source of intergroup (black/white) relations was the cultural clash of British values, beliefs and norms with indigenous patterns of behaviour. Over some 60 years these differences had diminished, with a notable and multiplying acquisition of "western" attitudes by many Africans through education and what anthropologists called "acculturation". Change - so much change that minor social revolutions in African culture were all fermenting simultaneously - was

the order of the day. "Change-tolerant" attitudes became a crucial feature of white political thinking, and for clarity might well be distinguished from "racial prejudices". Such prejudices, infused through several generations, became so deeply embedded in emotion as to be impervious to change, and although one might encounter such compulsive feelings in the Southern States of America or in parts of South Africa they were inconspicuous in Rhodesia.

In the labyrinth of inter-group relations and attitudes the word "prejudice" could usefully be restrictively defined and as for "racial" or "racist", it had entered political usage in such an inflated form as to become a meaningless term of abuse, with propaganda advantages but serious consequences when any message of criticism is thrown aside because the messenger is deemed to be a racist.

In 1960 there came a remarkable study,¹⁵ completed over the two years 1958 to 1960, of racial attitudes in Rhodesia. This attempt at cold, scientific exposure and measurement provides a valid account of the complexity of attitudes and prejudices - their relation to age, sex, country of birth, ethnic origin, length of residence, occupation, income, religion, political party preferences, and their changes over the decades. A picture is presented of the awesome dimensions of the problems inherent in the political sphere, a picture probably only obscurely and partially visualised by those who took up the hazards of leadership over such a pack of potential political wolves.

At the time of this study Sir Edgar Whitehead's party was in power. African political consciousness was beginning to assume some importance, so much so that the problem of a political system encompassing their ambitions was under discussion, and the government was trying to lead the white voters towards a relaxation of racial separation. In opposition was the Dominion Party under Bill Harper. The study found that its sample of whites believed without exception that African nationalism was inspired from outside the country rather than as a consequence of internal changes (so much easier to think that way and impregnate the public consciousness with this idea). Generally attitudes were against change but it was appreciated that this would come as Africans became more responsible and were ready to exercise the vote. However, 'to allow political control to pass out of European hands at this time would be reckless folly'.

¹⁵ C.A. Rogers and C. Frantz, *Racial Themes in Southern Rhodesia*, 1962.

Dominion Party attitudes were specially conservative and resistant to change. The study opened with the findings that 'the ingredients of (Rhodesia's) future society are in the early stages of distillation' - presumably meaning attitudes were not so deeply ingrained as elsewhere. It ended with the observation that the government, embracing a British heritage of respect, indeed sacred regard for authority and law, was in the valuable position of being able to exercise a large and critical measure of leadership. But it warned those in the position of leadership against becoming alienated from a conservative electorate, in which the biological fact of race was not perhaps the most important variable, the implication being that this was not so much race as cultural difference in values, interests and behaviour. These were still too widely divergent to permit of the "bi-racialism" which seemed to be preferred by the majority for the future. The trend was towards increased but gradual acceptance of Africans by Europeans with increasing awareness that cohesion and consensus would be the foundation of the future.

Within less than a year of this scientific appraisal the country was put through a test of political attitudes when in July 1961 Whitehead's United Federal Party won a referendum on a new constitution. This secured enhanced African representation in parliament, and a slogan "Build a Nation" served to stress the aim and need for African participation and advancement. The old tradition of a common roll and reliance on the attainment of "civilised standards", not race, seemed to be providing the back-bone for an advance into new political arrangements. But at the same time, like a nemesis, a new political party was taking over the discredited Dominion Party. Out of a surge of conservatism there emerged the Rhodesian Front in early 1962, to attract the electoral support which Whitehead, unbeknown to him and most people, was in fact losing - the alienation that the scientists had warned about.

The crucial test came in the normal general election of December 1962, with the astonishing swing of electorate feeling, within 18 months, away from the UFP to an RF capture of power by six seats.

Whitehead's proposed break with established ways of the past, in the form of a repeal of territorial segregation (following the Quinton Report of 1960),¹⁶ and an end to racial discrimination, was matched by the RF's acclaimed retention of such measures and a break with the past in the form of political separation of the races. There was a rise to political influence of pronounced racial attitudes hitherto the province of tiny minorities. African nationalist

¹⁶ Southern Rhodesia. *Second Report of the Select Committee on Resettlement of Natives* (Chairman H.J. Quinton), 1960, paras.149-231.

leaders who on second thoughts from London, had rejected Whitehead's proposals in 1961, contributed in large measure to this change in white attitudes by increasingly directed acts of violence and intimidation. The British High Commissioner at the time, Lord Alport, described their tactics as 'calculated to destroy any hope of developing the future along multi-racial lines'.

Perhaps the situation was best explained by a careful professional observer at the time: Professor Holleman summed up his analysis with 'the whites believed they faced a choice (UFP or RF?) between putting their faith in the rather obscure prospect of seeking cooperation with African leadership or sticking to entrenched positions which, no matter how heavily besieged they might be in times to come, at least represented familiar, cherished values of the "European way of life", a far less complicated position'.¹⁷ This serves to illustrate the irrational nature of elections, the mood, the faith, the mass crowd fervour in political attitudes; not the carefully thought out, rationalised principles set out in policy statements supposed to determine responsible choice by each "qualified" voter.

With the RF in power a new selective process of ideas, the fittest exponents, became operative. When Field withdrew as leader in April 1964 responsibility was vested in Ian Smith to mould, enthuse and guide what had hitherto been a submerged body of feeling. Its strange and unpredictable makeup covered a wide spectrum, ranging from rampant, crude, callous and "instinctive", petty colour-antipathy; through group arrogance, prejudice, ethnocentrism, and claims of biological superiority; up to the noblest sentiments about Christian civilisation, pride and purity of race, "no abdication of responsibility", and good government protecting both white and black against irresponsible self-seeking Marxist leaders. This both conscious and unconscious array of feelings was manifested in a variety of irrational and rational beliefs and interpretations and theories about the situation in Rhodesia.

Some of this feeling flowered in the bitterness, humiliations and bad manners which penetrated debates in Parliament. As Machiavelli discovered, individuals behave quite differently as members of a group and in the interests of a group will discard normal morality and justice for *raison d'état*. In the inter-group or plural society one may like another individual (concrete judgement) and hate the group to which he belongs (abstract prejudice).

¹⁷ J.F. Holleman, *Chief, Council and Commissioner*, (1969), p.272.

This was the hotch-potch of cultural irrationalities which packed into Ian Smith's political prop, the RF, as the security situation deteriorated. How would he and his Ministers handle the situation?

The Rhodesian Front in Power

Preceding the events of 1968 and 1969 which are the subject of this study, there occurred, or more accurately were arranged by Smith under pressure from his Party for Independence, three salient developments which enormously strengthened the flimsy base of his electoral power. In October 1964 the *Domboshawa Indaba* was held at which the assembled chiefs and headmen, some 600, were invited to debate and decide quite freely on whether Rhodesia should "cut the strings" with Britain and retain the existing 1961 Constitution they knew. Differing political interpretations of the *Indaba* erupted from varying quarters, ranging from the University staff of anthropologists who were highly critical to those who extravagantly claimed that the chiefs spoke for all Africans. It was in fact a genuine attempt to seek out the opinion of tribal people, not others, through their familiar channels of expression on a simple understandable issue - 'to cut and stand as we are, or not to cut'. The consensus supported the first alternative¹⁸ and in the following month a referendum of the electorate was held on the same issue of "Independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution". Although half the white voters refrained from voting Smith again achieved the majority support he needed and in May 1965 when the normal general elections were due and held, he swept the board winning all the A-roll seats.

The RF had consolidated white feelings and was in undoubted massive power, committed to stay on Whitehead's 1961 Constitution, with all British influence removed. Smith with his ministers was confident enough to declare independence unilaterally (UDI) on November 1965 with the result that Wilson described them as "the rebel regime" (in spite of their remaining loyal to the Queen), and declared his primary objective as 'the overthrow of the illegal

¹⁸ It should in no way be concluded from this that the chiefs supported Smith on UDI. A former high-placed civil servant close to these events has in fact firmly contradicted any such impression (he prefers to remain anonymous), writing: 'This was *not* so. In fact when I heard Smith was going to raise not just the "cutting of the strings" and the 1961 Constitution but declare UDI if Britain refused, I told Harper I should have to resign if he did that because we had never raised UDI with the Chiefs, on the grounds we could not advise or support the chiefs on an illegal act of Government. It was always "cut the strings" but remain under the Monarchy if possible'. *Personal Communication*.

