

CAMBRIDGE AFRICAN MONOGRAPHS 15

UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE
AFRICAN STUDIES CENTRE



NANDI RESISTANCE TO BRITISH RULE

The Volcano Erupts



A. T. Matson

INTRODUCTION

'Mat' was one of the last of the distinguished line of colonial administrator-scholars who have contributed so much to our knowledge of East Africa's history. Their work in the early years of this century has preserved much African knowledge that would otherwise have been lost. I can also speak for many later academic researchers in recording my gratitude to Mat, in particular, for invaluable assistance in suggesting oral and archival sources, for his gift of enthusiasm for the past and for the warm hospitality that he and his wife Betty gave to all scholars, Kenyan and expatriate, who came to their door.

Mat had no formal training as an historian. He made up for that in his experience as an official. He had no affection for grand theories of causation but infinite sympathy for the tribulations of 'men on the spot', African and British. He was fascinated by detail, and the detail of imperial conquest matters. He knew what it took to run a government station, how many days it took for the mails to get through, how to ration a column of men, about the wiles of informers, the nervous furies of isolation and ignorance, the intrigues of ambition. The wars of Kenya's conquest, even its largest conflicts, the wars of Nandi (and Turkana) resistance, were all small wars; individual decisions and indecisions counted; Mat could think his way into them. On the British side, this was possible only by an immense labour in scattered archives that told him not only where individual officials were, what they knew (and more often, did not know) at the time, and what they thought. On the Nandi side he had the inestimable boon, equally hard won, of the personal trust confided in him by the last survivors of the Kablelach age-set who as young warriors had first charged the British, losing one hundred of their comrades dead, at the battle of the Kimondi River in 1895.

It has nonetheless to be said that, however much *Chepkendi*, as Mat was known, clearly 'kept faith with his friends' (*Nandi Resistance* vol. I, Preface), we cannot learn from this volume as much about Nandi decisions as we can about the British. This was partly because of the way Mat collected his oral information. His knowledge was deep and general rather than specific. As he explains in his Preface here, he discussed the past with many people over more than a decade; he did not lean on the memory of a few key informants, as the grant-dependent research student must. While therefore we cannot find here either the illumination of individual reminiscence or the cross-comparison of alternative oral traditions that we would expect from a professional historian, we can nonetheless take on trust the deductions about Nandi motive that Mat felt able to make.

Mat's work will survive as an unimpeachable source for those who come after. His facts are cast-iron, hard-wrought, while historical theory is often the short-lived victim of intellectual fashion or political self-interest. No scholar will ever know more about the Nandi wars than Mat did, nor, now, can any Nandi. Both the Nandi of the future and future students from all parts of the world will first have to learn all that Mat can tell them before they can dare to reach historical judgments of their own. That is why the Managers of the African Studies Centre at the University of Cambridge are glad to be able to publish this study, now made available by the devoted editorial labour of Patricia and Donald Simpson.

John Lonsdale
Trinity College
Cambridge

August 1993

FOREWORD

Albert Thomas Matson, 'Mat' to his many friends, was born at Sipson in Middlesex in 1915, and educated at Southall Grammar School before joining the Royal Army Medical Corps in 1939. In 1944 he was seconded to the Colonial Service in Kenya as a Health Inspector. After serving in Kisii, he was transferred to Nandi District in 1949, and remained there until his retirement fourteen years later.

His interest in Kenyan History arose from a request from Senior Chief Elijah arap Chepkwony and his colleagues of the Nandi District Council that the history of their people should be written. Mat responded to their request by undertaking research into oral history in the course of his travels as a Health Inspector, and by consulting and copying a great range of archival sources, official and personal, in Britain and East Africa. Though never losing sight of his central purpose, he acquired a wide knowledge of many other aspects of east African history, which formed the basis of nearly forty articles contributed to the *Kenya Weekly News*, as well as items published in other periodicals. He retired at the age of 48 to concentrate on his writing, and made his home at Seaford in Sussex. The first volume of *Nandi Resistance to British Rule* was published in East Africa in 1972; the second volume is now published, but the final volume, carrying the story down to 1906, was never written owing to Mat's suffering a stroke in 1981, and though he courageously resumed his extensive correspondence by typing, he realised that he could no longer undertake sustained and detailed work. He therefore decided to place his large accumulation of transcripts, memoranda, correspondence and unpublished articles in institutions where they would be accessible to scholars, and his collection of 68 boxes of papers was distributed in this way by Dr Anne Thurston, either to bodies in England or, where there was duplication, to the Kenya Archives, which also received microfilms of items whose originals remained in England. He later transferred his magnificent collection of books and pamphlets on East Africa to Kenya, to form the basis of the Library of Moi University. Finally he prepared a detailed bibliography of his own writings, published in *African Research and Documentation* No 42 in 1986. In 1983 he was very gratified to be awarded the degree of Doctor of Literature (Honoris Causa) by the University of Nairobi, though his health did not allow him to receive it personally. He died at Seaford on 16 September 1987.

In an age of professional Africanists, Mat was in a great tradition of dedicated amateurs (in the true sense) and his meticulous scholarship and generous sharing of his knowledge was valued by many British scholars. However, he was not only admired for his scholarship but loved for his warm humanity, wise counsel, courage and humour. It was a source of regret to many that, though set in type, the second volume of *Nandi Resistance to British Rule* was not published in his lifetime; it has now been reset from the proof meticulously corrected by Charles Richards, O.B.E., in 1984; no attempt has been made to amend the text or references, including those to a projected third volume. Some obvious errors have been corrected, but a few possible inconsistencies present in the original typescript appear in the form left by Mat. Unfortunately it has not been possible to provide an index. The value of the book as a contribution to scholarship is indicated by Dr John Lonsdale in his Introduction. We are indebted to him, to Dr Keith Hart, and the Managers of the African Studies Centre in Cambridge for arranging for this publication, and to many friends of Mat's - particularly Dick Cashmore, John Rowe, and Alan Bell (who arranged a grant from the Bodleian Library towards production costs) - for their help and encouragement in various ways. We are grateful to Mat's niece, Mrs Mollie Palmer, for assigning the copyright of this work to the Cambridge Centre.

Above all we wish to pay tribute to Betty Matson, whose generous contribution made the resetting of this book possible, and whose devotion to Mat in his lifetime, and her concern that his work should not be lost, has ensured that this volume should be published. Mat dedicated it "To Betty" and since, sadly, she has not lived to see its fruition, her friends would like to dedicate it to her memory.

Donald Simpson

October 1993

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

This volume continues the story of the way the Nandi struggled to free themselves from colonial control, and describes the methods used by the government to overcome their resistance to alien rule. The importance of detail in relating the events of the pacification period has been stressed by Dame Margery Perham, who observed that a more balanced view of the imposition of British rule would only be possible after a close study of administrative policies, and an analysis of the impulses behind the incidents of resistance (Harlow, Chilver and Smith (eds.) *History of East Africa*, II, pp. xx, xxi). An effort has been made to provide such a study and also to rationalise the thoughts and feelings of the Nandi on the events described. The latter much more difficult task has been undertaken in the light of discussions with Nandi elders on particular incidents, and of deductions formed as a result of my lengthy association with the people. If Nandi sources are not documented in a more acceptable manner, this is because of the way they were collected, and the fact that very few of the items came from one informant. It seemed cumbersome to burden the footnotes and references with lists of informants' names, and invidious to attribute information from several people to a single source.

In addition to those mentioned in the Preface to the first volume, I am indebted to Sir Malcolm Henderson, Sir Algernon Rumbold, G.H. Hodges, Brother A. Koning, E. Rodwell, Hon. Taita arap Towett, R. Waller, Rev D. Weekes, M. Wright, and Drs J. Barber, J. Casada, A. Clayton, W. Foster, P. Fry, J. Rowe and M. Twaddle; also to Professor Oliver's *Sir Harry Johnston and the Scramble for Africa*, and reviewers of the first volume for their helpful comments on content, analysis and presentation.

A.T. Matson
1982

The author fell sick between the completion and projected publication of the manuscript in 1984, when he wished to record his gratitude to Charles Granston Richards without whose kindness and help publication would not have been possible.

It is hoped that the notes deposited in Rhodes House will be used by another writer to continue the story of Nandi resistance to 1906.

NOTES ON SPELLING AND ABBREVIATIONS

In order to avoid confusion between quoted passages and the text, tribal names are generally written in the form commonly used at the turn of the century. In most cases the correct name is given in brackets after the first entry: for example, Lumbwa (Kipsigis). Use of the misnomer, 'Kavirondo', calls for special comment. It has been retained for the reason given above; also because the district was officially designated Kavirondo in the 1890s, and because it is often impossible to determine whether the word, when applied to tribes in the district, refers to the Baluyia, Luo, or to both peoples. After the Port Ugowe station was established in July 1899, it is easier to distinguish between the two tribes, and this has been done whenever possible. Place names are given in their present-day form with the exception of Kisumu. Although Port Ugowe was officially re-named by Sir Harry Johnston in March 1900, Kisumu was not in general use until the end of the year. Titles, rank and initials are given when a person is first mentioned but not otherwise, unless their omission would lead to confusion.

The following abbreviations are used in the references and occasionally in the text:

AD	Ainsworth's Diary
B.C.A.	British Central Africa Protectorate
CEUR	Chief Engineer, Uganda Railway
Cmd.	Command (Parliamentary) Paper
CMI	Church Missionary Intelligencer
C.M.S.	Church Missionary Society
CO	Colonial Office
COCP	Colonial Office Confidential Print
Com.	Commissioner (Special, Acting, Deputy)
EAISR	East African (Makerere) Institute of Social Research (University of East Africa Social Sciences Council Conference)
E.A.P.	East Africa Protectorate
ESA	Entebbe Secretariat Archives (Uganda National Archives)
FO	Foreign Office
FOCP	Foreign Office Confidential Print
G.E.A.	German East Africa
HD	Henderson's Diary
I.B.E.A.	Imperial British East Africa Company
IJAHS	International Journal of African Historical Studies
JEAUNHS	Journal, East Africa and Uganda Natural History Society
JRAS	Journal, (Royal) African Society
JRGS	Journal (and Proceedings), Royal Geographical Society
K.A.R.	King's African Rifles
KNA	Kenya National Archives
KWN	Kenya Weekly News
Msa. Arch.	Mombasa Archives (Kenya National Archives)
NCB	Nandi Station Cash Book
pte.	Private letter
PUD	Port Ugowe Diary
R.G.Q.	Royal Garhwali Quarterly
RL	Rumbold Letters and Diaries
RSD	Ravine Station Diary
tele.	Telegram
Treas.	British Treasury
UCN/HD-RPA	University (College) of Nairobi Research Project Archives

UJ	Uganda Journal
URC	Uganda Railway Committee
WOID	War Office Intelligence Division
WP	Whitehouse Papers
ZG	Zanzibar Gazette

Passages in the first volume, published by East African Publishing House, Nairobi, are referenced as *NRBR* i, and in this volume as *NRBR* ii.

References to dispatches are usually from Foreign Office Confidential Prints (FOCP), copies of which are to be found in the Entebbe Secretariat Archives. FO2 and other Public Record Office files are cited when they contain papers and minutes which were not printed.

CHAPTER 1

Roads and forts

There were no signs that the Nandi contemplated challenging the government when Ernest Berkeley went home at the end of April 1899, and his deputy, Colonel Trevor Terman, Commandant of the Uganda Rifles, became Acting Commissioner of the Uganda Protectorate. Three decisions had, however, been taken before Berkeley's departure which might cause the Nandi to consider changing their attitude of passive resistance to one of active hostility. When arrangements were put into effect for realigning the railway down the Nyando Valley, transporting loads for the steamship *William Mackinnon* by the direct route over the Mau, and installing the temporary telegraph near the proposed line for the railway, the hitherto untouched southern and Tinderet sections might be provoked into acting in combination with their Lumbwa (Kipsigis) kinsmen, if their interests were threatened by interference with normal tribal pursuits. Furthermore, other commitments had prevented the deployment of sufficient forces in the Eastern Province to provide escorts for mail-runners, and the growing number of small, lightly-armed private caravans using the Uganda Road. Freedom from Nandi aggression for several months had led to a slackening of security procedures, with the result that opportunities for easy successes would not be lacking if hostilities were resumed against ill-disciplined and poorly-supervised transport caravans,¹ and small government parties.

No incidents occurred during May. J.P. Wilson, the Collector at Kipture, supplied Ravine with only 1,400 lb. of food, most of which must have come from Kavirondo since none of the Nandi chiefs received a present. The Uganda Transport Department's Veterinary Officer, R.J. Stordy, reported that pleuro-pneumonia had died out in Nandi and that cattle exchanges could safely be resumed. No transactions were carried out, however, although the Transport Department was so desperately short of draught animals that its local representative, Captain T.P. Johnson, suggested that females should be sent from Buddu to be exchanged for Nandi and Kavirondo oxen.² Pairs of mail-runners carried messages along Sclater's Road, and between survey bivouacs in the Nyando Valley and the railway's base camp at Ravine. Survey operations also continued without opposition and by the end of the month, when J.W. Blackett's teams were 52 miles from Mau Summit and well into Nandi territory, Wilson was burdened with an added responsibility, since he was answerable for their safety. At Kipture the two Uasin Gishu Masai (Uas Nkishu Maasai) herdsmen were replaced by local tribesmen, the first recorded instance of Nandi being persuaded to undertake regular government employment. Although this was a promising development³ after four years of Protectorate administration, any hopes Wilson may have had of fostering closer relations with the Kipture sections had to be deferred when a sick man, left at the fort by a caravan from Kampala, developed smallpox.^A

Later in the month the Nandi had other disturbing evidence of the risks they ran as a result of Sclater's Road. The huge caravan of Basoga, which William Grant had taken down in March with the Baluchi Regiment's baggage, travelled home in a stricken condition as a result of an outbreak of dysentery at the railhead camp at Kiu. Over 1,400 men died during the return journey to Luba's despite the efforts that were made to provide the caravan with medical care. In addition to help provided by E.A.P. doctors, a settler from Fort Smith, Dr. H.A. Boedeker, was pressed into service with the caravan from the River Athi, and Johnson's carts were commandeered to carry the sick. Even with this assistance it was impossible for Grant to control the thousands of men in his charge, and the disease spread along the road in the caravan's wake. Although parties were sent out from the road stations to bury the corpses, many were left lying on the more distant parts of the track. Grant's caravan was followed by 1,400 Baganda and Basoga under James Wallace, who lost 46 porters between Ravine and Mumias.^B Warriors manning the look-out posts in Nandi also witnessed the passage along Sclater's Road of two political prisoners, Mwanga and Kabarega, who were being escorted by Indian soldiers to the coast and exile. The Nandi had no conception of the importance of these formerly powerful potentates, and consequently could not envisage the effect their overthrow might have on the Eastern Province.

Berkeley had foreseen in March 1899 that a new station would be needed when the

railway reached Ugowe (Winam) Bay and, shortly after the Commissioner's departure, Major A.H. Coles, O.C., Road Military District, was instructed to select sites for military posts near the terminus and at two places along the railway route. C.W. Hobley, the Sub-commissioner at Mumias, who had persuaded Berkeley to include a 'South Kavirondo' station at Kitoto's in the 1899-1900 estimates, welcomed the proposal and provided porters for Coles' reconnaissance.⁴ If a passable track down the Nyando Valley could be found, Ternan planned to abandon the western section of the Uganda Road in favour of the direct route from rail-head to Lake Victoria. As a temporary measure, all Uganda-bound loads were to be re-routed from Kipture to Ugowe Bay instead of along Sclater's Road. This diversion would save caravans 45 miles (four days), and also reduce expenditure through staff adjustments at the existing intermediate posts at Kakamega and Mumias, and by closure of the terminal station at Port Victoria (Bunyala).^c Before these interim arrangements could be put into effect, a subsidiary post would be needed in south-west Nandi, an accommodation would have to be sought with the leaders in its vicinity, and the southern sections brought into closer touch with the administration.

Coles established a military post at the head of Ugowe Bay on 13 June. Sited on a small inlet on the north shore, near the camp of the engineers who were assembling the *William Mackinnon*, the post was intended to serve as a temporary fort until the exact location of the railway terminus had been settled. Hobley was instructed to establish a civil station and food market nearby; and his initiative in detaining artisans and porters bound for Kampala was approved by Ternan, who directed that building should begin at once even though Foreign Office approval of the 1899-1900 estimates⁵ had not been received.^d

In the meantime Johnson had reconnoitred a route from Kipture to Ugowe Bay which could be made passable for carts, except for the escarpment section which would have to be worked by porters and pack animals. He proposed putting a European subordinate in charge of a depot at the terminus of the plateau section to supervise the unloading of consignments delivered by cart convoys, and the conveyance of their loads to the bottom of the escarpment. Johnson anticipated that ox-carts could be used on the Kano Plains throughout the dry season, and hoped the Luo porters could be recruited to take their place during the rains. Coles agreed to provide a garrison for the escarpment post, which was to be built among sections who had earned a reputation for 'bad characters in the past', and 'whose bearing had been somewhat threatening' during the road reconnaissance. Luo chiefs promised to supply labourers for rock clearing, drainage work and drift construction on the plains, and to help build a bridge over the River Aketch. Johnson was confident he could carry out the work with local resources and fifty Swahili labourers, but asked for additional funds as his estimates had not been framed to cover this unforeseen expenditure. He also recommended that a depot should be set up at Ugowe Bay, so that the Transport Officer in charge could co-ordinate the movements of the carts, porters and pack animals on the plains with the cart convoys on the Nandi Plateau.^e

Ternan approved Johnson's suggestions provided they could be implemented without undue expense, and transferred Archibald Brown to Ugowe Bay from Mumias, where his services as Transport Officer would no longer be required when the Kavirondo headquarters ceased to be a major road station. Dr A.D. Mackinnon, Director of Uganda Transport, concurred with the arrangements, but warned that extra money would be required for porters on the Kipture-Ugowe Bay route until the direct road down the Nyando Valley had been made suitable for carts.

There was also the likelihood that porters would still be needed to carry loads to Mumias and Kampala, as the successful operation of Ternan's scheme depended on the number of load-carrying craft that could be pressed into service. Despite the 120 loads which the government's sailing boat had been collecting three times a month from Port Victoria (Bunyala), and the consignments shipped in privately-owned dhows and Busoga and Buganda canoes, a considerable number of the 1,200 loads the administration required every month were being carried overland to Kampala. Mackinnon surmised that shipping arrangements would prove even more inadequate at Ugowe Bay, which was visited by lake-going canoes far less frequently than Port Victoria.^f

After handing over the Ugowe Bay post to Lieutenant C.E. Pereira and a small garrison of Sudanese from Mumias, Coles marched up the Nyando Valley to select the sites for the two intermediate stations on the railway route.⁶ Beyond Kitoto's he found that the

country was uninhabited in the vicinity of the path, but noted a certain amount of cultivation on the Nandi hills to the north of his route. The railway parties told him they rarely met anybody on the road, though friendly Nandi and Dorobo occasionally brought in honey to sell at the survey camps.^G

By the end of June survey teams had completed their work to a point seventy-eight miles west of Mau Summit. Before leaving Ugowe Bay to fetch 300 *William Mackinnon* loads from Molo, Richard Grant had reported that timber suitable for making launching ways for the steamer could not be obtained in the neighbourhood. Hobley proposed sending a carpenter to Busoga to cut trees, which could be formed into a raft and towed to Ugowe Bay by steam-launch. This suggests that Hobley was either unaware that several suitable hardwood species grew on the south Nandi escarpment, or that he considered it unwise to send men into the forests to cut them. Ternan did not question the reason for Hobley's proposal, but merely noted that both launches⁷ were out of order and canoes might be used instead.^H

The inauguration of a fortnightly mail service between Kampala and the Eastern Province reduced the need for special runners, whose numbers had increased considerably after the temporary telegraph reached Ravine in April 1899.⁸ Nandi had rarely been employed on this service in the past, but from June onwards warriors carrying flags as badges of office took messages from Kipture to Ravine. This indicated some improvement in relations with the Nandi, at least among sections living near the fort. It was only a beginning, however, since none of the chiefs was given a present during June. No food was purchased at Kipture, probably because stocks were running low in the weeks preceding the harvest; and no cattle transactions were carried out, presumably because of the lack of female stock⁹ for exchange purposes.^I

Food supplies throughout the region gave cause for alarm because Kakamega and Kipture could not buy sufficient to send to Ravine. Naivasha was unable to make good the deficiency, or even to supply its own needs, owing to widespread famine in the E.A.P.^J Private caravans suffered most from the shortage, especially those fited out by Baganda chiefs and John Gemmill. Basoga and Baganda in Gemmill's caravan straggled along the road without food or supervision after its leader, Oscar Smith, was detained by sickness at Ravine; five of the porters crawled into Kipture in a state of collapse and thirty were left dead by the roadside.^K As a result of the heavy mortality occurring in Grant's, Wallace's and Gemmill's caravans, an embargo was placed on the employment of Basoga and Baganda porters east of Mumias. Supplementary regulations were promulgated to safeguard the welfare of caravan employees, and F.W. Isaac was deputed to see that the regulations were observed.^L In order to reduce the demands that loads of trade goods made upon carrying power, Ternan indented on the coast for specie to the value of Rs.100,000. He also devised an ambitious scheme for cultivating wheat and other exotic commodities consumed by Indian troops. Indents for various seeds were sent to the coast, and all the road stations were ordered to send locally grown wheat for planting trials in Buganda.^M Recruitment of Swahilis at the Mombasa depot was stopped in order to reduce the amount of imported food supplied to African soldiers, and instructions were issued for bananas and sweet potatoes to be planted in readiness for the Baganda companies which Ternan proposed to form for service in the Eastern Province. The decision to replace Swahilis by Baganda was also influenced by the favourable impression created by the recently formed III (Baganda) Company during the Buddu operations in February 1899, and by the military aptitude displayed by Semei Kakungulu's levies in the defeat and capture of Mwanga and Kabarega in Bukedi.^N

During his six months' service at Kipture, J.P. Wilson had done little to break down Nandi indifference to his presence. He had however carried out his principal task of ensuring the safety of Kipture and the unimpeded passage of loads along the Uganda Road. When he handed over his administrative responsibilities to the garrison commander, Captain R. Cooper, on 12 June, the district was quiet and there had been some improvement in relations between the tribe and station.¹⁰ Pointing out that at one time there had been two civil and two military officers at Kipture, Cooper reported that he had had to ask Sergeant W. Murphy to keep the station books and render the complicated returns required by Entebbe, until he could be relieved by one of the clerks who were shortly expected from the coast.^O

Cooper's dual appointment was forced upon Ternan because of the shortage of district officers which had been brought about by resignations, leaves, invaliding and deaths, and the

growing number of officials engaged on headquarters and departmental duties. Out of a total of 26 administrative officers sanctioned in the estimates, two had died, four had resigned, two had been invalided home and five were on leave. The Foreign Office directed that leave applications should be rejected unless the applicant could be released without detriment to the public service, and the Treasury agreed to pay 'overlapping' salaries so that replacements could be sent out before retiring officers stopped drawing leave pay. Captain E. Gorges' success in a similar role at Naivasha provided a precedent for Cooper's appointment, which was moreover in keeping with Ternan's views about the amount of money that should be allocated to the unproductive road districts. He also thought that soldiers acting as Collectors in the Naivasha, Nandi, Bunyoro and Nile Districts would free district officers for service 'at other posts where the work is of a more pronounced administrative type', and even questioned whether it was wise to 'waste money in trying to administer uninhabited regions on the road'.^P Although dual appointments were satisfactory under 'frontier' conditions, they had two disadvantages as far as Nandi was concerned. No matter what administrative ability and experience Cooper might possess, he would be inclined to regard his duties primarily from a military standpoint; and it was unlikely that a solitary military officer would have either the time or disposition to initiate administrative measures similar to those which Hobley had successfully introduced in parts of the Kavirondo District. Ternan's arrangements for administering Nandi showed that government policy remained the same as it had been in December 1898, when Colonel W.A. Broome of the Twenty-seventh Baluchis described Kipture as 'merely a fort on the lines of communication'.

Cooper's appointment coincided with a series of events on the western confines of the district which suggested that the Kakamega and Nandi near Slater's Road were becoming restless. When half of XIV Company was on its way from Kavirondo to reinforce VII Company at Kipture on 10 June, one of the soldiers lagged behind his comrades and was speared eight miles east of the Kakamega food post at Kivini's. Shortly afterwards a party of Kakamega spent the night in a Nandi village where they had exchanged a heifer for two of their host's bullocks. After leaving the village, the Kakamega met a detachment commanded by an African sergeant,¹¹ who accused two of them of murdering the soldier who was killed on the tenth. Although the accused denied the charge and stated their business, they were seized and in the ensuing scuffle a spear was thrown. The two alleged offenders were taken before Emil Lund,¹² the transport clerk at the Kakamega food depot, who sent them with an escort of two riflemen to Kipture. During the journey the escorting soldiers were killed near Campi ya Asali and the prisoners disappeared.

The incidents were reported to Hobley by Cooper, who also summoned the Nandi chiefs living near the scene of the murders to Kipture. Limaton and a sub-chief, Kitoi, who were said to control the area between Kakamega and Campi ya Mawe, answered the summons. While admitting he had known of the first murder before the arrival of Cooper's messengers, Limaton insisted that Kakamega living near the food post were the culprits. He also brought in articles found near the bodies of the two murdered soldiers, which seemed to Cooper to prove that Kivini's Kakamega were responsible for the attack on the escort party. Limaton denied all knowledge of the affray with the sergeant's detachment, but declared that some of Kivini's men had been seen in the neighbourhood the day it occurred. Both Nandi chiefs promised to keep the road clear and post men to watch the section traversing their country, and were handed papers stating that they had offered to cooperate in this way.^Q

When he learned that Cooper had persuaded Coles to agree to send punitive columns into Kakamega from Kipture and Mumias, Hobley decided to investigate the conflicting accounts he had received about the incidents.¹³ As a result of these enquiries, he thought the first murder had probably occurred because the victim had tried to seize a bundle of sweet potatoes the murderer was carrying. Hobley's informants denied any responsibility for the outrage, which some of them attributed to the 'Wakaware' Nandi living near the Kakamega border. One version of the second murder was that a Nandi chief, Kibutei or Kabwoita, had recognised the two Kakamega prisoners as old friends, and had killed the soldiers when they refused to give them up. This explanation rested on reports that Kibutei had been seen wearing part of the soldiers' uniforms, and had shaved his hair in a fashion indicating that he had recently killed an enemy. Support for this explanation also came from one of Hobley's headmen, who heard a similar account when buying food in Tiriki. A second version was that the prisoners - a boy about fourteen years' old and an infirm old man from Kivini's section,

which 'had been uniformly loyal to the Administration since the road opened' - had effected their escape themselves. Kivini recaptured the small boy, who was sent off to Kipture with four riflemen to whom he gave the slip when only a short distance from the Kakamega store. When they reported their misadventure to Lund, the soldiers claimed that the prisoner had made his escape while they were being attacked by a force of 400 warriors. Kivini's men could find no evidence of a fight when they visited the scene of the alleged attack, so Hobley treated the soldiers' account as an attempt to excuse their negligence, or even to cover up their part in the murder of the prisoner in their charge. The two rifles that had been lost when the soldiers of the first escort party were murdered were returned by a Nandi named Manuni, who said the escaped prisoners had shown him where they had hidden them. Hobley ordered a search to be made for the missing prisoners so that they could be questioned about the incidents, and concluded that nothing had so far been proved to incriminate the Kakamega or to suggest they were becoming restless.^R

Before leaving Mumias to build the administrative station at Ugowe Bay, Hobley advised Ternan against sanctioning punitive measures, because the food supply for Kipture and Ravine would be placed in jeopardy if military operations destroyed the ripening crops in Kakamega. Hobley was particularly anxious to avoid punitive measures at this time, because of the criticisms which Commander B. Whitehouse had made about earlier 'Government raids' in Kavirondo.¹⁴ Although he had no difficulty in refuting these allegations to the satisfaction of the Foreign Office and Uganda Railway Committee, Hobley was nonetheless nettled that such charges could be levelled against a senior officer who claimed, with some justification, that 'no man is more alive to the false policy of hastily proceeding to force the settlement of political questions than I, and upon no occasion have efforts been spared to settle matters amicably'.^S

Presumably as a result of Hobley's thorough investigation, Cooper changed his mind and agreed that punitive action was not justified. He surmised that the incidents had arisen out of private feuds between the local people and the Somalis of VII Company garrisoning the food post. Since the Kakamega had promised to give up the murderers, and parties travelling along Sclater's Road were not being molested by Kivini and his neighbours, Cooper acknowledged that the murders could not be regarded as symptomatic of general disaffection. This small episode illustrated the alacrity with which soldiers were inclined to recommend punishment for incidents before their causes were fully investigated.¹⁵ It also underlined the danger of placing a military officer in charge of such a politically difficult district as Nandi.^T

The reactions of the Nandi to these events showed a degree of willingness on the part of certain sections to cooperate with the Collector. Limaton and Kitoi had obeyed Cooper's summons to visit Kipture, where they agreed to act as accredited custodians over a section of Sclater's Road, and the stolen rifles had been returned by a Nandi, apparently without prompting or inducement. Presents were given to Limaton and a chief called Kibuli, but it did not escape Cooper's attention that Limaton had not thought it incumbent upon him to notify Kipture of the incidents that had occurred in his district, nor that the part played by Kibutei¹⁶ in the murder of the escort remained in doubt. Despite these misgivings, Cooper could rightly claim that he was the first district officer to establish personal relations with any of the chiefs on Sclater's Road beyond the Kimondi River, and to persuade two of them to give partial recognition to his authority.

The new route from Kipture to Ugowe Bay provided another chance for Cooper to get in touch with sections of the Nandi who had had few contacts with government officers.¹⁷ In view of the attitude of the chiefs during Johnson's road reconnaissance and their reputed truculence in the past, Cooper toured the escarpment area in order to investigate the security aspects of the proposed post. Apparently he did not meet any of the leaders during the tour but merely left messages asking them to visit him at Kipture in July. Noting that the country near the suggested site was more populous and cultivated than other parts of Nandi he had visited, Cooper was optimistic of feeding the post from local resources, and even of being able to buy grain for Kipture before crops in Kakamega were ready to harvest.^U

After studying Hobley's and Cooper's accounts of the incidents on the border in June, Ternan commented: 'I am sorry to say a series of wanton murders have lately occurred on the road between Nandi and Mumias - People merely apparently walking along being set upon and speared - bodies found in the road and robbed of everything - Reports so far not at all

clear - There will be no military expedition, but unless someone is hung for it, the murders will go on - It is difficult at present to spot the villages concerned - evidence conflicting - it's probably a band of young bloods amusing themselves - corner boys blooding their spears - Somebody will have to suffer - two men of the Uganda Rifles were murdered one day and one two days later - all at the same place on the track - The villages in the vicinity profess to be most friendly - but our black brethren are a sweet lot to deal with'. In view of the unsettled conditions revealed by the recent reports, Ternan asked the railway authorities to keep him informed about the movements of their employees in the Eastern Province,¹⁸ so that he could discharge his responsibility for ensuring their safety.^V

Before this request was received by G.C. Whitehouse, the Chief Engineer, a railway caravan of one hundred and thirty porters, which Richard Grant had sent from Molo to Ugowe Bay with steamer loads, was attacked on 10 July six miles west of Mau Summit. Two askaris were killed in the raid and their Snider rifles, ammunition and four loads carried off.¹⁹ Grant, who intended leaving for the Lake on the twelfth and was daily expecting the arrival of a caravan at Molo from the west, asked James Martin, the Collector at Ravine, to take reprisals against the culprits, whom Grant had identified as Nandi. Martin, who thought they must have been Lumbwa, wired that Cooper would deal with them, and warned Grant not to proceed with his caravan of one hundred and forty porters unless he could muster twenty-five rifles and five hundred rounds for its protection. As Martin could only supply eleven rifles and a few rounds, and Lieutenant R.R. Arbuthnot could only spare four riflemen from the Ravine garrison, Grant was advised to join forces with J.R. Baass, a railway engineer who was marching to Molo on his way to the Lake, or to apply to Naivasha for an escort. Grant chose to wait for Baass and their combined caravans passed safely through Nandi.^W

No redress was sought for the raid on the steamer caravan, which was the first hostile demonstration against the numerous railway parties which had been using the Nyando Valley route for nearly a year. The railway had advanced almost without hindrance in the E.A.P.²⁰ during this period, in which railhead reached Fort Smith and railway headquarters had been moved from Mombasa to Nairobi.^X In the Uganda Protectorate, Blackett was nearing the Lake with his survey lines and about to return to Mau Summit, in order to stake out the route through country in which a permanent military presence was shortly to be established. The raid on the steamer caravan provided a warning that the situation in the Nyando Valley might be changing, and a reminder²¹ that considerable reinforcements would probably be needed to safeguard railway interests in the Eastern Province.^Y Martin's force of forty-five riflemen had proved inadequate to undertake reprisals at Grant's behest, and Cooper was fully stretched in providing troops to protect Bushiri and the new route to Ugowe Bay. Without outside help, local officials could not contemplate taking retaliatory action against a poorly identified enemy in a distant and sparsely populated area, so the raid on the steamer caravan went unpunished. Grant's call for reprisals for an isolated outrage was not pressed by his superiors,²² who were possibly chary of provoking the Nandi and Lumbwa before sufficient troops were available to deal with the consequences.

Unless the raid proved to be a prelude to a series of incidents similar to those which had preceded the expeditions in 1895 and 1897, it was unlikely that the Eastern Province garrisons would be strengthened to any significant extent before the railway construction gangs crossed the Mau. Despite the resolution of the international crisis in the Nile Valley, and the deterrent effect of the quelling of the Sudanese mutiny and the deportation of Mwanga and Kabarega, the army of two thousand men had a number of urgent problems to attend to before law and order could be fully restored in Buganda and the neighbouring districts. Some of the troops were rounding up Sudanese remnants, while others were attempting to disperse Gabriel Kintu's 'brigand bands', who were harrying Buddu and the country bordering on German East Africa. But the major part of the army was engaged in bringing the Nile District under control, watching the movements of Belgian troops on Uganda's western frontier, and consolidating the victories gained over Banyoro and Baganda malcontents. Because of the strain imposed on the Uganda Rifles by these commitments, Ternan rebuked R.J. Macallister for undertaking punitive measures in Ankole, and threatened to abandon Mbarara station if the Collector could not control his district without assistance from headquarters. In another outlying district, Bukedi, the Acting Commissioner had no alternative but to entrust Kakungulu and his Baganda levies with the task of searching for

Sudanese mutineers, and of introducing some degree of order and administrative control in the country between Lango and Mount Elgon.^Z

The Nandi chiefs living near the Bushiri road responded to Cooper's summons to meet him at Kipture, and promised to sell food to caravans passing through their country. They also agreed to restrain their warriors from molesting the camps at the escarpment terminal and at an intermediate site called Campi Ishirini (Kaptumo). Meanwhile discussions and investigations were still taking place to determine the most suitable line for the new road. Cooper thought pack animals would have to be used from Kipture to Bushiri because Johnson's route would prove too difficult for carts. But the Transport Officer, who had already constructed a substantial bridge over the River Mogong, was confident that a passable cart road could be completed within a month. In the course of a reconnaissance from Ugowe Bay to the crest of the escarpment, Hobley discovered an elephant track up the Kibos Valley, which provided an easier ascent for pack donkeys than the Orobo route he had used in September 1896. He lost no time beginning a cart road from Ugowe Bay to connect with the Kibos route, and instructed Archibald Brown to bring fourteen carts from Mumias to work the plains section of the road.

Johnson, who had almost finished the road to Bushiri before he heard of Hobley's activities, began an investigation on 21 July of the Kibos route, which was abandoned after he had discussed its practicability with its sponsor. For the hazardous and exhausting four-mile journey on the escarpment face, Johnson decided to experiment with donkeys, and to maintain a reserve of porters to manhandle loads that were too heavy or bulky to be carried by pack animals.^{AA}

Early in July, Hobley established an administrative station close to Coles' temporary fort at Port Ugowe.²³ H.St.G. Galt was put in charge, and most of the staff and stores from his former station at Port Victoria were transferred to the new post. Hobley asked for additional funds for Port Ugowe commensurate with its future importance compared with the 'unpretentious outpost' which had been estimated for in 'South Kavirondo'. Foreseeing difficulties over food supplies because crop yields in the vicinity had been affected by lack of rain, Hobley asked Mumia, Odera Olalo of Gem, and other Kavirondo chiefs to build a cart road from Mumias so that food could be brought in to Port Ugowe from distant centres.^{BB} Originally conceived as preliminary steps in preparation for the launching of the *William Mackinnon*, the founding of Port Ugowe, and the consequent reorganisation of the transport system from railhead to the Lake, had far-reaching effects on administrative arrangements east of the Nile; Ravine, Mumias, Port Victoria and Kakamega declined in importance; the long deferred post at Kitoto's became unnecessary; and objections to moving the Busoga headquarters from the trans-shipment and ferry centre at Luba's to a central, inland site at Iganga lost much of their force.^{CC}

Because of its nearness to the Port Ugowe station, Nandi was transferred on 9 July from the Mau to the Kavirondo District. This adjustment was made because Ternan thought it would be 'much more convenient for working purposes and will save much correspondence and divided responsibility', and because co-ordination between Port Ugowe and Kipture was essential if caravans were to pass regularly and safely between the two stations.^{DD} Official convenience and the exigencies of the transport system were evidently of far greater moment than the advantages that had so far been derived from having all the eastern Kalenjin under a single administration. Ethnic considerations were disregarded by Ternan, who presumably had no misgivings about grouping the Nandi together with their traditional enemies, the Baluyia and Luo. The change also had the drawback from an administrative point of view of creating a 'divided responsibility' between two Sub-commissioners, if it became necessary to deal with disaffection occurring among the Lumbwa and Tindiret Nandi as a result of government activities in the Nyando Valley. This contingency was possibly overlooked because very little information had been received from Ravine about the attitude of the Lumbwa since their alleged participation in the abortive combination in 1897.²⁴ Only Martin, who had more experience of them than any officer in the Eastern Province at the time, seemed at all anxious about the possibility of a resurgence of hostility on their part. He had surmised that the warriors who attacked the steamer caravan were Lumbwa, and noted on 26 July that the Mau District headquarters at Ravine was in danger of attack by Lumbwa spearmen. Apparently the risk of a second combination between the Nandi and Lumbwa caused little apprehension at Entebbe, where the projected military posts in the Nyando Valley were presumably regarded

as a sufficient deterrent to belligerent elements in both tribes.

Another factor that possibly influenced Ternan's decision to transfer Nandi to Kavirondo was that no senior officer was available to fill the post of Sub-commissioner of the Mau District. Only three first class officials were serving in the Protectorate at the time, and one of these, George Wilson, had been ordered home from Kampala on medical grounds. F.J. Jackson, whose leave had been extended so that he could receive treatment for bilharzia, had been earmarked to return to his former station at Ravine, but George Wilson's illness forced Ternan to change his plans.²⁵ Jackson was to be posted to Kampala on his return from leave, so that Wilson's temporary relief, William Grant, could return to the Busoga District, over which he continued to exercise 'general supervision' while acting as Sub-commissioner for Buganda.^{EE}

By placing Nandi under the Sub-commissioner for Kavirondo, Ternan may have hoped that Hobley, who had often spoken disparagingly of his Kipture colleagues in the past, might be able to initiate in the new part of his district some of the policies he had successfully introduced in Kavirondo. When criticizing district officers at Kipture, Hobley had stressed their failure to gain the confidence of the people, with the result that unsettled conditions in Nandi hindered the progress of his own work at Mumias. As the Sub-commissioner strengthened his hold over Kavirondo, it was becoming increasingly galling for him to have requisitions made upon the resources of his district, in order to maintain a station among an unco-operative and virtually unadministered people for whom he had no responsibility.²⁶ It was, however, unlikely that the new arrangements would enable Hobley to effect any immediate change of policy in Nandi. Kavirondo would remain his chief concern, and when he assumed control of Nandi he was fully occupied in establishing himself at Port Ugowe. Nandi would have to be left for a time to the military officer at Kipture, whose reactions to the Kakamega border disturbances in June had given Hobley an opportunity to demonstrate the correct approach to such problems, and to stress his unwillingness to recommend punitive measures out of hand. The possibility of precipitate action still remained, however, because the retention of Kipture as headquarters of the Road Military District made rapid co-ordination between Hobley and the military commander difficult.²⁷ Emergencies might arise when Coles would have to act quickly, and without consulting the Sub-commissioner in charge of the district.^{FF}

While Hobley was building the administrative station at Port Ugowe, Coles had been siting two military posts in the upper Nyando Valley and on the Mau. He chose a place called Chilchila for the first post, which became known as the Cross Roads or Lumbwa Post, and later as Fort Ternan. Situated where the Nyando Valley road crossed a track which gave access from Nandi and Lumbwa to a salt lick on the River Namuting, Chilchila was near a projected railway station, some 32 miles from Kitoto's and 45 miles from Molo. The second post was sited close to the railway store at Molo, about 18 miles north of the Lake Nakuru camping ground. Coles thought Chilchila could be supplied with food brought by porters or donkeys from Kitoto's, and estimated that caravans could pass from Molo to Port Ugowe in seven days. The only troops available in the Road Military District to man the three new posts were sixty-one Sudanese of XVI Company, so twenty-five additional men would be needed to meet Coles' recommendations for a half-company at the Cross Roads Post, twenty-five men at Port Ugowe, and a smaller detachment at Molo. Some of these men could possibly be provided by reductions elsewhere in his command but, in view of recent events, Coles thought it inadvisable to weaken the garrisons at Kipture or Mumias. Although he recognised that garrisons of the size he recommended could spare very few men for escorts, Coles thought armed porters would be adequate for this purpose because the people near the road held themselves aloof from caravans.^{GG}

Ternan concurred in the main with Coles' suggestions and arranged to strengthen the establishment of the Road Military District.²⁸ He thought some of the men at Mumias could safely be withdrawn to strengthen the Port Ugowe and Kipture garrisons, and hoped it would soon be possible to dispense with most of the troops at some of the other road stations, or even to abolish the garrisons altogether. Johnson was ordered to substitute police for the twenty riflemen guarding the four Transport Department stables between Ravine and Kipture, because such detachments were 'contrary to military usage and prejudicial to efficiency and discipline', and Hobley was authorised to increase his civil establishment so that regular soldiers could be relieved of police duties. A food reserve was to be built up at the Cross

Roads and Molo Posts, which Hobley was to keep supplied by porters and pack animals from Kitoto's, 'a great centre of cultivation'.^{HH}

Ternan's assessment of the military needs of the Eastern Province differed from the appraisal made in London by Major J.R.L. Macdonald. The former Acting Commissioner and leader of the Juba Expedition supported an increase in the number of police, and the grouping of Kavirondo and Nandi under one administration, but differed with Ternan about the strength and disposition of the forces required to maintain law and order. Macdonald allocated seven of his twelve companies to Buganda, 'the most formidable foe we have to consider',²⁹ and four to the Nile and Bunyoro Districts. He considered the only people likely to cause trouble in the Naivasha and Ravine Districts were the Masai (Maasai), who could be reached from the railway and dealt with more quickly from the E.A.P. than from Uganda, and some 'very feeble tribes' in the hills, who could easily be kept quiet by a few police. In Kavirondo, including Nandi, Wanyiga³⁰ and Kitosh (Bukusu), he claimed there was 'no strength that one good company of Indian troops with the available police force could not overcome easily'. Macdonald proposed that an Indian company, with a military transport section of fifty Kavirondo porters, should be held in readiness at Mumias to reinforce the European sergeants³¹ and 450 police who were to replace regular soldiers at the road stations. Such a mobile striking force should be adequate to support an 'entirely civil' administration in the districts east of the Nile, which 'might with advantage also be grouped under an Assistant Commissioner'. The War Office agreed in principle with replacing soldiers with police, but questioned whether armed Sudanese policemen could be trusted.^{II} Macdonald, who had had little personal experience of conditions in Nandi and Mau, evidently discounted the opposition which Cunningham and Ternan had encountered in their efforts to subdue the Nandi and one of the 'very feeble hill tribes', the Kamasia (Tugen); he also ignored the possibility that increased activity in the Nyando Valley might induce the Nandi to form a militant alliance with the Lumbwa.