With this background comprising the emotional antecedents of Ian Smith's task and his party's contribution to the ferment, it is reasonable to accept that there was a deep cleavage within it and even within the Cabinet. Since cabinet proceedings are secret, speculation is the norm of reports, unless some revelation occurs as in the case of Lord Graham's actions, and it is a mistake to assume that all Ministers were in favour of political separation of the races as a policy, or considered that "Provincialisation" was an acceptable alternative solution when the Prime Minister in 1968 blocked the cry for "Partition".

To return to the historic drama of September 1968, we find a political leader integrating and defining the collective will of the majority of Whites as it was embodied in a multitude of irrational beliefs, fears and aspirations, exposing his political thinking to the neutral examination of the public service, whose job it was or ought to have been to turn problems of politics into problems of administration, and calculable stable patterns of behaviour.

In doing this the administrative head, whatever his Ministry, has to try to rationalise the irrational, to analyse and probe the problems before him with all the statistics, scientific studies and expertise available. He has to penetrate the fog of sentiment and propaganda, to foresee and weigh short-term probabilities, to evaluate and interpret the embarrassingly vague and ambiguous statements emanating from politicians; and to be aware of ideological prejudices or bias as dangerous factors leading to distortions and unbalanced selection of materials. It is the essence of his duty to frankly and freely inform his Minister, not to placate and connive - until after a decision has been made. Then his loyalty requires that he do his best to make a success of the government's policy.

Finally, the administrator, having mobilised his team of thinkers, has to present recommendations so pragmatic, so clear, so careful to signal the hazards and dangers ahead, that when the proposals are considered in Cabinet, they promote re-thinking. In order to attract such fresh attention they have to be courteously framed, not because they go to Ministers, but because in crossing the line from the rational sphere they must not arouse the ire of the irrational and so be dismissed, ignored or discounted.

¹⁹ According to Roger Howman, Smith was always anxious not to make a clean break "being intensely attached to Britain and the Queen, as distinct from the UK Government". His efforts to contact the Queen and how they were blocked by Wilson's Government are described by Dunlop in *March of Time*, 1977, 108.

Although it is not the direct concern of a civil servant, nor within his purview, he should have a good measure of sympathy when considering how his Minister is to cope with the even more irrational mood of his Party and the public, the ever menacing "what will the voters say?" looming over ministerial decisions. The knowledge that his advice controls or tempers most policy decisions should render a permanent secretary acutely aware of the Minister's burden of irrationality. He should be ever ready to compose speeches and public papers that elucidate policy, give it factual and decisive drive into the texture of the irrational, and leave it to the Minister to add the adjectives and flourishes he is good at - oratory being the forte of political eminence.

Provincialisation

Enough has been sketched above to lay bare the complex of racial feelings inherent in the issue of provincialisation and the overwhelming emotional concern with what was interpreted as white survival (and the survival of Civilisation in Africa). The Prime Minister had given an assurance that it was the key to the future and political security. Yet when searching questions were posed by a Working Party of officials, the Cabinet dropped the issue and Ministers had to exercise their political wits for the next eight years warding off discharges from the irrational sphere of the RF Party and public.

African Politics

In the background to these events was another irrational sphere, the rising tide of black nationalism, the emergence of ancient feelings given a modern form, an assembly of energies still to be integrated. How did the rational segment of the civil service deal with this third dimension?

The Rise of the Chiefs

During the 1960s efforts were made by the African Affairs Department to restore or strengthen the institution of chieftainship which had been severely impaired by an exercise implementing the Godlonton Report of 1944.²⁰ The earlier objective had been to reduce the number of chiefs by demoting the smaller figures and amalgamating tribal units to facilitate the payment of higher subsidies, the granting of greater powers, and the expectation of more exertions and efficiency from those who remained in office. Whatever advantages accrued from this policy, the harm done to the attitudes and functions inherent in the institution soon became apparent to the more

²⁰ Southern Rhodesia, *Report of the Native Trade and Production Commission* (Chairman W.A. Godlonton), 1944.

perceptive administrators, and a change in policy took place.

The new policy was at first motivated by an appreciation of the need to bring to the surface the deeper functioning of chieftainship. The rather neglected aspects, even prohibited zones such as crime and punishment, became objects of government consideration, alongside attention to the collective views of chiefs, from which came provincial assemblies and a national Council of Chiefs. Unfortunately these moves happened to coincide with the rising tensions fermented by black nationalism, and the chiefs were inexorably drawn into the very centre of the political arena as described so well by Professor Holleman in his survey of what he called "The Rediscovery of the Chiefs".²¹

This apparent digression into chieftainship seems necessary to explain why so little weight and potential influence was accorded to the nationalist leaders. The role of chiefs was an easy one to exaggerate, to magnify into a political image or force which could be used against the educated urbanised, so-called detribalised black leaders. In spite of administrative efforts and arguments to confine the chiefs to their age-old functions, politics gathered them up, made them spokesmen for all blacks, and the Prime Minister, ignoring warnings that he would ruin the institution and estrange a chief from his people, persisted in using some chiefs for his personal ends. Even in the 1970's a new set of officials re-discovered the chiefs as "Tribal Authorities", and when Independence came it was the misuse of the traditional leaders over the past dozen years that provided the new black leaders with their arguments in dealing with the chiefs.

African Nationalism

Some appreciation of this climate of enhancement-of-the-chiefs and diminution of the black nationalists can be gained by noting the casual manner in which the Whaley Commission (1968) disposed of the problem of 'an emerging and emergent African element', 'the urban dwellers, some floating, rootless and usually semi-permanent, but others who are permanent urban dwellers (.)'²² These people, the Commission generously allowed, would be given six seats (three in Mashonaland and three in Matabeleland) in Parliament as against twelve for "tribal" people and two for farmers. From the vantage point of history it is permissible to view the Commission's study and political assessment of the educated Africans' part in the future as a ridiculous under-

²¹ Holleman, *op. cit.*, Chap. 9.

²² Constitutional Commission, *op. cit.*, para. 239.

estimate; but seen at the time, the dimensions and the potential weight of the new political forces, the quantity and quality of feelings and the divisions in their leadership, were too elusive to grasp. Public opinion was diverted away from the main problem of appraising the future to pre-occupation with the idea of tribal authority (order and security through the chiefs), from changing Africa to traditional culture.

By its very nature, Professor Mannheim concluded from his world perspective of history, the rational sphere generates a style of thinking so bound up with planning and managing the "plannable and manageable" flow of social life, that when revolutionary energies and changes appear and threaten the existing pattern of order and stability, administrative thinking is apt to misread the signs and see only irrational outbursts. It treats them as momentary disturbances to be dealt with by regulation and penal action. This unpatterned movement of change belongs to the irrational sphere, politics.

Thus the nebulous, random feelings which leaders gather together, sharpen, mobilise and integrate into political energies are apt to be overlooked or minimised by administrative thinking. They can be falsified by propaganda "images" and resisted by psychological campaigns, but their nature forces them to the fore as an accumulation of vast incomprehensible changes in the fabric of society. In Rhodesia the steady growth of black national attitudes - from the spacious alterations of World War II, education and literacy, industrialisation, urbanisation, population growth and civic awareness - made such changes inevitable, supplemented forcefully by such specifics as land apportionment, certain legislation and economic inequalities. From further afield came dynamic influences on such feelings from the general conclusions of the social sciences, that the world's previous appraisal of superior and inferior races was not justified, and from an invigorating group consciousness seeking new definitions of status, free from the prejudices which Nazism had made abhorrent to the world in the 1940's.

Whatever the outcome of the power struggle which such formidable changes in the structure of any society stimulate, the result is a host of unpatterned situations. Administration has to bring these within the rational sphere, shaping them to conform with or accommodate to the flow of previous patterns and the prescriptions of a new power structure, or face social and legal chaos.

Independence and Government

Whenever a new power structure emerges to assume control, its irrational nature is governed by its earlier irrational search and struggle for power, the energy of collective feelings. In that process the new Party is likely to adopt whatever alliances, ideas, tactics, aims and promises, battle slogans and ideologies are conducive to its strength and success. The modes of thinking derived primarily from that time of political struggle for power are apt to penetrate into large spheres of life under the guise of "a new realism". The more a group movement strives to become a political party and prepares for power the more intolerant it becomes of any opposition or deviation from its adopted principles and interpretations. As a fighting instrument a party has to organise its members and its thinking in order to grip the emotional undercurrents and articulate the largely collective unconscious into open conscious political attitudes.

The evolving of such a complex whole by the leaders and their subsequent activities if they gain power, in the role of ministers to implement, modify or discard the array of new ideas, will provide historians with an African treasure house of material. Whatever their covert intentions leaders who have recently gained power - as Mannheim's analysis of world history observes - by participating in and sharing responsibility for the existing order, become wedded to things as they are, and come to exert a retarding influence through their espousal of orderly evolutionary change. The assumption of government liabilities, and responsibilities for the existing order, with the inexorable participation of the people (even if only to grow food), must inevitably create a divergence - a cleavage in the matrix of ideas - between those with such responsibilities in their decision making, and those (such as party publicists, writers of news articles and academics) for whom existing conditions are much less important and valid than revolutionary changes already prescribed by the party.

At present it is perhaps valid to observe how almost all independence movement in Africa required a theory to hold them together and discovered the ready-made fighting maxims of "Socialism". A few adopted "Marx-Leninism" whose claim to being scientific bequeathed a needed increment of psychological certainty and confidence as to what was right or "correct" as well as a fierceness which would pervert the past and sweep away both the good and the bad in hated Capitalism. Good fighting talk; but rather heedless of the divergence between Marx's thinking in exile and Lenin's thinking when in power. Some students of Africa have already noted the widening gap in politics between aspirations and performance, particularly as Productivity, a

major irrationality in socialist ideology, inescapably makes its weight felt in the rational sphere,

For optimum aspirations the new ministers should permit their irrational ideas to be rationalised by the civil service and re-assessed in the light and weight of new recommendations; for it is the task of the rational to adjust or to eliminate the pre-existing order and evolve, with no doubt much trial and error, a widened rational sphere incorporating new goals, new priorities and new political values. Of course this may not be feasible and ministers, as the only well qualified bearers of socialist ideas, may find themselves, willingly or unwillingly, precipitated into administrative operations in a partially vacated civil service, with unseen, even dire consequences from the mixture.

Zimbabwe's Independence Government and the Irrational

In Zimbabwe, independence and a new power set-up under Robert Mugabe came in April 1980, some twelve years after the processes described above. The intriguing feature of the change was that the new power-holders, having addressed themselves (perhaps not every one) to the fighting qualities of communist philosophy, and having learned to recognise the irrational in capitalist systems, are now seeking to graft into the activities of government the credentials of Marx's "Scientific Socialism".

The basic innovation in this claim to transformation of society by objective scientific methods is that the public sector (as the enlarged civil service is now called) is expected to assume wider and wider controls, penetrating into all categories of life. In this way the irrational sphere is dispelled and all crises, crime, trade cycles, unemployment and "the contradictions of the capitalist system", which account for such "evils", can be planned out of existence by rational, socio-economic methods managed by a bureaucracy "properly oriented" - the last two words being a necessary addition to excuse the lapses of behaviour.

The significance of this political aspiration is that irrational thinking elevates itself to so high a plane that it claims to rationalise the whole society, to transform it. This high-level lapsing into irrationality, usually inspired by the magnificent illusions of academics, or faith in something called Education or Training as an antidote to any menace or failing, is unlikely to be sought, much less promoted by Administration. In spite of the protagonists of mass education, campaigns of every kind, seminars and the use of mass media, the experienced administrator is normally aware of the scanty control which can be effectively exercised over human behaviour: that where such controls or

disciplines are imperative, compulsive and corrective measures are inescapable; and elements of the public, if not a freedom-loving public as a whole, are apt to gang up against, and discover ingenious means of outwitting a mass of government rules and bureaucratic officials.

Such ideas of concentrated controls over the material apparatus of life contain the seeds of an internal move to totalitarian dictation in a seed-bed initially devoted to education and persuasion. The rise of, and accumulating need for a public service of checks and curbs, a monitoring, supervising, documenting and policing bureaucracy, is likely to make the citizen's liberties a farce amidst plans for a new freedom-from-economic-constraints. What is even more crucial in this form of planning is that errors of judgement in the public sector take time to reveal themselves and, in the complexity of bureaucratic staffing and red tape cannot easily nor quickly be corrected, even when Administration is alive to the disorder. Regulations and high policy statements regularly become lodged in dead-letter boxes and Administration resorts to the art of knowing when to ignore or break the law.

Another facet of these trends of thinking likely to be more apparent to the administrator, is the stark contrast between the planning at the top where high ideals and altruism operate - or are constantly publicised as operating for the welfare of the people - and the pragmatic planning by the grass-roots team or individual. This type of planning, contrary to how it is supposed to function, is apt to order its daily activities according to what is seen as the easiest line to take, the path likely to encounter least resistance or unpleasantness, the famous art of passing the buck, or masterly inactivity in the hope that the matter will pass away or go unnoticed. Such attitudes can be assessed as the irrational elements of public affairs and they are susceptible to petty bribery and perquisites, which intensify the irrational and nullify or abort even the most rational planning on a national scale. Dedicated care is the most difficult sentiment to implant in individuals of a public service, yet it is the key to successful planning operations - the don't care attitude, the planner's incubus.

Some leaders have taken the line that because their party is a socialist party it is therefore "the people", it speaks for "the people", and by its exertions will free their will and enable them to control their own destiny. This is normal political rhetoric. But some thinkers go further and by logic announce that since the government itself is under the party (constitutionally subservient in some countries), the public service must also become political, be orientated to the party and any civil servants who have not joined the party "will be investigated". The selection of "party men" for promotion to high office in the public service, even to head ministries, is not unknown as a

device for facilitating ministerial policies. This dilution of the rational sector, while to be deplored as allowing undue irrational ingress, is not so fraught with irresponsible thinking as a subservient public service. It can be granted that civil servants often have political leanings, but these handicaps to clear thinking and full impartial advice to the minister, however disagreeable, are normally inexcusable. What happens when a whole civil service is party oriented!!!

Fortunately in Zimbabwe such an extreme overthrowing of the rational segment of the state by political irrationality has not got far, as yet. Even the doctrine that "Government is under the Party" has not been pushed to the extent that the Cabinet - that fusing point of the rational and irrational - takes its orders from the irrational. Strange consequences could flow, even in such a narrow facet as "provincialisation", if the Cabinet, forsaking the delicate balancing of the feelings of the electorate with the findings of its civil service inherent in its decisions, allowed itself to be dominated by the party. It is worth remembering that the founders of the United States Constitution recognised that 'in all numerous assemblies Passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from Reason', and tried to guard against their own experience of 'sudden breezes of passion and every transient impulse' in the field of popular power and weak government.

Even more fortunately the new Zimbabwe Government, although claiming to govern according to Marxist-Leninist principles, has not over-estimated the importance of these, and has manifested in its comprehensive planning and organisation "for the people" a strong appreciation of the need for a zone of private enterprise. In doing this it seems to be evolving the framework of a planned society within which the mechanism of competition is given freedom to operate - a kind of alliance between rational bureaucratic control, with its many experts, and the irrational, ceaseless freedom of individual initiative and variety. Is there a hint, in this kind of planning, of an awareness, even a division of opinion, in the circles of power, that happiness (and the drive of personal talents) is an intensely individual affair not to be founded in a System, be it a "socio-economic system" or a planned model of "order and happiness for all" as conceived by administrative thinking and the creeds of political power-holders? That the Irrational is an indestructible essence of human life?

The scope for unusual development is enormous and the array of hopes and experiments made feasible by international aid on a scale and variety not surpassed in any other country of Africa (certainly incredible by earlier Rhodesian standards of operation against cultural resistances), holds out

remarkable prospects; always provided irrational policies in the political climate do not surge into dominance and certain cultural propensities of the earlier subsistence mode of life can be mastered.

SUPPLEMENT No. 1 : Extracts from Minute to Secretary for Internal Affairs,
23.6.67. Col. Gayre's Views on Constitutional Change

... Far from supporting Dr. Gayre's views I did not think they would be taken seriously ... I offer the following comments on the questions (put by the Whaley Commission) -

- (i) Would partitioning affect the trend from a subsistence economy to a cash economy?

The economy has for say 60 years been a dual economy, with cash earned in employment paying an increasingly dominant part in supplementing the dwindling subsistence production. This is not to decry the great improvements made by individuals and in pocket areas but these are marginal, not massive. It is probable that most of these "improved farmers" are above the 3,000-foot contour, have communication with European marketing facilities and are motivated by the "acculturation" processes. To uproot them, to "re-acculturate" them, to consign them to a remote homeland, is to destroy the advance guard towards a cash economy ...

- (ii) Do you agree with large tracts of land being transferred and are the problems insurmountable?

I do not agree. The problems would be insurmountable in terms of human resistance and bitterness: unsupportable in terms of financial costs ...

- (iii) Do you agree with compulsory removal of large populations?

No. In any case to keep the African there in terms of Dr. Gayre's approach would mean the creation of human zoos ... I foresee, according to sociological evidence, an overflowing agricultural slum of apathic peasants developing, with an overlord strata of wealthy corrupt Chiefs and their hangers-on ...