While Ternan was planning the extension of government influence to Ugowe Bay and the Nyando Valley, Cooper administered Nandi without any assistance other than that provided in their specialist fields by Dr D.F. Copeland and Transport Officer Johnson. Sergeant Murphy was able to give more help in military matters after he handed over his book-keeping duties to A.V. Legros, a Goan clerk who arrived from the coast on 11 July. In addition to the presents given to Limaton and Kibuili in recognition of their co-operation and promised assistance, Arap Kongureit was also rewarded for his help on the Kaptumo stretch of the Bushiri road. These were the first presents to be given to Nandi chiefs since January 1899. A novel payment of seven rupees was made to compensate a Nandi whose sheep had been mutilated by a porter at Derajani. If the complaint was laid before Cooper by the aggrieved owner of the injured animal, it was the first recorded instance of a Nandi seeking redress from a district officer at Kipture. A plot of ground was cleared for sweet potatoes and bananas to feed the Baganda soldiers Ternan intended to station at Kipture. Prospects for the latter crop were unpromising, for the few trees which Bagge had planted had failed to fruit. Cooper thought the climate was better suited for grain crops since two experimental sowings of wheat were doing well.³² Food-buying parties found that drought had seriously reduced yields in Kavirondo, and only obtained a small surplus to Kipture's requirements to send to Ravine. A little flour was brought into the station when harvesting began in Nandi, so a market was opened on 26 July, at which 1,200 lb. of food was purchased in the first six days. Cooper was optimistic, as many of his predecessors had been, that Nandi producers would be able to supply all Ravine's needs, and even to alleviate seasonal shortages at Naivasha.^{JJ}

A critical situation arose at the two most easterly road stations by an outbreak of smallpox at Nairobi, which spread along the road and brought transport to a standstill. No food or other supplies could be brought in from the E.A.P. until Ternan decided that caravans must proceed at all costs. Quarantine camps were set up at every road station, the Eastern Province medical staff was mobilised for surveillance and vaccination duties,³³ and Dr Mackinnon organized a load transfer camp on the E.A.P. border at Kedong. In order to localize the outbreak as far as possible, Ternan closed the direct route from Nakuru to Port Ugowe to all caravans.^{KK} Although the first parties to get through when Sclater's Road was reopened was Captain E.J.C. Swayne's caravan, which was carrying 100,000 rupees to Kampala. Hobley detained some of the specie to encourage traders at Mumias, where an

Indian had set up a store, but none of the consignment was detained by Cooper for Kipture.^{LL}

The first caravan to leave Kipture for Bushiri was despatched by Cooper on 1 August. Commanded by a British NCO, the party carried provisions and equipment and was escorted by the section of XIV Company which was to garrison the new post, Kapkolei Hill,³⁴ at the head of a valley leading down to the Kano Plains, had been chosen by Cooper as the site for the new post, which was two days' march from Kipture and seven miles south-west of the intermediate camping ground at Kaptumo. The topographical features of the position made it readily adaptable for defensive purposes, and only minor works were needed to strengthen its natural defences. No funds were allocated for building the standard type of walled and ditched fort, probably because Bushiri was only intended to function on a temporary footing while the Nakuru-Nyando Valley road was being engineered for cart traffic.^{MM} His encouraging discussions at Kipture with the neighbouring chiefs, and the promises they had made to restrain their warriors from hostile demonstrations against the post, evidently satisfied Cooper that its protection could safely be entrusted to a small garrison under a Sudanese sergeant. An even smaller detachment was stationed below the escarpment at Mark's Boma,³⁵ the terminal depot for cart convoys from Port Ugowe and the point of departure for the ascent to the plateau.^{NN} Coles, too, was apparently satisfied that this extension of government influence could be undertaken without undue risk by troops withdrawn from the Kipture garrison, since he did not inspect either post or comment on the security aspects of Cooper's arrangements.

Although Bushiri was the first post to be established in a densely populated part of Nandi, it was not conceived as an administrative centre but as a means of facilitating the movement of goods to Uganda. Like Guasa Masa and Kipture, Bushiri was nothing more than a garrisoned post on the lines of communication between the coast and the Lake.

NOTES

1. John Gemmill's caravan, led by Oscar Smith, straggled into Ravine in several small sections between 28.5.1899 and 1.6.1899; RSD.
2. Terman apparently thought it unlikely that acceptable exchange cattle could be obtained in Buddu, and suggested that Stordy should buy oxen from Bunyoro if he thought they would thrive in the Eastern Province.
3. Also because of growing doubts about the loyalty of the Uasin Gishu Masai, whose leader, 'Smithic', had fled from Kipture where he was wanted on a murder charge.
4. Terman and Hobley did not know the Foreign Office had struck the Kitoto's, Elgon and Sotik posts out of the estimates. There was no Swahili military transport section in the Eastern Province; Terman complained on 13.5.1899 (FO 2/201) that Coles was having to engage porters privately because of the difficulty Hobley had in persuading Kavirondo to accompany Coles on visits to posts in his command.
5. Not approved until 5.9.1899, owing to Treasury concern over the growth of expenditure on the African protectorates, and inter-departmental discussions about the appointment of a Special Commissioner; *NRBR* ii, Ch. 3.
6. Coles rode an Aden pony, and this prompted him to suggest in March 1901 that 124 Somali infantrymen, similarly mounted, should be recruited to patrol the Nyando Valley; see *NRBR* ii, p. 189.
7. *Victoria*, which had been severely damaged by the Sudanese mutineers in October 1897, and *Ruwendzori*, a privately-owned vessel which the government could sometimes charter; see *NRBR* i, p. 275.
8. Runners had been travelling between Ravine and Kipture nearly every other day.
9. It was considered too risky, for climatic and disease reasons, to move animals from west of the Nile; and Hobley, who could not meet his Transport Department quota of 100 oxen till the end of June, found the Kavirondo reluctant to sell female stock for the Nandi market.
10. Stock in hand was valued at Rs 28,751 at the take-over. Money was saved by dual appointments, the holders of which did not qualify for an acting allowance because of the high rate of pay offered to soldiers.
11. Presumably from Kalanega post, which was garrisoned by Somalis of VII Company, a people inclined to feuding and scornful of other tribes.
12. Engaged at Cape Town as a cart driver, he had been promoted by Mackinnon who thought him far superior to his colleagues; (FO 2/197).

13. Hobley often reacted in this circumspect manner, which was in accord with the advice given to the pioneer C.M.S. missionaries to Uganda: 'Never believe the first report that goes through the country until further inquiry makes the truth plain'; cf. Berkeley's response to Cooper's and Major A.E. Smith's accounts of Nandi hostilities in October 1898, *NRBR* i, pp. 343, 346.
14. See *NRBR* i, p. 357.
15. Administrative officers often clashed with military men on this account; a number of soldiers equally deplored the lack of restraint shown by some of their colleagues, e.g., Captain W.R. Dugmore, 'many (punitive expeditions) never need have taken place, and probably wouldn't if there were not brevets, D.S.Os., and medals to be gained'.
16. Limaton and Kibutei (Kabwoita) can probably be equated with Limeto and Kiboit of the Kakimno *pororiet* (section). Kivini, who had occasionally received presents from Kipture, was also rewarded.
17. See *NRBR* i, Ch. 6 and 9, pp. 213-214, 282-283, 331, 357, for the short visits paid to south-west Nandi by Major G.C. Cunningham, Captain C.H. Sitwell, Captain B.L. Sclater, Lieutenant G.E. Smith, Hobley, S.S. Bagge, Captain C.E. Bagnall, and B. Whitehouse. All were engaged on specialist duties except Hobley, Bagge and Bagnall; if the two last-named did in fact visit the area, they were the only district officers from Kipture to do so.
18. A warning on the need for railway employees to avoid friction with tribes in the Nyando Valley was deleted from Ternan's draft.
19. Grant's wire mentioned that an Indian trader's caravan was also attacked.
20. Kamba and Kikuyu raids on railway camps, which had been caused by famine and by misconduct on the part of the coolies, had quickly been brought under control.
21. Nandi raids on steamer caravans on the old road (see *NRBR* i, p. 101 and CO 537/71) had apparently been forgotten by the Railway Committee, who instructed the Chief Engineer in June to investigate heliographic communication between the Nyando Valley and posts on the south escarpment.
22. Sir Clement Hill of the Foreign Office and Railway Committee, who had warned on 13.5.1895 of 'a constant risk of loss of one or more pieces on the way', commented resignedly, 'she is always unlucky'; (FO 2/237).
23. Near the European cemetery of colonial times. Hobley's preference for a healthier site on the hills to the north was presumably waived on the grounds of remoteness from Coles' post. Ternan rejected Hobley's choice of the local name Kisumo (*sic*) in favour of Port Ugowe, which he thought should also be adopted for the railway terminus instead of Port Florence, 'a meaningless name'; see *NRBR* i, pp. 339, 350, and, for Sir Harry Johnston's disagreement with the Chief Engineer on the same point, *NRBR* ii, p. 133. The same solicitude for retaining local names was not shown by Ternan over Chilchila, which Coles presumably renamed Fort Ternan after his commanding officer.
24. See *NRBR* i, pp. 319, 321, 335, 368, Ch. 11 and 12.
25. The vacancies created by Sitwell's and Major Smith's resignations were filled on 29.7.1899 by promoting William Grant and J.P. Wilson to first class assistants. Martin, although 'a good man in his way' and very senior, was passed over because of his social background and educational shortcomings. In August, Captain Gorges was appointed Acting Sub-Commissioner, Mau, a post which Ternan had stipulated on 22.5.1899 should be held by a first class assistant.
26. See *NRBR* i, pp.351-360.
27. Berkeley had urged in April that the telegraph should be continued at once from Ravine to Mumias via Kipture; this could not be installed until the wire reached the take-off point in the Nyando Valley, with the result that Coles was not in telegraphic communication with any of the neighbouring stations; the branch line had not been installed by the end of 1900, see *NRBR* ii, p. 189.
28. Major M.L. Carleton was transferred from the Nile District to act as Coles' staff officer, but was sent home because of his alleged failure to carry out orders. Only 20 reinforcements had been sent to the Eastern Province by the end of August, when garrison strengths were Ravine 53, Kipture and Kakamega 98, Bushiri and Mark's Boma 16, Port Ugowe 45, Fort Ternan and Mole 67, Mumias 130.
29. Cf. Johnston's views on the Baganda threat, *NRBR* ii, pp. 46, 54, 95. Macdonald anticipated Johnston and Sir Charles Eliot in recommending increases in the police force rather than the army.
30. The area north of Ugowe Bay to the mouth of the Yala River.
31. Presumably to be found from the nineteen Sergeant Instructors on the military establishment of twenty-seven BNCOs, the rest being specialist and headquarters staff.
32. Apparently made by S.C. Tomkins when he re-opened Kipture in February 1898. He noted on 11.10.1899 (FO 2/239) that Nandi was 'the district that most needs some effort to be made for its self-support', and that two harvests a year could be expected but there was 'no native labour'.
33. Dr. Boedeker was engaged, and Dr. Copeland transferred from Kipture to Naivasha until the end of

October. A number of cases occurred at Ravine, Nandi and Mumias.

34. Near the present A.A.C. School. The name Bushiri (sometimes written 'Abushiri') was probably coined by Swahilis or Sudanese stationed at the post, which was also called Campi Ishirini na Moja because it was probably twenty-one transport stages from Fort Smith.
35. Sometimes called Bagamoyo, which is said to mean 'lose hope' when used in reference to the port where slaves were shipped aboard dhows and never saw their homeland again; also called Sudi's, after Sudi C. Melimim (see *NRBR* ii, p. 16), and later Kibigori.

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- B. ESA A/4/17-19, 24; RSD; Msa. Arch., 75/47; F.G. Hall's letters and J. Ainsworth's diary; FO 2/200, 202, 205, 236, 258; FOCP 7401/129/144; *NRBR* i, p. 366.
- C. Ternan-FO, 25.5.1899, FO 2/201, to which Berkeley (in London) minuted: 'we cannot do away with the Nandi-Mumias route and Port Victoria station'. Hobley-Com, 31.5.1899, ESA A/4/17; Ternan-FO, 5.9.1899, 13.5.1899, FO 2/203; Johnson-FO, 28.2.1901, FOCP 7690/124.
- D. Ternan-FO, 6.7.1899, FOCP 7402/90. Ternan-Hobley, 20.6.1899. Hobley-Com, 9.6.1899, ESA A/5/6, A/4/17.
- E. Johnson-Com, 23.6.1899, Cooper-Com, 25.6.1899, ESA A/4/18.
- F. Johnson-Com, 23.6.1899, Ternan-Johnson, 8.7.1899, ESA A/4/18, A/5/5; Ternan-Hill (pte), 9.7.1899, FO 2/203; Mackinnon-FO, 8.9.1899, FOCP 7403/9; cf. Dr. R.U. Moffat's letter, 1.11.1899.
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CHAPTER 2

Rumblings of discontent

Incidents which occurred on Sclater's Road and in the Nyando Valley early in August 1899 showed that certain sections of the Nandi were becoming restless. The resumption of hostilities, after a lengthy period of seeming acquiescence, was possibly prompted by fears that the opening of the Nakuru-Ugowe Bay route would lead to a tightening and extension of government control, and to restrictions on the raiding activities of sections which had hitherto been unaffected by the presence of officials and troops at Kipture. It is more likely, however, that the incidents were merely symptomatic of the resentment which warriors who had been initiated after the 1895 expedition felt about the continued presence of an alien power in the tribal territory. As far as the government was concerned, the resumption of hostilities threatened the security of the reorganised transport system, and the other Protectorate interests which had been established in and near the district in the past few months.

Mailmen arriving at Ravine on 3 August reported a hostile encounter with Nandi raiders, who decamped after one of their party was killed. Two days later news reached Kipture that Walter Mayes' servant had been killed on 30 July in the vicinity of Sclater's store camp near Lessos.¹ The murderers were said to have been warriors from the section led by Chiefs Campilayo and Tamaswa, who were grazing their cattle in a *kaptich* area a considerable distance from their homes. After the murder the two chiefs had driven their cattle through the night towards Jamerdin, a place near the Lumbwa border about two days south-east of Kipture. One of Campilayo's men, who arrived at Kipture with six sheep and goats which had been left behind when his comrades left the *kaptich*, promised Cooper, in the presence of chiefs from the neighbourhood of the station, that he would go to Jamerdin and try to persuade Campilayo to bring in the murderers.^A

On 18 August two Sudanese deserters from a caravan commanded by Effendi Mulazain Kairalla were speared close to Camp Asali, near the western limit of the Nandi section of Sclater's Road. Chief Limaton sent word to Kipture that the murderers, who were not members of his *pororiet* or inhabitants of the district where the incident took place, were being tracked down. A few days later the chief himself visited the station to report that the tracks of the four murderers had been followed from Camp Asali to Jamerdin, where their comrades from Campilayo's country had also taken refuge. Cooper enlisted the help of Latongwa, the spokesman of the Koilegei *pororiet* near the station, in sifting the various reports on the Lessos and Asali incidents, but was unable to discover a motive for either crime. He warned Hobley that Campilayo's section would remain a menace to small parties on Sclater's Road unless the culprits were punished, and reported that several chiefs had offered to provide auxiliaries if punitive operations proved necessary. Realizing that an expedition against Campilayo, which would probably be more difficult and protracted than those he had often undertaken in Kavirondo, was bound to 'hamper transport to a terrible extent', Hobley seized on the offer made by the chiefs and asked Cooper to find out whether they would be prepared to apprehend the culprits without government help. These incidents involved Hobley for the first time in the affairs of the tribe which had recently been put under his charge, and he was naturally anxious that his work in Kavirondo should not be hindered by the general disruption that would result from military action against the Nandi. Ternan agreed that a punitive expedition should not be mounted unless all other methods failed, but instructed Hobley to make it clear to all the chiefs that retribution would be exacted if the murderers were not surrendered, and that the punishment would be severe.^B

While Cooper was trying to get in touch with Campilayo, an attack took place on the night of 23 August against two villages in Okwachi's Kumulu (or Koloa) section of the Kano Luo, about three miles north of the railway stores depot near Kitoto's and only some seven miles east of Port Ugowe. The villages and granaries were set on fire, all the cattle were taken from their kraals, and three men and seventeen women and children were burnt alive or speared. M.S. Jackson, a railway storekeeper who was in camp nearby, visited the scene while the villages were still burning, and counted the corpses of three women, two of them with babies in their arms, and two children. After recovering from their initial panic, the Kano warriors pursued the raiders and recaptured all but seven of the looted animals. One

informant declared that twenty-five 'Nandi of the Wasikisi tribe'² were killed by the Luo; Jackson, who counted nine dead bodies, noted that several more of the raiders had been slain. The storekeeper had not been roused until 11.45 p.m., so presumably the Kano followed the Nandi up before daybreak, an exceptional proceeding as the Luo did not often leave their villages at night. Cooper reported that the Nandi denied any responsibility for the outrage, which they insisted had been carried out by Lumbwa warriors, but Hobley's informants were convinced that the Nandi were the culprits. The Luo chiefs, who were equally adamant that the attack had been the work of Nandi from the nearby escarpment sections, declared that no Lumbwa lived within thirty miles of the scene. The evidence was conflicting, and Hobley finally compromised by ascribing 'the dastardly outrage' to the Lumbwa with the aid and guidance of their Nandi kinsmen.^C

Pointing out that Nandi and Lumbwa raiders frequently menaced protected tribes on the eastern borders of Kavirondo, Hobley took the opportunity to remind Ternan that during the past year raids on the Lago (Bok), Tatsoni, Kabras and Tiriki, as well as the murder of porters on Sclater's Road and the attack on the steamer caravan, had all gone unpunished. The incursions into Kavirondo had not previously been brought to the attention of the Commissioner - possibly because the Nandi Collector had insufficient reliable intelligence about the extra-district activities of the people he purported to control. It was, however, strange that Hobley, a prolific writer of despatches and a firm believer in the need to prevent inter-tribal fighting, had not reported any of these raids against people in his district to whom he had personally extended protection. It was not until the end of August 1900, when he was cataloguing items of evidence to justify the punitive expedition which had been sent against the Nandi in the previous July, that Hobley gave an account of the raids that had occurred in the previous two years. 'In 1898 they committed a series of raids accompanied by much cruelty upon the Elgon people, the Wakitosh, Wakabras and Watiriki, but the hands of the Administration were so full with the reorganization of Uganda after the mutiny that no notice was taken. In 1899 they committed numerous purposeless murders on the main road between Kakumega's (*sic*) and the Ravine; odd men belonging to traders' caravans were constantly getting speared and a number of Sudanese followers proceeding from Mumias to Nandi were murdered in cold blood'.^D The reticence shown by Hobley and the Kipture Collectors over these incidents suggests that with the Nandi, as with the Masai in the E.A.P., there was almost a conspiracy of silence about breaches of the peace unless they posed a serious threat to communications.

The recent incidents constituted a direct threat to the Uganda Road, and convinced Hobley that stern measures were required if the government's authority was to be upheld. His first suggestion was that friendly chiefs should raise a levy force to patrol the edge of the south escarpment; his second that Cooper should institute administrative measures similar to those which had operated successfully in Kavirondo. Hobley argued that a great deal might be done if the Collector was in a position to get into closer touch with the people.³ Ternan, who was becoming increasingly irascible under the unaccustomed burdens of administrative office, minuted agrily, 'Why doesn't he do it?'⁴ The Acting Commissioner's question ignored the fact that Nandi was run by a solitary district officer, whose garrison was barely sufficient to ensure the safety of the fort, and furnish detachments for the Bushiri and Kakumega outposts. Hobley contended that the government's influence would rapidly grow if Cooper toured the district with an escort of thirty men, and personally inflicted fines on offending sections. A suggestion that loyal chiefs near Kipture might be induced to recruit fifty warriors to accompany Cooper on his tours was rejected by Ternan. He stipulated that troops, not warriors, should be used if any fighting was to be done, because the latter were difficult to control and frequently killed women and children, whereas regular soldiers were not 'savages used to only the cruellest methods of warfare'.⁵ The suggestion made by Hobley, who had not asked for warriors to fight their fellow Nandi but merely to accompany Cooper on his tours, offered a cheap way of achieving the immediate objective. It could moreover lead in time to the escorting warriors being embodied in the police force, or to their employment by Nandi chiefs for the maintenance of law and order in their districts. Ternan, who had been unable to provide Cooper with the resources he needed to control the Nandi, clarified his minutes in a despatch to Hobley. Explaining that a Sub-commissioner's role was only to indicate the nature of the punishment required, Ternan directed that its execution should be left to regular troops under a military commander, with the district

officer in attendance as political adviser if required. This general principle was grounded on the assumption that the use of warriors in a punitive role increased inter-tribal feuding, and gave them opportunities for indulging in 'unrestrained' aggressive action with the government's connivance and blessing.^E

Hobley was anxious for something to be done to strengthen the government's hold over the Nandi, because the arrangements he had made to meet his commitment to supply food from Kavirondo to the new posts were being jeopardised by unsettled conditions in the eastern part of his district. He had organised the collection of the 200 loads which would be needed every month to feed the troops and about a hundred of their followers at the Molo and Cross Roads posts, and the Kavirondo chiefs had completed the cart road from Mumias so that a reserve stock of food could be built up at Port Ugowe. In addition to difficulties in finding men to carry food from Port Ugowe to the Nyando Valley, Hobley had also to persuade volunteers to come forward for the Port Ugowe-Bushiri section after the attack on the Kano villages had made this route unpopular. He reiterated that the Kavirondo were reluctant to carry loads to the Mau, because the cold spirited the unclothed porters, who were unable to buy extra food along the track east of Kitoto's, and because of their 'hereditary fear of the Nandi, Lumbwa and Sotik, who have raided them for generations'. After confessing he had little control over the Luo on the Lake-shore plains, over whom Kitoto had been found to exercise much less influence than had previously been thought,⁶ Hobley asked whether Ternan wished coercion to be used to secure porters for the Nyando Valley route. In order to reduce the number of Luo needed to meet the demands of the new posts, Hobley suggested using donkeys, or that arrangements be made to share the transport facilities which the railway was organising in the Nyando valley.^F

Archibald Brown left Port Ugowe with the first convoy of carts on 15 August and, on his return from Mark's Boma six days later, some of the Uganda consignments were shipped across the Lake in the steel boat.⁷ Although the disruption caused by smallpox in the E.A.P. and eastern Uganda had reduced freight deliveries, a shuttle service of cart convoys was established on the Kipture-Bushiri-Port Ugowe route.⁸ Consignments received by Johnson's transport clerk at Bushiri were handed over to Sudi C. Melimin,⁹ who worked the escarpment section under contract. Assembly of the *William Mackinnon* was suspended owing to Richard Grant's and R. Brownlee's recurrent bouts of fever,¹⁰ but steamer loads continued to be delivered at Port Ugowe by R. Barton Wright, who had been seconded to this work from the survey branch of the railway.^G His first caravan, which reached its destination on 27 August with 300 loads, had a number of smallpox cases among its members, with the result that the infection was introduced into the Nyando Valley, to the railway stores camp at Kitoto's, and among the two survey parties working on the western slopes of the Mau. The introduction of smallpox along the Nakuru-Ugowe Bay track, and the inauguration of the cart convoy shuttle service through Bushiri, prompted Dr Mackinnon to recommend that the employment of porters on the Nyando Valley route should be deferred.¹¹ Ternan agreed, and the Nandi Plateau route remained an essential link in the transport system.^H

Although the incidents near Kitoto's and at the eastern and western extremities of the Nandi section of Sclater's Road caused some alarm, the rest of the district was quiet throughout August. Mail-runners, small caravans and often solitary porters passed along Sclater's Road, and there were no fresh attacks on railway parties using the Nyando Valley route. Food purchases at Kipture were valued at 277 rupees, 48 rupees more than those made at the Kakamega market; and the pledge given to Cooper was redeemed by the sale of food worth 299 rupees to the Bushiri post. Toruree was the only chief to be given a present, but Cooper must have been gratified by the help he had received from Limaton and Latongwa, and encouraged by the response of the Nandi chiefs to his request for food and their offer to provide warriors for a levy force.

No incidents occurred in September. The envoy sent to Campilayo presumably failed in his mission, as Cooper followed Hobley's advice and entrusted Chiefs Toruree and Tirop with the task of persuading Campilayo and Tamaswa to comply with the government's demands. No presents were made to chiefs although food was purchased at Kipture and Bushiri in considerable quantities.¹² This was an opportune development as it eased the burden on the Kavirondo, who supplied food for Ravine, Naivasha, Port Ugowe, Kakamega and Mumias, as well as for Kipture and the Cross Roads post. Another encouraging development was the number of Nandi warriors who were prepared to carry messages on

Sclater's Road, and on the tracks connecting Kipture with the Nyando Valley routes. Among the travellers passing through the district was E.S. Grogan's companion, A.H. Sharp, who noted that the Nandi refused to trade their spears for anything but livestock. Several purchases were made at Kipture by traders and transporters, including the first recorded transaction with the leading Indian merchant, Allidina Visram.^I

The preliminary forward work for the railway was completed in September, more smallpox-stricken steamer caravans passed down the Nyando Valley,¹³ and the last loads of the *William Mackinnon* were delivered to the Molo store. Work began on the temporary telegraph extension from Molo to Kampala, an undertaking which used 832 loads of copper wire weighing 50,000 lb. Increased railway activity created the same problems as officials in the E.A.P. had faced for the past three years, and several cases of theft and misconduct on the part of railway employees were reported to Jackson when he passed through the Eastern Province to take charge of the Buganda District.^J

Since the incidents in August had not led to widespread disaffection, Ternan saw no reason for sending extra staff or troops to Nandi. His principal concern regarding the security position in the Eastern Province was to persuade the Foreign Office to reconsider its refusal to sanction a permanent military transport section for the Road Military District. He insisted that the improvised arrangements adopted in the past had deprived the troops of mobility, because porters, even when they were available, could not be induced to accompany columns when they were patrolling off the main road. In order to ensure that one company could be moved 'at short notice, which (in the Road Military District) is a matter of grave importance', he sought permission to engage 140 professional porters at Mombasa. Two of Ternan's other schemes also met with setbacks: the employment of Baganda soldiers had to be deferred until acceptable foodstuffs could be raised in the Eastern Province, as it had been 'unexpectedly found that the Waganda ... suffer a great deal from the change of climate and diet'; and a consignment of wheat seed was delayed on the road owing to the smallpox epidemic, with the result that the estimated saving of £32,670 a year on the cost of Indian rations was unlikely to be realized.^K

Although Nandi was quiet in September there were symptoms of unrest elsewhere east of the Nile. A series of robberies occurred on the main road through Busoga; Terere's Naivasha Masai answered Lenana's summons to join warriors from the E.A.P. in a raid against his brother, Sendeyu; and a soldier was killed by the Luo while he was labour-recruiting in Sakwa. Farther afield, several cases of dacoity occurred on the Kamba and Kikuyu sections of the railway, the Mad Mullah was beginning his long stand against the government in Somaliland, and over all lay the imminent threat of a major conflict with the Boers in South Africa. In order to deal with the situation in Busoga, F.G. Foaker at Luba's was instructed to seek the assistance he 'was entitled to claim' from the chiefs, so that the road could be patrolled and kept clear of robbers.^L Replying to Gorges' plea that Lenana's influence over the 9,000 Masai living in the Uganda Protectorate should be curbed, Ternan could only deplore the government's powerlessness to prevent Masai raids, and hope that Gorges could persuade Terere to resist Lenana's overtures.^L The Sakwa incident occurred when six Sudanese soldiers from Port Ugowe tried unsuccessfully to enlist volunteers to carry food to the Nyando Valley garrisons. The labour-recruiters, who left for home after Chief Ugada failed to prevail upon his people to change their attitude, were attacked by spearmen who killed one of the soldiers and carried off his rifle. After enquiries confirmed there was 'no provocation except objection to porter work', Holey urged that the murder should be avenged by the district police,¹⁵ because the standing of the government among neighbouring tribes would be lowered if attacks on its servants went unnoticed. Ternan agreed but added a rider that, if a punitive expedition subsequently became necessary, it should be undertaken by troops and not by the police.^M

The lengths to which the Luo were prepared to go in order to avoid working as porters on the Nyando Valley route, even when they were encouraged to do so by a 'principal chief', were demonstrated by the Sakwa at an inopportune time for Holey. The task of supplying the Mau garrisons had been added to his other responsibilities only a fortnight before, when Lieutenant Pereira and forty-six Sudanese of XVI Company left Port Ugowe to build and man the Cross Roads post. Porters for Pereira's two caravans were difficult to find, with the result that not enough loads could be carried to stock up the post. The deficiency was made up for the time being by small consignments delivered by porters

provided by Chiefs Ugada, Hukun and Ngonga,¹⁶ but Hobley doubted whether sufficient Luo and Baluya would continue to come forward to maintain a regular service. If, in view of the attitude adopted by the Sakwa, this proved to be the case, he suggested that donkeys be used, or that food should be sent from Nakuru to the Cross Roads post, where the presence of Pereira's troops would deter Nandi and Lumbwa from attacking caravans passing through the Mau forests.¹⁷

Pereira's instructions, 'to protect Railway Survey porters and caravans', made it clear that Fort Ternan¹⁷ was primarily intended as a garrisoned staging-post on the road to Uganda, rather than a means of gaining the confidence of the south-eastern sections. Unlike the Luo around Port Ugowe, the Nandi were not asked to help establish the new post; and, apart from acting as mail-runners, they contributed little to its maintenance. Although Hobley had no personal knowledge of the upper Nyando Valley, he hoped that food might be brought in when the local people realised there was a market at the new station for their surplus produce.¹⁸ He was nevertheless in no doubt that for some time to come Fort Ternan, like the other Nandi posts, would be dependent on the efforts of Kavirondo officials, porters and producers.

NOTES

1. Somree, who may have been a Nandi, brought news of the murder to Kipture. Mayes was operating at the time as a transporter on his own account.
2. For previous references to the so-called 'Sigisi' section, see *NRBR* i, pp. 245, 262, 267.
3. The Foreign Office pleaded with the Treasury on 17.7.1899 (FOCP 7402/17) for more officers so that they could 'move freely about, and thus gain the confidence of the natives instead of merely remaining stationary in certain spots'.
4. He suffered from a chronic liver complaint, which earned him the nickname of 'the Ever-Rearing Lord'; (Evatt's Letter, 4.6.1931). The spate of despatches from Entebbe during this period suggests that he was trying to establish a claim to be Berkeley's successor.
5. Ternan's views, which were possibly influenced by Ben Whitehouse's criticisms, were tantamount to a reproof for some of Hobley's methods in Kavirondo.
6. Hobley had noted (*JRGS*, 12 (1898), p. 366), that Kitoto 'claims to exercise a suzerainty over the Wa-Semi and the Wa-Uyoma'.
7. The first loads (146) from Kipture arrived by private donkey caravan at Port Ugowe on 6.8.1899, and were carried on by Baganda porters. Congestion at the port, where the steel boat left by the Juba Expedition was found to be unsuitable for use on the Lake, was eased by chartering Köther & Sixdorf's dhow from Entebbe and by requisitioning canoes from Port Victoria and Buganda.
8. Carts travelled light from Kipture and returned from Bushiri laden with food. Port Ugowe provided about 400 loads of food in August for Kipture, Ravine and Naivasha.
9. Probably the headman employed by Sclater in 1895; in 1896 he was put in charge of the Masai refugee settlement near the E.A.P. fort at Ngong.
10. Grant and Brownlee were invalided from Port Ugowe in August; Brownlee died on the way to the coast, and Grant returned from sick leave in India in December.
11. The Foreign Office opposed the use of porters; insufficient donkeys were available, and mules were ruled out because they were all needed for the Nairobi-Ravine stretch.
12. Kipture Rs.486 and Bushiri Rs.171. At two annas per lb., the Nandi contribution totalled 5,256 lb. compared with 1,976 lb. from Kakamega.
13. 34 cases (18 of them fatal) were recorded among steamer caravan porters at Port Ugowe during September; Hobley reported on 19.9.1899 (FO 2/204) that 430 died on one journey.
14. Contrast Ternan's attitude towards Hobley's suggestion of enlisting the help of Nandi chiefs and warriors.
15. The murder was not avenged until December 1899; see *NRBR* ii, pp. 28-32.
16. Presumably Ugada of Sakwa, not Kisumu; possibly Hukum of Seme (Hobley, *Eastern Uganda*, p. 54); for Ngonga Odima of Lego, see *NRBR* i, p. 336, and P.C. Oloo, 'Luo Clans of Alego', UCN/HD-RPA, A/2/5. Ugada provided 86 of the 156 porters employed in September.
17. Mentioned for the first time in official records on 26.9.1899 in the PUD; Pereira's diary records his arrival at 'Fort Ternan' on 10.9.1899, so the name was possibly coined by Coles when he sited the post in July.

18. Pereira's diary (in W. Lloyd-Jones, *K.A.R.*, pp. 78-80) records that a market was operating outside the fort in December, but gives no indication of the categories and quantity of produce offered for sale.

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- A. RSD. Cooper-Hobley, 23.8.1899, ESA A/4/20.
B. Cooper-Com, 19.8.1899, Cooper-Hobley, 23.8.1899, ESA A/4/20; Ternan-Hobley, 7.9.1899, ESA A/5/7.
C. PUD; Hobley-Com, 8.9.1899, 31.10.1899, ESA A/4/20, 22.
D. Hobley-Com, 24.8.1899, ESA A/18/1, FOCP 7689/84; see *NRBR* ii, p. 48.
E. Hobley-Com, 8.9.1899, Ternan-Hobley, 19.9.1899, ESA A/4/20, A/5/7.
F. Hobley-Com, 14.8.1899, ESA AS/4/20; cf. *NRBR* i, p. 340; and Hobley-Lt. E.G. Vaughan, 12.9.98, FO 2/257, stating it was 'quite impossible to induce Kavirondo natives to go over Mau, the numerous deaths which have occurred in recent caravans have caused such a dread of the trip that no pecuniary inducement it is practicable to offer is of any avail'.
G. PUD; Johnson-Com, 15.8.1899. WP V, VI, VIII; A.T. Matson, 'The William Mackinnon', *KWN*, 24.11.1961.
H. Mackinnon-Com, 20.8.1899, ESA A/4/20; Mackinnon-FO, 20.8.1899, FOCP 7403/9; Hobley-Com, 19.9.1899, FO 2/204, stating that 40 of Barton Wright's men died of smallpox on one trip, and 4.9.1899, ESA A/4/20, on the epidemic introduced into Alego by Luo porters, which Ternan minuted with 'Stuff!', 'Humbug!', etc.
I. NCB, RSD; Cooper-Hobley, 28.10.1899, ESA A/4/22. E.S. Grogan and A.H. Sharp, *From the Cape to Cairo*, p. 196.
J. PUD. Jackson-L.E. Caine, 28.6.1900, ESA A/7/6.
K. Ternan-FO, 5.9.1899, 1.9.1899, 26.9.1899, FOCP 7403/34/31/80.
L. Ternan-Foaker, 29.9.1899, ESA A/5/7. Gorges-Ainsworth, 30.9.1899, ESA A/4/21; Ternan-Gorges, 26.10.1899, ESA A/5/8.
M. Hobley-Com, 26.9.1899, Ternan-Hobley, 19.10.1899, ESA A/4/21, A/5/8.
N. PUD; Port Ugowe Cash Book; Hobley-Com, 7.9.1899, ESA A/4/20.

CHAPTER 3

Johnston's brief and the Kamelilo expedition

While the Acting Commissioner was doing what he could to strengthen the government's hold over the Eastern Province, Sir Harry Johnston arrived at Naivasha on 8 October 1899 and assumed control of the Uganda Protectorate as Her Majesty's Special Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief. The opportunity presented by Berkeley's illness and reluctance to return to Entebbe had been seized upon by the Foreign Office to create this special post, in order to allay Treasury disquiet over increases in the grant-in-aid, and to counter parliamentary, press and public criticism of the 'Uganda muddle'. The costs incurred as a result of the Sudanese mutiny and the campaigns against Mwanga and Kabarega, which had necessitated the employment of Indian troops, together with the reorganization of the military and transport departments, had placed 'a great burden on the taxpayer'.¹ The sums which Parliament was asked to vote for the African Protectorates and Uganda Railway had become sufficiently large to provide opponents with opportunities for attacking Salisbury's government.^A

The Special Commissioner was granted almost plenipotentiary powers to reorganize the Uganda administration, and was specially charged to increase revenue and control expenditure so that the annual grant-in-aid could be kept within acceptable bounds. In the meantime the estimates for 1900-1901, and most of the supplementary sums asked for by Berkeley and Ternan, were held in abeyance until Johnston reported. Under the terms of the Special Commission approved by the Queen, Johnston was entrusted with the general task of organizing the administration to 'meet the requirements of the Protectorate on the completion of the railway', and 'to place the Administration ... on a permanent and satisfactory footing'. In particular, he was required to raise additional revenue, 'whether by a hut tax or otherwise, without risk of arousing the susceptibilities of the natives, or pressing unduly upon their resources'; to examine the possibility of establishing administrative headquarters on a new site, bearing in mind 'the possibility that the two Protectorates ... may eventually be merged in one'; to report on the desirability of administering the territories to the north of the Protectorate which had recently been visited by Colonels Macdonald and Martyr; and to recommend adjustments to the boundaries of the existing administered districts.^B

The Special Commissioner was reminded that the deportation of Mwanga and Kabarega 'has removed the two great causes of unrest', so that the way was open for a reappraisal of the military position,² having regard to 'the growth of tranquility which may reasonably be expected, the absence of external enemies, and the increasing facilities afforded by the railway of throwing troops into the country in case of emergency'. With the restoration of tranquility, the Foreign Office thought the time was opportune for the initiation of development projects. Johnston was accordingly directed to encourage trade, popularize the rupee coinage, foster the cultivation of indigenous crops, and introduce exotic cereals and fruits. He was also expected to build roads, with the 'willing aid' of the chiefs, develop the use of water transport, and improve communications between Uganda and Europe. The wide terms of the Special Commission indicated that the Foreign Office concurred with Berkeley's judgement that a turning point had been reached, and that the occupation of Uganda had progressed beyond the pioneer stage.³

The scope of his instructions, the Treasury's approval of the exceptionally high salary of £2,800 a year attached to the post and, above all, the fact that he had been personally selected by the Prime Minister, convinced Johnston that he would be given as much latitude in Uganda⁴ as he had enjoyed as Commissioner of British Central Africa.^C This was seemingly the view taken by Sir Clement Hill, the senior clerk in the African Department, who told Johnston that he looked upon Uganda as being 'in the melting pot', and that judgement would be suspended until the Special Commissioner had reported. According to Johnston, he was assured by Hill that the condition in Uganda in 1899 was a 'plastic' one, and that 'it lay with me to take advantage of nothing having been settled on rigid lines to put the affairs of the Protectorate into a more settled shape before long use or custom had rendered changes difficult or undesirable'. Johnston was promised he would not be rushed, and that the

Foreign Office would try to meet his temporary requirements as far as possible. The only cautionary advice that Hill thought it necessary to offer was that the Special Commissioner should try and 'avoid any blood-letting in Uganda'. Despite these fine words, it was soon to become apparent that the measures proposed by Johnston would be subjected to close and critical scrutiny by Hill, whose views on the choice of a Special Commissioner had been brushed aside in favour of a man he had come to regard as an outsider.^D Johnston's freedom of action in carrying out his 'God-given task' was also likely to be restricted by the outbreak of the Boer War^E which diverted attention from East Africa and affected the amount of aid in men, money and materials that could be made available to the Protectorates.^E

Before leaving Naivasha to set up his temporary head-quarters at Ravine on 30 October, Johnston gave some thought to the difficulties facing officials in the Eastern Province, whose principal concern had hitherto been to safeguard the lines of communication between railhead and the Lake, and prevent hostile demonstrations which could disrupt transport on the Uganda Road and the operations of railway survey and telegraph parties. The Special Commissioner was quick to realize the tenuousness of the hold which Collectors^F had established over their charges: 'in the Mau, Nandi and Kavirondo districts it is doubtful whether we have yet acquired sufficient control over the country by cession or by conquest to arrogate to ourselves the right to dispose of the land'.⁷ Outlining the policy he intended following to remedy this, he went on: 'but it is a question which I hope to solve soon by Treaty in the friendly disposed districts, and by compulsion in those districts at present unfriendly, if and when the unfriendliness should ripen into aggressive hostility and repressive measures be entailed on us'.^F

Point was given to Johnston's assessment by events in the Eastern Province in October. After being questioned by Masai about the protection they could expect against interference from railway construction gangs, Gorges promised to ask for a railway magistrate to be posted to Naivasha to hear cases brought against the coolies, who were only amenable to the Indian Penal Code. The Masai elders agreed, as their part of the bargain, to graze their stock away from the Uganda Road, though they pointed out that they would sometimes have to take their herds to Lakes Naivasha and Elmenteita to be watered. Gorges was particularly anxious to ensure that railway employees did not cause misunderstandings in Masailand, where an outbreak of rinderpest had occurred which might lead to a resumption of raiding, and the disruption of transport and railway operations.^G

In Kamasia, three chiefs who had not been dealt with by TERNAN in 1897, and who consequently thought themselves 'too strong to be attacked', were adopting a 'most casual' and at times 'insulting' attitude towards Martin's requests for paid labour. Chief Mitei had also been warned on several occasions to stop harassing neighbouring tribes, an activity in which he was allegedly aided by Nandi warriors in return for the help they received from the Kamasia in major raiding expeditions. Mitei's warriors had blocked the road from Elgeyo to Ravine and wounded a number of Elgeyo (Keyo) messengers; and, in a raid against their western neighbours, they had killed seven Elbogor Elgeyo and looted twenty of their cattle. Chief Kimamet, who operated in a similar fashion on the track from Ravine to Lake Baringo, had attacked an Arab trader and stolen a mob of cattle. Chief Tumo's dereliction amounted to nothing more than a peremptory refusal to supply Martin with labourers.^H Farther west, Seme and other Luo sections to the north of Ugowe Bay were becoming increasingly truculent towards boat parties, who hugged the shore when negotiating the narrow entrance to the bay, and were often forced to land in order to shelter from storms, gather firewood or cook food. Several officials and missionaries had been threatened or attacked, and sixteen Baganda boatmen killed.⁸ Hobley investigated these 'quite unexpected and unsought-for outrages', and asked that the district police should be allowed to punish the offenders 'in a quiet manner', as 'the Pax Britannica must be maintained, even at the risk of being called a "raider" by an unfriendly critic'.^I

In Nandi, Toruree and Tirop failed to persuade Tamasawa to comply with Cooper's orders for the arrest of the murderers responsible for the Lessos and Camp Asali incidents in August. Toruree, who was described by Cooper as a 'most powerful Nandi chief', entered Campilayo territory from two directions when seeking for Tamaswa, and warned the people that extreme measures would be taken against them unless some of their chiefs visited Kipture. The Campilayo 'refused to have anything to do with him', but Cooper was satisfied that the 'other Nandi chiefs to a man were willing and anxious to support the government'.

Hobley handed the matter over to Coles, in accordance with Ternan's instructions, and suggested that a punitive force should secure reparation for the road murders, and also for the sacking of the Luo village near Kitoto's.^J

When Johnston arrived at Ravine, he heard of another raid which had occurred on Slater's Road three days before his arrival. A small government caravan, led by Headman Bakari and consisting of ten Indians, two African servants and a few women, was attacked by a large band of Nandi warriors near Darajani (R. Nganiek), seven miles from Kipture station. Sixty-five sheep and goats, which the caravan was driving from Busoga to augment the food supply at Ravine,⁹ were looted by the raiders, who also carried off a woman and two soldiers. Coles was summoned to Ravine to discuss the security situation in the Eastern Military District, and Cooper was directed to ascertain whether any provocation had been offered by Bakari's party. He was also to establish the identity of the raiders and report on the action needed to punish them, and was reminded that the Nandi had committed many outrages against isolated porters and mailmen, 'and have given other causes for offence'. Warning him to exercise discretion in his investigations, because it might not be expedient to take punitive action on this occasion, Johnston added that in time the Nandi would probably have to be taught a lesson but he had no wish for them to know this in advance.^K

Despite the successful outcome of the Campilayo raids, there were few signs in October that disaffection was becoming more widespread. Food markets continued to operate at both stations, and chiefs near Kipture confirmed their protestations of support for the Collector's attitude towards their obstinate colleagues by presenting him with five sheep and goats, the first recorded instance of a present being made to a Kipture official. Inter-station messages were entrusted to pairs of Nandi and Masai runners though, as a precautionary measure, the mail escort from Ravine to Kipture was increased to twelve riflemen.¹⁰ Caravans carrying *William Mackinnon* loads passed down the Nyando Valley, and staking work was completed by the survey party to a point eight miles west of Mau Summit. The temporary telegraph reached Fort Ternan, where it was operated by a sapper signaller who patrolled the line on a bicycle during the closed period for reception and transmission. Despite the recent incidents, Slater's Road continued to be used by small parties, one of which consisted of only Father Plunkett, two men and a boy. From what he learned at Kipture he thought the large caravan of Mill Hill fathers, which he was to bring up from Mombasa, might meet with a hostile reception, so he sought to ingratiate himself with the Nandi by distributing presents of buttons and needles.^L The unimpeded passage of caravans and messengers seemed to confirm Cooper's claim that people in the neighbourhood of the road and stations were disposed to be friendly, and that only the Campilayo were openly hostile.

At Ravine on 8 November Johnston and Coles discussed the situation in Kamasia and Nandi with Martin, who had been appointed Collector of the new Baringo District. It was decided, in open court before all the Kamasia chiefs,¹¹ that Mitei was responsible for the attacks on the Elgeyo, and that Kimamet was guilty of similar but less serious offences. Mitei was given 14 days to pay a fine of twenty-three head of cattle, all but three of which were handed over to the Elgeyo as blood money for the murdered men and compensation for the looted stock. Kimamet was ordered to bring in three head of cattle within seven days, and the charge against Tumo was dropped. If these judgements were not complied with within the stipulated time Coles was instructed to increase the fines, imprison the defaulters for six months, and punish their people. If necessary, the disaffected districts were to be occupied for a time by detachments from the Ravine garrison.^M

Similar instructions were issued to Coles and Cooper in connection with the Campilayo, who were held responsible for the attack on Bakari in addition to the earlier incidents on Slater's Road. Cooper was directed to 'invite' Tamaswa to return the prisoners and stolen animals, and pay a fine as punishment for the three attacks, which had 'resulted in the loss of life of Indians and Negroes in the service either of the Railway Company or of the Uganda Administration'. The Collector's overtures were unsuccessful, but Toruree contrived to release the prisoners and to recapture most of the stolen animals. Johnston decided this perverse obduracy must be punished in order 'to render the road absolutely secure' for railway and telegraph parties. The expedition was to be carried out by Coles, who was instructed to imprison Tamaswa for three months and levy a fine of twenty head of cattle. If the troops were opposed or the terms not accepted, Tamaswa's villages were to be burned,

the chief and headmen were to be deported to serve a term of six months' hard labour, and a small force was to be left to occupy their country until the Campilayo admitted defeat.^N

Having dealt with the pressing security problems, Johnston turned his attention to wider considerations affecting the Baringo and Nandi Districts. In reply to a request from the Kamasia chiefs that another station should be established in their country, so that 'they would find it easier to control their warlike young men', Johnston agreed to provide a Sudanese sergeant and police detachment from Ravine to man a new post on or near Lake Baringo.¹² He hoped this extension of government influence would deter Arab slavers from taking 'free labourers' from the Suk (Pokot), Elgeyo, Cherangani and Elgon tribes, who were carried off to German East Africa, by way of Lumbwa, Sotik and other unadministered areas. The new post should also facilitate the enforcement of customs and quarantine regulations, as well as discouraging hunters and freebooters,¹³ whose uncontrolled activities had antagonized the local inhabitants and made them suspicious of other Europeans.^O

In his appreciation of the Nandi situation Johnston agreed with Coles that 'the disturbed condition of the country and the irreconcilable nature of the people had been much exaggerated', and did not consider radical changes necessary. Although he thought a continuation of Coles' policy of 'patience and just treatment' would eventually win over the majority of the people, Johnston agreed that it might be necessary to give the warriors a sharp lesson if they began another series of attacks on government parties. This approach was much the same as that of his predecessor, though Berkeley's expectant policy and the punitive expeditions of 1895 and 1897¹⁴ had proved ineffective in weakening Nandi resolve to preserve their freedom of action. In a wider field, Johnston hoped that the occupation of Fort Ternan would lead to a friendly understanding with the Lumbwa, so that an investigation could be made of the largely unknown region extending from the Nyando Valley and Ugowe Bay to German East Africa.^P

Punishment of those responsible for the incidents on Sclater's Road had been left to Coles, who decided on an expedition to capture Campilayo and Tamaswa, and also one of their neighbours, Chief Arap Chemenga,¹⁵ whose two sons were alleged to have been implicated in the theft of Bakari's sheep. Coles planned to march from Kipture to the borders of the disaffected district, where he arranged to meet Captain Pereira's contingent of forty Sudanese of XVI Company from Fort Ternan. Major Cooper, with fifty-three Somalis of XIV Company and a maxim under the charge of Armourer-Sergeant A.W. Strong, accompanied Coles, and troops from Ravine and seventy-five Masai irregulars¹⁶ under Lieutenant Arbuthnot patrolled the country north and east of Nandi in order to prevent the enemy from breaking back into Kamasia. For the first time in an expedition against the Nandi the troops were assisted by warriors from friendly *pororosiek*: Latongwa and Kiturier led small contingents of Koilegei from the vicinity of the fort; Toruree and Tirop joined the main column with warriors from Kapchepkendi and Kakipoch sections south and east of the station; and Arap Sertu joined Pereira with more Kapchepkendi from the slopes of Tindiret. Cooper was satisfied that all the chiefs near the disaffected area were anxious to co-operate, and Pereira noted a similar disposition among the sections, including the Tindiret Kamelilo, through whose territory he marched¹⁷ from Fort Ternan to the rendezvous in Campilayo.^Q

Coles left Kipture on the afternoon of 17 November, and at 3.30 the following morning marched due south from Toruree's village to a vantage point from which most of Arap Chemenga's territory could be surveyed. Warriors led by Toruree and Tirop joined the main column at this point, thus bringing the strength of the Nandi contingent up to 150 men. This number was increased when Pereira, who had left Fort Ternan two days previously, arrived at the rendezvous with Arap Sertu's warriors. Enemy country was entered and houses near the line of march were burned, but neither men nor stock were seen. Parties of riflemen and spearmen, who scoured the country in all directions burning houses and trying to locate the enemy's stock, destroyed Tamaswa's huts and granaries, captured 317 sheep and goats, and brought two prisoners back to camp. No cattle were discovered, however, and tracks that were followed up showed that large mobs of animals had been driven towards Lumbwa.¹⁸ With one of the prisoners acting as guide, the column marched south-west for two and a half hours on the nineteenth when detachments, one of which went as far west as Koyo Hill, captured 248 sheep and goats. Patrols sent again into the hills to the west on the following day were no more successful and returned to camp with only 459 sheep and goats and a bull calf. Arap Kongureit, who accompanied a patrol on the march back from his

village, explained the absence of cattle by revealing that his warriors had fled with them towards Limaton's country.¹⁹

The column marched east for four hours on the twenty-first and retraversed much of Tamaswa's country. Houses and grain stores were destroyed in the vicinity of the camp, where a thorn boma was built in order to foil attempts to recover the captured livestock. When Coles consulted Arap Kongureit and the other chiefs on the best way of locating the Camplayo herds, Toruree offered guides to lead patrols to find Arap Chemenga's sheep and goats, and two Nandi women came into camp and said they knew where the cattle had been hidden. Eleven head of cattle and forty-eight sheep and goats were captured on the following day by two patrols, one of which reported that it was fired on by three Nandi riflemen.²⁰ Cooper sent for Chief Terece, who reported that some of Arap Chemenga's warriors had passed through his country and taken a path leading towards Ravine. He claimed that two of his men had been killed in a collision with the fleeing warriors, but Cooper doubted the truth of this disclosure as 'Terece is not a reliable chief'.²¹ Since there seemed little prospect of finding any appreciable quantity of livestock or forcing the warriors to stand and fight, the expedition was called off and returned to Kipture on the twenty-fourth.

The operations took place in country cut almost in two by the track leading down the valley from Kipture to Fort Ternan. This area included the Chebarus section of the Kamelilo in the present-day Nandi Hills area, and also scattered pockets of the same *pororiet* along the fringe of the Kapsiondoi, Kakipoch and Kapchepkendi around Koyo Hill and west of Kapsaos. The country worked over was described by Cooper as very hilly, with stone outcrops on the sides of higher hills and with valleys abundantly watered by small permanent streams. Aloes and thorn trees were found along all the watercourses, but otherwise the country was open, with more scrub and less cultivation towards the south-east. The population was housed in small groups of dwellings and seemed more sparse than around Kipture. The small granaries were almost full, presumably with recently harvested *wimbi* (eleusine), and fair crops of *mtama* (millet) were ripening in the fields. The people were apparently rich in sheep and goats but not in cattle, though Coles surmised that the latter may have been concealed in the steep, wooded ravines leading down from the escarpment face, where it would be difficult and dangerous to attempt to locate them.²² The operations were seemingly confined to the plateau, and patrols that reached the upper slopes of the escarpment did not venture any distance down towards the foothills and plains below Kapsimotwa. The country worked over had not been visited by Cunningham in 1895, and was some distance west of Kamwentowe where Ternan's operations had terminated abruptly in 1897.²²

The results of the expedition, like those of the 1895 and 1897 operations, were mixed and by no means decisive. Kamelilo was invaded four months after the attack on the mail caravan at the beginning of August, and the offending section punished for the raids they were alleged to have committed on Sclater's Road. Many villages were burned down and food stored in houses and granaries destroyed. Standing crops were apparently not slashed, possibly because Coles thought they would be useful if troops were left to occupy the district. Only fifty cattle and 1,100 sheep and goats were captured, so the Nandi auxiliaries proved no more enterprising in this respect than their Masai counterparts in 1897. The warriors made no attempt to harass the columns, and only one detachment had a slight skirmish with the enemy. The Protectorate forces suffered no casualties, and only six Nandi were killed and two taken prisoner. Coles regretted that it had been impossible to engage the warriors in force, and attributed their reluctance to stand and fight to the Nandi chiefs and auxiliary contingents, whose presence with the expeditionary force showed the Kamelilo that 'the government was not fighting alone'. Hobley's interpretation was different: 'it seems at any rate that the much vaunted fighting powers of the Nandi have been much overestimated' and 'that in future they may be treated with contempt as antagonists'.⁵

The most encouraging feature of the expedition was the partial erosion of the hitherto unshakable solidarity of the Nandi. This unity of purpose against the forces of aggression had distinguished them from the Kavirondo, and most other tribes throughout East Africa, and had prevented Kipture officials from imitating the divisive tactics which Hobley employed in the Western part of his district. For the first time during an expedition, a prisoner acted as a guide, and two Nandi women volunteered information concerning the whereabouts of their *pororiet*'s stock. Three leading Kakipoch, Kapchepkendi and Koilegei chiefs accompanied the troops, and a Kapsiondoi chief co-operated with the expedition in the field. Disapproval

of the attitude and conduct of the Kamelilo probably accounts for the willingness of neighbouring sections to fight against them, and for the reluctance of distant *pororosiek* to go to their aid. Kapchepkendi, Kakipoch and others, among or near whom they had settled, had always resented the excessive exclusiveness of the Kamelilo, who refused to join their neighbours at religious and other gatherings and held separate ceremonies at their own shrines (*kapkorosek*). This latent resentment possibly flared up into active hostility²³ when Kamelilo warriors began operating outside their customary raiding areas. This put unoffending inhabitants of the road districts in danger of becoming embroiled with the government, when outrages committed in their areas by the Kamelilo were investigated or punished.^T Coles thought the presence of friendly chiefs and warriors, who were rewarded by presents of livestock from the expedition's spoils, had a marked effect on the less well disposed chiefs of the Nandi country. It was also encouraging that depletion of the Kipture and Fort Ternan garrisons did not lead to outbreaks in other areas. This had enabled Coles to carry out localised punitive measures without endangering caravans on Slater's Road, the Nyando Valley route and the cart track to Bushiri and Port Ugowe.

The principal local objectives were achieved by the expedition, which also gave a general warning to the Nandi that hostile demonstrations against travellers on the Uganda Road would not always go unpunished. In some other respects the operation failed in its purpose or achieved only a partial success. Unlike the leading Kamasia dissidents, the offending Nandi chiefs were not brought to a parley, and none of them was captured or imprisoned in accordance with Johnston's instructions. Although it had been suggested that part of the expeditionary force might be left in Kamelilo after the operations ended, Coles evidently saw no advantage in occupying country devoid of fighting men and livestock. He was however confident that Pereira's presence at Fort Ternan would have a salutary effect upon the Kamelilo, now they had seen that their territory was vulnerable to attack from both north and south. Coles also hoped that the expedition would be a useful lesson to the Nandi friendlies and Kamelilo non-combatants, who had witnessed 'how easily small parties of soldiers scoured the country and brought in cattle'. Johnston accepted the assessment made by Coles, who 'seems to have carried out the expedition ... in a thoroughly able manner'.²⁴ Some of the expedition commander's observations were open to question, however, and the modest results achieved showed he had failed to learn from previous expeditions that the force required, in order to bring the warriors to battle and capture their stock, had to be large and mobile enough to encircle a disaffected district, and deploy several columns to work closely and simultaneously through it.^U

The Kamelilo who had been punished had been concerned only with the incidents on Slater's Road, which was beginning to lose some of its importance. The raid on the Luo villages near the Nyando Valley route, in which the escarpment Kapsile, Kakipoch, Kapchepkendi, and possibly the Lumbwa were allegedly implicated, remained unpunished. Until settled conditions were restored in this area, freedom of movement for railway and telegraph parties, which had been one of Johnston's principal reasons for justifying the expedition, was still in doubt. Furthermore, Holey's and Cooper's prediction, that 'the lesson meted out to the disaffected district will be fruitful in keeping the road safe for the future for small caravans, and in uniting the several chiefs to act loyally to the government', was likely to prove as unduly optimistic as Johnston's claim that 'the Nandi along the railway route' had at last been taught 'to abstain from highway robbery'.^V

NOTES

1. See *NRBR* i, pp. 364-365; cf. R.B. Pugh, *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, iii, p. 751: 'At the end of the century there was a rise in expenditure, previously unparalleled. The taxpayer was more than usually unwilling to meet it, particularly when his sacrifices would have been for the benefit of territories to whose welfare he was commonly indifferent'.
2. Inserted by H.St.J. Brodrick, Parliamentary Under-Secretary, in the draft prepared by Hill, who had misgivings about Johnston's appointment as Commander-in-Chief.
3. See *NRBR* i, p. 371.
4. Hill proposed £2,500 for a one-year assignment; Salisbury's amended salary figure of £3,000 a year was reduced by the Treasury to that paid to a Major-General in charge of a first-class district in India (FO

- 2/235, 236). Berkeley received £1,450 a year and Johnston's successor, Colonel J. Hayes Sadler, £1,500. Cf *The Times*, cited in ZG, 30.10.1901, 6.11.1901, on Johnston's free hand in B.C.A. and his transfer to Uganda as a 'consultant specialist'.
5. Johnston thought 'Her Majesty's Service in Uganda was just as urgent', as the Boer War, which he expected to be over in three weeks, and refused applications from officers to rejoin their regiments in South Africa.
 6. The designation OC Station was changed to Collector on 18.10.1899 to avoid confusion with OC Troops.
 7. When, as the result of a sale in Busoga (Uganda Land Registry No. 16), negotiated by Chief Luba with W.R. Trefusis and P.W. Dowse and approved by Foaker, Ternan asked Collectors on 28.6.1899 (ESA A/5/6) to outline the land tenure arrangements in their districts. J.P. Wilson stated on 1.8.1899 (ESA A/4/21) that land was considered by the Nandi as 'commonwealth property' which, if unoccupied, could be grazed by all. Chiefs claimed no particular area or acreage, and any man could cultivate unoccupied land which then became his property until it, and the buildings on it, were abandoned. He noted that no land had been bought or leased by Europeans, to which Hobley minuted: 'what I know of Nandi, no chief is of sufficient importance, or whose title to a particular area is as generally recognized, than any transfer he may make to a European would have any legal basis'. He and Wilson replied in much the same terms as far as the Kavirondo and Masai were concerned, though Hobley noted on 26.7.1899 (ESA A/4/19) that some Kavirondo chiefs had more control in land matters than their Masai and Nandi counterparts.
 8. G. Wilson (August); Captain W.W. Chitty (October); Rev. G.R. Blackledge and H.B. Lewis (C.M.S.), H.H. Baker and two parties of Baganda traders (November).
 9. Johnston's huge entourage severely taxed Ravine's food resources.
 10. Mailmen between Naivasha and Ravine were escorted by one askari.
 11. Johnston noted, 'to our great surprise they all attended on the day appointed'; he did not issue a similar summons to offending or friendly Nandi chiefs.
 12. Despite his inability to help Grant in July, Martin told Johnston that the garrison could be found from Ravine. The discussion with Suk chiefs about a post in their country, which was noted by Johnston on 15.3.1901 (FOCP 7823/63), was not reported at the time; and RSD does not record that Suk representatives visited Ravine while he was there.
 13. Lord Delamere's companion, Dr A.E. Atkinson, and two other sportsmen were in the Baringo area while Johnston was at Ravine; Captain H.O. Francis and Mayes were organizing a 'trading' expedition to the north from Kipture in September and October, but Francis fled the country to avoid proceedings brought against him for misconduct.
 14. See *NRBR* i, pp. 370, 374; Ch. 6 and 12.
 15. Possibly Arab Kimenja mentioned by Hobley in *Eastern Uganda*, p. 59, Johnston informed Coles on 8.11.1899 (ESA A/5/8) that Campilayo was in prison; this was not reported to the Foreign Office or recorded elsewhere.
 16. According to G.R. Sandford, *Administrative and Political History of the Masai Reserve*, p. 4, forty Purko Masai from Naivasha took part; the remaining thirty-five were presumably Uasin Gishu from Ravine.
 17. He presumably marched via the Mitete Valley, if Arap Sertu was the Kapchepkendi chief, Arap Sirtoi, who lived about ten miles east of Soba.
 18. The Kamelilo had strong links with the Kipkaige and Ngetunyo *pororosiek* in Lumbwa.
 19. Probably Arabkorongoret of the Kapsiondoi (Hobley, *ibid.*, p. 58) who are reputedly an offshoot of the Murk ap Tuk or Kakimno *pororosiek*, both of which lived in the forest in and near Limaton's country.
 20. The second reference in campaign reports of guns being used; see *NRBR* i, p. 141. Twenty warriors from Arap Sertu's *pororiet* arrived on the twenty-first and offered their services.
 21. Possibly Teres, a Kapchepkendi chief who 'came in' in May 1897; after languishing in prison for eight months, he organized a series of raids for which Jackson, Cooper and others asked for a punitive expedition; see *NRBR* i, pp. 320, 335-6.
 22. See *NRBR* i, pp. 145, 265, 276.
 23. Friendlies again participated in operations against the Kamelilo in March 1900 (see *NRBR* ii, pp. 49-50) and in April-June 1903. When the southern sections were being moved after the 1905 expedition, the Kakipoch chief, Arap Cheno, asked for an area away from the Kamelilo and Kapchepkendi, 'who always give trouble and are bad people'.
 24. In October 1900 he was less commendatory and described the expedition as 'fairly successful'. Foreign Office approval was given on 24.1.1900 (FOCP 7404/26); Hill evidently considered that casualties

inflicted did not constitute 'blood-letting', and commented (FO 2/204): 'shows the value of military officers when they interest themselves, as they should do, in civil matters - a little praise will do no harm'.

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CHAPTER 4

First steps towards ordered government

While an attempt was being made in November 1899 to punish the Kamelilo for their misdeeds, the rudimentary administrative machinery functioned as usual in districts outside the conflict area. Food purchases were made at Kipture and Bushiri,¹ and Nandi runners were entrusted with important messages even while operations against the Kamelilo were in progress. Cooper tried to establish the messenger service on a more regular footing by offering runners a bonus of a sheep for completing six journeys. From the loot taken during the expedition, thirty animals were retained for distribution to the runners; chiefs and warriors who accompanied Coles were given cattle and small stock respectively; seven head of cattle and 150 sheep and goats were sent to reward Pereira's auxiliaries and supplement food supplies at Fort Ternan; 200 sheep and goats were allocated to Ravine; and the balance was sold to officials and soldiers at Kipture.² Kiturier, Toruree and Arap Monde acknowledged receipt of the first substantial rewards ever paid to Nandi chiefs by presenting Cooper with seven beasts, the second time within three months that some of the leaders living near the fort had shown their approval of the Collector's conduct in this significant way.^A Elsewhere in the district, railway staking gangs were working between Kedowa and Lumbwa, and caravans passed unmolested along Sclater's Road and through the Nyando Valley. Telegraph construction parties were almost at Kibigori, and approaching the area where the unpunished raid on the Kano villages had taken place three months earlier.^B

Johnston and Coles were impressed with the progress which Cooper, the soldier-administrator, had made in fostering better relations with the chiefs near his station. The Special Commissioner nevertheless decided that siting the new capital and investigating the Nyando Valley route were more important considerations than touring Nandi, and meeting the friendly chiefs in order to consolidate the progress Cooper³ had made among certain sections of the tribe. For the first time since the founding of Kipture in 1896 the prospects of some lasting understanding with the Nandi were promising, but Johnston failed to take advantage of them.^C When he left Ravine on 22 November, he travelled for a short distance over the road which Martin was making to connect Ravine with the railway route. After investigating the potentialities of a site for the new capital in the Londiani area, Johnston proceeded down the Nyando Valley to Port Ugowe, which he reached on the 29th. During the course of his journey, he crossed the eastern and southern fringe of Nandi, but did not visit district headquarters or any thickly populated parts of the tribal territory. Though he reported at the time that the 'local natives' he saw were 'absolutely friendly',⁴ he later recalled that 'there were no resident settled natives dwelling along this line of route, no natives from whom food could be purchased between Kikuyu ... and these first outlying villages of the coast population round the Victoria Nyanza'. While Johnston's party was at Kitoto's, his secretary witnessed the 'great excitement' that was aroused by the appearance of a rainbow over the Nandi escarpment. The Luo declared it was an infallible notification that their villages would be raided that night. Cunningham observed that the Luo lived in daily and nightly terror of such raids, and that many of the local omens were connected with 'the incursions of the hill hordes'.^D

Johnston apparently saw only a few Nandi in the course of his journey and made no effort to meet any of the chiefs. At Naivasha he had discussed local problems with Masai leaders; at Ravine he had called a meeting of Kamasia chiefs; and later in Kavirondo he conferred with senior representatives of the Nilotic and Bantu tribes. But he gained no first-hand knowledge of the Nandi and, judging from some of his pronouncements about them, the information he received from Martin, Coles and Hobley was not entirely reliable. Indeed, Johnston himself had some misgivings about his superficial knowledge of affairs in parts of the Eastern Province. He had expected Ternan to meet him at Ravine but the Deputy Commissioner insisted that he could not leave Entebbe, where he said there was no senior officer to take over, and where there was 'always a chance of something happening which requires immediate action'. The Special Commissioner thought that Jackson and Lieutenant-Colonel J.T. Evatt could have managed in Buganda if Ternan had brought the draft estimates for discussion at Ravine, so that Johnston 'could then have proceeded to visit in detail the

eastern part of the Protectorate before coming to Kampala'.^E

Some of the Special Commissioner's decisions affecting the Nandi were taken before he left Ravine, notably an extension of the boundaries of the Nandi District, and a reappraisal of the forces that were needed to maintain law and order in the Eastern Province. Under the boundary revision proposals Johnston created four administrative districts: Mau, Baringo, Nandi and Kavirondo, with headquarters at Naivasha, Ravine, Port Ugowe and Mumias respectively. The Nandi District had not previously been precisely defined, but had consisted of that part of the country between the Mau and Kavirondo which was thought to be occupied by the Nandi. The absence of any clear definition had not been of much moment in the past since the area under anything approaching effective administration was much smaller in extent than the territory that was known to be under Nandi occupation. Johnston's proposals fixed the eastern boundary on the watershed between the rivers flowing westwards to Lake Victoria and those emptying into Lakes Baringo and Rudolf. The mainstream of the River Nzoia formed the northern boundary, and in the south the boundary was coterminous with the northern limits of the Masu District. The escarpment provided a natural boundary on the west as far as the most south-westerly direction to Asembo on the northern shore of Ugowe Bay.^F

Administration of the part of the former Kavirondo District was transferred by this arrangement to the Nandi District, in order to facilitate the 'smooth working of judicial affairs in connection with the advance of the railway through the new Nandi District, a district which really has very little in common with Kavirondo proper', (sc. the Bantu areas north of Ugowe Bay which were to be administered from Mumias). Gorges, Martin and Hobley retained command at Naivasha, Ravine and Mumias respectively; and, for the enlarged Nandi District, Johnston selected 'Major Cooper to be civil as well as military office in charge ... at any rate for the present'. The new district boundaries were based on geographical features and administrative convenience rather than on ethnological considerations, with the result that sections of the same tribe were placed in two or more districts, and members of the Kalenjin group were to be administered from every station in the province.⁵ The central feature of the new Nandi District was the Uganda Railway and the problems of control connected with it. This district, which was to be placed in charge of a military officer, was evidently regarded as territory to be policed in the interests of the railway rather than country to be administered for the benefit of its inhabitants. Thus the change of boundaries did not alter the administration's view that Nandi was primarily a military commitment on the lines of communication to Uganda.

When Johnston considered the draft estimates for 1900-1901, he decided the Protectorate no longer needed the expensive military organization which Ternan had built up after the mutiny. In the changed circumstances outlined in his instructions, the Special Commissioner felt that law and order could be maintained at a decreased cost if the number of soldiers was reduced, and some of their duties were taken over by a force of armed constabulary on lower rates of pay.⁶ Under Johnston's reorganization scheme three military districts, Masai, Uganda and Nile, were established, Nandi being placed in the first and Kavirondo in the second of these commands. In the Masai Military District, the proposed post in Baringo was to be staffed entirely by police, some of whom were to be recruited from Sudanese mutineers imprisoned at Ravine;⁷ and Lieutenant Arbuthnot was ordered to bring the Ravine garrison up to strength by enrolling twenty-one recruits from the local tribesmen.⁸ Johnston decided the new Nandi Administrative District required separate consideration from a military point of view, owing to the importance of safeguarding road, telegraph and railway interests in the Nyando Valley. He discussed the problem with Colonel Coles, OC of the Masai Military District, who recommended that vacancies in the Naivasha and Fort Ternan establishments should be filled by local recruits. He thought there was excellent fighting material among the Nandi though he was doubtful whether they would prove amenable to army discipline. In order to resolve this doubt, which was similar to that expressed by E.A.P. officers in connection with the Masai, he suggested that a small cadre of warriors should be tried as police on road patrols, with a view to transferring them to the army if the experiment proved successful. Coles, who was evidently not impressed by Ternan's views about the suitability of Baganda for military employment in Nandi, stressed that only Sudanese should be used if troops from outside the district were required to garrison Kipture and Fort Ternan, or for operations against the Nandi or Lumbwa. Johnston

concurred and authorized the experiment with police patrols,⁸ because it would lessen the military commitment, enable troops to be withdrawn from subsidiary posts, and provide a reservoir of army recruits. After discussions with Hobley at Port Ugowe, Johnston abandoned his plan to put Cooper in charge of the enlarged Nandi district, and decided that Hobley should retain control of both Nandi and Kavirondo.¹¹

In the short space of his two months' stay in the Eastern Province Johnston investigated a multitude of problems, on many of which he took steps to have his decisions implemented without the prior approval of the Foreign Office. When he left Port Ugowe on 3 December for Kampala by way of Mumias⁹ and Busoga, his assessment of the state and potentialities of the Eastern Province was generally favourable and in many respects optimistic. He was satisfied the political officers were following sound policies which were certain to bear fruit in the fulness of time. The groundwork done at district level helped him achieve a number of successes during his discussions with leaders of major tribal groups, with the notable exception of the Nandi and Lumbwa. Masai elders had given him an assurance that they considered their lands belonged to the British government, subject to certain grazing rights remaining vested in the tribe. Dissident Kamasia chiefs had attended at his summons, and had seemingly accepted the punishment imposed upon them for their misdeeds. The chiefs near Port Ugowe were friendly, and Johnston was surprised that 'so very little relatively in the way of robberies of, or attack on, caravans has taken place', as a result of the 'sudden current of trade which has set in towards Ugowe Bay', which 'not unnaturally has aroused the cupidity amongst the more lawless of the local tribes'. This happy state of affairs he attributed in part to the fact that the 'civil and military officers alike who have been residing for the past two years in these countries have done a great deal by their personal influence to bring the natives under control without undue exercise of force, and have made friends of them by the exercise of tact and patience'. Johnston thought the considerable improvement that had been reported to him in the relations between the administration and the Nandi and Lumbwa had been brought about by the tactful manner in which Coles, Cooper and Pereira had dealt with the chiefs. While acknowledging that Lumbwa raids on the people living in the lower part of the Nyando Valley¹⁰ posed a threat to the railway and would have to be sharply repressed, Johnson was gratified that a large section of the tribe had been 'weaned over to absolute friendliness by their intercourse with the British officers in question'. Among the Nandi, the assistance which had been given by some of the influential chiefs against their refractory fellow tribesmen in Kamelilo augured well for a better understanding with that reputedly unco-operative tribe.¹ Johnston's optimistic review of what had been achieved in the Eastern Province was only tempered by the inefficiency and inadequacy of the transport service, and the appalling delays on the construction of the *William Mackinnon*.

In addition to dealing with the immediate problems, Johnston considered the Province's prospective revenue-earning capacity, when development measures were instituted after pacification was completed, and trading facilities had improved with the help of a reorganized transport service. He was satisfied that many of the tribes who had benefited from British protection for several years were now in a position to pay tax; and that others would soon become so once they had been brought under effective control. He proposed to ascertain the resources of two of the more remote areas by establishing a post near Lake Baringo, and by sending Gorges¹¹ on an exploratory journey from Naivasha through Lumbwa and Kisii to Lake Victoria.¹ Traders of all races were to be encouraged to start businesses at government posts, where land would be made available for their premises.¹² Finally, Johnston envisaged that the open spaces of the Nandi Plateau, a vaguely defined block of country extending from the western Nandi escarpment to the Mau, would prove suitable for European and Indian settlers, and provide scope for agricultural enterprises and increased revenue. In a tentative sketch of the policy he proposed to pursue, he considered that foreign settlers should be excluded from the Masai grazing grounds so long as the tribe continued to co-operate with the government. Elsewhere, he intended to define the boundaries of land under tribal occupation, confirm the claims of the inhabitants to areas where they had occupational or grazing rights, and add a reasonable extension to such areas in order to provide for an anticipated increase of population as a result of settled rule. In order to regularize the government's power to dispose of the land, he hoped to acquire the necessary rights by making treaties¹³ with tribal leaders, and persuaded the Foreign Office to increase

from £568 to £1,000 the grant in the 1900-1901 estimates for 'Presents to Chiefs'.^K All Johnston's hopes and intentions depended of course on 'the growth of tranquility'. He was apparently satisfied that law and order would be maintained throughout the Eastern Province, and that district officials had adequate forces at their disposal to deal with sporadic, localized opposition to their authority.

When Johnston left the Eastern Province to grapple with the 'main task' awaiting him at Entebbe, only two major political problems remained unsolved: the threat to the Nyando Valley road and railway route, about which he did nothing at the time; and punishment of the 'coast pirates' living on the northern shore of Ugowe Bay. To deal with this latter and more pressing challenge, Johnston authorized Coles and Hobley to concert punitive measures to bring the offending tribes to their bearings. In October, Hobley had intended dealing with the Uyoma and Seme 'in a quiet manner' by police action; but, after the Uyoma killed fourteen Baganda traders, and Hyde Baker's canoes were attacked when on a voyage from Port Ugowe to Entebbe with a consignment of specie in November,¹⁴ Johnston agreed that the Mumias and Port Ugowe garrisons should undertake a combined operation so as to ensure the safe passage of vessels through Ugowe Bay. In order to achieve this object, he declared that it would be necessary to extend to the Seme and Uyoma 'the same lesson as that given to the Nandi'.^L In making this declaration, he was either under a misapprehension regarding the results of the localized and indecisive operation against the Kamelilo, or misinformed about the extent and severity of the projected expedition against the Luo pirates.

The two columns of the Uyoma expedition consisted of seven Europeans,¹⁵ eighty-five soldiers, one maxim section, 100 auxiliaries armed with muzzle-loaders, and some 700 Kavirondo¹⁶ and Masai spearmen. The operations, which lasted for nine days, began on 16 December and ranged over the extensive tract of territory occupied by the Sakwa, Uyoma, Asembo and Seme. Government casualties were one corporal killed and a few allies wounded; Luo losses were estimated at 250 killed or wounded. A number of canoes were captured, a few villages burned and a small quantity of grain destroyed. The number of animals captured, 2,589 head of cattle and 18,700 sheep and goats, was far larger than in any previous expedition in the Eastern Province, and four times as great as the total confiscated in the three expeditions against the Nandi. The tally was large enough for the Foreign Office to question whether punishment on this scale would not seriously deplete food reserves in the disaffected districts for several years. Peace was granted to the Sakwa during the course of the operations, and emissaries from the other tribes were ordered to proceed to Port Ugowe, where they accepted Hobley's settlement terms. The defeated sections promised to cease hostile activities and allow traders and travellers access to their country and Ugowe Bay, to obey administrative orders, and supply labour on demand.¹⁷ The introduction of a taxation system was explained to the defeated chiefs, who were informed that collection would be deferred until their people had recovered from the losses they had sustained during the expedition.^M

The operations secured redress for outrages against official and other parties, and demonstrated the government's overwhelming power to tribes who had set its authority at naught and refused to supply food and porters at the behest of officials at Mumias and Port Ugowe. Six months after a government station was established in their country, the northern Luo were forced to submit and accept peace terms which seriously curtailed their freedom of action. The protection afforded by the bush-covered neck of the Uyoma peninsula had rendered its inhabitants immune from attacks by their neighbours, who had consequently come to regard them as the strongest and most truculent tribe on the northern shore of Ugowe Bay. Hobley hoped the crushing defeat they had suffered would have the same effect on the Uyoma and their allies as the expeditions against the Kitosh and their neighbours in 1895.¹⁸ His hopes proved well-founded, as the Uyoma operations deterred other Luo sections from opposing the government,¹⁹ and probably strengthened their reluctance to make common cause with the Nandi in 1900.²⁰ Johnston echoed Hobley's hopes that the severe punishment would ensure travellers freedom from molestation, and that the Luo would 'enter into thoroughly peaceful and submissive relations with the Protectorate'. Hobley's part in the settlement was praised by the Special Commissioner, who was particularly impressed by his 'constant attempts to make the people understand that the punishment inflicted on them was inflicted with reluctance, and that our real aim is to make friends with them if they will consent to abide by the laws of the Protectorate'.^N

Apart from the political success of the Uyoma expedition, which 'cost practically nothing', the government profited considerably from the captured stock. Oxen were allocated to the Transport Department and railway, 730 head of cattle were to be sent to the new government stock farm near the proposed capital on the Mau and some of the remainder were disposed of at Port Ugowe and Nairobi.²¹ Part of the booty was used for political purposes in Uganda and the E.A.P. In the former case, 100 head of cattle were earmarked for a present to Apolo Kagwa for his assistance in securing Baganda acceptance of the Uganda Agreement; and in the latter case, Commissioner Arthur Hardinge presented Lenana with thirty cows and five bulls as a reward for restraining Masai warriors from raiding in order to recoup the losses they had suffered through the rinderpest epidemic. In addition to these gifts to influential government supporters, 700 sheep²² were sent to Busoga to help relieve the severe famine in which several thousand people died of starvation. Hobley's Kavirondo and Masai friendlies were rewarded at the expense of the defeated sections and 200 cattle were farmed out with Mumia and Odera²³ in order to boost their prestige among their followers and neighbours.⁰

The benefits derived from the Uyoma operations were much greater and more lasting than the results achieved in the previous month by the third Nandi expedition. Although the regular forces engaged in both cases were of similar strength, the losses sustained by the Luo were incomparably greater both as regards 'blood-letting' and booty.²⁴ The Uyoma and their neighbours were able to muster considerably larger forces than the Kamelilo, but this advantage was offset by the easier terrain in which the Uyoma operations took place and the two-pronged assault by land and water. The inexperience of the Luo warrior leaders also contributed to their discomfiture: the Sakwa were surprised by a night march; and the Uyoma and Seme who were facing disciplined riflemen for the first time, adopted the same tactics as they practised against tribal enemies armed only with spears, and on one occasion approached over open ground to within fifty yards of the troops.²⁵ Johnston attributed much of the expedition's success to the auxiliaries, whose counterparts in the Kamelilo operations had been much less successful: 'the regular soldiers have been of comparatively little use; the real work has been done by the native allies, who were probably quite naked except for a bandolier or a cartridge pouch, but who managed with the aid of Snider rifles and their own native spears, to encounter and defeat an enemy whom the regular soldiers rarely saw'.^P

The political results of the two expeditions were manifestly different. Acts of piracy and unpunished outrages perpetrated by the Luo were avenged, and peace was made with the offending tribes, who accepted government direction and discussed the imposition of taxation. Events were to prove not only that the lesson had been well learned by the participants and the rest of the Luo,²⁶ but that Hobley, by a single stroke, had achieved the same personal ascendancy over the Nilotic inhabitants of his province as he had established over the Bantu in the North.^Q The same was not the case in Nandi, where the Kamelilo operations were as inconclusive as those of 1895 and 1897, and the troops had been withdrawn before they could force the enemy to sue for peace. The 'Nandi problem' remained unsolved, the attack on the Kano villages unavenged, and the slight punishment inflicted on the Kamelilo proved no deterrent to the rest of the tribe. Johnston indicated his satisfaction with the Uyoma settlement by authorizing the return of some of their breeding stock to the Luo, 'so they can regain prosperity'.²⁷ and counselled Hobley to act towards them in such a way that they did not merely 'regard us as a body of raiders stronger than themselves, but equally keen about ravaging other peoples' flocks and herds'.^R No such concessions had been made to the Kamelilo, nor were they granted the privilege accorded to the Luo of redeeming some of their lost animals by working for the government.

In Kamasia, Mitei brought in two small tusks of ivory as well as the twenty-three animals which Johnston had ordered him to produce, but Kimamet failed to pay his fine of only three head of cattle.²⁸ As Martin lacked the resources to carry out the punishment which Johnston had authorized for non-compliance with his sentence, Coles left Kipture for Ravine on 12 December with a detachment from the Nandi garrison. Sixty-seven regulars, accompanied by Uasin Gishu Masai levies, worked through Kimamet's country near Lake Baringo for three days, and captured ninety-five head of cattle and 2,000 sheep and goats without meeting with any opposition. Johnston warned Martin that he did 'not want the Kamasia punished too severely, or this will turn them into permanent raiders', and added that 'he would sooner give all the stock away rather than they should suffer from hunger ...

and be unable to pay tax'. Twenty-five head of cattle and 100 sheep were offered to Mitei, who was to be told that if he tried to keep order he would be recognized as the head chief of the Kamasia.²⁹ Martin was also to select other chiefs and give them his backing in ruling their districts. The Kamasia and Uasin Gishu were to be taxed to pay for the police force which protected them, though Johnston did not wish this innovation to lead to unnecessary wars and raids. If punitive measures had to be taken against an obdurate section, Kamasia and Uasin Gishu were to be promised that they would be rewarded 'by a proportion of the loot'. On pacification generally, Martin was enjoined to be 'most careful never to punish except when the punishment is richly deserved and when the offence has been quite unprovoked. When you do punish, punish severely but be most careful that your cause is a just one'.³⁰ Thus Johnston was authorizing a similar policy in Kamasia to that which Hobley had followed for several years in Kavirondo, and Jackson had unsuccessfully urged upon Berkeley as the only effective method of dealing with the Nandi.³⁰

The raid against Kimamet did not put a stop to anti-government activities in Kamasia. On the day Coles' expedition returned to Ravine, a raid was made on a Uasin Gishu Masai encampment, probably as a reprisal for the part they had played in the operations against Kimamet. Twelve days later two Swahili guards at the Transport Department stable at Bridge Camp near Ravine were murdered, and the buildings fired. Martin thought the latter outrage was the work of Mitei, who continued to maintain friendly relations with Kimamet, and had allegedly boasted that he would recoup the substantial fine he had paid at Johnston's command. While Martin investigated the incidents, Kimamet and his headman were detained at the station guard-room, and bands of Kamasia and Nandi spearmen were reported to be prowling in the nearby forests. On the night of 4 January 1900, the prowlers carried off some cattle from a Uasin Gishu kraal close to the fort. Martin, who commanded one of the stations which, in Johnston's view, were not likely to stand in danger of present attack so their protection could be left entirely to police, authorized the Masai warriors near the fort to seize all the cattle they could find in the forests. Forty beasts were captured, and Martin sent word to the Kamasia chiefs that unless their conduct improved he would 'let loose' all the Masai with leave to loot at will.³¹ These reprisal raids were not repudiated by Johnston,³¹ who also remained silent about the unsettled conditions around Ravine and the alleged alliance between the Kamasia and Nandi warriors.

Some of the Nandi warriors sought an outlet for their raiding propensities in the Baringo District, but within the tribal territory settled conditions continued throughout December. Four hundred Kamelilo sheep and goats, some of which were intended for the Uasin Gishu levies who accompanied Arbuthnot's patrol during the Kamelilo operations, were driven from Kipture to Ravine in two batches. One of these was entrusted to three Nandi herdsmen with an escort of two soldiers; the other to two unescorted Nandi, who reported that twenty-five animals had died on the journey, a statement that Martin seemingly accepted without comment. Exceptionally large amounts of food were purchased at Kipture and Bushiri,³² some small payments were made for local labour at the former station, and considerable quantities of goods were transferred to Fort Ternan. The small body of warriors who had been recruited for service in the police received training in drill and the use of Snider rifles. Although Cooper was gratified with their progress and certain the experiment would prove successful, he warned that 'the material is good as far as physique and pluck goes but the traditional reaving character of the men must first be overcome, before they can act as efficient police'. As a change from drill, which was likely to prove irksome at first, the warriors' 'extraordinary powers of travelling' were utilized whenever it was necessary for urgent messages to be sent to Ravine or Mumias.³³

Operations under the direction of railway officials proceeded peacefully in the Nyando Valley throughout December.³³ Staking parties were approaching Lumbwa, and the temporary telegraph reached Port Ugowe and was continued on to Mumias. Commander Whitehouse's survey party returned to the Lake with an additional vessel, the *Good Intent*, and on the 20th the keel of the *William Mackinnon* was laid. None of the railway authorities approached local officials for escorts to protect caravans and working parties or for patrols to safeguard the telegraph wire from theft.³⁴ The cart convoys through Bushiri were reorganized and a weekly service inaugurated between Kipture and Port Ugowe. In order to attain his target figure of 1,200 loads a month, Johnson asked that literate headmen should replace the uneducated Swahilis who supervised the difficult section between Kipture and Port Ugowe.

Despite the increased quantities of food being bought from the Nandi, Cooper commandeered thirty donkeys to carry supplies from Kakamega to Kipture, where the loads were transferred to carts for the journey to Ravine,^W which was still mainly dependent on Kavirondo for food.

The Special Commissioner's intervention in the transport field did little to improve the service or assist its officers. His stubborn efforts to relieve the 'Railway Company' of responsibility for the construction of the *William Mackinnon*, which he considered was 'more urgently needed for the welfare and communications of the Protectorate than anything else', caused confusion and friction at Port Ugowé, until the Foreign Office ruled firmly in favour of the railway.³⁴ Johnston criticized the conduct of Cape Boy drivers and British NCOs and favoured the reintroduction of porters to replace 'this detestable system of waggons and draught animals and veterinary assistants'. As a first step in implementing these proposals, he asked for the appointment of three farrier sergeants to be cancelled so that a sapper NCO could be sent out to take charge of a road and bridge repairing party.³⁵ Another of the changes Johnston was contemplating was the abandonment of Bushiri in favour of the Nyando Valley route, so that the time-consuming haul through Nandi could be eliminated.^X

The Uganda Transport Department, which had been reorganized in November 1899 with D.J. Wilson replacing Dr Mackinnon as Director, was divided into two sections in January 1900. The first tasks of Captain Johnson, who supervised operations west of railhead from his headquarters at Kipture, were to devise better ways of running this section, and to estimate the cost of a direct track from Nakuru to the Lake. He was also to report on the practicability and cost of completing the road from Ravine to the Nyando Valley and thence to Port Ugowé. The Special Commissioner, who thought the sensible thing would be to use the railway route, commented that 'Nandi, except as a military post, really scarcely requires to exist for transport purposes'. He evidently considered it was time for Kipture's role as a transport centre on the Uganda Road to be changed to that of a garrison post, whose principal function was to keep the Nandi in order. Martin was told to discourage private parties from travelling along the new road from Ravine to the Nyando Valley, until the route had been investigated by Johnson and sites for the new capital and stock farm were marked out. Travellers were to be diverted at Molo, where Martin could offer them police escort on payment of a small fee, although Johnston did not think the danger of attack on this route was sufficient to warrant Martin insisting on parties being given such protection. At the other end of the province, Bagnall had re-opened the porter track from Mumias to Busoga with the help of almost all the chiefs of the country through which it passed.^Y

Although at the beginning of January mail runners, small caravans and large mobs of cattle passed uneventfully between Ravine and Port Ugowé,³⁶ Martin considered conditions along Sclater's Road were sufficiently unsettled for him to provide ten soldiers as escort and night guards for Father Plunkett's caravan of twelve Mill Hill priests. At Kipture the caravan leader received a message from Father Kestens saying that 230 of his parishioners were waiting with him at Mumias to act as porters for the journey to Kampala.³⁷ The missionaries passed safely through Nandi, where they bought meal and potatoes from the people, who promised 'they would come to learn the religion of the Great God whenever a mission should be opened³⁸ in their country'.^Z Martin's fears proved to be well-founded, for a mail party was attacked on the road between Kipture and Ravine only a few days after the Fathers left Nandi. The attackers were allegedly Kamasia who retired after sixteen rounds had been fired at them by the escort.

No incidents were reported in the Nyando Valley except a Lumbwa raid on some of Kitoto's villages. Railway staking parties had passed Lumbwa and were approaching Fort Ternan, where the experienced Capt. Pereira was relieved by a young lieutenant, P.W.T.H. Wortham. Barton Wright spent three days on the Nandi escarpment removing trees which W.B. Cowham had felled earlier in the month in order to provide timber for the launching ways for the *William Mackinnon*. A large number of trees must have been cut as Wright's party was unable to move them all, and those that remained had to be left for Brown to haul into Port Ugowé with the help of some of the Uyoma cattle which had been trained as draught oxen.^{AA} Farther south the lake survey parties made their first contact with the Kisii (Gusii). Recording their reputation as a warlike tribe, Commander Whitehouse noted that 'all round the coast from Nyakach to Kadem, natives pointed in the same direction, and spoke of this tribe as they do of the Nandi'. He also observed: 'The Wanandi are a very warlike race;

the finest young man I ever saw in Africa was in Nandi; he passed us carrying his shield and spears, walking as if he owned the country and knew it'. Whitehouse's survey report, in which he commented on a German post within the British sphere in Utegi, from which a punitive column had been sent into Karungu,³⁹ focussed attention on events south of the Nyando Valley. Gorges' journey from Naivasha to Lake Victoria brought the first reliable information about an extensive tract of unadministered territory, where trading caravans from Mombasa were often threatened though German parties were allowed to pass without opposition.^{BB} The German commandant from Shirati, Lieutenant A. von Wulffen, called on Hobley at Port Ugowe at the beginning of January, and it became evident that the territory south of Ugowe Bay could not be treated indefinitely as no-man's land.