- (iv) Could there be a fair distribution of land?

No. The proposals envisage all the plums in the cake being attached to the White homeland, all the growing points of economic growth being in the White economy, and this without regard to the fact that Black labour was and will continue to be as indispensable a contribution towards the creation of those national assets as the skills and organising capacity of the Whites.

- (v) What will be the effect upon administration of two black "homelands" divided into separate parts by white corridors?

Chaos, stunted growth if any growth is possible ...

- (vi) Will no race be under domination of another?

Many years ago when the "two pyramid policy" was the vogue someone pointed out that the tips of pyramids get further and further apart. Now we are confronted with three pyramids. Dress up the whole in genetic theory but one cannot conceal the system of naked force in the dominant role whether it be through the instruments of politics or economic power ...

SUPPLEMENT No. 2. Minute to the Minister of Internal Affairs, 27.8.68, The Harper-Graham Proposals.

Since my return from the Angola Seminar on Cooperatives and Community Development my attention has been drawn to a document widely referred to as the "Harper-Graham proposals" for a new Constitution and rumours that much of the content derives from officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. I have never seen the full document.

Today a copy of *Property and Finance* (No.150 of August 1968) has reached me on official circulation and in it is published an article on what is called a summary in detail of the "Harper-Graham proposals".

The article refers to 'the influence of experienced administrators in the field of African Affairs' in the proposals. I see considerable comment or generalisations on "African traditions and beliefs", "Tribal structure", "the tribe, the Chief and his traditional advisors" and "African values and aspirations".

I also note views and assessments about African Councils, with the suggestion that they should be "Chiefs' Councils" and the Chiefs and their advisors had to be recognised as "the thinking group of the tribe".

In view of my long association with the development of African Councils and my special responsibilities for chieftainships, African customs and community development, it is natural that many people have attributed some share in these writings to me.

I find myself so disturbed by this and by the possible repercussions of the views expressed on the whole course of community development that I write to ask you to accept the following comments and would be grateful if you decided to communicate them to the Prime Minister and Cabinet -

- (i) I do not know if any officials of this Ministry did or did not have any say in compiling the Harper-Graham document but whatever the true position I was quite unaware of it and had no share whatever in its compilation.

- (ii) I wish to dissociate myself - and I think I speak for a substantial section of our administrators - from the views expressed about Africans for they are superficial, narrow and loosely based on such an exaggeration of selected features of African society as to be unbalanced in my judgement.
- (iii) The views expressed about African Councils are certainly as blunt (to use *Property and Finance's* term) as a bull in a china shop and I do not think anyone with any real experience or appreciation of "local government - community development" problems would consider such views either adequate or justified. I reject such an ill-considered diagnosis.
- (iv) I am convinced, both from long study of African society and the experience of other countries who have done such things, that any attempt to turn our African local government into "Chiefs' Councils" and to establish Provincial Councils (or Chambers) prematurely, simply for the political purpose of "giving the African a part to play in the higher levels" is to sound the knell of community development and local government at their most genuine and crucial foundations. We would provide artificial European, ready-made provincial platforms for consolidating African (or Mashona or Matabele) political activity and, in the effort to give them some responsibilities, some functions, we would have to deprive the community or tribal level of most of their valued functions or aspirations.
- (v) The constitutional proposals, being political matters under public discussion, are not for me to comment on but in so far as they are represented as the natural conclusions drawn from expert assessment of African life and the role of Chiefs, I believe they are unsound and impractical. The findings of the Whaley Commission, whose evidence derived from a much wider sphere than the concept of "tribesmen", provide a much sounder basis when they said -

Para.112-3: 'In our view local government must spring from a spontaneous desire of the people concerned and cannot be imposed from above. In the fullness of time, given a comprehensive nation-wide network of local authorities, the concept of tiered government might be practically possible'

Para.10: 'There appear to be very few functions which could be regarded as relating purely to African Affairs; practically all legislation is common to all races and cannot be separated on a racial basis.'

Para.298: 'We are not convinced that the Chiefs could be expected to speak on behalf of all Africans on all matters ... there is merit therefore in providing seats for both Chiefs and "commoners" in the Senate.'

Para.620: 'We believe that the institution of chieftainship will grow in popular esteem if, on the one hand, Government continues to recognise that its contribution is that of *support* of traditional power and, on the other hand, Chiefs are willing to *adapt* themselves to a cash economy, the complex pattern of modern African life and evolving local government and other like institutions.' (Note the key words 'support of traditional power', not imposition of wholesale power, and 'adapt to', not assume control of, local government.)

I regret the need to have to write like this but when one feels that the future of Rhodesia is being jeopardised and that community development and local government is being threatened just as Government planning enables it to get going, it seems the only right thing to do.

SUPPLEMENT No. 3. Copy of Yellow Paper.

Republican Constitution of Rhodesia

Joint Proposals of the Caucus Sub-Committee and the
Divisional Chairmen's Committee; 4 July, 1968.

Preamble

In the knowledge that Her Majesty's advisers in the British Government have denied us the Queen of Rhodesia we have no option but to submit for your consideration the following proposals for a Republican Constitution of Rhodesia.

Stage I

Head of State:

To be appointed by the Government of the day for a period of five years and to retain present powers except that dissolution of Parliament should only take place on the advice of Government.

Speaker:

As in the present Constitution the Speaker would be elected either from among the Members of Parliament who are neither Ministers nor Deputy Ministers, or from among persons who are not Members of Parliament.

Judiciary:

The existing general and appellate divisions of the High Court would remain as presently constituted and the law to be applied would continue to be the law in force in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope on 10 June 1891, as modified by subsequent legislation promulgated in Rhodesia. Some minor amendments would be made.

Land Tenure:

Both European and African land to be entrenched and multi-racial areas to continue as at present.

A Land Tenure Act to control the occupation of land to be introduced simultaneously with the new Constitution.

Declaration of Rights:

To be simplified and the basic rights so retained to be non-justiciable.

Delimitation:

To continue as at present but with additional powers covering the appointment of an Electoral College for African representation. The loading of numbers between urban and country seats to be retained.

Franchise:

The qualifications set out in the Whaley Report to be accepted generally but no special provisions to be made for ministers of religion, chiefs or headmen to be on the Common Roll. Provision to be made for old age pensioners presently on the B Roll to be included on the Common Roll. Cross voting would be eliminated.

Senate:

To consist of twenty-three members made up of ten Europeans elected by the European Members of Parliament sitting as an electoral college, ten African Chiefs (five Matabele and five Mashona) nominated by the Council of Chiefs, and three persons appointed by the Head of State.

Powers of Senate:

To undertake the duties of the Constitutional Council. To have power to delay Bills for a maximum period of six months unless they deal with financial matters or a certificate of urgency has been issued by the Prime Minister. To have the power to amend Bills and to cause them to be re-submitted to Parliament.

Amendment to entrenched clauses in the Constitution to require a two-thirds

majority both of Parliament and Senate sitting together. In regard to other clauses only a two-thirds majority of Parliament and a two-thirds majority of the Senate, sitting separately would be required, but the Senate would have delaying powers up to six months.

The life of the Senate to be a maximum of one year longer than that of Parliament and the election of a new Senate to be within that period, after each Parliament is elected. The President of the Senate to be similar to the Speaker in Parliament and to have the same powers in respect of the Senate.

The Legislature:

The Interim Government to consist of 68 or 64 members. If the former, there would be 34 constituencies for which only Europeans could be elected on a European roll; ("European" in this context to include Europeans, Coloureds and Asians), 18 members to be elected by voters on a Common Roll and who could be persons of any race, and 16 African members of whom 10 (five from Matabeleland and five from Mashonaland) would be elected by an electoral college of Chiefs, Headmen and Council representatives, 2 (1 from each Province) would be elected by African Purchase Area farmers, and 4 (2 from each Province) would be elected by Africans in the urban areas as suggested in the Whaley Report. (Only indigenous Africans who are Citizens of Rhodesia would be eligible for this voters' roll.)

If the Interim Government is to consist of 64 members, then the same procedure would be adopted but there would be 32 European members, 16 Common Roll and 16 African.

Entrenched Clauses:

Only those dealing with the judiciary, land rights, the official language, the method by which the Constitution may be amended, and the Declaration of Rights to be entrenched.

After provincialisation has been implemented that part of the Constitution dealing with the National Parliament and the Provincial Councils would be entrenched further so that amendment would necessitate a referendum of provinces in addition to the usual entrenched procedure.

Cabinet:

The Prime Minister to have the right of appointing Ministers from both

Parliament and the Senate.