In the administered parts of his district, Hobley was preoccupied with preparations for implementing Johnston's tax proposals. The Special Commissioner had discussed tentative arrangements for their introduction when he passed through Port Ugowe, but no written instructions had been issued for Hobley's⁴⁰ guidance, presumably because Johnston did not wish to commit himself officially until the Baganda leaders had been consulted.^{CC} Johnston's preliminary proposals distinguished between districts 'where we have never been obliged to impose our control by force of arms', and those 'where we have had to establish a military occupation owing to unprovoked hostility on the part of the natives'. The friendly nomad tribes of the Eastern Province, whose chiefs had been invited in their discussions with Johnston to suggest some form of tribute suitable to their way of life, were placed in a separate category. The Special Commissioner enunciated as a guiding principle that 'at present I only intend to impose tax when a country is under our direct control, or where it is controlled by friendly chiefs, willing to cooperate with us in this matter'. In fact 'no Government, no taxation!' Although Hobley had been left with the impression that a tax of two rupees was to be levied on every hut, the rate was eventually fixed at three rupees, and the gun tax at four rupees.⁴¹ The Special Commissioner ignored Hobley's representations that the lower rate should be levied in his district because of the poverty of most of its inhabitants. The co-operation of the chiefs in operating the scheme was to be secured by paying them a commission of ten per cent on the tax they collected.^{DD}

Johnston reported that he had 'consulted almost all the tribes and chiefs on my way through the Eastern part of the Protectorate to Kampala', and claimed that the leading chiefs had assented to the tax which he was satisfied their people were able to pay in cash, saleable produce, or by engaging for one month's work on government projects. He stressed that the tax would only be imposed on a tribe when the time was opportune, and that its imposition and collection would be carried out with 'discretion, caution and patience'. No action would be taken against those who refused to pay, and the only sanction he proposed to invoke was the withdrawal of protection and help from those who were unwilling to contribute towards their cost. In view of these qualifications, he was convinced the proposals would not lead to a 'series of native wars or boundary expeditions for the sole reason of recovering the tax'. The Foreign Office also emphasized the need for caution and the avoidance of friction,⁴² and instructed the Special Commissioner that the steps he took to implement his proposals should 'at first ... be of a tentative nature, so as not to commit the Administration to enforcing the taxation in the event of its meeting with serious opposition'.^{EE}

One of the conditions under which peace had been offered to the Luo and Kamasia was a promise to pay tax as soon as they recovered from the effects of the expedition. In the case of the Baluyia, Hobley was instructed to transfer Galt, who had operated a similar scheme under Johnston in B.C.A., to Mumias so that the tax could be collected in the Kavirondo District by the end of the year. Johnston's despatch gave no clear guidance about the category in which the Nandi were to be placed for taxation purposes. Although such control as the government exercised over the Nandi had been imposed, and was maintained, 'by force of arms', the garrisons at Kipture, Bushiri and Fort Ternan scarcely amounted to a 'military occupation' entitling Johnston to claim that 'sovereignty has wholly passed to us'.⁴³ The Nandi did not qualify as nomads, and presumably fell into the category of tribes upon whom tax could be levied because an official had been placed over them, but against whom sanctions would not be invoked until they sought 'protection and help' against the assaults of their enemies. Johnston had no doubts on the matter, however, and Hobley was instructed that the system which Galt was to initiate at Mumias 'must be put in force in Nandi country as soon as convenient'. This instruction ignored the fact that the Nandi chiefs had not

discussed the matter with the Special Commissioner, nor had they promised district officials to co-operate in securing payment from the people. Presumably the proposals were to be explained by Hobley before the tax was imposed, although he was not instructed to make these explanations nor given any guidance on the procedure to be adopted in areas that had never been visited by a district officer. This omission was probably not lost on Hobley, who commented that not even Odera and Mumia, the two most powerful Luo and Baluya chiefs, were influential enough to collect tax without the backing of police escorts, while all the other chiefs admitted that their power was 'most limited'. Before it would be possible to institute a systematic method of tax gathering, under which every section would be visited in turn by an administrative officer accompanied by the chief and an armed escort, Hobley considered that police contingents of forty-five to fifty men would be needed at Mumias, Port Ugowe and Kipture. Besides being employed on tax collection, routine station duties and mail escorts, these contingents would also furnish a compact body of about thirty trained men who would be ready to go immediately to the scene of any local disturbance. If this suggestion was accepted, Hobley was convinced that tax collection could be carried out smoothly, and that the Kavirondo districts would become 'practically independent of the military for law and order'.^{FF}

Hobley left on 31 January to take his ailing wife to railhead on her way home. This was his first journey up the Nyando Valley through country which had been placed under his jurisdiction in the previous July. Before leaving Port Ugowe, he notified Entebbe of the arrangements he had made for the administration of his district during his absence. F.A. Knowles was to act as Collector at Mumias, where he would have the benefit of Mumia's backing, so that Galt could remain in charge at Port Ugowe, where the people were 'very raw and unaccustomed to our methods'. Instructions had been given to Galt about his duties among the Luo, and messengers had been sent to the Kavirondo chiefs telling them to come in for a briefing on tax procedure. Hobley warned that the Nyangori (Terik), 'an outcast Nandi tribe',⁴⁴ needed watching, as they were becoming troublesome and attempting to loot government livestock. One of their chiefs had been ordered to come in for a conference but had disregarded Hobley's summons. No information was sent to Johnston about Nandi, and no account was given of directions issued to Cooper about administering his part of the district or inaugurating tax collection among its people. Indeed, Hobley's only references to Nandi during January were limited to the proposed police detachment, and a recommendation that Cooper should receive half the Collector's pay in addition to his military emoluments. The Special Commissioner instructed Hobley to choose, on his return from railhead, whether he would take charge of Kavirondo from Mumias or the Nandi District from Port Ugowe, as his present practice of dividing his time between the two stations was unsatisfactory.^{GG} But Johnston did not comment on Hobley's silence about affairs in Nandi in his 'handing over' report.

Hobley's omission to leave instructions for the administration of Nandi was all the more surprising since a number of staff changes took place at Kipture and other stations in February. Major Cooper, who left in the middle of the month to rejoin his regiment in the Boer War, was relieved as Collector at Kipture by Bagnall; this was only a temporary posting, however, as Bagnall was under orders to take over Ravine when Martin went on leave in April. Cooper's military duties were to be entrusted to two young subalterns who were on the way up from Mombasa on first appointment. Early in the month Colonel Coles left for the coast with Lieutenant Arbuthnot from Ravine, and Captain Gorges handed over the Naivasha Collectorate to his young civilian assistant, H.M. Macallister.⁴⁵ Thus all the military officers serving in the Masai (Eastern) Military District, including Coles' successor, Captain A. Parkin, and Lieutenant Wortham at Fort Ternan, were new to the country and their duties. Finally, when Dr Copeland and Bagnall left in March, Transport Officer Johnson was the only officer stationed at Kipture with any knowledge of the district and people.

Cooper's departure came at a crucial time as far as relations between the Nandi and the government were concerned. During his service at Kipture he had travelled much more widely than any of his predecessors, and had succeeded in enlisting the help of some of the chiefs and people. The food markets at Kipture and Bushiri had all been well supported, a body of regular mail runners had been enrolled, and some of the warriors had volunteered for the Kamelilo expedition and station police force. Johnston had paid tribute to Cooper for his success in making friends of the Nandi, and Coles had recommended his retention as civil

and military officer at Kipture. It was unfortunate that just as his personality and policy were beginning to give hopes of a better understanding with the tribe,⁴⁶ Cooper relinquished his post and was followed by a succession of inexperienced and colourless officers who failed to make a similar impression on the critical Nandi.

The country east of Kavirondo was handed over to untried men at a time when its security was becoming increasingly important, whereas their older and more experienced colleagues at Port Ugowe and Mumias were engaged on routine duties and preparations for inaugurating Johnston's tax collection proposals. The only tribe threatening the general peace in Kavirondo were the Nyangori who had stolen cattle at night from the bomas at Port Ugowe. Although their daylight raids were less successful and cost them a number of casualties, this did not deter them from looting some of the Uyoma cattle which Hyde Baker's large, well-armed caravan was taking from Port Ugowe to Ravine. Galt asked for a punitive force of 100 men in order to disabuse the Nyangori of their conceit that they were too strong to be attacked in their difficult mountain retreat. Ugada had got in touch with Ujoo, the Nyangori chief, who again refused to come in and boasted that he would have nothing to do with white men. Galt thought it foolhardy in the circumstances to try and collect tax from the Nyangori before they had been taught a lesson. Unless this were done, they would have to be left undisturbed which would be unfair to tribes who had expressed their willingness to pay.^{HH}

Beyond the eastern confines of Kavirondo, railway staking parties were nearing Fort Ternan and thrusting deeper into Nandi country. The work was proceeding sufficiently well by the end of February for the Foreign Office to instruct Johnston to issue a notice reserving land in the 'railway zone' (one mile on either side of the line) for government purposes. When the last steamer loads, which had been held up so that the *Good Intent* could pass through, reached Port Ugowe, Barton Wright sent 200 porters and several teams of oxen to transport the logs that had been left on the south Nandi escarpment near Bushiri, and to fell trees for the *William Mackinnon's* masts. This operation was completed in three weeks, and the Chief Engineer promised that the vessel would be handed over to the Uganda Protectorate in the first week of May.^{II}

The Transport Officer at Port Ugowe complained of difficulties and delays in moving heavy and unwieldy stores down the Nandi escarpment because of the inadequate number of porters at the contractor's disposal.⁴⁷ Brown recommended that the cart road from Port Ugowe should be realigned to follow the railway route to Kibigori, so that it could form part of the projected Nyando Valley road and thus hasten the closure of the vexatious Kipture-Mark's Boma section. In the meantime, he asked for an engineer and Indian artisans to replace the drift on the Kibos with a bridge, so that carts could cross the forty-foot wide river during the rainy season.^{JJ}

Johnson had already left Kipture on 20 February to investigate the Nyando Valley routes when he received a directive to 'follow the Uganda Railway route'. He was told the Special Commissioner was thinking of abandoning the Ravine-Nandi road and escarpment post, and withdrawing all the soldiers from Kipture. If this plan was carried out, troops were to be concentrated at Fort Ternan to protect the Nyando Valley, and Kipture was to be garrisoned by a small police force.^{KK} Johnston's thinking on this matter was influenced by the promised date for the commissioning of the *William Mackinnon*, and the decision he had come to about the site for the new capital. Once the site near the line at Londiani was approved, Ravine and Kipture would cease to be major transport centres on the Uganda Road,⁴⁸ which would then follow the shorter railway route from Nakuru to the Lake.^{LL}

Work on realigning the cart road from the Lake⁴⁹ was halted when forty transport labourers engaged on its construction accompanied Hyde Baker's caravan of eighty-two Sudanese police, which left Port Ugowe on 9 February with 808 Uyoma cattle for the stock farm near the new capital. Baker was concerned lest this large mob of cattle would incite the cupidity of tribes through whose territory it passed, but Martin assured him that there was no cause for alarm; he nevertheless took the precaution of strengthening Baker's escort through Nandi by sending eighteen Uasin Gishu Masai to see him in to Ravine. After the attack by the Nyangori six miles from Port Ugowe, the caravan suffered no further mishaps and arrived at Ravine on the twenty-second. Four days later Baker left for 'Baringo'⁵⁰ with a caravan which included transport men from Port Ugowe and Ravine, with the result that road works in the Nyando Valley and from Ravine to the new capital were further delayed.

Johnston had intended Baker to take seventy-five Sudanese police to Baringo, but Martin could only spare forty-three because the remainder were needed to reinforce Kipture. Twenty-one armed Swahili porters were however seconded from the Ravine station staff until Baker could recruit replacements from people living near the new post. This arrangement dangerously weakened Martin's garrison at a time when he was providing patrols to protect the telegraph wire between Ravine and Molo.⁵¹ The cattle destined for the stock farm were detained at Ravine by Martin, who had to farm 300 of them out with Uasin Gishu because of a shortage of police guards. Owing to the truculent behaviour of the Lumbwa who lived within easy raiding distance of the farm, he thought it unwise to send the cattle on to their destination without adequate escorts for their protection.^{MM} This episode demonstrated how a single operation could dislocate the administrative machinery in the Eastern Province and cause the deferment of other enterprises.

Baker's posting to Baringo in February, in conjunction with the accommodation reached with the Luo and Kamasia after the recent expeditions, marked a turning point in government policy in the Eastern Province. Johnston accepted that it was no longer enough merely to control the country near the Uganda Road, and that the time had come to introduce the inhabitants to a more positive form of government. After five years of a predominantly military presence, which had been largely confined to a few strong points on the lines of communication, the type of embryonic civil administration which Hobley had initiated in parts of Kavirondo was to be extended to other tribes who acknowledged the authority of the government and were prepared to co-operate with its officers. The Baringo post was the first station in the Eastern Province which was not connected with the maintenance of the Uganda Road supply line between the coast and Buganda.⁵² However mixed the motives behind its conception,⁵³ the new post was an earnest of Johnston's resolve to administer the Eastern Province for its own sake instead of regarding it as 'the intervening country' between the E.A.P. and Busoga. Progress was tentative and intermittent to begin with, and was often halted by setbacks that were caused partly because of the Protectorate's other commitments, and partly because progressive measures could only be introduced among tribes who had submitted wholeheartedly to British rule. But a change of emphasis had been made which promised that something more than lip service would be paid to the government's responsibilities towards the local inhabitants. The Uyoma operations had completed the pacification of almost all of Kavirondo north of the River Sondu, and the opposition of the Kalenjin to alien rule had been significantly breached for the first time as a result of the Kamasia expedition and its aftermath. Henceforth, government policy in the Eastern Province had two principal objectives: the strengthening of administrative machinery at district and sectional level, and the encouragement of cooperative and 'progressive' leaders in the pacified areas; and the protection and improvement of communications, which depended upon maintaining the uneasy *status quo* in Masailand and Lumbwa,⁵⁴ and on bringing about the final subjugation of the Nandi.

NOTES

1. Rs.143 and 240 respectively; Kakamega Rs.379.
2. NCB records that of the 1,117 animals captured, seven died and 270 were eaten in the field, 164 were given to Nandi auxiliaries, and 676 sold for Rs.2,203.
3. Cooper was fighting in Kamelilo when Johnston left Ravine, and did not meet the Special Commissioner.
4. He nevertheless wrote to Hill on 3.3.1901 (ESA A/38/4) about the 'truculent manner' of the Nandi 'which I noted in 1899'.
5. Luo in Kavirondo, Nandi and Mau; Nandi below the western escarpment in Kavirondo, Kalenjin in Nandi, Mau (Lumbwa), Baringo (Kamasia, Elgeyo, Suk), and Kavirondo (Nyangori, Wangoma (Bungomek), and Elgon tribes).
6. Sudanese received Rs.20 a month, Rs.2 more than sepoys; police were paid Rs.10 a month. The Foreign Office accepted Johnston's proposal to reduce the pay of Sudanese recruits to Rs.18. Evatt noted on 4.6.1931 that 'I understand (Ternan) was a spendthrift as an administrator'.
7. This was rescinded when Johnston found the Sudanese were guilty of graver offences than he thought.

8. The long and proud association of the Nandi with the army and police may be said to have begun with Johnston's acceptance of Coles' suggestion. Kamba had been recruited in a similar capacity by Ainsworth as early as 1894; Munro, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
9. Presumably Johnston met Mumia though there is no record of this.
10. See *NRBR* i, p. 267 for the convention that these raids were the work of the unadministered Lumbwa and Kach and not the 'administered' Nandi.
11. He was 'to open friendly relations with the people', conclude treaties with the chiefs, and look for gold-bearing rocks.
12. Applications were pending from British, German, Italian, Indian and Arab traders at Kedong, Naivasha, Ravine and Port Ugowe, but not at Kipture, Bushiri or Fort Ternan.
13. No treaties were made in the Eastern Province during Johnston's administration.
14. Hobley was encouraging Baganda to visit Port Ugowe. Baker told Johnston on 3.2.1900 (ESA A/4/30) that the Luo were probably justified in retaliating against looting by Baganda canoeists. The Uyoma say they were punished not for 'piracy' but for refusing to pay 'flour taxes', and remember the expedition as the 'War of Flour' (*Lwenj Mojo*).
15. Captain C.E. Collard and Colour Sergeant T.F. Ellison, Sergeant-Major T. Greenwood (XVI Company); Hobley, Galt and Drs W.H.B. Jackson and G. Pownall.
16. Mumia and Tomia (Wanga) and Odera (Gem) supplied most of the auxiliaries and porters; Ugada of Kisumu presumably supplied the canoeists.
17. The Uyoma were told to seek redress at Port Ugowe if they were molested by Europeans or Baganda.
18. See *NRBR* i, Ch. 5.
19. Hobley noted on 24.1.1900 (FOCP 7405/6) that punishment of a Luo section had previously had little effect upon its neighbours. Johnston's inference that the expedition facilitated the erection of the telegraph across the Uyoma frontiers can however be largely discounted, since the wire passed through Gem, whose chief had cooperated in the punitive operations (FOCP 7405/45).
20. See *NRBR* ii, p. 69.
21. Port Ugowe sales realised £800. The Nairobi auctions set a precedent for settler demands for stock taken from the Nandi and other in later expeditions.
22. It is not certain whether these came from Uyoma or from Bagnall's Kamelilo patrol in March (*NRBR* ii, pp. 49-50).
23. Hobley had found both reliable when previously entrusted with government property. Whisson seems to suggest that Adhola, an Asembo leader and ally of Odera, fought against the Uyoma, and received some of the cattle Odera was given to distribute among chiefs who sided with the British. The Uyoma blamed Odera's slanderous reports on their conduct for the expedition, which enabled him to pay off some old scores.
24. Kamelilo force: 5 Europeans, 93 soldiers, 1 Maxim, 200 allies; Uyoma: 7, 85, 1 and 800 respectively. Nandi casualties, 6 killed; 250 Uyoma killed and wounded. Stock captured: Nandi 50 cattle, 1,100 small stock; Uyoma 2,589 and 18,700 respectively. The Rewards Council did not consider the Uyoma operations sufficiently important to warrant a medal; (FOCP 7405/45, FO 2/420, 460).
25. A patrol led by Ellison and Jackson extricated itself when surrounded by 3-4,000 spearmen. See *NRBR* i, pp. 143, 154 for Nandi tactics in their first and later encounters with the British.
26. It is said the Kadimo did not resist, partly because of the 'brutal pacification' of their eastern neighbours, and partly because they thought the formerly non-Luo clans within the chiefdom might defect to the British. No major operations took place in Kavirondo until the Kisii expeditions of 1905 and 1908.
27. He added that he 'would give back a larger number of stock rather than the Uyoma should die on the roads, but this would be interpreted as weakness'. The small amount of stock taken from the Kamelilo did not offer the same scope for concessions even if Johnston had wished to make them.
28. Cattle promised to the Elgeyo as compensation were handed over on 11.12.1899; (RSD).
29. Apart from complying with Johnston's sentence, Mitei's only qualification seems to have been that he lived near the station; cf. Kinyanjui at Fort Smith, Musau wa Mwanza at Machakos, and attempts to elevate Latongwa at Kipture (*NRBR* i, pp. 215, 322-325).
30. See *NRBR* i, pp. 320, 335, 370-373.
31. He told Hill on 3.3.1901 (ESA A/38/4) that 'the hiding they received kept them quiet during the Nandi rising'.
32. Rs.710 and 460 respectively; Kakamega Rs.338; local labour Rs.27. NCB was ruled off on 31.12.1899 with a balance of Rs.28,069 and expenditure for the month of Rs.7,108, compared with Rs.1,223 and 620 in August 1896.

33. Pereira's Diary records 'trouble with the Nandi, minor operations in cooperation with Somali Coy'; this is not mentioned elsewhere and may refer to the Kamelilo expedition in the previous month.
34. Matters were further complicated by instructions to Galt to stop building at Port Ugowe while he and Fowler examined alternative sites for the district station and railway terminus on the River Uro; (ESA A/5/9, A/4/25, 26, FO 2/204).
35. Q.M.S. W. Ramsay arrived in July to fill this post.
36. 100 Uyoma cattle and 50 oxen were sent to Kipture for sale to troops and transport staff, and for transport work respectively; four Nandi travelled to Ravine with 29 head of cattle; (PUD, RSD).
37. It is not clear whether Ternan's embargo (*NRBR* ii, p. 3) was still being observed. If this was not the case, Fr. Kestens probably thought it unwise to proceed beyond Mumias because of difficulties in feeding so large a party, and the reluctance of the Basoga to enter Nandi.
38. Cheperit Mission was founded in 1936, several years after African evangelists had been active in the district. For the first encounter between the Nandi and C.M.S., see *NRBR* i, pp. 230, 250.
39. For a similar report in January 1899, see *NRBR* i, p. 360, 375. According to a pamphlet commemorating the tenth anniversary of the German forces in G.E.A., the Wagaya (southern Luo) launched a surprise attack on Shirati on 17.2.1900.
40. Hobley was asking on 9.3.1900 (ESA A/4/26) for authority to collect. The first tax circular (No. 10 of 1900) was issued on 16.3.1900, six days after the Uganda Agreement was signed.
41. Hobley was notified on 4.1.1900 (ESA A/5/9), the day before Johnston informed Jackson that the Baganda could not be granted a concessionary rate of Rs.2 for the first year on compassionate grounds; the suspicion is raised (Low, *op. cit.*, p. 34) that 'acceptance' in the Eastern Province may have been used to counter Baganda objections to the higher rate of tax.
42. It is clear from the correspondence and minutes that European settlement and its demands for labour had no bearing on the decision to institute taxation.
43. Troops state 3.2.1900 (ESA A/4/25): Nandi 89; Bushiri 12. The Nandi total included the small detachment at Kakamega but not the 64 men at Fort Ternan.
44. The Nyangori allegedly disclaimed any relationship to the Nandi; for a similar disclaimer by Elgon tribes see *NRBR* i, p. 214.
45. With Gorges and Cooper's departure, only Nile and Bunyoro remained under military administrators, an expedient which Hill encouraged and Johnston wished to discontinue. Macallister, a third-class official on first appointment, had served at Naivasha since April 1898. No first-class official was available to succeed Gorges as Sub-commissioner, Mau.
46. Coles wrote on 14.9.1900 (FO 2/382) 'When I left them (the Nandi) in January, things were going very smoothly and I thought everything was making for peace'.
47. Thirty porters were needed for some exceptionally heavy loads of 600 lb. Five loads of spare parts for the beached steam-launch, *Victoria*, were held up at Bushiri until engineers could unpack them and reduce their bulk.
48. Ternan and Johnston had favoured Ravine as the joint capital; it was rejected because it was twenty-four miles from the railway, and had been a 'little too much affected by the East African drought'.
49. Work had previously been interrupted in January and February when forty-three of the Transport Department's seventy-three porters at Port Ugowe took Ternan up the Nyando Valley on his way to the coast. At the end of February the cart convoy system was placed at risk when Hermann Kother's agent, Koenig, was stopped seven miles from Port Ugowe with seventy-seven head of infected cattle which he was apparently taking to Nairobi. Over 120 had died on the journey from Mwanza, and the remainder were shot on the advice of the Indian Veterinary Assistant at Port Ugowe; (ESA A/4/25, A/5/9, FO 2/464).
50. Johnston's naturalist collector, W.G. Doggett, established a temporary post on the River Rongai about thirty miles from Ravine in December; (RSD). Foreign Office approval for the 'Baringo' post was given on 13.4.1900; (FOCP 7405/24).
51. One and a half miles of wire were stolen; (FOCP 7545/47). Railway engineers later contrasted Martin's energetic action with Wortham's alleged dilatoriness at Fort Ternan; see *NRBR* ii, p. 44.
52. Kitui (founded in 1897 to control slave traders) was the only station at any distance from the Uganda Road until Fort Hall was established in September 1900; see *NRBR* i, p. 191.
53. The northern territories were of concern to Johnston and the Foreign Office because of rumours of Abyssinian raids and encroachments. Johnston probably counted on Foreign Office support for measures aimed at curbing the slave trade and preserving game in order to gain approval for the chain of stations he planned to establish between Ravine and Lake Rudolf. Hill later realized (see *NRBR* ii, pp. 165, 170) that the northern territories were peripheral to the government's main objective in Eastern Uganda;

Johnston's continued personal interest in them possibly blinded him to the more relevant advantages to be gained by establishing a post to control the Lumbwa.

54. Macallister dissuaded the Kapte Masai in February from raiding Sotik in order to recoup some of their rinderpest losses; (ESA A/4/26). Johnston hoped to set up a 'depot' in Lumbwa, but this was not done until the Kericho post was founded in June 1902.

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CHAPTER 5

Threat to the Nyando Valley and Kamelilo Patrol

On the morning of 21 February 1900 an incident occurred on the construction track fifteen miles east of Fort Ternan which inaugurated the long struggle for control of the Nyando Valley, a struggle that led to three major expeditions and several localized 'police' operations, and was only finally settled when the Tindiret sections were removed from the vicinity of the railway after the campaign of 1905-1906. Since Blackett's pioneer journey down the valley in August 1898, the railway had conducted a number of operations in the area with little opposition from the Nandi or Lumbwa. Survey, staking, food and telegraph parties, as well as caravans of porters carrying loads of the *William Mackinnon*, passed unmolested through the valley; temporary camps were set up at intervals along the route; and in January 1899 a more permanent presence was established at the food depot near Kitoto's.¹ Although the Nandi and Lumbwa had raided the Kano Luo without incurring any punishment from the government, railway officials thought their relations with the raiders gave no grounds for anticipating that opposition in the Nyando Valley would be more determined and sustained than that which had been easily overcome in the E.A.P. and Rift Valley. The warlike reputation of the Nandi and Lumbwa was well known to the railway engineers, one of whom recorded that the interest the Kikuyu had shown in offering their services 'disappeared and nothing further was done with this tribe when they learned the rails ... would have to pass through the Nandi country'.² However, only on one occasion had a railway party been attacked west of the Mau;³ this was in July 1899 when two steamer caravan porters were murdered, allegedly by Nandi warriors. Although no redress was sought for this outrage it was not followed by other similar incidents. The result was that railway employees in the Nyando Valley became less vigilant, and their superiors neglected to ask district officials for escorts to protect small parties travelling on the railway route. The most vulnerable of these parties were the telegraph maintenance men who often went out in pairs to replace the broken line; there were also occasions when much larger parties were sent through the valley without escort or arms.³

In these circumstances it was almost inevitable that sooner or later the Nandi would attack some of these intruders into their tribal territory.⁴ The telegraph caravan, consisting of two askaris, eleven porters, two servants and one woman, which was attacked on 21 February while on its way from Port Ugowe to Molo, carried only two guns and four rounds of ammunition for its defence. Ten Nandi spearmen surprised the telegraph men by rushing down on the caravan from the hills; one askari and two porters were killed and one rifle carried off.⁵ After being chased for some distance, the survivors split up, ten of them making their way to Fort Ternan and three to Molo. When the incident was reported to Wortham at Fort Ternan, he sent a patrol to the scene of the occurrence and messengers to summon Arap Sertu to the station. The Kapchepkendi chief responded promptly to the summons and informed Wortham that the attack had been carried out by Dorobo; he insisted that the survivors had been mistaken in surmising that the raiders were Nandi simply because of the kind of spear they were carrying. Since several thefts of telegraph wire had recently been attributed to the Tindiret Dorobo,⁶ Wortham did not challenge Arap Sertu's assertions, but ordered the chief to investigate and send word if further enquiries showed that the outrage had been carried out by his people. When Arap Sertu returned to Fort Ternan a few days later he reported that the telegraph party had been attacked by Lumbwa warriors, who had also allegedly killed three men and captured five head of cattle during a raid on a Nandi village on the night of the murders.⁷ This version seemed more credible to Wortham because Arap Tumbo, the young Lumbwa chief of the Kapsaos section living on the hills eight miles south of Fort Ternan, had twice avoided seeing messengers sent to summon him to come in. Both emissaries had been told by his neighbours that the chief was not at home, so Wortham concluded that Arap Tumbo was keeping out of the way because he knew the attack on the telegraph party had been carried out by Kapsaos warriors. If this supposition proved to be true it represented a change of attitude on the part of the Lumbwa near Fort Ternan, who had hitherto shown themselves friendly to Wortham's predecessor and himself, and had never failed to come in when summoned.⁸ Wortham was disturbed by Arap Sertu's findings because

Fort Ternan had become largely dependent upon the Lumbwa for food. If local supplies were cut off, escorts would have to be found to accompany food convoys from Molo, Ravine or Port Ugowe. In the meantime Wortham instituted daily patrolling of the track for a distance of fifteen miles towards Molo, and Martin organized police patrols on the Ravine-Fort Ternan road.^B Nothing further was gleaned from these activities about the identity of the warriors who attacked the telegraph party.

The railway authorities reacted promptly to the threat to the safety of their men in the Nyando Valley, as telegraphic communications with Uganda could only be kept open if repairs could be carried out swiftly whenever a break occurred. Owing to the speed with which the temporary line had been installed, breaks were frequent, especially on treeless stretches, 'where the wire is merely fastened to any sort of stick with a bit of string'.^C When news of the murders reached Nairobi, Edward Stallibrass, the Telegraph Superintendent, wired immediately to Wortham asking him to secure the safety of the road. Wortham replied that the railway should provide a headman and at least four askaris as escorts for repair parties, and criticized the indiscipline of the linesmen and their tendency to straggle. The Superintendent reported that it was no part of his duty to protect his staff, and that escorts could be provided more cheaply and quickly from troops at Fort Ternan than by asking for reinforcements to be drafted in from other garrisons.^D Wortham's response to the railway's request for help suggests that he had not been properly briefed on his duties by his predecessor, his commanding officer, and the Sub-commissioner of the Nandi District. Ternan had accepted responsibility for the safety of railway employees in July 1899; Martin had seconded men to patrol the wire from Ravine to Molo; Pereira had provided escorts from the Fort Ternan garrison for telegraph repair parties; and Johnston had assured the Foreign Office in February that 'we certainly maintain something like 350 soldiers and several European officials merely to establish peace and security along the new route chosen by the Railway to Ugowe Bay', and 'are incurring expense in safeguarding the telegraph wire, in punishing the natives who steal it'.^E Wortham eventually complied with the Superintendent's demands, but the Chief Engineer made further representations to Johnston by telegram and personally through L.E. Caine, the Assistant Superintendent at Entebbe. The garrison at Fort Ternan was evidently not large enough to provide escorts for every repair party and undertake daily patrolling of the line.⁹

When Hobley passed through Fort Ternan on his way back from railhead early in March, responsibility for the telegraph murders had not been settled. But on 13 March Wortham reported that Arap Sertu had discovered that a section of the 'Kamelila' living to the north-west of Fort Ternan were the culprits, and offered to go with Wortham to the houses of those responsible. As the Kamelilo were 'on the warpath' and would probably massacre a small party entering their country, Arap Sertu advised that a strong force should be mustered for the proposed visit. Although Hobley noted that the Kamelilo had given trouble on a previous occasion by cutting the telegraph wire,¹⁰ he was not prepared to accept Arap Sertu's statements without further investigation as the informant had changed his mind three times about the identity of the offenders. Hobley realised it might be difficult for a Kapchepkendi chief to locate the Kamelilo murderers in a sparsely populated area, which was inhabited by Nandi and Lumbwa who were notorious for their roaming habits and the long distances they travelled on raiding expeditions. Bagnall was instructed to carry out the investigation with Wortham, and empowered to 'pay them a visit and exact reparations' if the case against the Kamelilo was sufficiently proved. Hobley was confident these measures would render the road safe for repair parties, and thus prevent further complaints that the work of the railway engineers was being hampered because of the dilatoriness of his district officers. He considered that Bagnall had sufficient police for a localized punitive operation because the Kamelilo lived in scattered communities and were not very numerous.^F Johnston, who was recovering from his fourth attack of blackwater fever, was too busy negotiating the Uganda Agreement, reorganizing the armed forces, and re-drafting the 1900-1901 estimates to comment on the telegraph murders or Hobley's instructions to Bagnall.

While arrangements were being made to deal with the Kamelilo, Hobley was also concerned about the activities of the Nyangori and Lumbwa. Negotiations were in progress to induce the former to give up the cattle they had captured and to pay 'a substantial fine'. If these demands were not met, Hobley proposed to punish the Nyangori for their obstinacy. From what he had seen of their country during his short visit in September 1896, he

considered a small expedition of seventy-five men from the Mumias and Port Ugowe garrisons would be adequate for the purpose. Although he hoped that punitive measures could be avoided because they would interfere with preparatory work on tax collection, he had to admit on 19 March that prospects for a peaceful settlement were not very promising, as the Nyangori had returned only eight of the seventy or so cattle they had looted, and refused to pay the fine imposed upon them.⁹

Although they had been exonerated from complicity in the telegraph murders, Hobley shared Martin's anxiety about signs of unrest among the Lumbwa, which were demonstrated by the changed attitude of their leaders towards Wortham and the threatening demeanour of the warriors. During his journey from railhead, Hobley met a war party of between 150 and 200 spearmen sixteen miles east of Kitoto's; and at Port Ugowe he was told that 600 spearmen had retired from the bush on the Kibos river, only seven miles from the station, when a white trader who was buying food from the Kolloa Luo pitched his tents in the neighbourhood. The presence of formidable Nandi or Lumbwa raiding parties on the Kano Plains prompted the victims of previous attacks to importune Hobley to provide the protection they had often been promised against their aggressive neighbours.¹¹ Hobley realized that inability or unwillingness to meet this obligation made nonsense of the proposition that taxes could justifiably be imposed in return for the protection which taxpayers were guaranteed by the government. After reminding Johnston that no retribution had been obtained for the attack on the Kano villages in August, Hobley suggested it might be politic to postpone punishment until the railway survey party reached Kitoto's towards the end of April.¹¹

The Kamasia were the only Kalenjin tribe near the Uganda Road who were settling down and showing signs of becoming reconciled to their lot. Kimamet's ardour had been cooled by the punishment he received in December, and leaders of every Kamasia section promised they would be ready to pay tax by the time Martin returned from overseas leave. Cattle and sheep were given to the principal chiefs to tend, and their people asked to move nearer the station and increase the acreage under cultivation. Mitei, the head chief, was entrusted with twenty head of cattle, some of which he was to retain as his own property if his good behaviour continued while Martin was away. The anticipated improvement in the unsettled conditions that had threatened the safety of the station and a difficult stretch of the Uganda Road for several years was an opportune development, as Martin had custody of large mobs of Uyoma stock, and as his indent on the Coast Agent for barbed wire to protect Ravine and the isolated cattle farm near the new capital had not been met. The Suk, Njemps (Iltiamus) and Uasin Gishu Masai also promised to pay hut tax at the standard rate, and the first two tribes volunteered to help Baker when he moved Doggett's Post some sixty miles further north to Kolloa near the Ribo Hills.¹

Relations with the tribes administered from Ravine were better in March than at any time since Martin's arrival at the station in December 1894.¹² This was an important consideration to Transport Officer Johnson, whose reorganization plans included the retention of Ravine as a principal staging post on the Uganda Road. He conceded that a cart road on the shorter Nakuru-Nyando Valley-Ugowe Bay route would be useful when the railway's traction engines and ox-waggons were working this section, but considered a road over the Mau an uneconomic way of coping with immediate needs, and much more expensive to construct than the alternative route from Ravine to the new capital, thence down the Nyando Valley to Port Ugowe. He had found a good line to the north of the Nyando River on the latter route, along which a cart road could be engineered with only a little side-cutting and the construction of a few small bridges. The advantages of this alignment would be a slight reduction in length compared with the Kipture-Bushiri road: closure of the Kipture transport headquarters and Kakamega food depot; avoidance of the inconvenient Nandi escarpment break with its costly contract portage; elimination of the difficult section through the Mau and Nandi forests; and the reduction from ten to four in number of 'garrisoned' night stables, all of which would be located between Ravine and Fort Ternan. Direct cart convoys from Ravine to Port Ugowe could be supervised from a headquarters station near the new capital by a single transport officer, with the help of a subordinate at a subsidiary food depot at Fort Ternan. Johnson estimated that completion of the road from Ravine to the capital, work on which had been suspended in order to furnish porters for Baker's journey to Baringo,¹³ and construction of a cart track down the Nyando Valley, would cost Rs.24,138,

some of which should come from railway funds. The project could be completed in six months by 150 labourers working in four gangs under European supervision.

In the meantime Johnson recommended that freight should continue to be routed through Nandi. In order to facilitate operations on this route, he proposed an embargo on heavy or bulky loads,¹⁴ and suggested improvements on the escarpment section which took caravans two and a half hours to negotiate. As far as communications with the Kakamega food post and Mumias were concerned, plans were made for extensive repairs to the sixty-foot bridge over the River Kimondi on Sclater's Road, which was in danger of being swept away by flood water. The time was convenient for these improvements to be carried out as goods were coming through slowly, owing to wash-outs and a strike on the railway and the dislocation caused by smallpox and rinderpest.¹⁵ Johnson thought his proposals would enable the Transport Department not only to meet its routine commitments, but also to provide regular loads for the shipping¹⁶ available at Port Ugo, and expedite delivery of much-needed Indian rations which the Special Commissioner refused to route through German territory. Before the Transport Officer's report reached Entebbe, Johnston had finally made up his mind that one of the Nyando Valley routes should be developed as the main artery to Uganda. This was made clear when, concurring with Hobley's opinion that a 'deadlock' would be more serious at Mumias than at Kipture, he stated that 'when my intention to move the transport from Nandi to the Nyando Valley is carried out, Nandi (sc. Kipture) will lose almost all its importance'.¹⁷

Johnston's declaration was made in connection with Bagnall's representations that he should be relieved at Kipture by Knowles from Mumias rather than by an untried third-class assistant, W. Seymour Leet.¹⁷ Noting that both military officers at Kipture were newcomers, and entirely dependent on a Somali interpreter who 'had recently been detected of fraud', Bagnall pointed out that Leet, who had only acquired a 'most rudimentary knowledge' of Swahili during his three months' stay at Ravine, would be almost as ignorant of the language and the country as his military colleagues. Hobley's attitude towards the relative importance and staffing of Mumias and Kipture was influenced by his long association with the former station, and his anxiety that tax collection should be introduced among the Baluya by an official who was known to the local chiefs.¹⁸ He evidently also thought it more rewarding to concentrate upon Kavirondo even if this meant postponing innovations in Nandi until prospects for their acceptance were more promising.¹⁹

The intention to run down the administration in Nandi was also reflected in the estimates for 1900-1901. In the civil list, the doctor was to be replaced by an Indian hospital assistant, and no clerk or even an interpreter was allocated to Kipture.¹⁹ £200 were included for local mail runners but no provision was made for building materials, tools and labour for station upkeep. In considering the military estimates, Johnston was concerned to lessen the dangerous and expensive dependence on Sudanese troops, 'whose loyalty to the Protectorate is still open to doubt', and who were 'the only race or division of men out here who have no inherent respect for the British Government'.²⁰ He proposed that a proportion of the Sudanese should be replaced by lower paid police, since the latter were better fitted to deal with 'the naked bandits of forest and mountain' than the 'stiffly uniformed, heavily-booted, heavily-armed' regular troops, who 'require military roads along which to tramp, tramp, tramp, in their military boots', and could only 'display their military qualities to the best advantage' if they were 'met by an enemy on much the same plane as themselves'. In order to disperse discharged and unemployed Sudanese from the Buganda townships, some were to be drafted to stiffen locally recruited police detachments; and others were to be encouraged to settle in the Eastern Province, where they could sell produce from their gardens to railway employees. Johnston was obsessed by the potential military threat posed by the Baganda, who were 'the only people for a long time to come who can deal a serious blow at British rule'. In order to discourage hostilities from that quarter, he proposed that the Indian Contingent²¹ should be concentrated at Kampala and Entebbe to safeguard 'the only spot in the Uganda Protectorate where our interests are vital and where a fatal blow might be dealt us'.

African troops were to garrison the Nile and Bunyoro Districts, and one company was to be stationed at Fort Ternan to protect railway interests and communications with the coast. Elsewhere in the Eastern Province all the regular soldiers were to be withdrawn and replaced by police. One hundred men of the armed constabulary were to be stationed in the

Nandi District and, as the Uganda Road once again moved south, the role of a military fort on the lines of communication which had previously been played by Kipture was to be assumed by Fort Ternan. Law and order within the district, as well as the prevention of Nandi raids against protected and other tribes in the province, were to be left in the hands of district officers in their capacity as police commanders. Johnston did not specify whether the 100 constables were to police the Nandi tribal territory, or whether they were to be posted to the Nandi District to replace the regular garrisons at Kipture, Bushiri, Kakamega and Port Ugowe. Baringo District was to be allocated 200 policemen, Mau 125, and Kavirondo, the principal Nandi raiding area, only 100. A strong detachment of regulars would however man the military post which he proposed to establish among the Sebei on the north flank of Mount Elgon.²² Since the African troops at Fort Ternan had routine local tasks to perform, it was Johnston's intention to use the Indian Contingent as a reserve which, after the commissioning of the *William Mackinnon* in May, could be speedily despatched to the aid of the civil power if police in the Eastern Province were unable to put down any opposition to the government's authority. Although the Special Commissioner was optimistic about the effectiveness of the para-military police force, he could hardly have been so ill-informed or naive as to believe that Nandi was one of the several districts where 'the population is so scanty, or is so entirely feeble in the art of war that a few police are all that are needed to keep order'.^L The proposals Johnston put forward do however suggest he was inclined to accept Hobley's views concerning the fighting qualities of the Nandi. He also chose to ignore their past record in engagements with disciplined troops, and glossed over the logistic difficulties of bringing up sufficient reserves to ensure the speedy punishment of offenders who proved too skilful, elusive and determined for the district police to tackle.

Johnston's financial provision for the Eastern Province was influenced less by the optimistic reports he had sent to the Foreign Office, than by the terms of the Special Commission, which left him little room for manoeuvre in framing the estimates. Furthermore, it had been made abundantly clear to him that no substantial increase of funds or services could be contemplated until revenue increased, and expenditure on the Boer War became more tolerable to a 'nation smarting under a shilling income tax'. Brodrick had 'called Sir Harry Johnston's serious attention to the whole question at two interviews at the Foreign Office, and Uganda's deficit of £100,000²³ had been sharply criticised during a House of Commons debate on a supplementary vote of £162,500 for the African protectorates.^M

Apart from the unsettled conditions in the Tindiret area, the Nandi were generally quiet throughout March; the exorbitant prices charged by an itinerant Indian trader was the only matter considered worthy of reference to Entebbe.^N Timber cutting for the *William Mackinnon* continued on the south escarpment, which Commander Whitehouse and C.S. Hunter climbed on the 24th to set up a survey beacon station on Kikirige Hill.²⁴ A C.M.S. party, which included five women missionaries, bicycled uneventfully from Ravine to Kipture, after they had been refused permission to travel by the new route through the Nyando Valley. One of their number, who recorded that they had more visitors at Kipture than at any other place on their journey from railhead, declared that the Nandi were the strangest people they had seen. A pet hen was brought to look at itself in a looking-glass by the Nandi girls, one of whom was coated all over with pink powder. The missionaries were told that a week before their arrival at Ravine six Swahilis had been murdered near the new road. The party passed safely through Nandi until they reached the edge of the escarpment near Bushiri, where one of the women was surrounded by several hundred warriors who were getting ready to raid a neighbouring tribe. The spearmen were diverted by Miss Ruth Hurditch's watch and gilt-edged Bible and she came to no harm. The alleged murder of the six Swahilis may only have been an exaggerated account of the incident near Molo on 21 February. Hobley's later assertion that 'in the spring of this year' the Nandi 'amused themselves by cutting and carrying off stretches of the telegraph wire',²⁵ and 'murdered on Mau several unarmed porters belonging to the Telegraph Department', does however suggest that the Molo incident may have been only one of several attacks on the telegraph staff.^O

Hobley, who was in a much better position to assess the true state of affairs than Johnston, did not fully endorse the latter's opinion that the Nandi could be brought under control by the same measures which had proved effective with their Kavirondo neighbours. Open hostility to the government was seldom exhibited within the district, but Hobley was well aware that warriors raided beyond the tribal boundaries with almost as much freedom as

their forbears. These raids against tribes who had been promised protection lowered the prestige of the administration, and demonstrated that the Nandi were scornful of its authority. When reviewing the events that caused the despatch of the punitive expedition in July, Hobley set out in detail his views on the intransigence of the Nandi and the government's failure to persuade or coerce them to adopt a more cooperative attitude:

'The Wanandi, with perhaps the exception of a few in close vicinity to the station, have all along viewed our presence in the country with veiled repugnance and just tolerated us without any friendliness ... They were tacitly friendly, or apparently so, only as long as they thought it advisable. We were unwittingly living on the edge of a volcano, and it has only needed a fortuitous chain of circumstances to cause the eruption. The eruption was, I believe, bound to come sooner or later ... I have felt for some months past that all was not right, and that while punishing the successive outrages in detail we were only touching the fringe of the question, for at the close of each little expedition the representatives of the clan to which it had been administered would never come in and make peace as is usual among the Kavirondo for instance, but although repeatedly sent for would hide away among the hills in a sullen defiant manner and decline all friendly overtures. At the bottom of this dislike of Europeans and the Administration lies the fact that the Wanandi are raiders by nature and have looted the surrounding tribes for generations; they are moreover a people in which a sort of blood lust seems to be ingrained and I think that all along they have realized in a vague way that by welcoming the Administration and placing themselves under its control their natural habits would be checked. The young men of the tribe seem to be in a perpetual state of unrest and are continually wandering about in bodies either on a planned raid or on the off chance of meeting somebody to loot or spear. As an instance of the distance they will travel for this purpose, some few months ago a war party from the vicinity of Fort Ternan started off to raid Eastern Kitosh, a distance of quite sixty-five miles, and when they reached the Nzoia River they killed a hippopotamus, which temporarily engrossed their attention; the people of Kitosh, who from past experience are always on the look-out for Wanandi, turned out in the meantime, surprised the war party and drove it off with some loss; and upon their return they actually had the assurance to go to Fort Ternan and complain that they had been attacked by the Wakitosh; they suppressed the fact that they were in Kitosh territory at the time, and they asked that something might be done about it; of course if they had achieved their object and carried off a number of cattle not a word would have been said.'^P

Hobley's views had naturally been strengthened by the events which culminated in the July expedition, but he evidently realized, soon after re-assuming control over the Nandi²⁶ in July 1899, that their relations with the government were anything but satisfactory. That this view was not shared by Johnston and his predecessors was to a large extent the fault of the Sub-commissioner himself and the Collectors at Kipture, Mumias and Ravine. Commissioners had seldom been informed of the warriors' activities unless they threatened to disrupt communications between Uganda and the coast. For example, the raid against the Kitosh which Hobley described with circumstantial detail had not been reported to Entebbe by the Sub-commissioner, the military officer at Fort Ternan, or the Collectors at Mumias and Kipture. Owing to the local officials' reluctance to report such incidents, Commissioners had only been informed of raids against protected tribes when a case was being made out for reprisals against the Nandi for acts endangering the Uganda Road.

His assessment of the situation inclined Hobley to use his own discretion over the shaping and timing of arrangements for introducing tax collection among the Nandi. He had previously declared his intention not to interfere with the Lumbwa for the time being, and in March he apparently had no special plans for Nandi beyond Bagnall's visit to the Kamelilo. Hobley had pleaded for the proposed splitting of the Kavirondo districts to be postponed on the grounds that he 'knew every chief personally from Elgon to Kitoto's',²⁷ and they know me, and I think they will probably do more for me than a stranger'. He knew the first year of tax collection was bound to be the most difficult, and possibly sensed that his work as an administrator would be judged by the peaceful and systematic inauguration of Johnston's proposals among the pacified Luo and Baluya, rather than by dabbling in the stubborn Nandi problem with the inadequate resources at his command. He had good reason to believe he could persuade most of the former to pay, and that collection could be carried out in such a manner that the regular imposition of taxes would be generally accepted.²⁸ Most of the tribes had become accustomed to having demands made upon them for porters, auxiliaries, labour,

materials and food, whereas the Nandi had obstinately refused to co-operate to any significant extent, and undertake obligations far less exacting than the payment of tax. Although Hobley did not question Johnston's order that the Nandi should pay tax, the evidence suggests that he considered the situation in the district was unfavourable to its immediate imposition.

This supposition is supported by his acquiescence in the proposed staffing of Kipture with untried men, even though this proposal was in direct conflict with his views on the qualifications and usefulness of Collectors and their assistants. He had urged that Collectors should have at least one year's experience of district work, and pointed out that 'if the OC of a station doesn't know the language, he is a cypher and nobody will bring any *shauris* (problems) to him'. Hobley went on to deplore the lack of interest shown by junior officers in political work: 'They have not the patience to accumulate, arrange and classify the mass of facts regarding the inter-relationships of various tribes around them, they do not make notes of names, and no man living can remember all these difficult native names; they look upon the people as a big featureless mass of *Washenzi* (savages), and they can never gain the confidence of them without infinite pains'. Despite these perceptive observations on the remissness of junior officers,²⁹ which hardly qualified one of them to introduce taxation in Nandi, Hobley did not contest Johnston's nomination for the Kipture vacancy. The nominee had neither local experience nor a working knowledge of Swahili, so Hobley probably intended that Leet should merely man the station and supervise the passage of mails and caravans. Since no preparatory work had been done by Johnston, Hobley, Cooper or Bagnall, it was politic for the collection of taxes to be deferred until Leet proved his capacity, or a more senior officer could be spared for the task. This seems to have been tacitly accepted when Hobley specified Tiriki, Nyangori, Kabras, North Kitosh and parts of Kakamega as the only parts of his district needing extra police for tax collection purposes.³⁰

The distinction which experience had taught Hobley to draw between the Nandi and Kavirondo in administrative matters, such as the imposition of taxes, was also discernible in his views on the measures that should be adopted to hasten pacification in Nandi. These views were to some extent conflicting, and suggest he was uncertain whether the policy he had followed in Kavirondo would be successful in Nandi. He was as convinced as most of his contemporaries that reparations should be speedily sought for individual outrages, for 'when disaffection once appears among native tribes, it generally spreads if not immediately checked with a firm hand'.³¹ This was the general principle that governed his response to disaffection in Kavirondo, where he had invariably taken action, often on his own initiative, to punish offenders and had generally been able to undertake reprisals without seeking assistance from outside the district.³² Some of his comments suggest he would like to have seen this policy enforced in Nandi,³¹ but there is other evidence that he felt the most practicable way of bringing about the pacification of the tribe was 'by occupying the surrounding countries to confine (them) to their proper limits, and to curtail the districts available for raiding',³³ until such times as the government was powerful enough to crush the raiders in their homelands. Should the volcano erupt and put road transport, the railway and telegraph seriously at risk, Hobley apparently accepted that such an eventuality would necessitate mustering an expeditionary force from outside the province, if it was to be strong enough to make a lasting contribution to the solution of the Nandi question.

While Hobley was pondering these problems, organizing tax collection in Kavirondo, and strengthening his hold over the Luo after the Uyoma expedition, Bagnall was preparing for his mission to the Kamelilo. On 23 March he left Kipture with a detachment from the station garrison, and a party of levies mustered by Latongwa and other Nandi leaders. The chiefs of the country traversed by the expedition all came in,³² professed their wish for friendly relations with the government, and confirmed that the telegraph caravan had been cut up by Kamelilo. Chiefs attending a conference at Fort Ternan were so unanimous and forthright in condemning the Kamelilo that Bagnall concluded that members of this *pororiet* were 'more or less banditti and a thorn in the flesh', not only to the government but also to the rest of the tribe. None of the Lumbwa chiefs came in for the conference, and Wortham considered their refusal to heed his summons³³ was in keeping with the insolent manner in which they had recently disregarded his orders and refused to bring in food for the garrison.

Having satisfied himself as to the identity of the offenders, Bagnall made a night

march against the Kamelilo who were caught unawares when troops arrived in their country at daybreak. 185 head of cattle and 2,000 sheep and goats were captured in two days, and fourteen of the enemy killed. The auxiliaries assured Bagnall that the Kamelilo had lost most of their stock, including all the cattle belonging to Chief Raptaminga. In what Bagnall described as 'a good attempt' to recover their stock the Kamelilo threw *simis*³⁴ and fired arrows at the troops but only succeeded in wounding one soldier with a stone. This short localised operation, which had originally been planned by Hobley as a police patrol, had to be carried out by about eighty regulars from Kipture and Fort Ternan, because Bagnall had insufficient police for the task.³⁵ The punitive force, which was the first to be assembled for operations against the Nandi without calling on help from outside the district, was the second within four months to be accompanied by Nandi friendlies,³⁶ whose services were rewarded by presents from the captured stock.

In order to consolidate the advantage gained by the expedition, Bagnall recommended that a temporary post should be established in Kamelilo. He thought a garrison consisting of a sergeant and twenty men would deter the inhabitants from returning to rebuild their huts, and force them to settle among other sections. Hobley opposed this recommendation because of difficulties in maintaining communications with such an isolated post,³⁷ and 'the character of the people'. He proposed a monthly patrol to prevent resettlement of the devastated areas, and directed Bagnall to try and get Raptaminga to come in and make peace. Johnston did not comment on Bagnall's report and recommendation, nor on Hobley's intention to dispossess the Kamelilo of their lands.¹

The results of the expedition were much the same as those of its forerunners: a few Nandi were killed, a large number of huts destroyed, and a quantity of stock confiscated.³⁸ It is questionable, however, whether the booty secured represented the major part of the section's flocks and herds. After the captures made as a result of the initial surprise, the remainder of the stock was probably driven into the forests or to Lumbwa, where they were out of reach of the expedition's foraging bands. Furthermore, the animals captured represented merely a proportion of the domestic and small stock kept at the homesteads, but not of the herds grazing in the distant, dry-weather *kaptich* areas. The government had given the Kamelilo 'a sharp lesson' and demonstrated its ability to punish dissident elements living some distance from the road and stations. The warriors had not, however, been brought to battle, and the troops were withdrawn before the Kamelilo leaders were forced to a parley so that peace terms could be imposed upon them.

NOTES

1. Whitehouse stated in February 1899 (CO 537/71) that disturbances in Nandi had twice caused the loss of essential parts of the *William Mackinnon* which had to be replaced from the railway workshops; this evidently refers to attacks made before the railway undertook to transport the steamer by the Nyando Valley route. For Blackett's journey and the food post, see *NRBR* i, pp. 329-332, 360.
2. Whitehouse recorded on 29.3.1901 (FOCP 7732/67) that men had been killed when two of Barton Wright's caravans from Molo to Port Ugowe (August 1899 to February 1900) were attacked; these incidents were not reported at the time they occurred.
3. Twenty-two telegraph men from Port Ugowe arrived at Fort Ternan on 2.3.1900 without rifles or even a headman (ESA A/4/26).
4. This was recognized by the Foreign Office: commenting on Johnston's proposals for a land survey, Hill minuted on 3.2.1900 (FO 2/377) that 'surveying parties unless in considerable strength, are likely to be attacked, especially on the eastern side of the Lake'.
5. According to Martin there were twenty Nandi raiders and two Swahilis killed.
6. See *NRBR* i, pp. 66, 75, 81, 142, 331, 349 for confusion between Dorobo and Nandi.
7. Wortham should have questioned the truth of this report since raiding between the Nandi and Lumbwa was most exceptional. He had at first suspected the Kapsigiria Lumbwa, who lived ten to fifteen miles south-west of Fort Ternan, because of a report that a warrior from this section had been wounded; his leader, Arogobelia, was sent to Kipture to explain how the injury was inflicted.
8. Pereira claimed in December (Lloyd-Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 80) that 'nothing could happen within forty miles without my being informed by the natives'.
9. Wortham insisted that all repair parties were being escorted, but asked for his garrison of sixty-four

- men to be increased so that escorts could be provided between Fort Ternan and Molo.
10. Hobley, who returned to Port Ugowe on 6.3.1900, apparently equated the Kamelilo with the Tinderet Dorobo, who were alleged to have cut the wire in February; wire-cutting by the Kamelilo had not previously been reported.
 11. Hobley often stressed this obligation: see his Journal for 4.9.1891 (in relation to the Masai and Wadthaka), and *NRBR* i, pp. 62-66, 78, 124, 161, 173, 360. Nandi raids in the Nyando Valley are well documented in Luo sources, e.g., J.O. Ondere, 'History of Kano', UCN/HD-RPA file A/2/4.
 12. Martin was away from 13.3.1900 to 23.3.1900 arranging Baker's move to Ribo, so he evidently thought the situation around Ravine was satisfactory. Apart from a break between December 1895 and August 1897, Martin had served continuously at Ravine; Bagge was stationed at Kipture for two periods aggregating eighteen months, far longer than any other Collector.
 13. Capt. C.H.Lewis had completed five miles of road when work was halted at the beginning of the most difficult section.
 14. The contractor complained that he had had to employ six porters with pole slings for private loads of 275 lb.
 15. Johnston wrote the first of many querulous letters about mail and telegraph delays in March, when the up mail was more than a fortnight overdue (ESA A/4/27).
 16. Five private dhows - three German, one British, and one 'Native' (owned either by an Arab or by the Baganda Regents, Kagwa or Zakaria Kizito) - sailed from Port Ugowe in March; also two flotillas of Baganda canoes (PUD).
 17. F.A. Knowles (1872-1922) arrived at Mombasa c. March 1898 and reached Mumias on 25.8.1898; he had served continuously at Port Ugowe and Mumias under Hobley. W.H.L.S. Leet was transferred from the Niger Coast Protectorate in August 1899 following an adverse report; his departure from Mombasa, where he had arrived on 4.11.1899, was delayed by his marriage until 29.12.1899; he arrived at Ravine on 17.1.1900.
 18. He also mentioned that there was four times as much clerical work at Mumias as at Kipture.
 19. There were twelve doctors and twelve clerks on the establishment for 1900-1901. Johnston reduced the number of clerks in Ternan's estimates on 13.3.1900 (FOCP 7404/88). Hill failed to impress the Treasury on 13.2.1900 (FO 2/377), when he pointed out it was false economy to appoint men to administer districts and then to tie them down doing storekeeper's work. Jackson made the same point on 14.12.1901 (FOCP 7946/24), when he asked for a clerk for every station.
 20. Grant had warned on 18.9.1899 (FO 2/204) of the possibility of a Sudanese mutiny in Buganda. Johnston planned eventually to reduce the Sudanese soldiers from 1073 to around 400.
 21. A War Office suggestion on 28.12.1899 (FO 2/241) that the Yao Battalion of the BCA Rifles might relieve the Indian Contingent, as a means of reducing expenditure without increasing the government's dependence on the Sudanese, was rejected by Johnston on 5.5.1900 on the grounds that 'withdrawal of the Indian Contingent would ... result in the speedy collapse of our Protectorate'; (FOCP 7404/55/85, 7675/6/26). Johnston's views were similar to those put forward by Macdonald in August; see *NRBR* ii, p. 9.
 22. See *NRBR* i, pp. 77, 124, 187-189, 337.
 23. Johnston was ordered to restrict drawing to £50,000 above the sum voted by Parliament in the previous year. The Civil Contingencies Fund could not meet the excess expenditure, so the Treasury Chest had to be resorted to as an emergency measure.
 24. The 'Nandi Rock'; Whitehouse (COCP 614/7) used the Luo name, Gorjajuock, 'hill of the spirits'.
 25. Cf. Dr A.R. Cook's letter, 4.3.1900: 'The Wa-Nandi have carried off several miles of telegraph wire for sale so telegraphic communication is blocked, we have had no telegrams for ten days'.
 26. Hobley was in charge of Nandi from February to December 1895, when he handed over to Jackson.
 27. The reference is to Kavirondo not Nandi; Hobley's list of Nandi chiefs on pp. 58-59 of *Eastern Uganda* (1902) is far from complete.
 28. He told Johnston 'I don't want any tribe to brag they have escaped, as this will affect the others'.
 29. This applied with equal force to the more senior officials who had administered Nandi since 1896, as very little accurate information had been recorded on tribal organization and personalities; Hobley himself failed to distinguish between clan and *pororiet*.
 30. Kakungulu's Baganda and Grant played a major part in the Kitosh expedition in August 1895 (*NRBR* i, Ch. 5). Hobley occasionally enlisted the help of detachments passing through the district; see *NRBR* i, pp. 327, 349, also p. 354 and Hobley's diary, 21.8.96, for a small detachment from Kipture.
 31. See *NRBR* i, pp. 337, 355-356, *NRBR* ii, p. 15.
 32. Chiefs Arap Sertu, Nagano, Arap Kuna, Arap Samba, and Miena accompanied the Kipture detachment,

and Terok, Kibotio, Arabquenu and Ramgara came in during the march; few of these 'difficult native names' can be identified in the forms given by Bagnall.

33. Until Pereira left in February relations with the Lumbwa had been good; possibly Wortham was personally less acceptable than Pereira.
34. Short, spatulate two-edged sword. Knobkerries, and in the south-west short spears, were thrown, but it was unusual for *simis* to be used as missile weapons except in pitched battles with the Nyangori. The Lumbwa were renowned for their marksmanship when throwing the *simi* (Wortham, Uganda Intelligence Report for May 1901, FO 2/804).
35. Capt. C.L.R. Petrie, who was passing through Nandi on his way to Kampala, took command.
36. For the effect of the friendlies' action in November 1899 and March 1900 on morale and the timing of the raids preceding the July expedition, see *NRBR* ii, p. 178.
37. A post was established at Soba in Kamelilo after the 1903 expedition. Bagnall's suggestion to disperse offending sections was considered by Johnston in October 1900 and January 1901 (*NRBR* ii, p. 136).
38. 1,000 sheep were sent to Kampala as rations for the sepoys; 700 were possibly sent to relieve the famine in Busoga (see *NRBR* ii, p. 32).

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- D. Wortham-Parkin, and Hobley, 13.3.1900, ESA A/4/26.
- E. See *NRBR* ii, pp. 6, 37, and FOCP 7545/96; Johnston-FO, 27.2.1900, FO 2/297; O'Callaghan-FO, 22.2.1901, FO 2/300. Cf. Hobley's detailed briefing to Wortham in June (*NRBR* ii, p. 72).
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- G. Hobley-Com, 9, 19.3.1900, ESA A/4/26.
- H. Hobley-Com, 16.3.1900, ESA A/4/26; the two reports possibly refer to the same warrior band.
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- L. FO-Johnston, 13.3.1900, FOCP 7404/88. Johnston-FO, 17.3.1900, FOCP 7405/51; Johnston-Martin, 18.2.1900, ESA A/5/9.
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- N. Bagnall-Com, 16.4.1900, ESA A/4/27; Bagnall expelled an Indian trader from Ravine in April for refusing to reduce the price of his wares.
- O. R.B. Fisher (née Hurditch), *On the Borders of Pigmy Land*, pp. 16-17; Miss A.B. Glass's Diary, 10.3.1900 to 15.3.1900, CMS Archives. Hobley-Com, 24.8.1900, ESA A/18/1; cf. Johnston-FO, 28.4.1900, ESA A/31.
- P. Hobley-Com, 24.8.1900, ESA A/18/1. The Kitosh raid may be the incident described by Kimilili elders in KNA EN/3.
- Q. Hobley-Com, 9.3.1900 (pte), ESA A/4/26; Johnston-Hobley, 12.1.1900, ESA A/5/9.
- R. Hobley, 'Kavirondo', *JRGS* 12 (1898), p. 371. For the views of his contemporaries, see *NRBR* i, pp. 236, 373. M. Perham and M. Bull, *Diaries of Lord Lugard* iii, p. 388.
- S. Hobley's Journal, 7.10.1891, referring to the policy that should be adopted towards the Masai.
- T. Bagnall-Hobley, 30.3.1900, Hobley-Com, 2.4.1900, ESA A/4/27.

CHAPTER 6

Johnston is not alarmed

When Bagnall left for Ravine on 5 April 1900 to take over the Baringo District from Martin, there was no administrative colleague at Kipture to whom he could hand over the station and district. Captain Petrie had been ordered to Kampala, Parkin was in the Nyando Valley organizing patrols to protect the telegraph and prevent Raptaminga's Kamelilo from returning to their homes, and Legros, the Eurasian clerk, was under suspicion for speculation and intemperance. Leet arrived to take charge on the twenty-fourth, and became the third Collector to administer the district within a period of two months. When, by the end of the month, Legros had been suspended, and Leet was under orders to proceed to Uganda to explain his alleged misconduct at the coast, Hobley asked Parkin to assume civil charge of the district, in addition to his dual military role as OC XIV Company and Commandant of the Eastern Military District. Parkin refused on the grounds that both his subalterns were newcomers, and that additional commitments at Kipture, where he had neither a British NCO nor a company clerk to help him, would restrict still further his supervisory visits to detachments in his extensive command.^A Hobley accordingly had no choice but to retain Leet at Kipture until a replacement could be found.

Leet spent most of his time straightening out the station accounts, which Bagnall had left in confusion for the second time,¹ and could give little attention to administering the district.^B Hobley's attitude to the staffing problem in Nandi reflected his view on Kipture's importance in relation to the administrative arrangements for his district. Captain Johnson ran the transport system, Parkin's troops were available to deal with minor incidents and provide escorts, so all that was required on the administrative side was as man to take charge of the station stores and ensure the regular passage of the mails. His responsibilities as postmaster were the Collector's principal concern, because of the Special Commissioner's scathing criticism of the road station officials' inability to prevent delays and losses in operating the fortnightly mail service linking Entebbe with the coast. Cooper's cadre of Nandi mail-runners continued to work the local service, and the through mails were carried by professional porters, often with escorts of as few as six riflemen.

Nandi was quiet after the return of the Kamelilo expedition. The last survey peg was driven in, 'with much ceremony', at Port Ugowe on 20 April, and the railway surveyors returned to Nandi. The Chief Engineer reported that this lengthy operation² had been completed without opposition from any of the tribes west of the Mau. Unlike the telegraph parties and some of the steamer caravans, the survey had been carried out by large bodies of disciplined staff working in escorted teams and living in large encampments under close European supervision. Friendly relations had been established with the Nandi and Lumbwa who often sold food to the camps. The Nandi unwittingly aided the progress of the work on one occasion by saving the surveyors the trouble of paying compensation for a Luo village, which was destroyed by Nandi raiders before negotiations with its owners were concluded. The Telegraph Department was not so fortunate as the survey parties. 'Not infrequent' thefts of wire between Mau and the Lake caused breaks in transmission, which were often of long duration owing to the time taken by the repair parties stationed at Molo to locate the faults and replace the stolen wire. After abortive attacks on two private caravans between Fort Ternan and Molo, traders and transporters became anxious for the safety of their men and goods. Allidina Visram, the leading merchant on the Uganda Road with 'a shop in nearly every *boma* (station) in the Protectorate', asked for all private caravans to be escorted by Punjabi riflemen on the scale of four sepoys for every hundred loads.^C This request was rejected because most caravans were considered large enough to take care of themselves, and because soldiers detached for escort duties would reduce the number of troops that could speedily be mustered in an emergency. As it was, the forces allocated for the defence of the whole of the Eastern Military District consisted of only three companies of the Uganda Rifles³ and small contingents of newly recruited and largely untrained police. Evatt, who had been promoted to Acting Commandant when Ternan went on leave in January, planned to man the district stations with a total of 525 policemen, but only a small proportion of this number had been embodied by the end of April.^D

Despite the unsettled conditions prevailing in the Eastern Province and the need to protect the vulnerable telegraph wire through the Nyando Valley, Johnston pushed ahead with plans to reduce the regular soldiers⁴ guarding the lines of communication.^E He had been badly briefed, if not misinformed, about the history of the government's relations with the Nandi, and the threat they posed to communications. In his characteristically optimistic Preliminary Report he noted that Nandi, together with the Mau, Baringo and Kavirondo Districts, 'were fairly under Administrative control on the part of the British officials', and that all these districts were '(with the exception of the western portion of the Mau district), quite safe for the European traveller, merchant or settler'. While admitting that the Nandi and Lumbwa 'for the past four years have given us a great deal of trouble', he claimed that 'the majority of the Nandi chiefs are now friendly with us and actually turn out on occasions and help us against their bandit brothers'. He did however concede that 'there still remains a small section of the Nandi, who make constant efforts to pilfer goods from weak caravans, to drive off cattle and to cut the telegraph wire - wire being, unfortunately, almost the only article with which these perfectly naked people adorn themselves'. His comments on the Lumbwa followed similar lines: although reputedly a powerful tribe, they were 'only formidable if pursued into their own forests', for, 'like the Nandi, they have no guns, but use spears and poisoned arrows'. Because of 'their habit for centuries' of raiding 'the peaceful dweller in the plain, especially the Kavirondo people near the mouth of the Nyando River', Johnston was 'afraid we shall have to send an expedition eventually into their country to reduce them to submission'. He obviously had no misgivings regarding the outcome of such an expedition, since they were 'of course utterly unable to meet a disciplined force in the open'. Even after discounting Johnston's style of composition,⁵ it is evident that he thought the naked Nandi and Lumbwa spearmen and archers could be swiftly conquered whenever it was convenient for this to be taken in hand.^F

Johnston had not thought it necessary to investigate the Nandi or Lumbwa problem himself, but was content to base his opinions on information acquired at second hand from officials who had no real understanding of the structure and temper of either tribe. In his first appraisal of the steps necessary to implement his Special Commission, which had itself made light of the possibility of a serious breakdown of law and order, Johnston considered that his immediate and important tasks were to consolidate the government's position in Buganda, reduce the annual grant-in-aid, institute a regular administration, and introduce taxation in the settled parts of the Protectorate. In his view the only dangers that were at all likely to interfere with this programme were a second Sudanese mutiny, and the remoter possibility that the Baganda might try to rid their country of the British.^G In the light of this assessment and the information that was made available to him, it was not surprising that he underestimated the Nandi threat and failed to make adequate dispositions to contain it. Although he accepted that sporadic outrages might be perpetrated by recalcitrant sections, he evidently considered these could be dealt with by the 'man on the spot'. He also apparently discounted the possibility of a Kalenjin combination such as Jackson and Ternan had allegedly been faced with in 1897.⁶ Johnston exaggerated the significance of the help given by a few Nandi chiefs against the unpopular Kamelilo, and probably took an unduly optimistic view of the results achieved by Coles and Bagnall in the recent expeditions. His remarks about the Nandi as a fighting power verged on the disparaging, and he failed to appreciate the significance of the change in tactics which they had made as a result of the battle of Kimondi in November 1895,⁷ or to be impressed by their bravery, stubbornness, military organization and discipline in previous encounters with British forces. Finally, he had every confidence in the ability of Evatt's Indian troops to undertake the swift subjugation of such a small tribe. Johnston was satisfied that sufficient sepoys and Baganda could be rushed across the lake to reinforce the district forces in Nandi, where they could move quickly through the country with the help of the 147-strong military transport section attached to the Eastern Military District.^H His assurance on this account suggests he had not been told of the problems the Indians would encounter when facing resourceful guerilla fighters in the difficult Nandi country, or the logistic requirements for maintaining a large army among a hostile population in an area devoid of the kind of foodstuffs the Indians and Baganda were accustomed to expect.

The senior officers who might have been expected to advise him were unlikely to persuade him to change his opinion of the Nandi 'bandits', or add much of value to his

information about them. Ternan and Jackson were naturally not disposed to analyse the reasons for their failure to subjugate the Nandi in 1897, and Hobley had never taken part in an expedition against them. For the past five years Hobley had been preoccupied with the Kavirondo, and had little personal knowledge of the Nandi and only a passing acquaintance with their country, most of which he had not visited since he assumed charge of the Nandi District in July 1899. When he first met the Special Commissioner at Port Ugowe, Hobley could only have told him a few of the items of information that were included in his report dated 24 August 1900 as many of these were unknown to Hobley in the previous December. In these circumstances Johnston's assessment in the preliminary Report was understandable. The Nandi were by no means reconciled to British rule but, if military action was forced upon the government in order to change their attitude, he had no doubt that such action would prove as decisive and lasting as the expedition against the Kitosh in August 1895, and as easy and thorough as the conquest of the northern Luo in December 1899.⁸

Two operations against Kalenjin tribes in April 1900 provided no grounds for Hobley and Johnston to revise their views about the Nandi. Bagnall reported on the nineteenth that no trouble was anticipated in the Baringo District, where several sections had already paid their taxes, and other Kamasia and Elgeyo chiefs were coming to Ravine to discuss collection arrangements for the remaining areas.⁹ Three days later two Sudanese policemen were found murdered and 'horribly mutilated' near the fort. Twelve chiefs, who were at the station discussing tax collection at the time, told Bagnall that Kamasia from an outlying section had set upon the policemen while they were cutting thatching grass. Accompanied by twenty police and forty Uasin Gishu Masai spearmen, Bagnall marched through the night of the twenty-third, surprised the alleged offenders, burnt all the huts he could see and seized five head of cattle and 600 small stock. The rifles and accoutrements which had been stolen from the dead policemen were later recovered, and the Kamasia chiefs promised to bring in the murderers. When the report on this swift and decisive action against the 'forest and hill bandits' reached the Special Commissioner, he urged upon Bagnall, who thought the punishment inadequate for 'the most dastardly, cold-blooded murder I've yet seen in this country', the need to conciliate the Kamasia as they had shown themselves in the past to be 'one of the most difficult tribes to deal with'. Johnston declared that he would be more gratified to learn they had been brought under control without confiscating any more of their stock, than to 'read of successful expeditions resulting in the devastation of their country'. He did however add that, if the Kamasia did not respond to conciliatory treatment, it might be necessary to drive them out and to bring in Sudanese or Masai settlers. Considerations of humanity apart, Johnston realized not only that punitive measures might lead to expensive expeditions, but that inhabitants of a devastated countryside could not be expected to pay tax. He was also anxious for the Kamasia to settle down and cultivate so that Ravine would cease to be 'a parasite'.¹ The advice given to Bagnall presumably outlined the policy which Johnston hoped he would be able to follow in dealing with other tribes in the Eastern Province who had not yet fully submitted to the government and recognized the permanent nature of its occupation. The completion of pacification by repressive measures was only to be contemplated if conciliation and the avoidance of provocation failed to elicit the desired response.

More systematic and thorough punitive measures were taken against the Nyangori. Hobley had done his best to win over the tribe but his personal representations to Chief Ujoo met with only a token response. The fine of ivory had not been paid, and Ujoo protested that he was unable to return any more of the looted stock or even prevent warriors from his own section from raiding. In addition to the cattle stolen from the government herds at Port Ugowe, the Nyangori raided a German trader's caravan, and carried off draught oxen working on the cart convoys between Port Ugowe and the Nandi escarpment. Moreover, both the Baluyia and Luo appealed to Hobley for redress for the losses they had suffered as a result of Nyangori raids. When Ujoo finally broke off negotiations, Hobley organised an expedition to chasten his people and discourage other tribes from following their example. Precautions were taken to prevent the Nyangori from driving their stock into the deep ravines and thick forests of the Nandi escarpment, where Hobley thought it would be hazardous for regular soldiers to operate.¹⁰ Although they claimed to be on bad terms with their kinsmen, Hobley thought the Nyangori would probably prefer to risk their cattle among the Nandi than leave them to be rounded up by the expedition. Sergeant-Major Greenwood

was accordingly detailed to leave Port Ugowe on 6 April for the south-east corner of Nyangori, so that he could seal off the escape route into Nandi. Hobley went as political officer with the main party from Mumias under the command of Lieutenant F.I. Day and Sergeant Ellison. Day's column consisted of fifty riflemen from VII Company, a maxim, 250 auxiliaries and a large number of Kavirondo porters. Half of the Kavirondo auxiliaries carried guns, and some of the remainder were spearmen from the Uasin Gishu Masai settlements.¹¹ The main party marched through Kakamega and Tiriki and, after some severe fighting in Nyangori, reached the southern limits of enemy territory. Here they were joined by Greenwood's detachment which had also met with stubborn resistance from the Nyangori, and possibly from the Kakipoch Nandi during the march along their western border.

One mob of cattle was captured while it was being driven into the Nandi forest, but others probably found refuge there as only 1,003 head of cattle and some 2,000 sheep and goats were rounded up in Nyangori.¹² Government casualties were three soldiers killed and seven wounded and a few auxiliaries killed. Hobley himself had a narrow escape when a small party he was leading to seek a parley was charged by forty spearmen. About eighty Nyangori were killed and Hobley considered the punishment sufficient. Peace was concluded at a conference, which was arranged through Luo envoys, and confirmed at a blood-brotherhood ceremony in which the Tiriki and Maragoli also participated. Hobley invited the Baluyia, 'so as to stop Nyangori raids on them', but not their other neighbours, the Nandi, although he was aware of the enmity that existed between the two tribes. Under the peace agreement the Nyangori promised to work for the government, open their country to traders, bring food regularly to the Port Ugowe market, pay taxes, cease raiding their neighbours, and surrender the rifles belonging to three of Greenwood's men who were killed in the fighting.¹³ Ujoo stated that fugitives had taken the rifles into Nandi but promised to secure their return. Although Hobley was impressed with the amount of land under cultivation, and wondered what the Nyangori did with all their grain, apart from making it into beer, he was not optimistic that food would be brought to Port Ugowe before the next harvest. The Nyangori were told they were unlikely to be called upon to pay tax until they had recovered from the effects of the expedition. Ujoo went back with Hobley to Port Ugowe where he was given a few head of cattle 'to establish his position as Chief ... and help build his future influence'. Hobley considered the operations would deter further raids on the Port Ugowe cattle, but warned that the Nyangori were 'more intractable than the Nile tribes (sc. the Luo)', and that much more work would be needed before they were finally brought under control.¹⁴

The only tribes in the Eastern Province to challenge the government in 1900 were all members of the Kalenjin group. Two of the smallest, the Kamasia and Nyangori, were virtually subjugated in operations undertaken as reprisals for specific outrages, but the two strongest, the Nandi and Lumbwa, remained a threat to law and order. Both the Kamasia and Nyangori held discussions with senior government representatives who persuaded them to accept peace terms and pay hut tax. Mitei was being built up as the principal chief of the Kamasia and Ujoo was chosen for a similar role among the Nyangori. Progress on this scale was not achieved among the Nandi and Lumbwa, whose leaders were not even given the opportunity of discussing their problems and future with either Johnston or Hobley. The Nandi and Lumbwa may not have proved so amenable as their kinsmen and would possibly have spurned an offer to parley before they had been beaten in the field. However this may be, no effort was made to put a procedure to the test that had produced promising results elsewhere. The accommodation arrived at with the Kamasia and Nyangori was to prove of some importance when the government was forced to take action against the Nandi a few months later.

In the neighbouring district to the west, the Protectorate was facing a threat to its authority and communications from the Basoga, who had stolen large quantities of wire and halted work on extending the line to Kampala. Responding quickly to the challenge, Johnston ordered Fowler to discover the offenders and destroy their villages. This punishment was considered appropriate for what was 'tantamount to an act of war' and Johnston hoped it would 'put the fear of God and the Commissioner' into the culprits and discourage them from re-occupying the country near the wire. His concern over delays in completing the telegraph to Kampala was shared by the Baganda Regents, who built huts at intervals of 500 yards along the Buganda section to house armed men who patrolled the wire in pairs. Taking advantage of this spontaneous demonstration of loyalty, Johnston persuaded the Regents to

provide similarly manned picket posts in Busoga. In order to ensure that the 'rascally Basoga' suffered for their misdeeds, Hobley was ordered to stop sending them famine relief from Kavirondo, and Fowler was told to consider establishing Baganda settlements near the wire¹⁴ as a permanent means of protecting the Busoga section.^K Urgent regulations were issued which placed the onus of detecting and surrendering wire-cutters on the Basoga chiefs. These regulations, which were vigorously challenged by C.M.S. missionaries and received a mixed reception at the Foreign Office,¹⁵ instituted a form of collective punishment on sections living near the wire, and imposed severe penalties on chiefs who failed in their duty.^L Johnston was able to deal with the problem in this manner in Busoga, where there were recognised chiefs and where help from Buganda was readily forthcoming. The suggestion he made, a few months later, that a similar system should be enforced in the Nyando Valley, had to be dropped, because several Nandi and Lumbwa chiefs had not submitted to government direction and few of them were powerful enough to control the activities of their people.¹⁶

The measures taken in Busoga enabled construction of the line to be resumed and, on 12 April, Kampala was brought into telegraphic communication with London. Although it may be said that this event marked the beginning of rule from Whitehall,^M Johnston did not seek Foreign Office approval for any of the punitive expeditions that were undertaken in Uganda after that date. Communications between Uganda and London were moreover dependent on the line being kept in working order throughout its length;¹⁷ transmission was often interrupted through natural causes and Nandi raids so that for long periods the line had two ends but no middle.

One of the expedients Johnston proposed for safeguarding the telegraph was to establish colonies of Sudanese ex-soldiers in the Nyando Valley, where they could be called upon to form patrols similar to those operated by the Baganda Regents in Busoga. Alarmed by the concentration of doubtfully loyal, unemployed Sudanese at Kampala and Entebbe, Johnston decided to remove them 'before they could start another revolt'. Jackson was made responsible for selecting 300 from those at Kampala who were 'the greatest nuisance and potential danger'. Because of his experience of their provocative habits, he decided against an overland journey to Port Ugowe, and ordered the canoes they travelled in to stop at uninhabited islands where there were no opportunities for looting. The Sudanese, several of whom had taken part in the mutiny, were to be dispersed by Hobley in settlements near Port Ugowe, Mumias, Kipture, Ravine, Fort Ternan, Molo, Mbaruk and Naivasha. Johnston stipulated that the number accommodated at any one place in the Nyando Valley should not exceed 200, and that not more than fifty houses would be allowed at Kipture. The colonists were to be issued with hoes which had been received from the Kavirondo in lieu of tax, and fed until their crops were harvested. Some of the younger men were to be enrolled as police in the Eastern Province, where Johnston thought they would not prove dangerous because 'the native population is ... equally fierce with the Sudanese and able to hold its own against them'.¹⁸

Probably because of delays in obtaining enough canoes only a small proportion of the Sudanese reached Port Ugowe before the Nandi campaign caused the scheme to be suspended. Hobley, who shared Jackson's views on the disrupting influence of the Sudanese, refused to accommodate any but police volunteers at Port Ugowe. Twenty-one police and fourteen settlers were sent to Fort Ternan, and smaller detachments to Ravine, Molo and Naivasha, but apparently none were sent to Kipture.^N If any were allotted land at settlements in the middle and lower Nyando Valley, the numbers were not large enough to guard the telegraph wire and thus relieve the half company at Fort Ternan of this responsibility.

The location of the Sudanese settlements was in line with Johnston's policy of concentrating government interests in the Nyando Valley rather than along the realigned Sclater's Road. The road linking Ravine with the proposed capital and railway route was nearing completion, and the Transport Department asked for guards to be stationed at the three stables which had been built on the new road. Johnson was particularly anxious to open the Nyando Valley route because, in addition to his normal commitments, he was required to replenish the stocks of Indian rations which were running low owing to delays, losses and deterioration through drought. He argued that closer supervision, which could more easily be exercised over through caravans on the direct route, would reduce delay, damage and pilfering, especially on the Nandi section.^O Before this change could become operative, the

key station on the route, Fort Ternan, had to be made more secure and its facilities improved. Parkin was accordingly ordered to transfer the headquarters of the Eastern Military District to Fort Ternan as a preliminary step towards implementing the withdrawal of the remaining troops from Kipture, which was planned to take place as soon as the district police had been brought up to strength by the arrival of the promised Sudanese recruits from Kampala. £150 were allocated for buildings at the new headquarters station and Kipture, 'which, owing to the railway, are acquiring importance'.^P When these grants were made, the Chief Engineer's final location report, which placed the railway station ground on the opposite side of the River Namuting and distant by half a mile from Fort Ternan, had not reached Johnston.¹⁹

Little progress was made in May towards implementing Johnston's intentions concerning the development of the Nyando Valley route. The direct road route over the Mau ceased to be used by large railway parties, and Kitoto's was no longer required as a food depot after the departure of the survey teams. Military headquarters remained at Kipture and the plan to concentrate the regular forces at Fort Ternan was postponed. No work was done on the road through the upper Nyando Valley, for which Johnson had requested additional funds and an extra sergeant so that he could be ready by mid-July to move the transport headquarters to Fort Ternan or the proposed capital.^Q The only activities taking place in the region during the month were the passage of cart convoys over the waterlogged track from Sudi's to Port Ugowe, the attempts by telegraph parties to repair the line, the despatch of police recruits and Sudanese settlers to Fort Ternan, and patrol operations by a detachment from Kipture under Parkin's command. Telegraphic communication westwards beyond Molo was only possible on eight days during the month, and the Chief Engineer feared that the whole system was in danger of breaking down.²⁰ Europeans in Uganda were becoming annoyed and the Special Commissioner was furious. Hobley's and Bagnall's assurances that breakdowns were the result of natural causes and not the failure of officials to control marauding tribesmen did nothing to appease the critics.^R

The potentialities of the country bordering the railway route were brought to the attention of the Foreign Office by Commander Whitehouse, who reported that the plains below the south Nandi escarpment provided excellent grazing, and could carry a much larger population when the Nandi had been compelled to renounce their raiding habits. He recorded that tobacco was grown extensively on the plateau, and forecast that plantation enterprises would prosper there as well as in the neighbourhood of Fort Ternan. He had no doubt that Nandi and the Nyando Valley would 'become greatly settled' when the railway reached the lake and raiding was no longer tolerated. A cautionary note was added, however, that 'long habits of pilfering, cattle-raiding and murder in retaliation for thefts cannot be expected to cease at once'. He reported that the plains to the north of Port Ugowe were no longer thinly populated now that 'people are beginning to see that there is more security for themselves and their herds', and noted that the Uganda Road was traversed by a constant stream of small trading caravans.²¹ The number of Indian traders had increased to such an extent since August 1898 that one of the caravan leaders complained that there were far too many for the traffic to be profitable.^S

The probability that the advance of the railway into the Eastern Province would encourage Europeans to investigate settlement prospects in the Protectorate was also recognized by Johnston. He issued a circular on 9 April declaring that, 'in virtue of Treaties and Agreements concluded with the Kings and Chiefs ... H.M. Government has acquired the sole right of disposal over the waste and uncultivated lands of the Protectorate', and prohibiting the alienation of land to Europeans without the consent of the Special Commissioner.²² On instructions from the Foreign Office, this regulation was followed on 10 May by a notice appropriating 'for public purposes ... all lands ... which are situated within one mile on either side of the line of the Uganda Railway', unless ownership of the land could be proved by persons resident on it. Although in the past the government had used small acreages in Nandi for posts and roads, these regulations entailed a substantial alienation of tribal lands,²³ which could only be contested if claims to ownership were lodged 'within three months from the date on which this notice is published in the *Official Gazette*'.^T

While awaiting funds so that work on the Nyando Valley road could be resumed, Johnson maintained the flow of loads from railhead in the Kedong Valley through Ravine, Kipture and Bushiri to Port Ugowe. Only pack and draught mules were being used on the

first section, but heavy losses from horse sickness forced him to apply for relief porters from Kikuyu and Mombasa. Convoy oxen working from Ravine to the Lake were fortunately not affected by rinderpest, which had been introduced into the lower Nyando Valley by Koenig's trade cattle from Mwanza.²⁴ The disease was however rife in the E.A.P., where the Masai lost thousands of their animals, and regulations were issued prohibiting the movement of cattle into the Kedong Valley or from the northern districts. Despite an estimated outlay of Rs.2,250 a month for the carriage of loads over the short Nandi escarpment section, Johnson managed to reduce the cost of delivering 1,200 loads a month to Port Ugowe for shipment to Uganda.^U

Throughout this period Transport Officer Johnson was the only link with the past at Kipture. Galt's transfer from Port Ugowe on 19 May enabled the embittered Leet to proceed to Entebbe at the end of the month. His replacement by an able and experienced officer was only a temporary expedient, however, since Galt²⁵ was due for overseas leave at the end of June. Hobley suggested that J.P. Wilson, who had been promoted to first-class assistant on his return from leave, should be posted to Kipture, but Johnston sent him to Mumias to take charge of the Kavirondo District after Hobley elected to settle permanently at the Nandi District headquarters at Port Ugowe. Since Galt's transfer left Hobley single-handed at Port Ugowe and unable to move about the district,²⁶ he asked for Knowles to be sent from Mumias as a replacement.^V Galt was not only conscious of the temporary nature of his stewardship at Kipture, but also unsettled by rumours that the station was shortly to be abandoned. When twenty loads²⁷ of seed oats arrived from Ravine, Galt questioned whether it was worthwhile planting them in view of the uncertainty about Kipture's future.^W

When he handed over to J.P. Wilson on 18 May, Hobley reported that the Kavirondo District was very peaceful and that 'no political issues of any importance were under consideration'. The tax census and collection were proceeding smoothly among the Wanga, 'who have received the greatest benefit', and Hobley had not met with the 'concerted and united opposition' he had feared when he visited the Kitosh.

This encouraged him to think that taxation could safely be introduced throughout Kavirondo providing suitable staff and methods were employed. Payment was being made almost entirely in kind; and goods, mainly sheep and goats, were received to the value of £300. Hobley was convinced that the tax could not be efficiently gathered by a Collector who sat at Mumias and told the chiefs to collect it for him, but only 'by an officer who understands the natives having the time to go quietly round taking section by section'. This would particularly be the case in the south of the district, where there were no large, mud-walled villages but only single huts hidden among bush and crops.^X Judging from the painstaking methods which Hobley found it prudent to adopt for the Baluyia, and which he hoped to make standard practice among other tribes under his jurisdiction, he evidently did not think it would be 'convenient', either for a census to be made, or for collection to be carried out, under the conditions prevailing in Nandi at the time. Furthermore, as far as the Baluyia and some of the Luo were concerned, there was some truth in Johnston's statement that taxation had been accepted 'after a series of agreements had been concluded with the native Chiefs', whose people were 'quite shrewd enough to appreciate the advantages of the British Government', because 'it means the defence of the weak against the strong and a guarantee as to the safety of life and property'. The same did not apply to anything like the same extent to Nandi, which hardly qualified as 'one of those districts which are at present effectively administered', and 'where British supremacy is undoubted'. The distinction was probably not lost on Hobley, despite the fact that the whole of his district had been gazetted as being ready for the imposition of taxes. Johnston's injunction, that only 'gentle and prudent measures' should be taken 'until the Natives ... have come to realize the advantages of a civilized Administration, and the fairness in principle of native contribution towards the expenses of that Administration', also gave Hobley some latitude in deferring collection until the Nandi were more firmly under government control and the staffing position at Kipture had improved.^Y

Early in May it seemed that some improvement had taken place in relations with the Nandi, despite the lack of continuity among the administrative staff at Kipture. Three mobs of cattle and small stock from the Kamelilo operations were escorted to Ravine without incident, and rifles taken from the telegraph party in February were brought in. Cooper's corps of mail-runners continued to operate the local service, and a few warriors had taken

employment as messengers with the Uganda Transport, in addition to those undergoing training with the Kipture police. Raptaminga had fallen ill and taken refuge in the forest, but some of the other chiefs promised to bring him in when he was sufficiently recovered to be moved. At Ravine on the twenty-fourth, five Nandi chiefs handed over 'Chief Lakiminjaa',²⁸ who was alleged to have played a part in the murder of two porters, and the prisoner was held in the guard room until Bagnall returned from Baringo.²⁹ These events gave some promise that the pattern of behaviour followed by the Nandi in the past would be repeated, and that there were good prospects for a few months at least that the district would be free from disturbance because of the deterrent effect of the punishment inflicted on the Kamelilo.