Stage II

Legislature:

The legislative structure to be a provincial system of government to be initiated immediately after a referendum on the Constitutional proposals and to be completed within a period of five years. It would consist of three Provincial Councils (which in time could grow into Parliaments), one for each of the main racial groups, the Mashona, Matabele and White, with an overall National Parliament responsible for matters that could not be decentralised and which would include responsibility for national finance, defence, internal security, justice, law and order, international affairs, and indivisible national affairs such as communications, power, major irrigation projects, etc.

National Parliament

White
Provincial
Council

Mashona
Provincial
Council

Matabele
Provincial
Council

Provincial representation in the national Parliament would be based upon the contributions made by each of the three provinces to the national exchequer on the basis of calculated personal income tax.

Once the National Parliament had delegated certain powers to a Provincial Council these powers could not be withdrawn with the concurrence of the Provincial Council concerned.

In the unlikely event of cooperation, trust and goodwill between the races breaking down, a two-thirds majority of the members of the National Parliament should be empowered to authorise complete partition. It is accepted that today partition is, for practical purposes, virtually impossible, but it is felt that our descendants may decide it is both necessary and possible and for this reason the safeguard should be included in the Constitution.

SUPPLEMENT No.5. Minute to Minister of Internal Affairs, 26.8.68, Notes on "RF" Papers on Constitution - July 1968.

It is difficult to decide how to criticise these RF proposals because they ignore so many economic, administrative, moral, cultural and political aspects in their narrow, short-term, single purpose concern to achieve separation of the races as a guarantee of European preservation and control. Sentences are loaded with emotional selection of words and generalisations to support this goal and anything to the contrary is ignored or minimised.

A few examples -

- (i) "Preservation of identity, culture and way of life" is presented as a *right* and objective, but this in no way deters the RF from imposing Provincial Councils, income tax, provincial functions and a distorted concept of the role of the chiefs which amounts to an inexcusable misuse of chieftainship for European political purposes.
- (ii) Any form of political or social collaboration or association is labelled *integration* but the outstanding fact of our economy, of Western and South African economics as well, which is "economic integration", is conveniently labelled "economic interdependence" to avoid the political odium.
- (iii) It is assumed that politics has nothing to do with economics so there can be hundreds of thousands of Africans in the European area who will be quite content to exercise political rights in the African areas.
- (iv) Each Provincial Council will "govern according to the customs, way of life and will of the inhabitants". Presumably subsistence farming, overstocking, position of women, nepotism must no more be interfered with by European ideas than methods of selection of representatives, traditional power and conduct of public affairs.
- (v) What political party was responsible for arousing ill feeling over the term "multiracial" - a purely factual term apparent at every

street corner? Yet now the term is not to be used, nor the facts faced!

- (vi) The disastrous complacency with which it is assumed that "co-operation, trust and goodwill" will be promoted by these proposals and that their breakdown is "unlikely" - yet the political ideology is one of defiance of African aspirations. Supplementary to this is the dangerous assumption that Chiefs and so-called "traditional leadership" are exaggeratedly powerful and will use that power to support the system. It should be noted that the Chiefs have never said they supported separation into political compartments.

Chiefs

The proposals envisage 10 to 12 Chiefs in a Senate and a predominance of them in Provincial Councils or a Chamber of African Affairs. It is true to say that there is not a single chief who is capable of exercising such senatorial functions and no more than 4 or 5 who could adequately perform at provincial level. There are unlikely to be any more competent Chiefs in the foreseeable future. The 2 to 3 Matabele Chiefs who at tribal level do seek to exert their influence have the worst councils in the country, because they seek to be all-powerful autocrats and are hostile to any training of their councillors in local government.

For political purposes we have painted an idealistic, simplified view of chieftainship (see *Domboshawa Ndaba* paper), a fiction which it would be absurd to use for practical administrative and internal purposes. The following reports are still true to some extent -

Godlonton Commission 1944 - 80 per cent of the 215 collateral succession chiefs are over 50 years of age and of all 306 chiefs in the country only 58 are helpful.

Chief Native Commissioner's 1953 Report - 'A description of Chiefs, particularly in Mashonaland, takes on the nature of a catalogue of the vices and virtues of an old men's home. So many are old, blind, opposed to new ideas, senile, swayed by an entourage of hangers-on, lethargic, that they are of little use administratively.'

Nevertheless, within a restricted traditional field, most chiefs are very important and chieftainship as an institution holds a tribe together. The sound administrative aim is to preserve and strengthen that institution by adapting it

to other institutions in these modern complex times, not to permit its destruction by political ideas of using Chiefs as the only recognised leaders, bringing them into the political arena and pushing them out as a shield against political pressures. ...

As an antidote to the unrealistic liberalism of the 1950's which made the educated African 'the model of political thinking' we Administrators had to stress the "tribesman" and his resistance to change. Which is "the real African"! We are unbalanced if we claim that the vast majority of Africans are tribesmen content to stay as they are. Over 40 per cent of them at any one time are living and working in a progressive industrial society where an educated, intellectual, ambitious elite exists and the educational system is pouring out annually tens of thousands amidst whom the average chief and his elders exist as a minority relic of the past, confused, uncertain, bewildered by the strange new world around them.

Economic Development

"Political separation, social separation on a basis of economic interdependence" is a crazy interpretation of the relationship between politics and economics. Can they be divorced or put in separate compartments, and if so does economics regulate political activity or politics determine economics?

Surely political activity is primarily an expression of economic conditions! The roots of discontent, of protest, of the power of trade unionism and of organisation into political parties are to be found in economics.

If this is true what kind of European "state" will emerge when a handful of Europeans base their economy on a mass of politically inarticulate Africans (including the most educated, discontented and active emergent element) living in the urban areas with only two channels of protest against social injustice -

- (i) Labour organisation to cripple or disrupt the economy;
- (ii) Return and capture the only political platform provided, the black provincial governments, and turn them into hostile machines to redress grievances in the European area.

It is what happens in the urban areas, not in the black rural areas, that will determine the pattern of African politics.

If the European economy was based on primary industry and unskilled African

labour migrating from the "black areas" something could be said for these *apartheid* ideas (hence their attraction to farmers). But since an expanding, industrial and manufacturing economy is the objective, with a technically skilled labour force and a thriving consumer market of Africans (the 'greater domestic purchasing power we so desperately need ...') we must expect the African urban communities to grow so that in 10 years time there may be 2,800,000 Africans in the European towns (a statistical projection of urban growth in 1956).

(Note In South Africa, behind the facade of *apartheid*, employment in Industry and Commerce rose by over 80 per cent between 1946 and 1960)

In the black areas it is stated that the customs, way of life and will of the inhabitants will determine government under the traditional leaders. No regard is given to Professor Sadie's verdict that transformation of the subsistence sector is the highest priority in economic development and that economic progress cannot take place without changes in customs, values and institutions. If these RF political values are to dominate then we must expect the emergence of two political African poverty areas or overcrowded subsistence slums, hanging like a necklace of millstones around the neck of the European "state". All the economic growth-points, the railways and main communications will be in the European Area, so increasing helplessness and dependency on the paternalistic bounty of the European, will characterise the African "states", and the European State will be crippled or stunted by the sheer size of the problem and paralysed by the inertia and hostility of the African area.

The Tomlinson Commission was realistic enough to tell South Africa that 'save for a few blocks like the Transkei (Rhodesians like to use the Transkei as a model!) the Bantu areas are so scattered that they form no foundation for community growth ... this fragmentation can result in nothing else than a supplementary growth attached to a European community ... the geographic dispersal of the Bantu areas, and of the Bantu themselves will make socio-economic development impossible ...'

The Public Service

The problem of how four Civil Services (the Overall, the European, the Mashona and the Matabele) are to function and criss-cross the scattered bits and pieces of territorial autonomy has been brushed aside. How close to a Plan for Chaos is this political thinking!

It is assumed that somehow each "state" will provide its own services in the course of time and have its own "Ministers". In the *Health* field the trend is towards a few highly specialised and concentrated hospitals serving a hinterland of "first aid" and preventive services, so the focus of African ill-health will be in the European State. In the *Water Resources* field, where we have only stored one-fifth of run-off and must store another three-fifths within 40 years to meet national needs, the only river systems available lie mainly in the present Tribal Areas, so the European economy will be dependent on water resources in the Black States. In the *Social Welfare* field distress, delinquency, crime, old age security are intertwined with urban technology and economics so responsibility for the African proletariat and Social Security will rest on the European State. In *Natural Resource Conservation* the Black States occupy the most strategic areas for erosion.

But apart from problems of responsibility for services across "State boundaries" and functional divisions within the services there is still a further problem. Where an attempt has been made to put down workable proposals for the allocation of functions to the African Provincial Councils the list has been based on some such criterion as "African Affairs", where the African is supposed not to have any concern with other services. The result of setting up Provincial Councils for political aims will be the imperative to give them something to do to justify their existence by depriving the existing African Councils of their responsibilities. Thus the policy and aims and educational aspects of Community Development will come to an end and artificial, non-traditional, European-contrived Mashona and Matabele Councils will take over. Since both "Mashona" and "Matabele" are generic terms covering a fictional or manufactured unity we shall have a kind of United Nations Organisation having the audacity to take over or interfere with the valued services and cherished autonomy of the tribal communities - and in a hurry, for the timetable allows for 5 years! Which will survive the feud, provincial or local body?

To those who, for a separatist goal, play down the difficulties of two or three racial states operating from a scattering of geographical areas it is worth quoting the Tomlinson Commission - 'it is essential to have a policy aimed at consolidation of the Bantu areas' - and to note the enormous sums expended and drastic steps taken by the South African Government to implement this. When political propaganda is held aside administrative thinking in South Africa, facing the staggering size of the problem of consolidation, considers that there will be only one Bantustan in South Africa, and that a hazardous one, the Transkei.

The Fundamental Objective

When fear of African domination and personal emotional objection to association with the African (except when it is advantageous!) determine the ultimate objective of Separation for Survival at any cost then the 'creation of confidence through cooperation and mutual trust' (the goal of devoted Rhodesian endeavours over 70 years) must fade and die.

No administration, no community development policy can hope to sink roots if we forfeit the confidence and goodwill of the emergent African. The future depends on him, not on a traditional leader. 20,000 teachers each teaching say 40 pupils a year - what weight do 250 dear old chiefs carry against these!

A special "African administration" comprising European District Commissioners will be required to keep law and order in the Black areas and *build* development plans but as cooperation fades and resentment grows that Administration will have to become increasingly tough and security minded. The African Affairs Act will require amendment to ensure the tribesman remains an obedient tribesman - no movement out of a kraal without permission, immediate corporal punishment, arbitrary powers for chiefs with a blind eye towards their corruption, as "Africans like a strong hand and that is customary".

What kind of Rhodesia do these political thinkers really think will be shaped by their plans? Brave words about preservation of the European's future but nothing about his standards and values, and still less about the morality of his actions. A little premonition of the shape of things to come peers out of the reference, from a military point of view, to the 'foolishness of fragmenting the lines of defence by giving the black areas too much autonomy', and the despondency in empowering 'our descendants to decide that complete partition may be possible'. This is passing the buck with a vengeance.

Of course, to give the whole sad and dismal picture an air of respectability and scientific validity it would be well to appoint the Laird of Gayre and Nigg as Secretary for African Affairs in whatever nucleus remains of the dismembered Rhodesia.

SUPPLEMENT No. 5. Speech made by H.R.G. Howman on his Retirement as Deputy Secretary for Internal Affairs, 7.7.69.

Mr. Minister, whilst deeply appreciating the kind things you have said, I feel that you are thanking me for something for which I deserve no gratitude. I was merely "doin' a'what comes naturally". It is my parents, my great teachers, my predecessors and colleagues who deserve your thanks, not me - for I was just following my own inclinations and, like a jackdaw, collecting odds and ends all along the road, as my hobby.

Someone said to me the other day, 'Retirement - great, when *once* in your life you can do what you *want* to do'. I must have retired in 1927!

What I have contributed has mostly been a capacity for curiosity. The impulse to look around the next corner was an overwhelming one. The joy of exploring strange places and new ideas has never left me. That ridiculous motor cycle trip the Minister mentioned is an example - a fly crawling about the face of 1931 Africa; no plans, no preparations, no safety precautions, just a wanderlust to see the Sabi, the Melssetter, then Tete, then Lake Nyasa, then Kilimanjaro, then the source of the Nile, the Mountains of the Moon and Lake Kivu! - 'quite stupid' as a Tanganyika D.C. said when he looked at the bike and observed that even cars travel in convoy with water and rifles!

Curiosity of this nature about Africa, its places and people - what other Department could have satisfied it?

This seems to be an occasion for talking about what the Department has done for me. I find that much easier. I feel I must thank the old Native Department (now our Ministry of Internal Affairs) and set out what it has done to make life so full and exciting.

Looking back, I confess to a sense of wonder at what the Native Department, and our job in life, can do to a new recruit. From the tiny point of struggling with a T.A.F.¹ one expands to a whole Rhodesian universe. From that first

¹ Tax Advice Form

station, which the cadet enters so timidly, one builds up an experience (at Government expense, mind you) of a Rhodesia which ranges from Kazangula at the end of the Panda Matenka trail to Chitsa's pool on the Sabi-Lundi junction, and from Kariba to Crook's Corner. No parochial feeling that, no artificial mouthing about patriotism as used for political purposes. It is a silent feeling, much deeper, that our Department inculcates. One becomes a part of everywhere you've been, and a part of everyone you've met. That is the source of the make-up of the Native Department man - its width of feeling and thinking, its understanding of all sorts and conditions of black and white Rhodesians, its identification with the Low-Veld and the Chimanimani.

I didn't start with a T.A.F. I was one of those few born into a Native Department climate. So one grew up amidst the round of patrols, civil cases, tax collections, *ndabas*, and the creaking of the waggon by day, the clank of the tethered oxen at night. The first native words I learned were *sunga* and *sunnungura*,² the waggon brakes down the fearsome Selukwe hills of 1916.

Those early years saturated a youthful mind with responsibilities for tribesmen as the key to Rhodesia's future; with interest in custom, belief and history; with arguments ranging from Segregation to Trusteeship, from Magic to Religion - and across the floor of such discussions past the figures of Wiri Edwards, Fritz Posselt, Ernest Morris, Bullock, Nielson, Bazeley, H.M.G. and S.M.G. Jackson, Carbutt and Oliver.

When two or three of these kind of men gathered together, there you would find "Native Affairs" - the inexhaustible topic. The overriding impression I got from this panorama was one of disagreement and differences of opinion among the experts. They were all great authorities in their own way; all ardent speculators as to the future of the races (I can hardly believe I lived through the dreadful times some of them forecast for 20 years ahead!). But all were explorers, discoverers just beginning to uncover fragments of the strange world of African culture, and with no tools to help them except Frazer's *Golden Bough*, or Tylor's *Primitive Culture*. This is why I have always promoted scientific research, tried to bring the University in, and gained so much satisfaction from the help such people as Professor Holleman and Dr. Green brought to our Ministry.

I sketch this background to show what a tremendous weight of importance was

² *sunga* : (vb) tie, fasten, inspan, arrest
sunnungura : (vb) tie together (D. Dale, *Duramazwi, Shona-English Dictionary*, Mambo Press, 1981.)

given to race relations and the need for justice, goodwill and understanding. Nothing else mattered - what politicians might say, what mines were opening up, what farmers might be growing, what stocks and shares were up to, these were sidelines. What mattered for Rhodesia was "Native Affairs", and a great tradition to see fair play was built up.

Given this background you will be surprised - as I was shocked - to find that on leaving school, my father refused to let me join the Native Department. He considered that the Auditor General (Dicky Everett) was the finest head of department to start under and he wrote to him. When a vacancy occurred, at £16.13.4d per month, in August 1927, I joined the Audit.

Why? Because my father considered that the Native Department was the worst place for a youth straight from school - too narrowing, too isolated. What is wanted is a variety of contacts, breadth of ideas - Native Affairs was far too vital to the future of Rhodesia to be entrusted to officials who couldn't see beyond their noses. In the Audit you would at least see how all parts of the Public Service worked, meet all sorts of people in Salisbury and, he added, learn the value of accuracy (he might have had the balancing of tax registers in mind!). The Native Department could come later.

By the end of a year I had become the examiner of education grants to missions - I recall the figure of £20,000 - and then that great ruler of our lives, *accident* struck. A completely new Department of Native Education was set up in 1928 and I was sent to help them put the grants to missions through to Treasury.

I found myself in a new world - and yet a familiar one - amidst an inspiring company; a band of enthusiastic professional educators with a brilliant leader in the person of Harold Jowitt whose breadth of vision and deep learning were breath-taking to his young clerk. I had never met a person of his stature before.

It was a team of tremendous drive and dedication, with the unforgettable Emory Alvord on the agricultural wing, Miss Rudd on the women's wing, and with such sweeping vision of Native Education that in no time it became the Department of Native Development, and Education spilled out of the classroom into the community. There were Jeanes Teachers, Community Demonstrators, Women's Work, a Unified Shona Orthography and *Chiringiro*, the first African newspaper. My old Native Affairs Department had shrunk away into tax collections and legalistic administration of law and order.