Towards the end of May news reached Port Ugowe of two attacks by Nandi warriors at widely separated points in the Nyando Valley. These reports dispelled any hope that the Kamelilo expedition would be followed by a period of inactivity. One of these incidents occurred near the south-eastern limit of Nandi occupation at Mt Blackett, where a caravan led by a German trader²⁹ was sharing a camp with a party of railway porters. Four Nandi came into the camp in the afternoon, and at midnight the camp was attacked by warriors who were driven off without causing any casualties among the defenders. Hobley thought the raiders were possibly Kamelilo, though he added that 'nobody but an expert can distinguish between Nandi and Lumbwa'. Kipture and Fort Ternan were asked to report on the incident but no fresh evidence was obtained to confirm that the raiders were Nandi.^{AA}

The second incident took place on the night of 18 May, when a large party of Nandi warriors attacked the former railway stores depot, two miles east of Kitoto's, which was occupied at the time by an Indian telegraphist and a porter. When the raiders fired the thorn perimeter fence and most of the abandoned huts, the operator and porter escaped into the long grass and eventually made their way to Kitoto's village where they were given sanctuary. The depot was stripped of its contents, including the telegraph instruments,³⁰ a quantity of food and trade goods, and all the telegraphist's personal belongings. Hobley sent a police corporal from Port Ugowe to the scene of the occurrence, where a party of Nandi warriors were found lurking in the bush close by. The path taken by the raiders was traced to the foothills of the escarpment above Kitoto's, so Parkin and Galt were asked to discover the identity of the culprits and undertake reprisals against them.³¹ Hobley's urgent application to Entebbe for help met with a rebuff from Johnston, who said he could do nothing about raids which occurred 200 miles from headquarters. Parkin was to be told that 'surely even naked men leave traces of the course they have taken', and Hobley was asked for a confidential report on the local commander's attitude and conduct.³² As a result of Hobley's findings, Johnston informed the Foreign Office that Parkin 'did not apply himself to the maintenance of order with that degree of zeal which might have been expected of him'.^{BB}

Johnston's testiness over the request for help in what appeared to be relatively minor incidents was understandable in view of his preoccupation with Buganda affairs, and the disturbed condition of several other districts. In addition to the possibility of disruption in Buganda as a result of the Agreement, and the equivocal attitude of the Sudanese in garrisoned posts throughout the Protectorate, reports had been received of the unsettling effect of incursions into Kavirondo, Koki and Ankole from German East Africa, and the activities of the Congo authorities on the western border. Bands of guerillas were intensifying their pillaging operations in the south-west, despite the flight of their leader, Gabriel, across the German border. Bakedi raids were also terrorising the inhabitants of the unadministered area south-west of Elgon, and the Basoga were said to be 'out of hand'.^{CC}

Still suffering from the after effects of blackwater fever, Johnston was becoming increasingly disturbed about the Foreign Office's attitude towards his proposals for reform. He summarized his priorities and anxieties in a private letter to Jackson, to whom he confided that 'I want to stay out here and complete my Special Commission, and I do not want to take my eyes off Uganda proper (sc. Buganda) for a long time yet ... unless, of course, the Foreign Office forces me to go home by sending out Ternan or by rejecting all my schemes *en bloc*'.^{DD} His main interest outside Buganda lay in extending the government's writ to frontier areas where Arab traders and European freebooters roamed at will,³³ disturbing the inhabitants and destroying the game.^{EE} Elsewhere he assumed that district officers were sufficiently in control to cope with routine problems, and commanded adequate resources to deal with minor, localized opposition to their authority. In only one of the

potential danger areas, West Busoga and Bukedi, where Trader Gemmill had stirred up trouble by usurping the functions of a collector, did Johnston think it necessary for troops to go to the aid of the civil power. An expedition of Indian troops was assembled under Captain M.L. Hornby to assert the government's authority, and reconnoitre a site for a military post on the Elgon slopes. Hobley, who had chosen a site for an administrative station when he visited the area in January 1896³⁴ was to advise on the location of the new post, which was intended to maintain order among the frontier tribes and curb the activities of Arab slavers on the plains to the north of the mountain. When Evatt briefed his second-in-command about his mission, he ordered Hornby to return via Mumias³⁵ as the troops 'will probably then be wanted to give the Nandi a much-needed lesson'.^{FF}

In another frontier area farther to the east, Baker's efforts to conciliate the people near Ribo were being frustrated by Arab and Swahili traders, who cornered the grain market and prevented the Suk from bringing in food for the forty-three Sudanese policemen and twenty-one porters manning the post. In view of this threat to the continued occupation of the area, Baker felt justified in implementing the somewhat ambiguous instructions Johnston had told him to follow if such an eventuality arose. These instructions authorized him to 'make the British power respected, while avoiding imprudent expeditions or unnecessary warfare'. Baker sent word of his plight to Bagnall who, with forty-five armed constabulary and a number of Njemps and Uasin Gishu Masai spearmen, left Ravine on 16 May with the intention of making 'an example of the Swahili traders who are said to be running the country'. Instead of carrying out the declared object of his mission, Bagnall roused the tribesmen to such an extent that he asked, on his return to Ravine on 14 June, for three companies of Sudanese so that the government's prestige could be restored.³⁶ He urged that only action on this scale could ensure the safety and regular provisioning of Baker's station.^{GG} The need to demonstrate the British power in the northern districts was also emphasized by reports of renewed Abyssinian incursions around Lake Rudolf, and by rumours of their intention to push farther south to the areas in which Baker and Bagnall had been operating.^{HH}

On the eastern borders of the Protectorate, the Naivasha Masai ignored Macallister's orders forbidding them to join Lenana in a raid against Sendeyu in German East Africa. The Collector was apprehensive that his embargo on the entry into Uganda of stock captured by the raiders would also be defied,³⁷ because the Masai had become much less amenable to persuasion since the death of Chief Terere had deprived the government of a staunch ally.^{II}

Johnston, who could view these events in perspective at Entebbe, evidently regarded them as nothing more than manifestations of the disquiet which was an inevitable concomitant of the institution of ordered government. As far as 'the naked people, scarcely armed with anything better than spears and bows and arrows', in the Eastern Province were concerned, he was convinced they could be kept under control by the armed constabulary. Should reinforcements to quell minor outbreaks be required, these could readily be provided either by Sudanese settlers, or by Masai warriors, 'who are really becoming our allies' and who, as irregular police, 'have been of great service to us in our dealings with the robber tribes of the Mau forests'.^{JJ} Collectors tended to exaggerate the extent and seriousness of opposition to their authority; the Special Commissioner, on the other hand, was satisfied that most of their difficulties could be resolved without his intervention, and that none seemed likely to hamper the fulfilment of his plans.

Johnston left Entebbe on 29 May to recruit his strength and to make an extensive tour of the western districts.³⁸ The day to day running of the administration was taken over by Jackson, who had been appointed Acting Deputy Commissioner in January at Hill's suggestion.^{KK} Before leaving for Toro, Johnston reminded Hobley about transferring military headquarters to Fort Ternan, replacing troops at Kipture by police, and employing Sudanese settlers to patrol the telegraph line. He also asked what action had been taken in connection with the raid on the telegraph station near Kitoto's.^{LL} Apart from an occasional query or suggestion, the Special Commissioner did not intervene again in Nandi affairs until September, when events forced him to take a hand in attempting to bring Evatt's expedition to a satisfactory conclusion.

A few precautions were taken early in June in preparation for reprisals against the section which was held responsible for the attack on the telegraph station. Nandi ceased to be employed as messengers between Kipture and Ravine, though it was not thought necessary

for Masai inter-station runners and through mail parties to be given extra escorts. It was considered imprudent for timber for the *William Mackinnon's* masts to be brought down from the escarpment near Bushiri to Port Ugowe, where the steamer had been launched on the fourth. Despite Richard Grant's protests about delaying completion of his work by more than a month, Hobley sought permission for Cowham to cut trees in Busoga, and tow them to Ugowe Bay by the recently reconditioned steam launch, *Victoria*.³⁹ Kavirondo porters, who were replacing insect-damaged telegraph poles between Mumias and Fort Ternan,⁴⁰ were not however withdrawn, although the country in which they were working had recently been the scene of Nandi and Lumbwa disturbances. This was possibly because Hobley thought they were less likely to be attacked⁴¹ than unescorted telegraph porters, who patrolled the line in pairs making 'slipshod repairs' to the wire.^{MM} He evidently considered the risk worth taking in order to maintain communications between Molo and the Lake, so that Johnston could keep in touch with London during his travels in the west.

Knowles had been sent from Mumias to Elgon to investigate the murder of three Kitosh traders by Umoni (Bagisu) warriors, and was unable to come in to Port Ugowe to take charge of the station and stores. This prevented Hobley from acceding to Parkin's request for him to act as political officer for punitive operations against the escarpment Nandi. He did however advise Parkin not to withdraw his forces from the escarpment area until peace had been concluded and the road made safe.^{NN} In order to ensure secrecy, Parkin decided against seeking the help of Nandi auxiliaries, and marched from Kipture to Kitoto's via Fort Ternan with the object of masking the purpose of his mission. On 7 June the baggage train, with an escort of only twelve rifles, left Kitoto's under orders to march to Bushiri by the Transport Department's track from Sudi's. The NCO in charge was warned against acting provocatively or giving battle, and the detachment arrived unscathed at the escarpment post. A man from Kitoto's village guided the striking column up the escarpment by the path which the chief reported the raiders had taken.⁴² Complete surprise was achieved when hostilities began on the morning of the eighth, but as the column moved eastwards large groups of Nandi collected, and severe fighting took place until Bushiri was reached. Four attempts to recover the captured stock were repulsed on the night of the eighth. Two men of XIV Company were killed, another soldier was wounded by spears, and a rifle and some ammunition were lost. Nandi casualties were estimated at between thirty and forty killed, and 229 head of cattle and 1,836 sheep and goats were captured. The following day Parkin marched to Camp Ishirini (Kaptumo) and arrived back at Kipture on the tenth.^{OO}

Although the warriors who sacked the telegraph depot were punished, Parkin failed to secure the other objectives which Hobley had set him. The troops were withdrawn before peace was concluded, and Parkin acknowledged that the road was still unsafe for parties without strong escorts. The outcome of the expedition was as inconclusive as its four predecessors, and its commander frankly admitted that no lasting or general effect could be expected from it. Parkin made a few minor alterations to his troop dispositions in order to discourage reprisals. The Bushiri garrison was increased from twelve to fifteen rifles, so that eight men could be detailed for escorting porters on the escarpment section. Until the road was safe again, Parkin decided to keep 'the field force' at Kipture so that the weekly convoy could be escorted as far as Sudi's. If similar protection was considered necessary for the remainder of the journey, Hobley was asked to furnish escorts to take the convoys on to Port Ugowe. As Parkin had been told by Kitoto that the Nandi often assembled in great force in the vicinity of his village, twelve riflemen were sent from Kipture to guard this 'important' point and discourage attacks on cart convoys and the telegraph.^{PP} The local commander's belated recognition of the strategic importance of Kitoto's possibly explains why the Indian telegraphist had been working at the nearby station without any protection, despite the fact that Hobley and other travellers had recently seen large marauding bands in its neighbourhood. If, as seems likely, the railway authorities had not asked for protection to be provided in this case, the omission confirms the allegations by district officials that the railway failed to keep the administration informed of the movements of its employees, and was largely responsible for the lack of coordination between the two services.^{QQ}

It had been customary after previous expeditions for administrative officers to echo the claims of their military colleagues that deterrent reprisals had been carried out, and that little trouble could be expected in the future.⁴³ On this occasion, Hobley declared^{RR} that no improvement in Nandi affairs could be looked for from Parkin's attempt to punish the

NOTES

1. For the period March to November 1897, the discrepancy amounted to Rs.4,030; for his seven weeks stay in 1900 to Rs.412; see *NRBR* i, pp. 283-284.
2. Survey west of Mau began in January 1899.
3. Troops state, April 1900: Ravine Nil (September 1899, 53); Kipture 97 (98); Bushiri 12 (16); Port Ugowe 43 (45); Fort Ternan 64 (67); Mumias 92 (130); Total 308 (409).
4. In the dispute after the Nandi expedition about troop reductions in the disaffected area, Cunningham conceded on 15.1.1901 (FO 2/461) that the regular forces had been reduced by about 100 men, but insisted that the 200-300 Sudanese police sent to Baringo and Suk increased 'the actual armed forces at the disposal of the authorities'.
5. He probably had Salisbury in mind when composing despatches. Hill expressed his dislike of Johnston's style by comments such as 'magazine article', 'thoroughly Johnstonian', 'a characteristic despatch', and withheld his approval for circulating several important despatches as Confidential Prints.
6. See *NRBR* i, Ch. 11 and 12.
7. See *NRBR* i, pp. 143, 154-155, 273.
8. See *NRBR* i, p. 123; *NRBR* ii, pp. 31-32.
9. Bagnall asked for Leet to be replaced by Knowles so that outlying areas could be visited. Johnston passed the request to Hobley, who was also asking for Knowles as a replacement for Galt at Port Ugowe.
10. Hobley made a road reconnaissance of the western end of the south escarpment in July 1899; see *NRBR* ii, p. 7. In September 1896 he climbed the escarpment along the line of the River Orobo; see *NRBR* i, p. 213.
11. The indiscipline of the Masai levies was again criticised.
12. Ten per cent of the booty was given to the auxiliaries, 'without whom the punishment would not have been so effective'; seventy-five head of cattle were sent as presents for the Baganda chiefs, instead of the indifferent Uyoma animals which had been chosen for this purpose from the Ravine herds. Contrast Nandi stock losses in 1895, 1897, 1899, 1900, *NRBR* i, pp. 150-151, 153, 266, *NRBR* ii, pp. 24, 50.
13. The terms were similar to those which earned Hobley a rebuke when he imposed obligations upon the Kabras in September 1895, before the Eastern Province was incorporated in the Protectorate; see *NRBR* i, pp. 123, 131.
14. One hundred Baganda were given estates along the line in Busoga. The benefits to be derived from control over Buganda's man-power resources were often stressed by Johnston. See *NRBR* ii, pp. 128, 138, 147 for proposed Baganda settlements in Nandi.
15. Hill minuted: 'Object good, and if new arrangement enables the Commissioner to act on a native district chief, the results may be obtained'; W.E. Davidson, the Legal Adviser, asked if the Regulation would be published in the vernacular; Albert Gray, the Legal Draughtsman employed by the Foreign Office, thought it should not have been issued under the Africa Order in Council, 1889, and compared its terms to those imposed on the Boers in the South African war (FO 2/381).
16. See *NRBR* ii, pp. 165-166.
17. Breaks in the Mombasa-Zanzibar-Aden submarine cable often took weeks to locate and repair, because of the extensive area covered by the Eastern Telegraph Company's repair ship based at Zanzibar (FO 2/290, 513). A more permanent telegraph line was installed from Londiani to Ravine, partly in connection with the proposed occupation of the northern territories, but no plans were made to extend it to Kipture (FOCP 7545/89, 7868/64).
18. No Sudanese were sent to Busoga, where Johnston feared they might combine with Muslim dissidents and attempt to spread their faith (ESA A/23/1, A/11/1).
19. Whitehouse referred on 14.11.1899 (FOCD 7422/94) to 'a spot named Fort Ternan, the exact position of which I am not aware of'. The government station was moved in July 1901; RL, p. 95, Matson and Sutton, *op. cit.*, p. 177.
20. Uganda's adherence to the International Telegraph Convention was under consideration in mid-1900.
21. Twenty Indian caravans passed through Ravine in June.
22. Hill did not comment, although when Johnston outlined his land proposals on 13.10.1899 (FO 2/204) he had minuted, 'Johnston's method is simple: treaty or compulsion - your money or your life'.

23. About 140 sq. miles in Nandi, where no Treaties and Agreements had been concluded and the chiefs had never been consulted on land matters.
24. Burning of the diseased animals also prevented the infection from spreading among indigenous cattle. Relief porters were hard to obtain because of heavy recruitment by the railway to replace mules and oxen lost through horse sickness and rinderpest (FOCP 7545/66/96).
25. Galt (c. 1872-1905); B.C.A. service August 1893; Third-Class Assistant, Uganda 20.11.1897; promoted to Second-Class 29.7.1899.
26. Hobley said he worked 9-10 hours a day on police cases, public works, tax collection, water traffic, market control and *shauris* (interviews), and complained that his clerk was useless and the station stores insecurely housed. Staffing arrangements east of the Nile were upset by William Grant's delayed return from leave. Fowler, Superintendent of the Marine Department, was placed in temporary charge of Busoga when Grant's successor, Captain H.C. Moorhouse, was invalided in April; the following month, Fowler was told to instruct his clerk, H.M. Tarrant, on the telegraph and mails, and to consider Kakungulu, the Baganda chief, his Assistant Collector (ESA A/5/9, 10).
27. About 1,300 lb. Bagnall sent more seed to Kipture than to Fort Ternan and Mumias, 'as I know they will grow there, as I have grown them'. Galt was ordered on 26.6.1900 (ESA A/5/10) to plant the oats.
28. If Lakiminjaa cannot be equated with Raptaminga, who was said by Bagnall to be in chains at Ravine in June ('so I don't think the railway will bothered any more'), he may have been responsible for the murder of porters on the road to the proposed capital, which is recorded in RSD on 12.5.1900, but not elsewhere. It is not clear what happened to Lakiminjaa (Raptaminga); see *NRBR* i, pp. 261, 269, 319-320 for the imprisonment and fate of Chief Teres.
29. Probably R.F. Huebner, who sent five caravans to the Lake early in 1900, and was fitting out two more at the end of March (FO 2/286).
30. See *NRBR* ii, p. 69 for the surmise that the Nandi mistook the apparatus for a Maxim gun; the metal itself would have been sufficient inducement.
31. Leet alleged on 11.11.1900 (FO 2/303) that punishment was decided upon without proper enquiry, and before establishing that the Indian had not provoked the alleged offenders.
32. Parkin, who explained on 14.6.1900 (ESA A/18/1) that a wire, sent by the Senior Staff Officer on 26.5.1900 asking about the safety of the road, was not received until 9.6.1900, resigned; his resignation was accepted but was later withdrawn.
33. The Foreign Office rejected Johnston's expansionist policy on 19.4.1900 (FOCP 7405/37) because of the questions it might raise in Europe, and the Boer War. Hardinge and Johnston were concerned about repercussions arising from the activities of Dr G. Kolb and Captain Hans von Bastineller in the northern areas (FO 2/282, 284, 287, FOCP 7405/103).
34. See *NRBR* i, pp. 185, 189, *NRBR* ii, pp. 46-47. Hobley said the Sebei were like the Nandi and would not help build the post. The expedition was withdrawn before Hobley's presence was required.
35. It is not clear whether this order was issued on Evatt's initiative, or whether he had discussed with Johnston the possibility of giving the Nandi a lesson.
36. Three hundred head of cattle, 1,500 sheep and goats and fifteen donkeys were taken from the Japtulleal (Cheptulel Suk), Endeo and Jabelean, whose huts were emptied of grain; Bagnall's men were too weary to punish the people at Weiwei. Jackson rebuked Bagnall, who possibly launched the assaults against the Kamasia and Suk in order to show his mettle: his career had been undistinguished, and he was nettled at having been recently passed over for promotion in favour of J.P. Wilson; cf. Ternan in 1897, *NRBR* i, pp. 240-241.
37. Jackson thought it inevitable that the embargo, which was imposed to prevent the introduction of diseased stock into the Protectorate, would be disregarded; cf. FOCP 7090/185 for Hardinge's views on the futility of imposing unenforceable prohibitions on the Masai.
38. The decision to make the tour, despite Dr Moffat's objections, illustrates Johnston's resilience and strength of purpose. Dr Cook thought that Johnston, after recovering from blackwater, would 'return to Mau to recuperate and thence, I suppose, home'.
39. The *Victoria* could not be spared, and the masts arrived at Port Ugowe by dhow in September.
40. Hobley added poles (and hoes) to Johnston's list of articles that could be accepted in lieu of tax. He said the line between Port Ugowe and Mumias was hardly ever broken because Luo and Baluyia chiefs realized its importance.
41. See *NRBR* ii, p. 67 for an attack on one of these parties.
42. Sitwell could not persuade a guide from Kitoto's to accompany him in November 1895; see *NRBR* i, p. 149. Hobley's diary does not record that he was given a guide in September 1896, see *ibid*, p. 213.

According to one account, Parkin's force consisted of twenty-five rifles and a number of Masai spearmen; this was probably the size of the Kipture contingent, which was presumably reinforced by troops from Fort Ternan and the Nyando Valley patrols.

43. See *NRBR* i, pp. 157, 267, *NRBR* ii, pp. 24-25. This tendency was deplored by the War Office, see e.g. FOCP 7690/180.
44. So identified, from prisoners' accounts, in Hoble's report dated 24.8.1900; Leet doubted if the right people had been punished (FO 2/303). Baraoi may be a misnomer for Boi, which is Kapchepkendi country, or may refer to the Kaptalam *pororiet*, Simotwo Baraoi, which is said to be named after a notable war leader and counsellor.

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Maanja.

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CHAPTER 7

The volcano erupts

While the Kapchepkendi on the edge of the escarpment were being punished, a neighbouring section attacked a bridge-repairing party a few miles east of Bushiri, and less than a dozen miles from the country where Parkin was fighting. The attack, in which a headman, five drivers and an askari were killed, took place between Bushiri and Camp Ishirini on 8 June 1900. The raiders removed the wheels from two carts, captured sixteen draught oxen and four rifles, and carried off small quantities of trade goods, harness and specie. Captain Johnson had not asked for the party to be escorted by soldiers from Kipture, possibly because the garrison had been depleted of troops for the expedition against the Kapchepkendi.^A Shortly after this attack two Kavirondo porters and two askaris, from a gang which was replacing damaged telegraph poles in the Nyando Valley, pushed ahead of the main party and its escort in order to inspect the line for faults. After joining forces with two telegraph repairers from Fort Ternan, the six men spent the night in a camp near the Bagamoyo (Kundos) River with a caravan led by Carlisle Fraser, who was taking porters from Donaldson Smith's expedition to the coast. Soon after Fraser's caravan left camp at dawn on the eleventh the telegraph men were rushed by Nandi warriors who wounded one of the porters and looted the party's tents, food and belongings.¹ The repair men scattered into the bush but afterwards claimed they had killed one of the raiders and driven the remainder off.^B Three days later a sentry was speared during an abortive night attack on Bushiri in which seven Nandi were killed. Bushiri was again attacked a few days later, when a raider, who approached near enough to the perimeter defences to spear another member of the garrison, was shot dead.^C

As a result of the attack on the bridge-repairers, parties were refused permission to leave Kipture unless they were adequately escorted. Among those detained by the embargo was a small caravan organized by the Italian Company, which had contracted with Boustead, Ridley & Co. to transport the remaining loads of a sixty-four foot steam-launch, *Kampala*, which the Zanzibar merchants planned to assemble at Port Ugowe.² An Italian, Fabri Foust, was in charge of the five carts, twenty-three donkeys and mules and sixteen porters forming the caravan, which was carrying fifty loads of machinery and boiler parts and forty-nine loads of provisions and brass wire. As the party only carried three rifles, Galt and Parkin ordered Fabri to wait four days at Kipture until he could join the weekly cart convoy to Port Ugowe. Fabri, 'who understood no English and little if anything of the native languages', waited for two days and then left without warning very early in the morning of the fourteenth for Bushiri. Near Camp Ishirini later that day Fabri and all his men were killed and the caravan ransacked.³ When news of the outrage reached Port Ugowe, Hobley asked Kipture for a full report of the incident and, in particular, for details of the protection given to the caravan.⁴ He feared that this attack, taken in conjunction with the incidents of the preceding week, suggested that hostility to the government was more intense than at any time since 1895. He was convinced that only quick and decisive action against the militant sections could prevent a repetition of the unfortunate results caused by the government's procrastination after Peter West's murder in July 1895.⁵ Hobley's fears were later confirmed when he discovered that the outrage had been committed by Kapsiondu living near the road a little to the west of Camp Ishirini. This section had never caused trouble in the past and Arap Kongureit, their leader, had even assisted the government on two previous occasions.⁶ Hobley wired Jackson on 15 June asking for troops to safeguard communications and prevent disaffection from spreading throughout Nandi.^D

Reports of other incidents during the next few days further confirmed Hobley's fears. Before news of the attack on the Italian caravan reached Port Ugowe, the weekly cart convoy had left for the Nandi escarpment. Three discharged Indian gardeners, who had been working on agricultural experiments under Alexander Whyte in Buganda, accompanied the caravan. One of their number, disregarding warnings about the dangers of straggling, lagged behind his colleagues, and was surprised by a small party of Nandi some distance from the escarpment. The gardener was speared, and the escort corporal reported that the warrior responsible was chased and shot by soldiers who had been alerted by the victim's cries.⁷ A

few miles to the east, Sudi bin Melimin threatened to evacuate his men and goods because of hostile demonstrations against the transport camp below Bushiri. In order to maintain this important staging post, Hobley abandoned the depot near Kitoto's and ordered the twelve riflemen recently sent there by Parkin to go to Sudi's aid. Goods awaiting transport at the contractor's camp were removed to Port Ugowe, with the exception of some loads of flour which Hobley thought might prove useful if an expedition was sanctioned.⁸ By abandoning Kitoto's and concentrating troops and porters at Sudi's, Hobley hoped the transport service could continue to function and raiding parties would leave the Kano Plains.⁹ Meanwhile, on the eastern borders of the district, a band of warriors staged a 'hostile demonstration' against a party of Indian traders in a camp near Mt Blackett. When reports also reached Hobley that Johnson's weekly cart convoy had been cut up on top of the escarpment between Kipture and Bushiri, and that bands of Nandi warriors were lying in wait on the Kano Plains to ambush the convoy which was due to leave Bushiri on the seventeenth, he telegraphed Jackson reporting 'Situation serious ... hurry up troops'. A few days later Hobley learned that Johnson's carts had not been attacked, and that the Bushiri-Port Ugowe convoy had avoided the ambushes by making a diversion through Kitoto's instead of following the usual route nearer the escarpment. This was reassuring news, but on the twenty-fourth two Uganda Riflemen were wounded and fifteen raiders killed in another attack on Bushiri.¹⁰

Since the incidents were restricted to the escarpment area around Bushiri, the plains near the western border, and the mountains in the extreme south-east, this emphasized that the area of conflict had shifted from Sclater's Road to the more direct routes to the Lake. Around Kipture settled conditions continued, and no special precautions were taken to ensure the safety of mails, messages and caravans on the road to Ravine. While disturbing incidents were being reported almost daily from the south, 226 cattle and 1,785 sheep and goats were driven from Kipture to Ravine. The animals, which presumably represented the net proceeds of the operations against the Kapchepkendi, travelled independently of a large convoy carrying five tons of flour, though neither party could have had a strong escort. The size of the food consignment suggests that Galt expected regular deliveries of replenishments for Kipture and further supplies for Ravine would continue to be received from Port Ugowe by cart convoy.¹¹

Running alongside the more southerly of the direct routes was the temporary telegraph which provided both an attraction and a challenge to the Nandi warriors. From the time of its installation towards the end of 1899, small quantities of wire had been stolen and, as the number of marauding bands roaming in the Nyando Valley increased, long sections of the line from Molo to Kitoto's were removed. Telegraph officials insisted that thefts could only be prevented by regular patrolling, but the forces at Parkin's command were insufficient to watch nearly 100 miles of line. Several observers noted that large quantities of metal, which could be fashioned into ornaments or made into slugs for captured rifles, were bound to arouse the cupidity of the warriors.¹² Telegraph wire differed from other articles carried by caravans or stored in government posts, because it was a commodity the Nandi desired and could acquire without much trouble or danger.¹³ Although the copper wire undoubtedly appealed to their acquisitive instincts, the warriors were influenced by motives other than simple greed or the desire to provide ornaments for their lovers. Raids on the telegraph not only increased a warrior's acceptability in his sweetheart's eyes and his standing among his neighbours, but also reflected a deep-rooted desire to remove the evidence of the warriors' failure to protect the tribal territory against intruders.

Apart from the geographical spread of the various outrages, Hobley was concerned to find that they had been perpetrated by several *pororosiek*. This he considered a significant departure from previous practice, for 'when any one clan (*sic*) has been punished for its misdeeds, the neighbouring clans have carefully stood aloof, apparently anxious not to be implicated'. When information reached Port Ugowe on 17 June that a big war council had been held, Hobley was convinced that 'disaffection was spreading through the whole of Nandi, and that a general organized revolt was being planned'.¹⁴ Even more serious were reports that representatives of tribes from the neighbourhood of Port Ugowe, including the Kano, Kisumu and Seme Luo, the Bantu Maragoli and the 'Nilo-Hamitic' Nyangori, had been summoned to the council. Although only the Nyangori, who were smarting under the losses they had suffered in April, and the Kano responded to the summons, Hobley was told that envoys had been sent to ascertain the intentions of those who had ignored the invitation.

After the projected alliance had been ratified at a blood-brotherhood ceremony,¹² the Nandi proposed that the participants should 'rise in concert and make a combined attack on Port Ugowe on all sides'.^H

In view of the 'treacherous nature' of the treatment they had received from the Nandi in the past, Hobley was confident the Baluyia chiefs would not join the alliance, and that he could win over any 'troublesome spirits' amongst their followers. Since they, too, had suffered at the hands of the Nandi, the same response could probably be expected from the Luo, some of whom had only recently felt the length and strength of Hobley's arm. As far as the two tribes who attended the war council were concerned, the Nyangori eventually decided not to risk incurring fresh punishment by joining the proposed alliance.¹³ The Kano had never been punished for wrong doing, although the treatment accorded to their chief was markedly different from the favour which Hobley had shown to Mumia and, after the move to Port Ugowe, to Odera Ulalo of Gem. Despite Kitoto's unwavering desire to be friends with both the I.B.E.A. Company and the government, no station had been built in his country and no protection afforded to his people against Nandi and Lumbwa raids. Disappointment at the evasive response to his frequent requests for help may have caused Kitoto to consider joining the proposed alliance,¹⁴ but he finally 'replied that the Nandi had raided them for so long, they should now help the Government'. All the tribes approached by the Nandi were warned by Hobley about the consequences of faltering in their loyalty, or attempting to maintain an alliance with the government and the Nandi at the same time. Despite his views on the beneficial results to be expected from the longstanding antipathy between the Nandi and their neighbours, Hobley's anxiety about the safety of Port Ugowe was evidently not entirely dispelled, as he raised a local levy of thirty rifles to strengthen its garrison.^I

Sufficient evidence had been accumulated to confirm Hobley's fears that the recent outrages were not merely localised and isolated acts, but part of a general plan to force the government to leave the country. After interrogating prisoners captured by the expedition in July, he discovered that Kibeles, 'the head Leibon',¹⁵ had prophesied some months before that trouble with the British was imminent. Following Parkin's punitive patrol against the Baraoi Kapchepkendi, Kibeles called the elders together and warned them that action must be taken swiftly if the enemy were to be prevented from humbling the Nandi still further. In order to reinforce his warning he instanced the livestock taken from the Kapchepkendi, and the tribute of goats which had been demanded by the Collector at Kipture.¹⁶ He urged that the warriors should be encouraged to cut up convoys and kill as many men as possible, so that they would be forced to return to the coast and allow the Nandi to return to their former way of life. Nandi prisoners and Nyangori informants also told Hobley that Kibeles had directed that a Maxim, which he prophesied would be captured in a night attack, should be brought to him as a trophy. The Laibon's injunctions accorded well with the temper of the people at the time of their promulgation, and were possibly given added weight when the telegraph instrument was captured during the night attack in May on the depot near Kitoto's.¹⁷ Finding themselves in a dilemma as a result of the Laibon's pronouncements, the chiefs around Kipture had sent to Kibeles for guidance about their special position. They were told they could continue to appear on friendly terms with the station officials, but were on no account to provide auxiliaries to fight against other sections.^J

Hobley was satisfied the time was opportune for implementing Johnston's policy of punishing severely when punishment was justified, and for reducing the Nandi to submission as effectively as he had subjugated the other tribes in his district. He told Jackson that no pains would be spared 'to finish the Nandi question once and for all', and that he would not 'close the expedition, until I feel assured they are quite subjugated'. Galt was likewise informed that 'we must make this expedition the final one and not leave the country until they are quite subjugated'.¹⁸ Jackson, who shared Hobley's views on the futility of localized retaliatory raids followed by withdrawal of the punitive force from the disaffected area, supported Hobley's declaration of intent.¹⁹ Not only had the Nandi to be punished for past misdeeds but the power of the warriors had to be utterly broken, so that they could no longer jeopardize Protectorate and railway interests in the Nyando Valley and along Sclater's Road. In order to achieve these objectives, Jackson proposed to extend the expedition to Lumbwa and Sotik,²⁰ and instructed Evatt to undertake the exemplary punishment of the refractory tribes.^K

The Acting Deputy Commissioner's readiness to sanction operations on this scale

suggests that the action to be taken in the event of a major threat to communications in the Eastern Province may have been authorized by Johnston before he left Entebbe. The latter's statement in March 1901 that 'negotiations proving futile,²¹ I was obliged to have recourse to force', and 'entrust to Colonel Evatt one of the most difficult expeditions we have as yet had to organize', gives the impression that the expedition was a deliberate act of policy on Johnston's part. However this may be, when he returned from his western tour he confirmed Hobley's and Jackson's proposals for dealing with 'the present trouble, which must now be disposed of once and for all by the effectual conquest of this troublesome race'. He promised the Foreign Office that 'measures will be taken to bring about the complete subjection of the Nandi, as it is impossible that this tribe can go on any longer disturbing the peace of the Eastern Province and threatening communications between Uganda and the coast'. These views reflected the humiliation and exasperation felt by other Europeans in the Protectorate, one of whom stated 'Everyone seems to be very mad, and considering the number of years we have held this country one would think that the natives along the one road might have been brought to subjection', and that 'the Administration (if they) can't keep one road open, then they're a poor lot'.¹

The categorical declarations made by Hobley, Jackson and Johnston affirmed their determination to settle a problem which Berkeley and Ternan had been unable to tackle decisively during the five years that had elapsed since the Nandi first demonstrated their hostility to the presence of an alien power in their country. The last pocket of resistance to the free movement of men and materials between the coast and Uganda was to be eliminated, and settled conditions assured for the unimpeded progress of the railway to the Lake. The advocates of this strong line had no doubt about the successful outcome of the coming struggle, and never contemplated that the Nandi would continue to harass the government for five years after a policy of complete subjugation was adopted.

In view of the limited success achieved in previous operations, Hobley's initial request for troops was hardly in keeping with a policy of complete subjugation. His views may have been influenced by his revised assessment of Nandi military prowess after Coles' expedition in November, or by the strength of the forces that had sufficed to crush the much more numerous northern Luo in the following month. He thought the Nandi could be conquered by a company of Sudanese or Swahilis without calling upon Indian troops who, in his opinion, were not mobile enough for operations in which speed was more important than skill or numbers.²² Because of the reluctance of the Kavirondo to enter Nandi, he asked for a contingent of Baganda porters to be sent with the troops. In order to reduce delay in mounting the expedition, his final suggestion was that troops and porters should be ferried over to Port Ugowe by steam-launch, dhows and canoes. Jackson, who had personal experience of campaigning in Nandi, replied that he proposed sending a strong punitive force, and was recalling Hornby's sepoys from Busoga and Bukedi.^M He presumably overrode Hobley's objection to using Indian troops because of Johnston's intention that they should act as the Protectorate reserve whenever trouble occurred in outlying districts.²³ The logistic problems that would arise if African troops were called in from distant garrisons, and the need for speedy action may also have influenced Jackson's decision. After his successful operations against Mwanga and Kabarega, Evatt probably welcomed the opportunity to pit his professional skill against the Nandi, and naturally preferred to do so with soldiers he could trust.²⁴ Although both were aware that rations for the sepoys were running low, and that they were suffering from the effects of the enervating climate and the privations of previous campaigns,²⁵ the Acting Commandant and Jackson possibly hoped that the Nandi warriors, who had acquitted themselves with some distinction against the Sudanese, would be overawed when confronted for the first time by Indian troops.²⁶

Turning to local preparations for the campaign, Jackson asked Hobley to exert his influence with Luo and Baluyia chiefs to facilitate transport arrangements, and ensure that he and J.P. Wilson had 500 porters ready within ten days to replace the Baganda²⁷ who were to carry Hornby's food and baggage from Bukedi. Knowles was to be recalled from his Elgon investigations to take charge of Port Ugowe, so that Hobley could accompany the expedition as political officer. Although relieved by Jackson's ready response to his request for help, Hobley thought one and a half companies of African troops would be sufficient, and questioned whether his transport resources could guarantee regular supplies of rations for Hornby's contingent. He pressed once more for Baganda porters on the grounds that 'the

Kavirondo have such a hereditary fear of the Nandi, they will not venture to accompany the expedition', and that, as plain dwellers, they found climatic conditions on the Nandi Plateau uncongenial.²⁸ After the false rumour about the massacre of Johnson's cart convoy reached Port Ugowe on 17 June, Hobley recommended that the African companies should be increased to two so that stations in the theatre of operations could be secured against attack.^N

In order to concentrate his resources, Hobley closed the road to all except government convoys for which Parkin could provide strong escorts. Five C.M.S. missionaries, who arrived from Uganda on 15 June, were detained at Port Ugowe until they could be escorted to Mumias.²⁹ On the twenty-second they left, with Dr Moffat and his ailing wife, to await a detachment to take them on through Nandi as soon as Hornby arrived at Mumias from Bukedi. Sergeant Ellison was detailed to command the escort as far as Kipture, where his detachment and a Maxim from the Mumias garrison were to strengthen the station defences. At the other end of the Nyando Valley route, Wortham was ordered to post a notice at Molo informing travellers that the road was closed, and notify the telegraphist at Mbaruk of the closure. Hobley instructed Wortham to concentrate his forces by recalling detachments on outpost and patrol duties to Fort Ternan and also to warn Bagnall, who was reported to be away in Baringo,³⁰ that he should return at once to Ravine because it was impossible to foresee the extent of the rising. Jackson, too, sent a number of instructions about arrangements to be made in readiness for the expedition's arrival: Brown, the Transport Officer at Port Ugowe, was placed under Evatt's orders in matters of transport and Indian rations; the Chief Engineer was asked to secure the regular working of the telegraph, which was far from satisfactory even on sections between Port Ugowe and Entebbe which had not been tampered with by the Nandi; J.P. Wilson was instructed to have men ready on Hornby's arrival at Mumias to move 380 loads; and Hobley was told to recruit 200 porters before Evatt reached Port Ugowe. Jackson stressed that the success of the expedition depended entirely on its transport arrangements, and directed that the porters were to be paid liberally³¹ in cattle, sheep and goats.^O

Hobley, who had studied the ethnography of the various Kavirondo tribes, was quick to realise how little had been recorded about the topography of Nandi or the organization and customs of its people. This state of affairs was not peculiar to Nandi,³² though by June 1900 a considerable, and in some cases impressive, amount of information had been accumulated in several districts in both protectorates. A great deal of this intelligence had been collected by officials, such as Grant, Hobley, Ainsworth and Hall, who had served for several years in one district. Useful contributions had also been made by missionaries, many of whom had mastered the vernacular,³³ and, to a lesser extent, by travellers, traders and settlers. Several Collectors had been able to make use of friendly chiefs, local informers, interpreters, discontented individuals and sections, and, in some cases, Baganda agents, and members of alien tribes such as the Uasin Gishu Masai.³⁴ Almost all these sources of information had been denied to Collectors at Kipture, with the result that very little of substance had been learned of tribal affairs beyond the immediate neighbourhood of the station, even by the few officials who had served for any length of time in Nandi.³⁵ Moreover, the man charged with administering the district had seldom been free to venture far from Kipture, partly because he rarely had a deputy or a reliable clerk to assist him, but mainly because of the demands made upon him by transport, postal and station commitments. Pressure of affairs in his own Collectorate had also prevented the Sub-commissioner from visiting his subordinate at Kipture, and becoming personally acquainted with the country and its leaders.³⁶

When circumstances forced him belatedly to turn his attention to Nandi, Hobley regretted 'the want of reliable intelligence as to the constitution of Nandi, their various clans and their relationships to one another', and pointed out that such information could only be acquired 'from a systematic series of journeys through the country'. In order to provide Evatt with information that could assist him in his task, Hobley sent instructions to the officers at Kipture and Fort Ternan to remedy the deficiencies of five years within the space of a few weeks. In addition to being advised to concentrate on safeguarding mails and convoys, and stock-piling food for a secondary base for Evatt at Fort Ternan, Parkin was urged to spare some time for the collection of intelligence. Galt was directed to 'work up the political side' and, in particular, to ascertain 'exactly who are friendly in Nandi and who are not'. Acting on the assumption that sections near the station could be relied upon, Hobley suggested it might be judicious to enlist their services as allies in order to prevent them from

turning against the government while the expedition was in the field. Galt, who had been in Kipture for less than a month, was to make it clear to chiefs he could trust that 'men who are really friendly must point out offenders and assist in their being crushed'. Finally, the Collector was asked to send a map of Nandi, 'if you have one', because there was no map of the interior of the country in the Sub-commissioner's office at Port Ugowe.³⁷ When these instructions were issued, Hobley was unaware of the Laibon's part in fomenting opposition to British rule, and Galt was equally in the dark on this account. Evidently very little came from the enquiries which Hobley called for, since he noted later that 'it was very difficult before entering the country to obtain information as to the development of matters and but little intelligence of value seemed obtainable from Nandi station'. It was only when interrogating prisoners during the campaign that Hobley learned of the Laibon's complicity. From the same source he also collected sufficient information to compile the first tentative list of Nandi 'clans', their location and reputed leaders.³⁸ As a result of Hobley's representations, Galt summoned the Kipture chiefs to a meeting, at which he promised that 'as long as they remained loyal, their people would not be interfered with in any way'.³⁹ Without divulging the instructions which the Laibon had sent in response to their appeal, the chiefs begged Galt not to ask them to muster their men as allies, a plea he had perforce to accept.^P

On 19 June Hobley sent eleven Sudanese soldiers back to Fort Ternan with ten porters carrying food, as he was becoming anxious about the safety of the station and the adequacy of its food supply. He took the opportunity to send detailed instructions to the inexperienced station commander regarding his conduct in 'the present crisis'.⁴⁰ Hobley prefaced his advice by noting that the 'situation was beyond the proportions of a local outrage', and that he suspected nearly all the country to be in a state of rebellion. Wortham was told not to go any distance from his station for shooting or other purposes; to trust no one; to beware of male and female spies trying to discover the strength of the garrison; to strengthen the fort's defences; to be on his guard against the enemy's practice of starting a night attack by igniting the station thatch with burning arrows; to warn the Collector at Ravine and advise him to review the arrangements for guarding the large government herd in his care. Wortham was also told to collect intelligence about the extent of the disaffection, the strength of the clans which were known to be implicated and those which were said to be loyal, and to send his predecessor's map of the Fort Ternan area and any other topographical information which might be useful during the campaign.⁴¹ Finally, he was specially charged to ascertain the attitude of the Lumbwa, determine the possibility of their joining the rising, and discover whether non-combatants and stock were moving into Lumbwa from Nandi. Hobley thought Chief Arap Tumbo might help with Wortham's enquiries, and be approached about furnishing a contingent of Kapsaas warriors to fight on the government's side. Adding 'it does not follow we should use these', Hobley thought the Chief's response to Wortham's suggestion might 'give an indication as to the intimacy of their relation'.^Q

When Hobley telegraphed his request for troops, Jackson asked Evatt to prepare a plan of campaign. The strategic objectives the Acting Commandant set for the expedition - 'to thoroughly work through the Nandi country, eventually moving southwards through Lumbwa and Sotik' - were in accordance with Jackson's intention to secure the Protectorate's communications by conquering the tribes which threatened the Nyando Valley. Runners were sent with a wire from Iganga on 16 June ordering Hornby to withdraw his detachment from Bukedi so that it could form the main striking force for the Nandi campaign. At stations in and near the theatre of operations Evatt could call on VII Company at Mumias and Port Ugowe, and XIV Company⁴² which provided garrisons at Fort Ternan and Kipture and detachments at Bushiri and Kakamega. Both companies were considerably understrength, and included a number of men who were unfit for active service owing to chest, bowel, feet and venereal conditions which had been exacerbated by want of medical attention.⁴³ In addition to the regular forces, every station could furnish small contingents of quasi-military police, whose numbers could be increased by recruiting youths and discharged soldiers from the Sudanese settlements.⁴⁴ The weakest stations were Ravine and Baringo whose garrisons of thirty-five and fifty-three respectively were composed entirely of policemen, many of whom were indifferently armed⁴⁵ and unaccustomed to the discipline and rigours of campaign service.^R

According to Johnston, the Nandi District garrisons at Port Ugowe, Kipture and Fort Ternan totalled 320 men, about half of whom were police.⁴⁶ The Bukedi column was made up

of a company of 105 Indians, and eighty-three Sudanese of XIII Company from Mruli, so the total force under Evatt's command at the beginning of the campaign amounted to some 341 regulars and 166 police.⁵ Hornby's column was strengthened by 210 Baganda levies, about 150 of whom were gunmen drawn from the forces that were operating under Kakungulu in Palisa, Bugwere and Bugisu.⁴⁷ Kakungulu himself was excused because he was in need of medical attention, and Isaka Nziga was deputed to act as commander in his stead. Isaka, whom Kakungulu called 'my Pokino', was a seasoned campaigner, who had fought against Mwanga in Buddu in 1897, and been awarded the Uganda Mutiny Medal for his services against the Sudanese in 1898-1899. The remainder of the auxiliaries had either joined Hornby in Buganda for the Bukedi expedition, or been recruited from Baganda who had emigrated to the country under Kakungulu's control.