It was Jowitt who took me in hand; said I was wasting my life; explained to me that it was necessary to learn how to think about such complex problems; and who told me about such unheard of subjects as Anthropology, Sociology, and Ethnic History. He mapped out a university course and set me going on a road that took me to England, America, Eastern Europe's plural society of Magyars, Slavs, Czechs and Germanic groups, and even the USSR, to study race relations. It was a pretty wide experience stretching from the Grand Imperial Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan to a Vienna psychiatrist treating German and Slav patients for phobias about each other. Malinowski and Karl Mannheim were the central figures in the study of society.

It was from Jowitt that the seeds of "Community Development" came but somehow I was never able to see myself in the role of a School Inspector, nor Administration as something separate from Development. When in 1935 Jowitt went to Uganda, Education was put back inside the classroom, and the two departments were merged under Col. Carbutt who became both Chief Native Commissioner and Director of Native Development. I swapped places with my friend Steve Davies - he became the educationist with administrative experience. I became the administrator with educational experience.

In passing it is worth recalling the fight we had in 1959-1961 to stop history from repeating itself when moves were made to take Development away from Administration and place it in the hands of specialists.

I suppose it was the Wedza Council which attracted the attention of Head Office, for not many years after, in 1951, I was pulled out by the Chief Native Commissioner and told to take myself off on an African tour to report on councils and courts. So started a new chapter which was to change my official career, see Sir Patrick Fletcher pilot the African Councils Act through Parliament, and end, 18 years later, mind you, with our present Minister putting the Tribal Courts Act through.

Oddly enough that 1951 tour took me over much the same ground I had crawled over on a motor cycle. But this time it was in the luxury of air and official chauffeur-driven cars that I covered thousands of miles through Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, and saw the source of the Nile and the Mountains of the Moon a second time.

No sooner had the reports on councils and courts been completed than I found myself in yet another new experience - that of helping in preparing the case for Rhodesia at an Inter-African Conference on Rural Welfare at Lourenco Marques in 1953. I did not attend the Conference but I recall what a struggle

Arthur Pendered and I had trying to formulate the facts, and give them life in a theoretical framework, a picture of Rhodesia's Administration.

Looking up those old papers I was astonished to find how close we came 16 years ago to our present concepts of Primary Development and Community Development. May I quote :

'A policy of rural welfare is twofold in character. On the one hand there is external and direct government aid ... which is the task of the central authorities. On the other hand there is the work of social education or community development to assist rural people by their own effort and acceptance of responsibility.'

That Conference was held under the auspices of the Commission for Technical Cooperation South of the Sahara - CCTA - that now almost unknown body. It comprised France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Portugal and all their African colonies, South Africa and our Federation; a pan-African body seeking to bring Science to Africa and to share technical experience.

CCTA provided a delightful and challenging series of meetings in strange parts and in the course of them I saw the gradual change from white faces, intent on scientific matters, to increasing black faces, intent on political advantage, and so the CCTA passed away.

It may interest you if I recall not only the CCTA visits but all the others which have made life so enjoyable and wide in our Ministry, for few know how heavily involved our Ministry became -

- 1953 The Conference already mentioned.
- 1955 The Inter-African Conference for Human Sciences held at Bukavu on Lake Kivu. There was born the idea of research among the Tonga before Kariba waters spread.
- 1957 The Second Inter-African Conference on Rural Welfare held at Tananarive in Madagascar.
- 1959 Rhodes-Livingstone Institute Seminar on "Tribal Rule to Modern Government" held in Lusaka. This was one of many such visits as I was the Rhodesian Government's trustee member of the Institute.
- 1960 Federal Constitutional Review Conference in London.

- 1961 Inter-African Conference on Community Development held in Kampala.
- 1965 Official tour of South Africa with Mr. Nicolle to see how Bantu Authorities worked.
- 1965 Chiefs' Tour to Greece, Italy, England, Portugal and South Africa.
- 1967 Seminar on Cooperatives and Community development held in Lourenco Marques.
- 1968 The same Seminar held in Angola.

Have I not good reasons, Mr. Minister, for being deeply grateful to a Ministry which has offered such a life? Am I not justified in disagreeing with a Public Service Board Officer who recently, on radio or TV, said that External Affairs was the most romantic ministry to join? How little he knew of the romance of the "Native Department"!

By this time you may be wondering if I was ever doing a normal office job! Of course, in between, I was; and I tried to make my contribution to policies, plans and legislation as sound as could be on the basis of Rhodesian experience *and* that of other territories.

Every country, tackling the same problems, is apt to place its stress on differing aspects, to forge ahead on its own particular theory or view of the situation. So a visitor is often able to see actual practical development 10 to 12 years ahead of his own country, learn the snags, appreciate the consequences and return to make sure his home-country does or does not follow such examples.

The one great lesson I learned was the danger of allowing any one aspect to run out of joint. No single factor causes more trouble than the tendency to exaggerate particular features, or give undue importance to one aspect at the expense of others.

To see things as a *whole*, to keep them in balance, changes as well as traditions - this was the greatest lesson. There are no solutions. Only in fairy tales and politics does everyone live happily ever after!

Africa is full of theories and plans that came to nought, not because anyone

could say they were right or wrong but simply because they were based on half-truths or distortions. For instance no institution in Africa has been more twisted into odd shapes, and been more misused, than that of chieftainship.

Of course chieftainship is important - much more important than any of us outsiders can ever know; much more important than the present holders of office (the chiefs) and their personal interests. Of course its voice, as the voice of tribal affairs, deserves a place in the Senate, *if* that Senate is a wise, experienced and impartial forum. But why over-do it, why fall into the error of exaggeration by having *only* chiefs to speak for Africans and in a Senate whose credentials have a political party bias.

My long association with chieftainship has caused many people to think that I have been involved in the White Paper's constitutional arrangements for Chiefs. I want to make it clear that I have not; that I disagree with the proposals, more because of the harm they are likely to do to chieftainship, than for their lack of realism; and that I hope Government will go back to the Whaley Commission for a sounder scheme.

So often in Africa "tribes have lost their heads" (if I may borrow the title of a famous book) by attrition due to misguided notions about the power of chiefs. British colonial theories produced extravagant ideas about them, overloaded them with responsibilities, isolated them from their people. Must we do this!

Mr. Minister, I really believe that we have got foundations laid among our African people which are so sound, and adaptable to change, that no other country in Africa can rival them - and that includes South Africa, so often held up as a model, as if we lagged behind them!

I say foundations - because there is still much to grow and build, but if we look at the framework provided in legislation for the growth of institutions, at the training schemes, at the financial arrangements, at the inter-ministerial concord over action, and at the spirit of confidence and local pride spreading among African men and women, have we not good grounds for believing that one day our Rhodesian brand of Community Development will attract world attention and our local governments will learn to collaborate in a plural society? There is a *vital condition* to this hope - that those who handle the Community Development aspect realise that they are not, like engineers *building* things, but, like farmers, are *growing* things.

It is the spirit of our people, not a constitution, which will determine the shape of things to come.

SUPPLEMENT No. 6. Minute to the Minister of Internal Affairs, 2.9.68, on Provincial Councils.

You asked me to examine the proposal to set up "provincial councils" on the lines of a European, a Mashona and a Matabele Council and the allocation of functions to such bodies.

I do so, as objectively as possible, as a problem of local government structure, but I start off by declaring my own bias - I believe that the mass or emotional vote should in time be abolished for both black and white; that the tiered system described in paras.104 to 108 of the Whaley Report offers the best future answer to Rhodesia's problems but I accept the arguments in para.108(c) and support in principle the conclusions reached in paras.111 to 113 where *for the present* the tiered system, except in attenuated form, is unacceptable.

Why are provincial councils to be established, for what purpose? This is the basic question. The simple answer is for a political purpose - to implement a paper constitution based on the belief that the European needs to and can preserve his heritage by separation of the races. To this end it is said councils must be established within five years, thus an artificial European thrust (despite lip service to the exclusion of "foreign" elements) takes preference over natural organic organisational growth from below; and, since the councils are racial, they are expected to operate on the unprecedented and abnormal basis of areas scattered amongst all three councils.

Even in South Africa which faces the same problem, the Tomlinson Commission was realistic enough to say, 'save for a few blocks like the Transkei the Bantu areas are so scattered that they form no foundation for community growth ... such fragmentation can result in nothing else than a supplementary growth attached to the European community', and went on to urge a policy of consolidation of Bantu areas because, 'their dispersion will make socio-economic development impossible'. So much for the social and economic aspects. From an administrative viewpoint this territorial criss-crossing of provincial powers, influences and responsibilities, with four Civil Services in operation, looks more like a plan for chaos. From the local

government - community development point of view there appears, superficially, to be little connection with these political contrivances until the question of Functions is examined.

It is comparatively easy to set up the Form, the statutory body. Trouble arises when the formal body is required to do something more than talk. When political objectives are dominant the immense question of Functions is usually ignored, minimised or concealed in such a meaningless phrase as 'responsibility for matters directly affecting Africans'. There are many lessons to be learned from British Colonial attempts to set up political bodies of the nature of the present proposals.

Devolution of power from a centre to provincial levels may be either administrative or political, executive decisions or policy decisions. If it is both, as I assume is the intention for provincial councils, then they become part of the structure of Local Government and it becomes imperative to define and allocate distinct and exclusive fields of power, functions and jurisdiction among the local government tiers. This means not only a precise division of a wide range of services provided or not provided by Central Government Ministries, but also-

- (a) a defined, threefold division of powers of taxation, rates and fees among central, provincial and local bodies,
- (b) defined shares of revenue and loan funds raised by the national body.

As regards services it is impossible to say precisely where Central Government leaves off and local government begins and in any case the nature of any service is always changing and requires re-assessment. An exercise lasting 10 months has just been completed whereby a division of functions between Central Government and Rural or African Councils has been approved in a Prime Minister's Circular. If provincial councils are introduced and they are not to be simply "talking shops" which become irresponsible because they have no responsibilities, inevitably functions for them will be sought either from Government or the existing local councils.

If one examines the services and functions allocated to African Councils it is difficult not to conclude that they properly belong to the "local" tier and that to take them away and vest them, either for expediency or efficiency, in an upper tier (an artificial remote tier) would be to sound the death knell of genuine organic local government and communal responsibilities. For instance, primary education generates an intense communal interest, pride and motive

power for community organisation, and its responsibilities for day to day operations, stores, supplies, records, etc. must be local, so if such a service was removed to a provincial tier resentment, withdrawal of participation and collapse of the council would be probable consequences.

Presumably we wish to avoid what usually happens in the tiered system, the two tiers trying to share the same service but at different levels, a double complement of staff or shared staff with all the evils of divided loyalties and responsibilities.

Our African councils have generally been found to be operating too high up or remote from the people. We have been encouraging the emergence of Community Boards, a kind of informal, interest-spreading, indigenous tier. Community development policy stresses a downward movement, deeper roots for councils, not the opposite movement upwards to a third tier of provincial councils. Provincial councils, because they will be premature and rootless, hollow bodies, will only function under external imposition from officials and are therefore the very antithesis of community development.

As regards assigning functions from Central Government to provincial councils, the notion that a criterion of "matters directly affecting Africans" or a list of statutes specifically applied to Africans offers a means of division, is inadequate. The fact is that all affairs are African affairs and the Whaley finding in paragraph 101 has my full support.

Just because they have similar colouring is no good reason for assuming Chief Mabigwa and Chief Wankie wish or will be able to "integrate" in a Matabele Council and assess each other's needs impartially. I recall a Central African council where two chiefs, who were tabooed from seeing each other, were supposed to make council plans with a screen between them! Fictitious unities created by such terms as "Mashona" and "Matabele" do not wipe out tribal antipathies and incompatibilities, and these become decisive when plans and operations depend on combined participation and solidarity.

Finances

If division of functions is difficult it cannot compare with the complications of carving out fields of revenue raising and the sharing out of national financial resources among competitive bodies.

This problem is intractable because in a small country with a widely scattered population, the great bulk of which is an underdeveloped peasantry, there is no

means of measuring capacity to pay, no basis for revenue allocations, no formula for fair and reasonable division.

Great financial authorities like Phillipson on Nigeria and Marshall on the Sudan, concluded that it would be a gross disservice to such countries to introduce such problems by a tier system and have pointed out that by their nature these fiscal issues are a source of endless suspicion, recrimination and friction between tiers and their component bodies. When such financial frictions and potential accusations are tied to racial and tribal emotions the outlook is grim.

Nothing has been said as to what taxable resources will be made available to provincial councils, nor how they would collect. Since they could hardly collect directly they would have to do so indirectly either by relying on District Commissioners as tax collectors, or by precept on the lower tier or by appropriating a percentage of the revenue of African or Rural Councils. Any way is fraught with vicious repercussions.

It may be taken for granted that the revenues of the two African provincial councils and the lower tier will fall short of their expenditure needs, so a system of central grants in aid will be inescapable. The normal division is between central and local government where a fairly practicable allocation of financial responsibilities and resources has evolved. However, when a third party, in the form of provincial councils with highly disparate populations, natural resources and industrial capacity is intruded immense difficulties are created. How much each "province" is to get is arguable enough without conceiving of a province as a conglomerate of small isolated territorial units. Is the provincial body to be regarded as a kind of racial projection of central Government to which all grants will be paid for distribution to subordinate local government bodies below? Or will it be a kind of larger local authority, with all councils enjoying autonomy and direct financial relationships with central government.

Conclusion

In Rhodesia we have tried to follow the English Local Government Boundary Commission's conclusion that, 'The general aim should be to make the administration of local government service as local as is compatible with securing an effective service. It is of first importance if local interest is to be preserved and encouraged and full use made of local knowledge. As the unit becomes larger the element of public control (.) tends to diminish and to be replaced by officialdom'. This is the danger of provincial bodies and the Prime

Minister's Directive of July 1965 lays down 'that at district level Government's *primary purpose* is local self-government'.

I think that the evidence requires a rejection of the proposals because -

- (i) they are impracticable;
- (ii) Community Development will be frustrated and with it economic growth inhibited in Tribal areas;
- (iii) inextricable administrative and financial tangles will be created;
- (iv) unnecessary ill-feeling and hostilities will be manufactured or aggravated.

SUPPLEMENT No.7. Minute to Minister of Internal Affairs, 11.3.69. Provincialisation.

Cabinet, at its meeting on 13 January 1969 decided to call upon all Ministers to submit details of functions which justified devolution from Central Government to proposed provincial councils.

I am a member of Working Party No.2 Provincial Government, which framed the questions which gave rise to this issue, and also other questions, including the nature or composition of the provincial councils which would be responsible for the functions.

The Working Party, assuming that the provincial body would be a genuinely representative, responsible local government creature of the central national government, and also assuming that no existing functions vested in African Rural or Urban local authorities would be removed, came to the conclusion that the number of functions which could be devolved was negligible (as did the Whaley Commission).

Of course if the provincial bodies contemplated are to be no more than a facade, a sham, and so governed that Government nominees or officials are the real decision-makers and power-holders, then it does not really matter so much what functions are devolved. In that event the real problems shift to such matters as the effects on national life of introducing a middle tier of nominal, irresponsible "post boxes" between central and local governmental bodies, and whether any "educational influence" can be expected from such an arrangement (the arrangement was a familiar one in British Colonial Territories - all I ever learned from it was 'do not copy').

Since a study of the facts and experience elsewhere suggests to me that it is neither wise nor workable to split up functions and apportion them out to politically created bodies (I gave you my views in September 1968), I referred this subject to Messrs. Powell, Barlow and Leach who are on record as being in favour of provincialisation.


To my surprise they were opposed to handing over the statutory functions

covered by "African Affairs" in Volume II of the Statutes ("African affairs or interest" is the usual slogan offered as a solution) and made the following suggestions provided there was adequate official European representation on the African Provincial Councils -

- (i) Tribal Courts: certain delegated powers such as approval of the Estimates.
- (ii) Tribal Land Authorities: consideration and coordination of by-laws prior to submission to Minister.
- (iii) Councils: coordination of activities of all councils, approval of their Estimates and control of grants.
- (iv) Forestry: coordination of afforestation plans from councils.
- (v) Agriculture: provision of African representatives for Natural Resources Board, Grain Marketing, etc., and submission of schemes to the Tribal Trust Lands Development Corporation.
- (vi) Health: programming of health activities of councils and financial control, also training facilities.
- (vii) African Education: coordination of council activities.
- (viii) Roads: coordination, planning and financing of road work undertaken by councils, and recommendations to Road Service.
- (ix) Audit: provision of audit services for councils.
- (x) Social Welfare: provision and financing of all services.
- (xi) Development of rural and home industries including marketing.
- (xii) Licence Control Act: administration of.
- (xiii) Taxation: possible fields are cattle, beer, land use, personal tax, and should exclude income tax, customs, excise and mining royalties: provincial taxation would be to augment grants to councils.

I refrain from comment except to suggest that if "interference in" be

substituted for "coordination of" a more realistic picture tends to appear of the probably *acid* relations between the supra-tribal provincial body and the jealously autonomous tribal bodies below ("acid" meaning to turn sour or neutralise the influence of).



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