Evatt's plan of campaign was for the Bukedi column and thirty-two rifles from VII Company to march to the Nandi border from Mumias, and then to work through the country in a south-westerly direction to Port Ugowe. While the striking force was being assembled at Port Ugowe, the garrison of fifty-five rifles at Fort Ternan was ordered to remain at its station, while the fifty-six men at Kipture were to patrol the road to Ravine and the country to the south of their station. Until Evatt arrived to take command, Parkin was made responsible for organizing escorts and pickets on dangerous parts of the road to protect convoys and working parties on the Ravine-Bushiri and Nyando Valley routes. If this commitment could not be met by troops already on patrol duty, their number was to be augmented by withdrawing men from the Port Ugowe, Fort Ternan and Kipture garrisons.⁴⁸ Evatt ordered Brown to detain all the Indian rations delivered at Port Ugowe and report on the quantities in transit and in store. The Collectors at Ravine and Naivasha were requested, probably at Jackson's suggestion,⁴⁹ to have Masai contingents, consisting of not more than fifty warriors each, 'ready to enter countries dealt with from the east, if required'.^T The limit on numbers and the proviso suggests that Evatt was confident the regulars could achieve his objectives without the help of auxiliaries, who were only to be called in if there was work for them to do after the Nandi had been broken by his columns. As a professional soldier, he probably brushed aside any suggestion that his Sikhs, who had given a good account of themselves in several engagements during the past two years, needed any help in crushing the Nandi.⁵⁰ The sepoys had been in the field for long periods during the Ogaden expedition, the mopping-up operations after the Sudanese mutiny, and the campaigns against Mwanga and Kabarega. During these operations, they had fought over a vast extent of territory compared with the circumscribed area in which his present force was expected to operate for a month or so at most. Moreover the Nandi warriors, who were much less numerous than the considerable forces which the Indians had defeated in Uganda, had few guns and little practice in their use. Another consideration that probably accounted for Evatt's reluctance to call in auxiliaries was his experience of their use in Uganda, where their unmanageable numbers and indiscipline had sometimes proved an embarrassment.

When Evatt left Entebbe on 18 June in the steam-launch *Victoria*,⁵¹ preliminary dispositions had been completed for mounting an expedition on a considerable scale against the Nandi and Lumbwa. Johnston took no direct part in the arrangements, and did not intervene until he sent a few instructions from Toro early in July. Although he had authorized his deputy to communicate with London, Jackson did not consult the Foreign Office about the 'blood-letting' he had sanctioned,⁵² and it was not until Hill's despatch, dated 27 October, was received on 10 December that the Foreign Office was given a detailed account of the genesis and progress of the expedition.^U

On his arrival at Port Ugowe on 21 June, Evatt found there might be difficulties in maintaining communications between the field force and district stations. The telegraph was not working between Mau and the Lake, and he was told it was most unlikely that runners could be induced to carry messages after the expedition entered enemy territory. As it was, Hobley could not bring Evatt up to date with developments, because he had heard nothing from Fort Ternan for a fortnight and nothing from Kipture since the fourteenth. In order to lessen his dependence on runners, Evatt set up a heliograph station at Port Ugowe to maintain contact with Kitoto's, Bushiri and the Nandi escarpment.⁵³ He also sent four signallers and four policemen to man a heliograph post on the Maragoli Hills to the north of Port Ugowe.^V

Captain Hornby, Lieutenant W.H. Cooper, and Captain P.B. Haig (Indian Medical

Service) left Bukedi on 24 June and arrived at Mumias five days later.⁵⁴ J.P. Wilson had recruited the 400 porters requisitioned by Jackson and on 1 July the column left for Port Ugowe. Since Hornby joined Evatt two days later, he could not have followed the circuitous route through western Nandi envisaged in the campaign plan.

Cooper took charge at Mumias of the party, consisting of details from Hornby's force and Ellison's detachment from the garrison troops, that was to escort the C.M.S. missionaries and several other travellers who had been diverted from the direct route at Port Ugowe. Owing to the presence of women and children and the slow rate of progress made by the donkey carts, it took six days for Cooper to reach Kipture. There it was found that a strong escort was needed as far as Darajani, twenty-three miles east of Kipture, with the result that he did not leave for his rendezvous with Evatt until 11 July, several days behind schedule. During the journey from Mumias, the party was watched by Nandi warriors from the hills and there were several alarms, but no attack was launched against the strongly guarded caravan.^W Finding that Kipture was dependent for its food supply on the Kakamega store, Cooper recommended that its garrison of six riflemen should be doubled when operations began. Grain was usually short in Nandi at this time of the year, purchases at Bushiri and Kipture had either ceased altogether or been reduced to insignificant proportions, and deliveries by cart convoy from Port Ugowe had been suspended. This meant that Evatt was faced with the unforeseen problem of feeding the African garrisons at Kipture and Fort Ternan. The immediate needs of the Indians were, however, met by the arrival at Mumias early in July of a convoy carrying their special foodstuffs.^X

Rumours were current at Kipture that large herds of cattle were being driven into Lumbwa. Apart from this indication that the Nandi were aware of the threatened invasion, relations between the station and nearby sections gave no cause for alarm. Indeed, during what Galt described as a time of 'wars and rumours of wars', an urgent message for Baker at Baringo was carried from Kipture to Ravine by two Nandi runners.^Y Bagnall reported that the Uasin Gishu Masai near Ravine were also quiet, and had captured 'Smithie', the former headman of the Kipture settlement, who was wanted on a charge of murder. The Kamasia, too, were quiet, though Bagnall suspected they were not displeased at the government's discomfiture, and would probably go to the assistance of the Nandi. Farther east, the Naivasha Masai had not merely confounded the Jeremiahs by accepting the presence of 4,000 coolies and 1,000 Swahilis in the three railway camps that had been established in their country, but had also shown a positive desire to be friendly by agreeing to pay tax at the 'nomads' rate.^Z The situation at the beginning of the expedition therefore was that the Baluyia, Luo and Masai were friendly and helping the government, whereas the attitude of the Lumbwa and Kamasia was unknown and possibly hostile. The response of the latter to Nandi requests for help would probably depend on the speed and thoroughness with which Evatt achieved the objectives Jackson had set him.

NOTES

1. When the news of the attack was brought to Port Ugowe by one of the victims, police were sent to rescue his comrades and investigate.
2. Originally intended by Boustead, Ridley as a sister ship to their part-owned *Ruwenzori*, the *Kampala* was offered to the Protectorate, which had allocated £2,000 in the 1900-1901 estimates for a steel sailing boat. P.H. Clarke delivered the loads for the hull at Port Ugowe on 31.3.1900 and, on 7.5.1900, B. Whitehouse anticipated that she would soon be in service. Financial difficulties delayed delivery of replacements for the 110 parts looted by the Nandi, and the vessel was not launched until October 1902. Boustead, Ridley asked for Rs.43,000 compensation for the lives, time and property lost on the grounds that traders had a right to expect protection in return for the heavy transport dues levied upon them. Various forms of compensation, including an *ex gratia* payment 'from out of the war fine inflicted on the Nandi', which were suggested by Johnston and the owners, were finally rejected by the Foreign Office on 11.10.1901 because they would create a precedent.
3. The owners thought troops should have been sent out to arrest Fabri. Sudi reported that two Indians (possibly clerks or ship erectors) and six Masai were in the party.
4. The bodies were recovered and Jackson promised a search would be made for the lost property. Mayes alleged that four donkeys, which he confiscated from Uasin Gishu Masai in August 1901, had been

- stolen from the caravan; (ESA A/18/1).
5. See *NRBR* i, pp. 94-95, 114, Ch. 5.
 6. Kapsiondu peace envoys told Holey in February 1901 that Arap Kongureit had fled to Kamasia because of his part in Fabri's murder. Holey later saw the attack as evidence of the Laibon's complicity in the rising, on the grounds that it was carried out by a section which had not been punished in the recent operations; (ESA A/18/1).
 7. After hearing of Fabri's death, Holey sent messengers by two different routes to recall Captain C.E.H. Laughlin, who decided to push on to Kipture because he thought Parkin might be in need of help. He left the corporal in charge and knew nothing of the Indian's murder.
 8. Sudi's claim for damages was disallowed on 1.9.1900 (ESA A/18/1) 'as our inability to supply loads for transport is entirely owing to the country being in a state of rebellion'.
 9. After Laughlin's convoy left on the fifteenth, the next 'weekly' convoy did not leave Port Ugowe until 6.7.1900.
 10. Cattle and the few other forms of property which had an attraction for the Nandi were usually strongly guarded; see *NRBR* i, pp. 80-81.
 11. It is difficult to reconcile this with his assertion in August 1905 (COCF 771) that 'no tribe has ever deliberately rebelled against the Administration'.
 12. For the Nandi attitude towards blood-brotherhood, which was well known to their neighbours, see *NRBR* i, pp. 45, 99. If, as seems probable from later disclosures, the plan was suggested by the Laibon, it shows the prophet in the role of innovator; see *NRBR* i, p. 245, for a less ambitious scheme in 1897.
 13. In June Holey thought it possible that the Nyangori would join the Nandi, but later recorded (ESA A/18/1) that they 'have held aloof from us since the commencement of the rising, but they have not actively joined it'.
 14. See *NRBR* i, p. 63 for his treaty with Jackson (for the I.B.E.A. Co.). For his requests for help, see *NRBR* i, pp. 78, 87, 218, 241, 269; and for the proposed station, *NRBR* i, pp. 59, 124, 189, 191, 205, 282, 310, 337, 355, 360, 364, 375, *NRBR* ii, pp. 2, 7.
 15. The second Laibon to be mentioned by name in official records, the first being Ketchumber (Kipchomber) who was identified by Jackson as the instigator of the 1897 conspiracy (*NRBR* i, p. 319). Kibeles was not the Head Laibon, an office that was held in 1900 by Kipchomber's younger brother, Koitalel; all laibons belonged to the Talai clan, but Kibeles may have been living in the Kapchepkendi *porriet* (see *NRBR* ii, p. 89).
 16. If this is a reference to hut tax, the tribute would have been exacted from sections near Kipture since the Collector complained that he was unable to travel far from the station.
 17. It is questionable whether the Nandi believed, as Johnston asserted on 21.10.1900 (FOCF 7690/16) that the telegraph instruments were parts of a Maxim.
 18. After the indecisive first phase of the campaign, he restated his position on 24.8.1900 (ESA A/18/1): 'the expedition must keep the field until they one and all voluntarily come in, acknowledge themselves beaten and crave for peace'; cf. CEUR's July Report (FOCF 7545/124).
 19. See *NRBR* i, pp. 321, 335.
 20. He had advocated punishing the Lumbwa in 1897 and June 1898 (*NRBR* i, pp. 242, 321). Evatt was advised on 22.6.1900 (ESA A/5/10) that stock captured from the Lumbwa should be driven, by the route Jackson had taken in 1889 (*NRBR* i, p. 62), to Naivasha 'where there is a ready sale', or to Molo and Fort Ternan, as the animals would die if taken to a lower altitude.
 21. The only recorded negotiations with recalcitrant chiefs, since Johnston's arrival, were those undertaken in October by Chiefs Torturee and Tirop in Campilayo.
 22. His views were endorsed by a number of military men; e.g. Captain N. Malcolm, who wrote in his diary that sepoys were the 'wrong men for chasing *Shenzies* (savages)'; and cf. Austin's diary, 3, 13.5.1898, 23.10.1898, 15.12.1898, 23.1.1899, and RL, 18.6.1900, 17.12.1900.
 23. See *NRBR* ii, p. 61, for the possibility that Johnston had discussed the composition of a punitive force with Evatt.
 24. Cf Ternan in 1897 (*NRBR* i, pp. 240-241). The failure of the expedition he had urged upon Ternan in 1897 may have rankled with Jackson, and induced him to do all he could to avoid another setback. There is no evidence that he shared Johnston's high opinion of the Indian troops, or agreed with his assessment (FOCF 7675/23) that 'an Indian Service Corps officer is worth two British officers, who have not had that special Indian training'.
 25. See *NRBR* ii, p. 119. When half the sepoys at Kampala were being chosen for the Bukedi expedition in May, Haig reported that the number required was barely available because of ill health; (ESA A/7/6,

FO 2/257, 599). The 402-strong Contingent was also understrength and awaiting the twenty replacements asked for in September 1899.

26. See *NRBR* i, pp. 303, 316 for Indian troops passing through Nandi.
27. Presumably engaged by Hornby at Kampala. Jackson's later pronouncements (e.g. FOCP 7953/86) suggest his views on the usefulness of Baganda in the Eastern Province were more in accord with Berkeley's (*NRBR* i, p. 138) than with Ternan's and Johnston's.
28. He often stressed that 'the Kavirondo dread the people and cold of Nandi', especially after their experiences during the mutiny relief operations, see *NRBR* i, p. 281 and *NRBR* ii, p. 19. Climatic conditions on the Nandi Plateau were equally uncongenial to the Baganda. See *NRBR* ii, pp. 3, 8 for Ternan's embargo.
29. The Misses E.M. Furley, G.E. Bird, E.L. Pilgrim, and M.S. Thomsett, who arrived in a miserable condition after spending ten days on a dhow, and Allen Wilson. James Wallace, their caravan leader, was accompanied by his wife and two children (one a babe in arms).
30. From 16.5.1900 to 14.6.1900 he was punishing the Japtulleal; on the nineteenth he left on a fruitless mission to establish a Sudanese colony at Molo, and returned to Ravine on the twenty-fifth; (ESA A/4/29; RSD).
31. Presumably during the expedition from stock captured from the Nandi, and from hut receipts when the porters returned home.
32. Cf. Jackson (FOCP 7946/59): 'It is generally found that unreliable information, or no information at all, is one of the greatest difficulties that a Field Force in these parts (Lango) has to contend with, and it has, in more than one instance, been the cause of a punitive expedition returning in despair after accomplishing very little or nothing at all'.
33. Missionaries not only acted as interpreters but also explained government policy to their adherents; see e.g. Ternan, *CMI*, February 1898, Rev. J.A. Wray, *Kenya, our newest Colony*, Ch. 39. Jackson commented on 25.1.1902 (FOCP 7946/142) that most officials speak Swahili and only Grant a local language.
34. Those living in the small settlement near Kipture came from Ravine in 1896 as station staff (*NRBR* i, p. 220); they, unlike the large number who had lived in the district for many years, were not accepted by the Nandi.
35. Collectors were not always well informed even about affairs near the station; see, e.g. *NRBR* i, pp. 322-323, for the misconception about the Latongwa's status, and pp. 124-125, 160-161, 214-215, 246-247 for other examples of the lack of intelligence.
36. Hobley paid a one-day visit to Kipture in September 1896 (*NRBR* i, pp. 213-214).
37. Although twelve copies of the map compiled by Lieutenant S. Vandeleur during the 1895 expedition were sent to Uganda on 12.1.1897 (FO 2/133), it is not certain whether a copy was held at Kipture; it was never referred to in despatches from Nandi Collectors.
38. Amplified later in *Eastern Uganda*, which was sent to the Foreign Office on 6.7.1901. During the expedition he compiled a map which was sent to the Foreign Office on 10.6.1901 (FO 2/467).
39. Confirmed by Hobley in July and disregarded by Hornby in August; see *NRBR* ii, pp. 90, 93.
40. Wortham was twenty-six. Commissioned in 1895, he took over, what was probably his first independent command, from Pereira in January. Hobley evidently wished to ensure he was better briefed than seemingly had been the case in February.
41. If Periera made a map it has not survived.
42. Composed principally of Somalis, who affected to scorn the Nandi as naked, bow-and-arrow savages, and were particularly vulnerable to attack on this account.
43. The only Eastern Province stations with a resident doctor were Ravine (D. Donald) and Port Ugowe (Copeland). A Hospital Assistant was stationed at Mumias. Several soldiers were without boots.
44. Only forty-four Sudanese had passed through Port Ugowe by the end of June. At most stations there were also a few settlers who had been discharged while serving in the Eastern Province.
45. Bagnall complained on 15.6.1900 (ESA A/4/30) that Baker's Sudanese were armed with Sniders 'which should have been condemned years ago'.
46. Since April the Kipture and Fort Ternan garrisons had been reduced from 97 and 64 to 56 and 55 respectively; there were probably similar reductions at Mumias and Port Ugowe. Rumbela, who passed through in May, stated on 18 June that there were '30 men at Ravine, 50 at Nandi, about 50 in the Nyando Valley and about 25 at Port Ugowe', and a company at Mumias.
47. Estimates in Luganda sources of the number of guns carried by the auxiliaries vary from fifty to 200; the Senior Staff Officer at the time, Captain H.B. Rattray, reported in a note dated 3.3.1903 (ESA) that the number was 150. I am grateful to Dr M. Twaddle for help with this section.

48. Removal of military headquarters to Fort Ternan was postponed. In view of the number of men at Parkin's command, Hobley's policy of concentrating resources seems more appropriate to the situation.
49. See *NRBR* i, pp. 183, 233-234, 255-256, 320, 335.
50. Cf. Ternan in 1897 (*NRBR* i, p. 255). If he knew that Baganda auxiliaries had been called upon by Hornby, Evatt may have thought them sufficient for his needs.
51. Repairs (including a new engine) to this vessel, which was damaged by Sudanese mutineers in October 1897, were not completed until May 1900; (ESA A/4/27, 29, FOCP 7675/37).
52. The first hint of trouble to reach London was telegraphed by Hardinge on 8.8.1900 (FO 2/291). A telegram from Entebbe could have been sent by using runners between Mumias and Ravine or between Port Ugowe and Molo.
53. Almost all the twenty-four signallers of the Indian Contingent probably took part, since heliographs (with a 5" mirror and a range of about seventy miles) were also set up later at Fort Ternan and on Ketparak Hill near Kipture, and others were carried in the field.
54. A Luganda source (Sanwiri Tekiwagala) records that the Bukedi column marched via Majanji to Mumias, where thirty of the auxiliaries' useless weapons were replaced, and a number of extra guns issued. The Foreign Office had not been told of Hornby's activities in Bukedi; this probably explains the somewhat disingenuous statement in Evatt's Report that he was 'diverted from reconnaissance duty towards Mt Elgon'.

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- A. Johnson-Com, 11.6.1900, ESA A/4/29 (he called it a pay and rations convoy); Parkin-Hobley, 14.6.1900, ESA A/4/29; Hobley-Com, 16.6.1900, ESA A/4/29, A/18/1.
- B. Hobley-Parkin, 16.6.1900, ESA A/4/29; PUD; Stallibrass, 25, 27.6.1900; WP VII; O'Callaghan-FO, 22.2.1901, FO 2/300.
- C. Hobley-Com, 20.6.1900, ESA A/18/1; Nandi Political Record Book, KNA, in which Bushiri is wrongly equated with Kipture; Evatt-Coles, December 1900, in Johnston-FO, 5.2.1901, FO 2/461, FOCP 7690/150, edited version in the *London Gazette*, 10.9.1901, pp. 5969-5973 (hereafter cited as Evatt's Report).
- D. Hobley-Com, 16.6.1900, 15.6.1900, 24.8.1900, ESA A/4/29, A/18/1; RL, 18.6.1900; Hobley-Parkin, and Galt, 16.6.1900, and Wortham, 23.6.1900, ESA A/4/29. Jackson-Boustead, Ridley, 28.6.1900, 9.7.1900, ESA A/7/6. O. Tonks-Com, 23.1.1901, ESA A/6/9. Johnston-FO, 28.9.1901, FO 2/463. B. Whitehouse, 7.5.1900, WP V; RSD. Compensation correspondence in ESA A/6/9, 10, A/7/6, 7, A/9/1; FO 2/459, 461, 463, 513-515, 521; Hill states erroneously in FO 2/513 that Fabri slipped away from Fort Ternan. *African Standard*, 1.4.1905, has a description of the launch; see also Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 134.
- E. Hobley-Com, 10.6.1900, ESA A/4/29; Johnston-D.J. Wilson, 4.7.1900, ESA A/5/10; PUD. Hobley-Com, 16, 20.6.1900, ESA A/4/29, A/18/1.
- F. Evatt-Hill, 18.10.1900, FOCP 7689/84. Hobley-Com, 17, 19.6.1900, ESA A/18/1. Evatt's Report. E. Huxley, *White Man's Country*, i, p.68 states that the ration store at Kibigori (presumably Sudi's) was fired by the Nandi or by lightning; no source is given and the incident is not mentioned elsewhere.
- G. Caine-Com, 12.6.1900. Stallibrass-Com, 14.6.1900. ESA A/6/8. Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 394. Letter 18.1.1901; Alex Johnston, *op. cit.*, p. 213; Eliot, *Africa* 6 (1903), Cd. 1626, p. 10, *op. cit.*, p. 214, cf. Johnston, *NRBR* ii, p. 176.
- H. Hobley-Com, 20.6.1900, 24.8.1900, ESA A/18/1, but not mentioned in his MS, 'Early History of Kavirondo', written without access to records in 1911; nor in *Kenya From Chartered Company to Crown Colony*, published in 1929, which reflects the author's uncertainty concerning dates and events for 1900-1901, which he attributed to 'affairs (being in) such a whirl'. No references have been found in Nandi or other tribal sources to the coalition. For the prophet as innovator, see T.O. Ranger, 'Connexions between 'Primary Resistance' movements and modern mass nationalism in East and Central Africa', *JAH* 9/3 (1968), pp. 447-452.
- I. Hobley in Com-CD, 14.8.1905, COCP 771. For Kitoto, see J.O. Ondere, *op. cit.*, J.M. Lonsdale, *op. cit.*, Hobley-Com, 17, 20.6.1900, ESA A/18/1.
- J. Hobley-Com, 24.8.1900, ESA A/18/1. For confusion about the identity of the Head Laibons, see A.T. Matson, 'Nandi Traditions on Raiding', *Hadith* 2, pp. 74-76.
- K. Hobley-Com, and Galt, 16.6.1900, ESA A/4/29. Jackson-Hobley, 15, 16.6.1900, ESA A/18/1.
- L. Johnston-Viceroy of India, 15.3.1901, FO 2/551; Johnston-FO, 21.10.1900, FOCP 7690/16, the

- imprecise wording of which suggests that Jackson took the decision after consulting Evatt, Banks's letters, 14.8.1900, 7.12.1900; cf. *Mengo Notes*, December 1900.
- M. Hobley-Com, 16.6.1900, ESA A/18/1, A/4/29; Jackson-Hobley, 15.6.1900, ESA A/18/1. See RL, 18.6.1900, 15.8.1900, for criticism of the inadequacy of Evatt's forces.
- N. Jackson-Hobley, and J.P. Wilson, 16.6.1900, ESA A/18/1. Hobley-Com, 16, 17, 19.6.1900, ESA A/4/29, A/18/1.
- O. Hobley-Com, 20.6.1900, ESA A/18/1; PUD. Miss Furley's account, *Mengo Notes*, September 1900. Hobley-Wortham, 18.6.1900, ESA A/4/29; Hobley-Com, 20.6.1900, ESA A/18/1. Jackson's telegrams, 16, 18.6.1900, in ESA A/18/1; he also warned Dr Moffat that Nandi was unsafe.
- P. Hobley-Com, Parkin, and Galt, 16.6.1900, ESA A/4/29; Hobley-Com, 24.8.1900, ESA A/18/1. Galt-Com, 17.8.1900, Hobley-Com, 16.9.1900, ESA A/18/1.
- Q. Hobley-Wortham, 18.6.1900, ESA A/4/29.
- R. Evatt-Com, 15.6.1900, Evatt-Hornby, 16.6.1900, ESA A/18/1; RL 18.6.1900. Evatt and Haig in Evatt's Report.
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- T. Evatt-Com, 15.6.1900, Evatt-Parkin, and Brown, 16.6.1900, ESA A/18/1. F.J. Jackson, *Early Days in East Africa*, p. 201.
- U. Hill-FO, 7, 27.10.1900, FOCP 7689/21/84; the latter enclosed an unexpurgated version of Hobley's Report dated 24.8.1900. Johnston-FO, 10.10.1900, FOCP 7689/82, stating Jackson was to inquire into the Nandi rising, and 21.10.1900, FOCP 7690/16, his first full report, which the Foreign Office received on 8.1.1901.
- V. Hobley-Com, 20.6.1900, ESA A/18/1; PUD.
- W. Hornby-Senior Staff Officer, 1.7.1900, ESA A/4/30; Fowler-Com, 25.6.1900, 1.8.1900, ESA A/4/29, A/10/1. J.P. Wilson-Com, 2.7.1900, ESA A/27/17; *Mengo Notes*, October 1900, Moffat's letter, July 1900; *The Times*, 5.9.1900; a garbled account by Mawanda.
- X. Cooper-Parkin, 8.7.1900; ESA A/27/17. J.P. Wilson-Com, 5.7.1900, ESA A/4/29; R.L., 28.6.1900, stating that he had sent 300 loads of Indian rations from Iganga.
- Y. Nandi Political Record Book, KNA. Galt-G.D. Smith, 23.6.1900, FO 2/546; RSD.
- Z. Bagnall-Com, 30.6.1900, ESA A/4/29. Macallister-Com, 30.6.1900, ESA A/4/29; this and Bagnall's despatch were monthly reports which had been called for from all districts by Circular No. 19 on 2.5.1900; no reports were submitted by the Nandi Collector until August 1901. For the Masai threat to the railway, see M.F. Hill, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-91, 85; Mungeam, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-42, 'Masai and Kikuyu Responses to the Establishment of British Administration in the E.A.P.', *JAHS*, 11/1 (1970), pp. 128-131.

CHAPTER 8

Invasion and reappraisals

Evatt, Hornby, Haig and Hobley left Port Ugowe on 5 July 1900 with the sepoys and Baganda auxiliaries from the Bukedi expedition. Over 500 Kavirondo porters accompanied the column, some from Mumias and some recruited by Hobley from the Luo. Several chiefs went with their men to discourage desertion, and were accorded the status of *neoparas* (headmen), with special responsibilities for the care of the sick and the enforcement of camp conservancy discipline. Among their number were Odera Ulalo of Gem, Ogada of Kisumu, Ngong, Leutha,¹ and a number of headmen from Kabras. Port Ugowe was guarded by station police, Hobley's recently recruited levy force, and a detachment of sepoys who were unfit for active service as a result of five weeks' campaigning in malarious country with the Bukedi expedition. The strength of the garrison was increased to about 130 men on the tenth by the arrival from Uganda of twenty-eight Sudanese soldier-settlers.

Evatt's column entered Nandi from the extreme south-west, and marched up the Kibos valley by the route which Hobley had investigated for a cart road in July 1899. Livestock were seen grazing on the hillsides during the advance, but no attempt was made to capture them, and the troops were forbidden to take other aggressive measures during the gruelling climb to the top of the escarpment. A spear was thrown at one of the sentries shortly after the tents had been pitched, and one porter was killed and another severely wounded in an ambush at a stream near the camp. As a reprisal for these attacks, all the houses in the neighbourhood of the camp² were burned down before the column marched eastwards on the following morning. When Hobley asked a prisoner why the camp had been attacked, he was told that the Kakipoch, 'had never made peace with the Europeans after the Cunningham expedition and were not friendly to Europeans', a declaration that prompted Hobley to comment 'and this I think was more or less the attitude throughout'. After camp was pitched near Kikirige Hill ('Nandi Rock'), patrols were sent out in various directions in an unsuccessful search for stock. The Chebilat Kakipoch and the Kapsile *pororosiek* offered no resistance to the passage of the column, apart from shooting arrows at the porters from the shelter of the bush. Retaliatory action was evidently taken against the bowmen, as the Port Ugowe garrison heard rifle shots and saw a number of fires on the escarpment. After marching through Chepsiria Kakipoch and Kapchepkendi, the column entered Kaptalam and arrived at Bushiri on the ninth.³ Apart from burning huts and looting food, no punishment was inflicted on the enemy.^A

Evatt found the Bushiri garrison of fifteen riflemen under a Somali sergeant was in danger of being overrun. The Nandi had launched a series of raids in the neighbourhood which had virtually cut Bushiri off from Kipture and Port Ugowe. Evatt reported that his arrival probably prevented the post from being sacked by warriors whose self-confidence had been strengthened by their recent operations in its neighbourhood. The first of these successes occurred on the seventh, when a corporal and four privates were massacred a short distance from the post while carrying mails to Kipture. The following day seven soldiers and a Transport Department askari were killed and several others wounded, when the 'weekly' convoy of twenty carts with its escort of twenty-five riflemen was destroyed between Bushiri and Kipture. Robert Livingstone,⁴ a clerk in the Protectorate service at Kampala, and his Muganda servant, who were travelling as passengers with the convoy, were also killed. Five carts were broken up for their iron fittings, and six draught oxen and various items of saddlery were carried off. Captain Johnson's version of the incident implied that it was the culmination of a series of determined running ambushes which had been sprung between Bushiri and the bridge over the River Mogong, three miles from Kipture. The details tally, however, with Nandi accounts of a raid on a convoy some two miles from Bushiri, in which the parties became so inextricably mixed that friend could not be told from foe.⁵ This disaster was a severe blow to the transport system and forced Parkin to suspend convoy operations between Kipture and Bushiri. The third incident occurred only two hours before Evatt's arrival at Bushiri on the ninth. Seven soldiers, who were travelling from Bushiri to Kitoto's with local mails and four Masai prisoners, were attacked on the Kano Plains by Nandi warriors, who were eventually driven off with the loss of seven killed. The government

casualties were three soldiers and two prisoners killed and two porters wounded. Hobley discovered later that the raiders were Toruree's Kaptalam, who 'were nominally friendly at the time'.⁶ Surmising that the warriors had left their homes to the south of Kipture, 'on the off-chance of attacking a small party', Hobley thought this confirmed 'how widespread the rising had by this time become'.^B

Though Evatt may have learned that the Nandi had killed a Transport driver between Kipture and Ravine on the second and captured his rifle and seventeen rounds of ammunition, nothing was known at Bushiri about Wortham's position at Fort Ternan. Evatt was told that the sections near Kipture had neither joined the rising nor allied themselves with the government. He considered his food supply problems had been 'simplified' because of the unco-operative attitude of these reputedly friendly sections. He accordingly directed that Kipture and the other posts were to be virtualled by levies on the surrounding countryside, and that units in the field were to live off the country. As he anticipated these measures would produce supplies far in excess of demand, orders were given to abandon the Kakamega food store and withdraw its garrison.^C

Evatt was unaware at the time that the Nandi had also struck in the upper Nyando Valley. Owing to his fears that the revolt was not confined to the area near Bushiri, Hobley had refused to send a caravan to Molo to bring up replacement parts for the *William Mackinnon* which had been made in the railway workshops at Kilindini. Cowham, an engineer on loan to the railway for the steamer construction, nevertheless left Port Ugowe on 26 June with porters and a telegraph repair party to collect the loads which were holding up completion of the vessel. He reached his destination at Molo on 2 July and set out a few days later on his journey back to Port Ugowe. When the caravan was attacked on the seventh, one porter was killed and his load carried off. While searching for the load, which contained the most essential part of the steamer's engine, Cowham received an urgent message from Wortham warning him that he must reach Fort Ternan that evening if he wished to avoid being molested. After a further fruitless search for the missing load, Cowham buried the steamer's cable and machinery loads and dashed for the shelter of the fort.^D

Wortham's warning was sent on the same day that one of his own detachments was badly mauled about six miles west of Fort Ternan. Twenty-eight soldiers had been ordered on 9 July to march to Port Ugowe, but were diverted from their purpose by a large herd of cattle which they seized and began to drive back to the fort. The Kamelilo quickly mustered 400 warriors who attacked the detachment and recovered the captured cattle. Nine riflemen were killed and two wounded in the affray, in which the survivors claimed about fifty Nandi were shot. Wortham went to the soldiers' rescue and drove the Kamelilo off when they were within two miles of the fort, and still harassing the rear of the retreating detachment.^E

This series of reverses angered Evatt, who attributed them to an inexplicable disregard of his standing orders, which declared the road closed to all but specially organized and heavily guarded convoys.⁷ Owing to uncertain communications, these orders may not have been received by every detachment commander, and may have been misunderstood at Bushiri where there was no English-speaking subordinate to explain them to the sergeant in charge. Small parties continued to move along the road, and lay themselves open to surprise attacks while marching through country that was admirably suited to ambushes. The troops failed to appreciate the skill and determination of the enemy, a miscalculation which Evatt attributed to their contempt of the Nandi as fighting men. Reports of the Nandi victories, which caused considerable loss of life, property, arms and ammunition, created alarm at Kampala and other stations, partly owing to breaches of security regulations by telegraph operators, who spread exaggerated accounts⁸ of the losses inflicted upon Evatt's forces.

In addition to the reverses suffered by troops in the campaign area, Evatt learned shortly after his arrival at Bushiri that a sergeant-major and forty-three police had been slaughtered in the Baringo District, and that Baker and the remnant of his garrison at Ribo were in danger of being massacred. After Bagnall punished the Japtulleal and Endeo in June for refusing to sell Baker food, Silalui, one of the Endeo chiefs, had promised to supply grain to the post. Baker, who had made five fruitless visits to Cheptilil to collect the grain, was prevented from leading the party that left Ribo on 29 June because of illness, which was probably brought on by an attempt by the Japtulleal to kill him with a present of poisoned honey. When the party arrived at Cheptilil, the chief temporized with the sergeant-major in charge but eventually allowed his men to cut the grain themselves. Reaping was however

suspended while the sergeant-major and his men attended a wedding feast, at which they apparently got drunk and were butchered to a man by the Endeo and Sipo. While Baker was awaiting the return of the food party, 700 Endeo, Sipo, Mukorra and Japtulleal warriors arrived at Ribo and drove off all the station livestock. When Baker made a sortie to recover the animals, the raiders overran the station and looted it of most of its contents.⁹ After a hard fight, in which Baker was wounded in the hand by a poisoned arrow, the post was reoccupied with the loss of four men killed and two wounded. After being beleaguered for five days, the garrison of ten Sudanese police and nine porters was relieved by sixty-two Njemps spearmen, who had been advised of Baker's plight by two messengers who slipped through the besiegers' camps at night with a message for Bagnall.^F

When Baker's messengers reached Ravine, two Masai runners were sent to Kipture on 7 July with an urgent letter for Evatt. Bagnall pointed out that he was unable to help Baker, as there were only thirty-five police at Ravine to guard the station and livestock farm¹⁰ if the Kamasia decided to throw in their lot with the Nandi. He asked for a company of Sudanese from the Nandi field force to relieve Ribo, which would have to be abandoned with the consequent loss of prestige unless soldiers and food could be rushed to the post. He also urged that three companies of regulars and a contingent of Masai and Njemps auxiliaries should be sent, after the Nandi operations were concluded, to punish Baker's attackers and 'decide whether Her Majesty's Government or Arabs and Swahilis are in charge of this area'. Evatt was also told that if he wished to communicate with Ravine this could only be done by runners, because the telegraph wire was broken on both sides of the station. The Commander of the Nandi field force, who was unaware of the attack on Wortham's detachment in the Nyando Valley on the ninth, arranged with Hobley for thirty unarmed Sudanese police in training at Fort Ternan to be sent to Ravine, where it was assumed they could be issued with the rifles of the disbanded XII Company.¹¹ Evatt noted it would be impossible to reach Ribo in time with troops, all of whom were required in any case for the Nandi campaign, or to replenish the station's food supplies, which Baker said would be exhausted by the seventeenth.^G

Evatt, who had been far from well when he left Port Ugowe, derived small comfort from the budget of news that awaited him at Bushiri. Moreover, the field force had failed to bring the Nandi to battle, hardly any stock or prisoners had been captured, and his experienced troops had been obliged to restrict their efforts to burning houses and confiscating food. The Kavirondo porters had proved excellent carriers but difficult to manage. Evatt observed that 'besides being essentially unreasoning creatures, they laboured under the additional disadvantage of working in an unfavourable climate'. Relations between his officers and the African *neoparas* were far from good,¹² owing to the inability of the headmen to control and discipline the porters, and their unconcern for the welfare of their men. Similarly strained relations evidently existed between the Baganda and Evatt's officers, who had to be reminded that auxiliaries giving their services in return for a share of the expedition's spoils should not be treated as if they were troops under military discipline.^H The march to Bushiri had revealed how little was known of the topography of the difficult country in which the field force was to operate, and that problems of communication were even greater than Evatt had feared. Furthermore, the Indian troops had not overawed the Nandi, who had made a number of successful strikes, some of them in areas close to the invading column.

Having reviewed the position, Evatt decided to remain for a period at Bushiri before resuming the campaign. This decision was forced upon him by the fact that his freedom of action as military commander was curtailed by factors outside his control, and the demands of other services. The Telegraph Engineer at Port Ugowe had asked Jackson for escorts so that the station at the Bagamoyo River (Kundos) could be repaired and guarded, and the line through the Nyando Valley put in working order.^I Officers and loads had been detained at Ravine, and transport beyond Kipture and along the telegraph route brought to a standstill. Evatt proposed using the respite from campaigning to secure the removal of the road blockage and, in particular, to organize convoys of rations for the sepoys. Although the main emphasis was placed on achieving these objectives, he also planned to send out patrols to inflict what damage they could on the enemy, and acquire some knowledge of the country around Bushiri.

While these proposals were being put into effect, a message from Johnston in Toro

was relayed from Entebbe on 6 July warning Evatt that 'we shall always have trouble with the Nandi until a certain old medicine-man, or Laibon, is caught'. This information, which had presumably come from Bagge at Fort Portal, was supported by assertions that the Laibon was 'very bitter against Europeans', and responsible for inciting the warriors to carry out raids against government parties. Johnston's informant revealed that the Laibon lived 'somewhere in the western part of the country',¹³ and that his authority was recognized by the Kamasia and Lumbwa as well as the Nandi. Evatt proposed to act on Johnston's suggestion, but thought it prudent to defer seeking out the 'old medicine-man' until the transport position improved, and the field force was reinforced by the detachment which had escorted the C.M.S. missionaries through Nandi.^J

Evatt only partially achieved the objectives he had hoped to attain by his stay at Bushiri. Indian rations were moved up from Kikuyu, though these took longer than expected because of the railway's decision to reserve the escarpment rope inclines for construction materials. Convoys of mule carts had to be organized for the through journey to Ravine, but these, too, were often delayed because the railway's embargo also applied to forage supplies.¹⁴ Consignments of medical stores were received from Mumias, but clearance of the transport blockage on the Uganda Road could only be tackled in piecemeal fashion. About a dozen government, Indian, Arab and Swahili caravans, which had been detailed for varying periods at Ravine, were given an escort on 6 July, only to be held up again at Kipture. Evatt decided that freight at Bushiri should be cleared before regular convoys between Kipture and Port Ugowe could be resumed, with the result that the first through convoy did not reach the lake until the eighteenth.^K These measures created another transport block at Port Ugowe, where officers and time-expired men proceeding to the coast were held up and the mail delayed.¹⁵ As the operation of cart convoys was curtailed, Johnston's redundant drivers and other transport staff were requisitioned for service as porters with the field force.¹⁶ These included men who had been making a road between Fort Ternan and the Nandi escarpment, work on which was suspended owing to the unsettled state of the district. It was considered safe, however, for Lewis and his gang of twenty-four labourers to continue working on the road from Ravine to the new capital.^L

Evatt was unable to make alternative arrangements for communicating with Port Ugowe and Fort Ternan, so he remained dependent on favourable weather conditions for using heliographs to maintain his telegraphic connection with Entebbe. Knowles eventually organized runners from Port Ugowe to Kitoto's, where messages were held until they could be forwarded under escort to Bushiri. The system broke down, however, when the corporal in charge returned a telegram from Jackson to Evatt, and refused to accept messages at Kitoto's for the field force. Knowles thought it foolhardy to send messengers direct to Bushiri, and Evatt could not get runners for the journey to Port Ugowe until two Nandi volunteered in the middle of the month. Caine was repairing the telegraph wire connecting Entebbe, Mumias and Port Ugowe, but escorts could not be spared for work on the stations and line to the east of Ugowe Bay. Suspension of patrolling and traffic in the Nyando Valley allowed the Nandi free rein with the telegraph wire, all of which had been removed from Camp Baridi on the Mau to Kitoto's by the end of July. The degree to which inadequate communications hampered military operations was emphasized when a wire which was heliographed from Bushiri to Port Ugowe could not be forwarded to Wortham until Knowles persuaded eight Sudanese to carry it to Fort Ternan.^M Thus, little was gained by Evatt's decision to suspend military operations so that transport and communications could be improved.

While the field force rested at Bushiri, a few of the enemy were killed and a small amount of livestock captured by patrols operating in the neighbourhood of the post. The Nandi concentrated their efforts on safeguarding their cattle, with the result that Evatt was caused some embarrassment about supplying his men with meat. No provision had been made for livestock to accompany the field force, because it was anticipated that ample supplies would be captured as soon as the expedition entered enemy territory. Mobs of cattle had been concentrated at Port Ugowe, Mumias and Fort Ternan, but Evatt had insufficient troops to fetch animals from these reserves to supply units in the field. Rationing of the small number of animals captured from the Nandi led to a lowering of morale, especially among the porters and auxiliaries who came off worse in the distribution.¹⁷ The Baganda, who suffered severely from the shortage of meat and an unaccustomed diet of millet flour, began to sicken

and lose heart. Parkin's African troops at Kipture were more successful than the Indians and captured forty head of cattle and 600 goats during a sweep on the thirteenth, in which the British casualties were only four men wounded. This operation was applauded by Hobley as 'the only relieving incident' in a situation which, from the government's point of view, had reached stalemate.^N

During this period of stalemate the Nandi took the initiative once again in the Nyando Valley, where they inflicted a notable defeat on the Protectorate forces. On 17 July two bags of mail, one for Mombasa and the other for the road stations, arrived at Port Ugowe from Entebbe. Knowles forwarded the bags to Kipture with the cart convoy on the following day, but managed to retrieve them after receiving orders from Evatt to send them direct to Fort Ternan with an escort of twenty rifles. Knowles mustered a corporal, eight Uganda Riflemen, eleven Sudanese police and two telegraph men, who were instructed to push on quickly in order to avoid an encounter with the enemy. The corporal interpreted his instructions loyally, but too literally, and by marching through the night lost the advantage of the escort's fire-power. While passing through a narrow defile below Mnara Hill, about six miles from their destination, the party was ambushed and annihilated by Nandi warriors, who ripped open the mail bags and scattered their contents over the ground.¹⁸ News of the disaster did not reach Port Ugowe until 8 August when Cowham returned to his station with the steamer caravan. The Commander of the Nandi field force learned of the annihilation of the mail party only two days earlier when he passed the scene of the massacre on his way to Fort Ternan. Wortham, too, was unaware of the outrage until Evatt brought him some of the scattered mail later that day.^O The success of the attack on the mail escort, and the losses sustained by Wortham's detachment on 9 July, forced Evatt to make a second reappraisal of his position, and stung the Special Commissioner into action.¹⁹

Wortham's ignorance of the attack on the mail escort near Fort Ternan was due to the fact that he was to all intents and purposes besieged in his station after the mauling his detachment had received on the ninth. For several days after the latter incident, bands of warriors²⁰ could be seen watching the fort from the surrounding hills until Wortham tried to pick them off at a range of 1,200 yards. He was afraid the station would be attacked after dark and spent three sleepless nights checking the sentries. On one occasion the Nandi got to within 300 yards of the perimeter fence but no attack developed. It was unsafe to venture far from the station in daylight because of the number of spearmen lurking in the long grass near the tracks leading from the fort. The telegraph had been cut and the garrison was too small for Wortham to risk sending a strong patrol for help. Runners were slipped out at night but failed to locate the field force. Only one of the five messengers sent to Kipture reached the station, and three of the remainder were known to have been killed. With a French explorer's caravan²¹ and Cowham's men to feed, Wortham's food supplies were running low. The Lumbwa had stopped selling to the garrison, so grain issues were cut by half and eked out by slaughtering animals which had been sent to Fort Ternan as reserves for the field force. Cowham complained later that his porters were rationed to four pounds of millet a week, and only given two oxen during their three weeks' stay at the fort. Relations between the two caravans and the station were far from cordial, the visitors making themselves a 'perfect nuisance' to their hosts.^P

Wortham's position was critical for he had only forty-five soldiers, and the so-called fort was merely a collection of grass huts surrounded by a thorn fence. When he took over from Pereira in January, Wortham realized the thorn fence afforded little protection against a determined assault, and indented for picks and shovels so that a ditch and parapet could be built. None of the tools had been supplied, and barbed wire sent to encircle the fort was diverted to Port Ugowe. When a night attack seemed imminent, thorn bushes were cut to strengthen the defences and, with the help of three old picks and two shovels, a tower was improvised for the Maxim and small towers built at the corners of the perimeter fence.^Q Evatt, who had not succeeded in communicating with Fort Ternan after he left Port Ugowe on 5 July, was unaware of Wortham's predicament. It had been assumed at the beginning of the expedition that the half company was adequate for the station's defence, presumably because the nearby sections had not been implicated in the recent hostile demonstrations. Evatt was possibly also optimistic that the eastern *pororosiek* would not be eager to join the rising when they heard that their compatriots in western Nandi were being punished by Indian troops.

During Evatt's stay at Bushiri, problems had also arisen at other stations in the Eastern Province. The alarm was raised at Port Ugowe on the sixteenth by a report that the cattle enclosure was being raided by a large body of Nyangori warriors, who were threatening to advance on the station itself. When the garrison sallied out against the raiders, the Nyangori decamped after stealing only five goats from a village near the cattle enclosure. This trivial raid, the first to be carried out near Port Ugowe since the punitive expedition in April, was not taken lightly at district headquarters, owing to the possibility that the Nyangori had been sufficiently emboldened by the exploits of the Nandi to emulate their example, and even to join the rising. Anxiety was also felt at Port Ugowe about the whereabouts and safety of Cowham's caravan of steamer loads. The need to reserve the steam-launch *Victoria* as a liaison boat for the Nandi campaign also helped delay completion of the *William Mackinnon*, as dhows had to be chartered from Baganda to tow the steamer's masts and other timbers from Busoga. Of more immediate concern was Evatt's closure of the Nyando Valley road, as this prevented rations for the Indian ship-erectors from being brought up from the Molo store. At Ravine, where a number of cattle had been looted near the station, the garrison stood-to throughout the night of the sixteenth in anticipation of an attack by Nandi warriors, who were rumoured to be lurking in the nearby forests. The raid did not take place, but Bagnall remained anxious about the huge government herd in his charge, and the attitude of the Kamasia towards the rising. Despite these anxieties, he felt obliged to send twenty armed porters to Ribo to strengthen Baker's garrison of ten police and seventy Njemps spearmen.^R

Much of this information was unknown to Evatt while he was at Bushiri. News that the conflict had been extended to the eastern *pororosiak* did not reach him until the eighteenth, when he received a report on the attack on the Fort Ternan detachment which had taken place nine days previously. He also heard that the Lumbwa, while professing to hold aloof from the struggle, were doing nothing to prevent the Nandi from driving their cattle across the Nyando. When he was told three days later that the majority of the Lumbwa had joined the Nandi, he realized that it would be necessary for him to adhere to his original plan of extending the campaign to Lumbwa. After completing this reappraisal of the situation, Evatt concluded that the field force was too weak to carry out its task. He recommended that a detachment of Indians should be transferred from Kampala to Luba's, so that XV Company could be released to reinforce Fort Ternan.²² This request was supported on the grounds that all the African companies were understrength, and that the Fort Ternan garrison was too small to take part in active operations as well as guarding the station. Jackson sent immediate confirmation that the African Company, which would leave as soon as the sepoys reached Luba's, should arrive at Port Ugowe about 6 August. Evatt was also advised that if Bagnall was afraid of the Ravine farm being raided he should ask Naivasha for an escort to drive the cattle to Mbaruk.^S

Meanwhile the field force had been strengthened by the arrival of Lieutenant K. Henderson²³ with seventeen of the twenty Sikh replacements that Ternan had asked for in September 1899. This detachment came up without rifles to Ravine, where Bagnall was unable to equip them properly from the 'old iron, prehistoric Remingtons and Sniders ... relics facetiously termed rifles',²⁴ which he held in store. The Sikhs were detained for ten days until 21 July, when Sergeant A.R. Rundle²⁵ brought seventy-two Martini-Henry rifles and seventeen sets of accoutrements from Kipture. During his stay at Ravine, Henderson heard of an abortive assault on Kipture on the sixteenth and a number of other raids in which 'several Europeans and Indians have been scuppered'. He was also told about Galt's precarious position and failure to get in touch with the field force from Kipture. Several messengers had been killed when despatches from Evatt were intercepted on the way to Ravine, where the garrison was confined to the station after a muleteer was speared by Nandi lurking in the forest close to the transport camp.^T

As Cooper had been delayed, and No. 11 Column under Parkin had failed to locate detachments of the main party operating from Bushiri, Evatt wired Entebbe on 15 July explaining that it would be some days before the field force would be at full strength to resume operations, and attempt the capture of the Laibon. In all these exchanges Evatt showed no readiness to admit that the Nandi could not be conquered by regular troops, and to acknowledge that this could only be speedily effected with the help of the Masai levies who had been ordered to stand by at Naivasha and Ravine. Jackson was equally adamant that the

enemy could be subjugated without outside assistance. When the Commandant of the E.A.P. Indian Contingent²⁶ wired offering to help quell the rebellion in the Eastern Province, Jackson retorted that rumours of the rising, which only affected the Nandi district, had been greatly exaggerated, and that no assistance²⁷ was required from the sister Protectorate.^U

Evatt's fortnight stay at Bushiri was forced upon him largely by events beyond his control. Hasty and inadequate preparations, based on faulty intelligence and a misconception of the magnitude of the task, were nonetheless contributory factors. The delay, though 'doubtless necessary', was 'unfortunate' in Hobley's view, for he considered 'its effect upon the enemy was not beneficial to our interests, a savage foe being likely to put a wrong construction upon our apparent inactivity'.^V The Nandi, for their part, had every reason to be encouraged by the success of their first encounters with the expeditionary forces: the troops at Fort Ternan were unable to move from the fort; the main force of Indians seemed unwilling to leave the shelter of Bushiri; and only the efforts of the Kipture detachment had brought any comfort to their enemy. The inactivity of the punitive columns provided a respite, which allowed the Nandi to secrete their stock in the forests and neighbouring districts, to remove food reserves from the homestead granaries, and send non-combatants to places of safety.

NOTES

1. Possibly Ngonga or Ukola Ndong (Lego), and Loota from near Mumias; (Hobley, *Eastern Uganda*, p. 52).
2. Probably at Kesengei, where a tree with a bullet hole through its trunk suggests some fighting took place.
3. Hobley's first visit to the Nandi Plateau since he took charge of the district in July 1899, and his first to Bushiri. For his previous visit to the area in September 1896, see *NRBR* i, p. 213.
4. Jackson considered Livingstone's services invaluable, and Ternan thought he would be difficult to replace as a Luganda, Arabic and Swahili speaker; (ESA A/4/21, A/5/7).
5. To commemorate their success in the *mélée* the Nandi renamed the place where the affray took place Ndurio; cf. J. Lamphear, *Traditional History of the Jie of Uganda*, p. 205. According to Hobley, the convoy was attacked 'soon after leaving' Bushiri.
6. For Toruree's previous co-operative attitude, see *NRBR* i, p. 352. Hobley erred in saying Toruree was a Kaptalam leader; the error was righted on his map in *Eastern Uganda*, p. 58, where he is described as a chief of the eastern Kapchepkendi.
7. More realistic and charitable than Evatt, Coles explained (Evatt's Report) that 'their contempt for the enemy made them easier victims of ambushes: still, the mails and convoys had to go forward, large escorts were not available, and had the escorts been actuated by more consideration for their personal safety, serious delay would very likely have occurred'.
8. Captain Chitty complained on 16.7.1900 (FOCP 7690/79) that 'telegrams from the Colonel about some men of the Uganda Rifles being cut up in Nandi ... went all round' Kampala, and were 'much improved on'. Banks (Letter, 20.8.1900) was told that nineteen Indians and twelve Sudanese soldiers escorting the mail that left Entebbe on 8.7.1900 were killed. Cf. the catalogue of alleged Nandi successes in RL, 18.6.1900.
9. Jackson disallowed Baker's claim for compensation because 'there is no record here (Entebbe) or at Ravine', and 'the whole matter is, to a great extent, wrapped in mystery'; (FO 2/462, 464). Despite the fact that the episode is well documented in the Entebbe and Ravine archives, Johnston complained to Baker on 29.10.1900 (ESA A/20) that he had only heard 'indirectly of serious trouble and the loss of forty-five police'.
10. When Stordy left in June to deal with a rinderpest outbreak in the E.A.P. the farm near the new capital was abandoned and the animals removed to Ravine.
11. The rifles had already been issued to Bagnall's police. The day before he arrived at Ravine, Henderson was told the sepoys were probably going to Ribo after the Nandi campaign.
12. Hobley commented (*From Chartered Company*, p. 110) that Odera's 'splendid response ... was but little appreciated by the headquarters staff, and the treatment accorded to him was very inconsiderate'.
13. For the vagueness of the information supplied by Bagge, who had served in Nandi for sixteen months, see *NRBR* i, pp. 227, 246-247, 358. For the attempt to seize the Laibon in 1897, see *NRBR* i, pp. 244-247, 262-264, 268-269. Proposals to capture Kipchomber in Lumbwa and Koitalel in Nandi were

put forward respectively in 1904 and 1905 by H.B. Partington and Major Gorges, and by Major L.H. Pope-Hennessy and Captain R. Meinertzhagen. Cf. Hall's statement on 22.8.1898 (FO 2/165) that, since Lenana did not accompany Masai raiding expeditions, 'it would not interfere with the expedition if he were detained'.

14. 800 loads of grain, oats, bran and rock salt were required for the mules every month. Three of the four Cape conductors, 'the backbone of convoy work', resigned when their rations were withdrawn, and the artisans threatened to leave when their wages were reduced. So that he could meet his monthly requirement of 1,200 loads with a mule force depleted by horse-sickness and inadequate rations, Johnston disobeyed an order to send twenty mules to Entebbe (ESA A/4/29, 30, A/5/10; RL, 9.5.1900).
15. Lieutenant A.C. Cockburn, who arrived from Buganda on 20.7.1900, died eleven days later from a self-inflicted wound while delirious with blackwater fever; see *NRBR* ii, p. 130.
16. Johnson's staff totalled 226, including men at Ravine, Port Ugowe and on road works.
17. The sepoys fared better as the sheep and goats they ate were more difficult than cattle to drive long distances, and so were easier to capture.
18. Jackson did not take the opportunity of reporting on the Nandi campaign, and the few official despatches dealt only with routine matters. Items lost in the mail which left Entebbe on 8.7.1900, included the much overdue accounts for 1897-1898; B. Whitehouse's Lake survey report; Leet's criticisms of the conduct of affairs in Nandi; the annual indent for the C.M.S. Mengo Hospital; L. Decle's reports to the *Daily Telegraph*; and indents for machinery and stores which P.W. Dowse hoped to fetch from railhead with carts from his Busoga coffee plantation.
19. See *NRBR* ii, pp. 92, 95. Johnston heard of the mail disaster towards the end of August when he returned to Fort Portal after visiting Ruwenzori and Ankole. The inconvenience caused to correspondents, who were advised to send duplicates of missing items, also brought the seriousness of the situation to the notice of every section of the European community; (Cook's Letter, 23.8.1900).
20. Evatt asserted (HD, 26.9.1900) that the Lumbwa helped the Nandi; see *NRBR* ii, pp. 113-114.
21. Captain Martin Decaen, who 'raved like a lunatic when he heard he could not go on' (FO 2/381). Rejecting his claim for compensation on 10.12.1900 (ESA A/32/9), Johnston complained that he had 'inconvenienced the officers at Nandi anyway'.
22. When he heard of the projected expedition, Rumbold had sent a runner to Kampala suggesting that XV Company should take part. Other considerations aside, Evatt presumably thought it unwise to withdraw troops from Luba's and Iganga owing to the recall of the Bukedi expedition and unsettled conditions in Busoga (RL, 18.6.1900).
23. Selected 26.2.1900, but did not leave Bombay until 13.6.1900, although the Foreign Office asked on 3.3.1900 for him 'to proceed at once' (FO 2/423, 428).
24. The Uganda Rifles had been re-armed with Martini-Henry .450 rifles; as an economy measure, Sniders and Remingtons were retained for the police and as reserves. Henderson thought the rifles at Ravine were dangerous.
25. Proceeding on leave from Kipture where he was relieved on 10.7.1900 by Q.M.S. Ramsay, who could not begin work as Superintendent of the Maintenance of Roads and Bridges because of the rising. Henderson had great difficulty persuading his porters to enter Nandi.
26. Salisbury's instructions to Hardinge on 15.2.1899 (FOCP 7400/144) that punitive expeditions and a forward policy on the northern frontier should be shelved, 'until there is less pressure in other parts of the Empire', meant there were few opportunities for the Contingent to distinguish itself. Sporadic incidents (Kamba raids on the Galla and railway, Kikuyu dacoity in the escarpment area, and a Somali riot in Nairobi) during the first half of 1900 were all dealt with by African companies of the East Africa Rifles.
27. Cf. RL, 15.8.1900, that the E.A.R. would be called in on Ternan's return. Prestige considerations apart, the two protectorates were engaged in an acrimonious debate over debts raised by the E.A.P. to cover its expenditure on the Uganda Relief Operations in 1897-1898 (FOCP 7689/51/83, 7823/54).

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- D. CEUR-URC, 9.7.1900, 29.3.1901, WP VII, VIII, COCP 614/8, FOCP 7732/67; Telegraphist J.T. Oulton, *Globe Trotter*, 6.3.1907.
- E. Wortham's letters, 23.7.1900, 30.7.1900, FO 2/381.
- F. Baker-Bagnall, 3.7.1900, Baker-Com, 21.7.1900, ESA A/4/30; Baker-Com, 17.8.1901, ESA A/20; RSD; Johnston-FO, 15.3.1901, FOCP 7823/63; Elgeyo Political Record Book, KNA, presumably from African sources, (K.R. Dundas was told in 1909 that Marakwet sections were not implicated); P.H. Powell-Cotton, *In Unknown Africa*, pp. 114-115; Moyses-Bartlett, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-92; there are many divergences in the various accounts.
- G. Bagnall-Evatt, 7.7.1900, Bagnall-Com, 7.7.1900, ESA A/4/30; RSD. Evatt-Com, 13.7.1900, ESA A/18/1. HD, 10, 13.7.1900.
- H. Evatt's Report. Evatt-Com, 9.7.1900, ESA A/27/17.
- I. Caine-Com, 10.7.1900 (also stating that 1,000 yards of wire had been stolen near Jinja), ESA A/6/8; Jackson-Evatt, 11.7.1900 ('please do all you can'), ESA A/5/10; Knowles-Com, 15.7.1900, ESA A/18/1.
- J. Cunningham-Evatt, 6.7.1900, ESA A/5/10. Sir Donald Stewart-FO, 15.2.1905, FO 2/915; Sadler-CO, 21.3.1906 (Appendix P), CO 533/12; R. Meinertzhagen, *Kenya Diary*, p. 227. Evatt-Com, 15.7.1900, ESA A/18/1.
- K. HD, 2.7.1900; PUD; RSD; Evatt-Com, 15.7.1900, ESA A/18/1.
- L. Brown-Com, 23.7.1900, ESA A/4/30; PUD; Cook's letter, 23.8.1900. Johnson-Com, 1.4.1900, 11, 27.7.1900, ESA A/4/30.
- M. PUD. Caine-Com, 28.7.1900, CEUR-Com, 22.7.1900, ESA A/6/8; CEUR-URC, 7.8.1900, FOCP 7545/124.
- N. Evatt's Report; Evatt-Com, 15.7.1900, ESA A/18/1. Coles-Com, 16.8.1901, Jackson-FO, 20.8.1901, FO 2/463. Hobley-Com, 24.8.1900, ESA A/18/1.
- O. Knowles-Com, 21.7.1900, ESA A/4/30; PUD; Evatt's Report; Evatt-Com, 8, 13.8.1900, Hobley-Com, 9, 24.8.1900, ESA A/18/1; Hobley, *From Chartered Company*, p. 110; Leet-FO, 11.11.1900, saying the escort should have been at company strength, FO 2/303; Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 333. FO-Hardinge, 15.6.1900, FOCP 7405/110; Audit Dept.-FO, 13.11.1900, notifying receipt of the duplicate accounts, FO 2/383; B. Whitehouse-CEUR, 7.7.1900, 23.8.1900, COCP 614/7, CO 537/66; Leet-FO, 7.7.1900, (duplicate dated 11.11.1900 received on 5.2.1901), FO 2/303; Cook's letters, 23.8.1900, 14, 30.9.1900; Declé-FO, 16.1.1901, FO 2/513; Banks' letter, 20.8.1900. Wortham's letter, 15.8.1900, FO 2/381.
- P. Wortham's letters, 23, 30.7.1900, FO 2/381; CEUR-URC, 9.7.1900, 29.3.1901, WP VII, VIII, COCP 614/8.
- Q. Wortham's letter, 30.7.1900, FO 2/381. RL, 19.9.1900, suggests that Wortham also built a stone wall.
- R. PUD. CEUR-URC, 7.8.1900, September 1900, FOCP 7545/124, WP VII. RSD; Bagnall-Com, 21.7.1900, ESA A/4/30.
- S. Evatt-Com, 18, 25.7.1900, Jackson-Evatt, 23, 25.7.1900, ESA A/18/1.
- T. RSD; HD, 11 to 22.7.1900; Bagnall-Evatt, 13.7.1900, Evatt-Bagnall, 16.7.1900, ESA A/27/17.
- U. Evatt-Com, 15.7.1900, ESA A/18/1. OC E.A.P. Contingent-Com, 16.7.1900, ESA A/6/8, with Jackson's minute which was either not acted upon until 15.9.1900 (ESA A/32/9), or wrongly dated.
- V. Hobley-Com, 24.8.1900, ESA A/18/1.

CHAPTER 9

The escape of the Laibon and failure of the Regulars

The attacks launched in widely separated parts of the country by several different *pororosiek* during the past three months suggested that disaffection had become general throughout Nandi. In some respects the situation was comparable to that created by Peter West's murder in 1895, and the raids which followed this first clash between the Nandi and the government. However, there was no evidence in the expedition of that year that resistance was directed by a central authority. The attacks on Cunningham's and Sitwell's columns were not organized by a tribal commander as part of a general plan, but initiated by *pororosiek* leaders whenever circumstances seemed favourable. Despite Jackson's discovery in 1897 that the Laibon had sponsored a conspiracy embracing the whole of the Nandi and some of their Kalenjins, opposition to Ternan's forces in the ensuing expedition was unco-ordinated, and their withdrawal had not induced the Laibon to proceed with his plan to expel the British. *Pororosiek* which were actively hostile in 1899 and early 1900 were not supported by their neighbours, and on two occasions auxiliaries had offered to help punish the offending sections.¹

The series of incidents beginning with the raid on Kitoto's in May 1900 were spread over a wider area than in previous outbreaks, and seemed to justify Hobley's suspicions that the whole tribe was bent on challenging the government's authority. The timing of this concerted upsurge of tribal feeling may have been affected by the aspirations of the first subset of the Kimnyigei, who were hoping to succeed, where the Kipkoimet and Kabelach had failed, in ridding the country of the intruders. Initiation of the Kimnyigei began in 1895, when the Laibon was regaining some of the prestige his office had forfeited as a result of the disasters that had preceded and followed Kimnyole's murder in 1890.² The initiates felt less strongly than their elders about the dispute over the wisdom of Kimnyole's punishment, and were more ready to ally themselves with elements in the tribe who condemned its execution. Sections which had taken no part in Kimnyole's downfall attributed the natural calamities and tribal confusion that followed his murder to the curse imposed upon the tribe for flouting a Laibon's commands. Added weight was given to this assessment by the disaster which had befallen the Lumbwa at the battle of Mogori³ in 1890 as a result of their rejection of the Laibon's advice.⁴ The representations of the pro-Laibon faction were also strengthened by the profitable raids which the Kamelilo, Kaptalam, Kapsile and Kapchepkendi had undertaken from 1895 onwards under the Laibon's patronage. Since several of these ventures had been carried out without loss and most had gone unpunished, this had confirmed the participants' faith in the efficacy of the Laibon's powers. Furthermore, Kimnyole's prophecies concerning the advent of a foreign power and the building of a railway were being fulfilled. The 'iron serpent' was approaching from the Rift Valley, and it was becoming plain that the white strangers from the east were not merely raiders, but intended to remain permanently in the country as rulers.

For some time after Kipture was established in 1896, the Collector had never been in a position to interfere with the warriors' freedom to raid other tribes; but by 1900 the Nandi began to sense that the government intended to challenge the continued exercise of this freedom. If a curb were to be put on raiding, then life would never be the same again for the Nandi. As a result of these factors there had been a gradual strengthening of the Laibon's influence. His authority was recognized by many of the waverers, who came to acknowledge that only under his leadership could the Nandi regain their independence, and return to the 'golden age' which had been brought to a close by Kimnyole's death. By 1900 even the humiliations which Kimnyole's murderers, the Kakipoch, Kaptumois,⁴ Koilegei, Kapsiondu and their associates, considered they had suffered at his hands were forgotten, and once again the Laibon's writ ran throughout the tribal area.

Towards the end of 1899 an event occurred, within the Laibon family itself, which greatly strengthened the authority of one of Kimnyole's sons. When he informed them of his impending death, Kimnyole had ordered his sons to renounce their claims to his office. Kipchomber, the eldest son, was unwilling to assume his father's position after the murder, but his brother, Koitalel, had not shown the same dutiful regard for his father's orders.

When asked for advice about the opening-up of the Uganda Road, Kipchomber counselled caution and vigilance, whereas Koitalel had rallied behind him those who saw in the new challenge an opportunity for the Nandi to escape from the disunity and indecision caused by the controversy over Kimnyole's death. The two parties held their ground through a period of tension, during which minor skirmishes⁵ occasionally occurred between *pororosiek* with conflicting attitudes towards the Laibon's growing pretensions to political power. Members of the faction which had long been uneasy about these pretensions were also fearful of being punished for their part in Kimnyole's death. They were accordingly opposed to either of the sons gaining the same influence over the warriors which Kimnyole had enjoyed. The other faction consisted of those who not only deplored Kimnyole's murder, but also felt that tribal solidarity could only be restored by military successes achieved under the protection of one of his sons. Koitalel finally seized the initiative in 1895 by sanctioning the sacking of Peter West's camp and attacks on the Uganda Road caravans. Although these operations only benefitted Koitalel's supporters, they made both factions equally liable to suffer the consequences of his aggressive policy. The malaise⁶ resulting from these dissensions possibly explains why there was no immediate response when the British first crossed the northern grazing grounds, why early attempts to oppose the intruders were sporadic and localized, and why some of the sections volunteered to help punish the Kamelilo.

In 1899 Kipchomber became increasingly disturbed about the trouble that would be brought on the tribe by continued hostilities against the government. When his warnings about the consequences of the warriors' belligerence were ignored, he removed himself to Lumbwa where he quickly became recognized as Chief Laibon.⁷ Although nothing was heard of his activities in 1900, his cautious attitude may have helped restrain the Lumbwa from taking a more active part in their kinsmen's struggle. His departure left the more circumspect sections of the Nandi without a leader, and enabled Koitalel to attract to his person and office the undivided loyalty of the tribe.⁸ Thus, by 1900, Koitalel was in a stronger position than any Laibon since his father's death a decade before.^B

Neither the Arab traders nor the early European travellers and officials had learned anything about the Laibon, whose existence was first brought to notice in October 1895 by a Swahili porter, who gave a misleading account of his position in Nandi society.⁹ Following his reported flight to Lumbwa during the expedition of that year, information concerning his whereabouts and activities was sparse until the combination he had allegedly instigated was discovered by Jackson in 1897. From the time he took refuge in Lumbwa after eluding Ternan's forces in the Mitete Valley, so little was heard of the Laibon that Bagge was not even sure where the 'certain old medicine-man' could be found.¹⁰ It was not until Hobley began his enquiries during the 1900 expedition that any trustworthy intelligence was obtained about Kimnyole's family, and its connection with the Nandi outbreak. Hobley recorded that the three Chief Laibons¹¹ had 'carefully kept aloof from any relations with the Administration and in fact, as far as I know, the Civil officers at Nandi have never quite realized the scope of their influence'. As a result of these investigations, Hobley was convinced that the most effective way of forestalling a 'concerted attack' was for Evatt to seize the initiative by capturing the Laibon.^C

At Fort Portal Johnston was told, apparently for the first time, of the Laibon's existence, and had recommended that an attempt should be made to catch him. With this object in mind, Evatt joined forces at Camp Ishirini na Moja (Kaptumo) with Parkin's troops from Kipture on 21 July. Shortly after midnight the two columns proceeded by different routes towards Kibeles' house at Kapsimotwa, where large herds of cattle were said to be concentrated. The sepoys moved too slowly over the difficult, hilly ground to achieve the surprise which had been planned, and dawn broke an hour and a half before the column reached its destination. When the alarm was raised the Nandi decamped with their cattle, and Evatt was unable to follow in pursuit because the baggage train was far behind. Kibeles fled to Lumbwa, and patrols sent out to reconnoitre next day confirmed that large mobs of livestock had been driven down the escarpment in the same direction. When Hobley accompanied a patrol to Koitalel's house,¹² he discovered Peter West's diary, note-book and correspondence, and trophies looted from caravans on the old Uganda Road. The failure to surprise and capture the Laibon was caused, as in 1897, by faulty intelligence, which had led Evatt to miscalculate the time needed to reach the objective before dawn. Both failures were attributed by the Nandi to the Laibon's superior prescience, and further strengthened their

confidence in his ability to outwit the enemy. The only relieving feature of the operation was the capture by Parkin's African troops of 600 goats, which enabled the porters to be issued with meat for the first time since their departure from Port Ugowe on 5 July. This proved a mixed blessing, however, for the consumption of large quantities of goat's flesh caused an outbreak of severe diarrhoea, which incapacitated nearly a hundred porters.^D

Evatt marched his dispirited troops into Kipture on 26 July, where Hobley interviewed Latongwa and other friendly chiefs, and 'warned them against the consequences of attempting to maintain an alliance with both the Administration and the rebels'. He repeated Galt's assurances to the Kipture sections of immunity from harm at the hands of the government and their rebellious compatriots, provided they remained loyal. Hobley then parted company with Evatt in order to take a mail detachment by a new route via Mount Teito to Kitoto's. His efforts to organize a food convoy at Kitoto's were abandoned when an attack of dysentery necessitated his return to Port Ugowe for treatment. While convalescing and awaiting news of the expedition's movements, he despatched seventy-five Kavirondo porters to take on food loads from Kitoto's to Fort Ternan, and interviewed the handful of prisoners who had been sent from the field force with a few captured animals. Supplies of arms, ammunition and Indian rations also arrived at Port Ugowe from Mumias, but Hobley was unable to forward them because he was ignorant of Evatt's whereabouts.^E

While dealing with the mail at Kipture, Evatt received news on the twenty-seventh that Fort Ternan was closely besieged and running short of supplies. Parkin was sent with sixty rifles to fetch food from Kitoto's for the beleaguered garrison, and Evatt also proposed sending additional supplies by XV Company, which was expected to leave Port Ugowe early in August. After nearly a month's campaigning, during which the sepoys and Baganda had failed to achieve the strategic target of capturing a significant number of cattle, Evatt decided to call in more auxiliaries. His deference to the opinions of his administrative colleagues implied that he had at last been brought to acknowledge that victory could not be secured, at any rate as speedily as he had hoped, by Indian¹³ and African troops, Baganda gunmen and a few Uasin Gishu spearmen. After delivering food loads at Fort Ternan, XV Company was to collect Purko Masai from Ravine, so that levies and escorting riflemen could take part in a major offensive against the Kamelilo in the middle of August. In the meantime the sepoys and Baganda auxiliaries were to return to the Bushiri base for raiding operations in its neighbourhood.^F

Evatt's column did not get off from Kipture until 10 a.m. on 28 July, as 100 of its porters refused to start and bolted into the bush. Some of their discarded loads had to be left behind, the remainder being carried by Johnson's donkeys which slowed down the column's progress. The march to Bushiri did nothing to restore the morale of the sepoys, after their failure to capture the Laibon, or the Baganda, whose proceeds from the expedition's loot had not come up to expectations. Some 'blazing off' at 'shadowy figures' in the bush, which Evatt admitted caused fewer than twenty casualties, the firing of houses and granaries, and the capture of twenty cattle and 1,000 small stock were small recompense for the discomfort caused by storms, Scotch mists, and wet camp sites in which all felt 'very damp, and dirty and miserable'. By the time the column reached its destination on the thirty-first, Evatt was proposing to transfer his base to Kipture, and send Hornby's sepoys to fetch the Masai from Ravine.^G

There was no news at Bushiri of XV Company's departure from Port Ugowe, but Evatt learned that Bagnall had left Ravine in order to relieve Fort Ternan. The reason for this action, which meant that Parkin's mission had been forestalled, was unknown, and the Commandant, who considered the country to be under military law, was 'very sick' about an administrative officer's decision to act on his own initiative. He was also perturbed by the presumption that the despatch of the relief column must have seemed more important to Bagnall, who was known to be anxious about the loyalty of the Kamasia and the possibility of the Nandi attacking the station, than keeping his small police detachment at Ravine at full strength. A heliograph message on 1 August that Parkin had been delayed at Kitoto's gave Evatt the opportunity to find out for himself the full extent of Wortham's plight at Fort Ternan, and the reason for Bagnall's 'impertinent' meddling. After joining Parkin at Kitoto's, Evatt, who was ignorant of the disaster to the mail escort a fortnight before, reported all he knew of the situation at Fort Ternan, and advised Entebbe of his decision to keep the road from Mau closed to all but specially escorted convoys. He claimed that most of the houses on

the escarpment west of Kamelilo had been destroyed, and notified his intention of launching an offensive against the Kamelilo, who seemingly owned the bulk of the Nandi cattle and provided most of the fighting men. This intention could not, however, be carried out until a column had escorted passengers, urgently needed rations and stores, and the Masai from Ravine.^H In the meantime Hornby, with a mainly Indian force of 130 rifles, was to operate against the escarpment sections, and the Baganda gunmen were to be sent back to Port Ugowe.^{I4} Evatt, who evidently thought the latter would not be needed when the Masai arrived, considered they were 'full of complaints and of little use', while his medical officer had found that they 'suffered from bronchitis, diarrhoea^{I5} and home-sickness' and 'soon gave in'.^I

Meanwhile Wortham's plight was becoming desperate. Grain supplies and the expedition's meat reserves were running out, and he was uncertain whether any of his messengers had got through to Evatt or Kipture. The station was being watched by Nandi warriors, who used some of the rifles they had captured to harass the garrison. In order to ease the food situation, Cowham and the French explorer left on 31 July for Molo, where they hoped to get supplies. On the way the box, which had been taken on the seventh from the murdered porter near Mt. Blackett, was found prised open with spears and emptied of its contents. After digging up boxes of machinery fittings and the cable, which he left with other loads at Fort Ternan on his way back, Cowham pushed on to Port Ugowe, where he arrived on 8 August with news of the loss of the replacement parts for the *William Mackinnon's* engines,^{I6} and the annihilation of the mail caravan on 19 July. Cowham was accompanied from Fort Ternan by Sapper Oulton, who had been prevented by the unsettled state of the country from carrying out repairs to the telegraph serving the fort.^J

Bagnall responded promptly to Wortham's appeal for help, which was delivered at Ravine on 25 July by a detachment of thirty-nine police recruits.^{I7} The following day seventeen men from XIV Company also managed to evade the Nandi pickets and, after narrowly avoiding being ambushed in the forest, completed the journey to Ravine in twenty-four hours. Bagnall, Lieutenant A.J. Whittle,^{I8} fifty Sudanese police, and the seventeen soldiers from Wortham's company left Ravine on the twenty-seventh with 100 loads of food, which were carried by fifty mules requisitioned from Lewis's road building gang. The heavily-laden caravan found it hard going over the new road to the capital, which had become a quagmire in the heavy rains, and did not arrive at Fort Ternan until the thirty-first. Twenty-six of Bagnall's police were handed over to Wortham, who was also expecting ten more men from Oulton's telegraph repair party. The Nandi, who were unpractised in this form of warfare, were evidently becoming less vigilant in their investment of the fort. Not only had Wortham's two parties got through to Ravine, but messages had at last reached Evatt and Kipture, and 150 goats had been captured close to the station perimeter. During Bagnall's stay at Fort Ternan, he suspected that the Kamelilo had taken most of their cattle to hiding-places in the Mt. Tindiret forests, and crossed the remainder over into Lumbwa by the numerous well-worn tracks that could be seen on both sides of the Nyando. He was told that Arap Tumbo was the only Lumbwa chief who was not openly hostile, but he warned Wortham to be on his guard because Arap Tumbo was probably only pretending to be friendly so that he could gain access to the fort for purposes of spying.^K

Bagnall hurriedly left on 1 August to return to Ravine, where a large war party had been seen proceeding in the direction of Molo, and several smaller bands were reported to be operating in the vicinity of the station. He was relieved to find that Kamasia had not joined the rising, and gratified that eighty Uasin Gishu Masai had volunteered for service with the field force. By enlisting twenty Sudanese settlers into the station police, he was able to send the men they replaced to strengthen Baker's garrison. With these reinforcements and the food and cattle which had been drawn from Ravine, Bagnall thought Baker could hold Ribo providing he refrained from engaging in offensive operations. Jackson agreed that the post should continue to function on these conditions, but stipulated that Baker should withdraw to Njemps if Ribo could not be held without calling on troops from the Nandi expedition. As it had been reported that Nandi cattle were being secreted in the Kamasia forests, Uasin Gishu were sent out to locate them. Bagnall intended to go out himself to seize the cattle discovered by the Uasin Gishu, but the search apparently proved fruitless. He was also experiencing difficulties over feeding the garrison and caravans awaiting escorts to Kipture. Food was no longer obtainable from his normal source at Kipture, so help had to be sought from Naivasha

to replenish the station stores and furnish supplies for distribution to Ribo and Fort Ternan.¹⁹ E.A.P. officials organized caravans to take extra food to Naivasha to meet Bagnall's demands, but deliveries from Kikuyu had to be suspended when smallpox broke out among the porters and spread along the road to Ravine.^L

Evatt passed the scene of the mail party disaster on his way to Fort Ternan, where he arrived on 6 August to bring Wortham news of the massacre which had taken place only five miles west of his station. Several parties were sent out to patrol the country around Fort Ternan, but only small quantities of stock and grain were captured and a number of houses destroyed. Parkin and Wortham went further afield with seventy men on a sweep lasting three days, but only succeeded in burning houses and granaries. The Nandi had taken to the hills and forests, from which Parkin thought it too risky to attempt to dislodge them.^M These measures were merely intended to harry the enemy while Evatt waited for more troops to arrive from Uganda. As the Uganda Rifles had no central reserve, reinforcements could only be provided by depleting the strength of detachments in other districts. XV Company was already on its way to Port Ugowe from Luba's, and Evatt recommended that additional troops should be brought up by transferring V Company from Fajao to Masindi, so that IV Company could join the expedition before proceeding to the coast for discharge. The commandant intended using some of these extra men to garrison Port Ugowe, so that the Indians who had been left there at the start of the expedition could be released for field service. In order to ease the burden on the expedition's medical staff, Dr A.D. Milne, who was awaiting an escort to take him to Kampala, was appointed to Parkin's column. On 10 August, Captain W.E. Rumbold marched into Port Ugowe with XV Company, and four days later joined the field force at Fort Ternan with 164 porters from the Kisumu Luo. The concentration of troops at Fort Ternan made heavy demands on its food supplies, so forty-seven of the 150 Sudanese women²⁰ living at the station were sent to Port Ugowe, and thirty unfit porters were taken to Kipture for treatment. Evatt left for Ravine on the sixteenth with an escort of sixty rifles to bring up the Masai auxiliaries, and a party of Kamasia who had volunteered for service in a similar capacity. While he was away the station was kept under continual observation by warriors on the surrounding hills. An attack was made against Arap Sertu, whose warriors showered Rumbold's camp with poisoned arrows, but otherwise the troops at Fort Ternan contributed little to the progress of the campaign.^N

The troops which Evatt had left with Hornby at Bushiri for operations against the escarpment sections also accomplished little, and were more often being harried themselves than harrying the Nandi. Two of the four officers and many of the rank and file were too sick to leave camp; the track was lost in a storm during a night march that came to naught; and, when an encircling movement was detected by hilltop scouts, the troops were reduced in desperation to burning down houses 'to show our independence'. One discovery was however made which subsequently enabled Evatt to score one of the few major successes of the campaign. The discovery was made on the fourth when a soldier in a party investigating the sound of sheep bleating among the rocks was wounded by an arrow. A second party went out in support and found that arrows were being fired at their comrades from inside a cave.²¹ An inspection showed that a barricade of sticks and stones, which was loopholed for the convenience of the defending bowmen, protected the entrance, so it was decided to burn or smoke the occupants out. Poles and thatch, which had been collected for rebuilding houses that had been destroyed during the first week of the campaign, were set fire to, but the enterprise had to be abandoned after an hour because flights of arrows made it too dangerous to place the burning material close to holes in the sides and roof of the cave. Protected by a make-shift screen of three Uasin Gishu shields fastened to a pole, Hornby, Henderson and Havildar Kalandar Khan advanced, revolvers in hand, towards the entrance, but were forced to retire when Henderson and the Havildar were hit by arrows discharged from flanking loopholes. Hornby decided it was pointless to make another effort to take the cave, and also to risk his force in further operations against the 'plucky and clever' escarpment dwellers, whose 'country is all in their favour'.^O

Thinking the reason so few cattle had been seen was that they had been driven down to the plains as soon as warning was given of the soldiers' approach, Hornby set out for the escarpment at 5.30 a.m. on the fifth. During the first part of the march the troops ran the gauntlet of jeers, horn-blowing, arrows and stones. When they reached a stretch of the narrow path so precipitous that the porters had to crawl on their hands and knees, they were

ambushed by archers and bombarded with boulders rolled down upon them from the escarpment edge.²² Things looked ugly for a time when the Nandi got between the main party and the rearguard, but the situation was saved by the steadiness of the sepoys under Henderson's command, several of whom were hit by arrows and splintered rocks. The troops re-formed on the plains, which they scoured for hours without seeing any cattle,²³ and then climbed back up the escarpment to arrive at Bushiri at dusk. Hornby felt he had done all he could in the circumstances, and took advantage of the arrival of mails and travellers from Port Ugowo to take the few animals he had captured to Kipture, where soldiers and porters could be given a well-earned rest.^P

There was no rest for Henderson and some of the sepoys, who were sent to Ravine on the eighth with mails, passengers, and a cart convoy to bring back Indian rations in readiness for the Kamelilo offensive. During Henderson's absence, Hornby learned from Uasin Gishu settlers that a mob of cattle was being concealed in Arakiblagat's territory to the west and south-west of Kipture.²⁴ After a fruitless visit on the tenth, 119 cattle were seized in a night attack in the same area four days later. This was the biggest haul so far made by sepoys or a raiding party commanded by an officer of the Indian Contingent. Before the column reached its destination, the station interpreter²⁵ explained to Hornby that the troops were marching through friendly country. His representations were brushed aside by Hornby, who preferred to listen to the Uasin Gishu, probably because a soldier had been killed and another wounded on the march.

When the captured cattle arrived at Kipture they were claimed by Latongwa's family and other Koilegei, who had presumably driven them away from the neighbourhood of the station as a precautionary measure. Latongwa complained about the government's failure to honour the Collector's and Sub-commissioner's pledges, and asked for the animals to be restored to their owners. The request was rejected by Hornby on the grounds that his action in driving the cattle away from their usual grazing grounds exhibited a lack of confidence in the good faith of the government. He also pointed out that the two casualties suffered by the raiding column proved that, even if Arakiblagat was friendly, his people were not. Protesting that he had been misled about the column's destination, and criticizing Hornby's reliance on the Uasin Gishu, 'who, as we know, are not particular whose cattle they capture, and should surely not be allowed to judge what natives are friendly or otherwise to the government', Galt contended that friendly Nandi would no longer trust the Collector's word unless restitution was made. He added that the sections concerned had paid their hut tax, and he had no reason to suspect they had broken their pledges of loyalty. Hobley supported Galt and expressed concern lest the action taken by Hornby, who 'is not distinguished by the wisdom of his actions in regard to matters relating to native affairs', should jeopardize the friendly relations which the administration had tried to foster with sections near the station. The Sub-commissioner urged that Latongwa's goodwill, which had been of considerable value in the past,²⁶ should be retained at all costs, especially as his co-operative attitude was likely to have damaged him in the eyes of other Nandi.

Hobley proposed to investigate the incident when he visited Kipture, and asked for permission to return the cattle if Galt's version proved correct. Providing the Kipture sections remained loyal until the end of the campaign, Hobley also suggested that their steadfastness should be rewarded by some of the animals captured from their hostile kinsmen. After considering the reports from the civil and military officers, Jackson concluded that Hornby 'was perfectly justified in seizing the cattle under the circumstances', and ordered Galt to apologize for his disparaging remarks. While giving the Koilegei leader full credit for his many friendly acts, and for keeping his people loyal in the face of 'the opposition and undoubtedly strong influence of the Laibons', Jackson considered Latongwa's action 'an extremely foolish one and verging on an unfriendly act'. Though payment of hut tax could not be held to exempt people from punishment for offences they committed after the tax had been paid, Jackson conceded that it might be politic for the forfeited cattle to be returned at a later date as an act of grace,²⁷ provided Latongwa survived this 'severe test of his loyalty' and 'kept his people in hand until the end of the operations.' The accusations that were exchanged during the discussions on this incident were typical of the strained relations between civil and military officers, which were to deteriorate still further as the campaign proceeded.²⁸

Evatt returned to Fort Ternan on 23 August with about 300 Masai and Kamasia

auxiliaries.²⁹ The employment of the Kamasia volunteers was a promising innovation, for this was the first time that members of another Kalenjin tribe had helped the government against the Nandi.³⁰ The Kamasia chiefs told Bagnall that many more warriors were prepared to fight and the Njemps sent emissaries to Ravine to ask if they too could join the expedition.^R With the arrival of this much larger contingent of spearmen than Evatt had asked to be held in readiness in his original plan, the second phase of the expedition began.

In his review of results achieved in the opening stages of the campaign, Evatt admitted that the damage done to the Nandi had been slight. The strength and morale of their fighting men were unimpaired and their livestock losses insignificant.³¹ By marching and counter-marching Evatt had kept the enemy moving and constantly on the watch, and the destruction of houses and granaries had made it difficult for warriors and non-combatants to find food and shelter during the rainy season. Evatt did not think these deprivations on their own would force the Nandi to submit, though he anticipated they would help lower morale as the campaign was intensified. Meanwhile there were no signs that the operations had weakened the enemy's will to resist; on the contrary, Evatt was forced to admit that the whole tribe was in a state of rebellion, with the exception of the small minority of sections near Kipture, and even their attitude was doubtful. The same was probably true of the Lumbwa, who had afforded asylum to Nandi cattle and the Laibons, severed relations with Fort Ternan, and adopted a truculent attitude which suggested that they were preparing to play a more active part in their kinsmen's struggle.

Evatt acknowledged that his chief difficulty lay in bringing the Nandi to battle. They had shown themselves adept at avoiding major clashes with columns and patrols, and skilful at launching attacks, on ground of their own choosing, whenever circumstances offered spearmen and archers a chance of success against riflemen. The initial reverses had caused Evatt to adopt measures that greatly reduced the opportunities offered to the watchful Nandi for practising guerilla tactics: troops were concentrated at a few strong points; an embargo was placed on independent convoys; and discipline was tightened in order to prevent straggling and the detachment of inadequately protected parties. After the annihilation of the mail escort on 19 July, the only casualties among the field force were confined to a few soldiers on the line of march, intercepted messengers, and porters who disobeyed orders regarding looting, straggling and camp discipline. Away from the troop concentration areas, the Nandi scored only one success when they ambushed twenty head of captured cattle between Bushiri and Port Ugowe on 3 August. Although Evatt's tactics reduced government losses they had some less fortunate side-effects. The Nandi were given time to hide food supplies and livestock, and opportunities for removing the few remaining stretches of wire from the unpatrolled Nyando Valley. Transport and mail services were disrupted by the ban on convoys, and no escorts could be spared so that Caine and Oulton could replace the telegraph wire between Molo and Port Ugowe. Owing to the shortage of runners,³² the watchfulness of the Nandi outposts, and the embargo on small detachments, Evatt's communications with Parkin's troops and the district stations were often erratic. Finally, the sepoys had become discontented as a result of their confinement to posts where food was double the price they were accustomed to pay in Buganda.⁵

Hobley's appraisal³³ was similar to Evatt's but more informed and critical. Because the operations had been unsuccessful, the Nandi considered 'they have had entirely the best of it ... and their attitude is even more defiant than at the commencement of the expedition'. The failure to make any significant captures of livestock had strengthened their faith in the Laibon's medicine, which caused the troops 'to stop short of the cattle and turn back whenever they arrive in their vicinity'. Hobley's informants told him the Nandi were not perturbed by the destruction of their houses, which could be rebuilt in a few days, nor by the loss of their crops, which could be replaced by selling livestock to the Lumbwa.³⁴ Hobley was convinced the enemy would never sue for peace until a crushing blow had been delivered by the capture of at least 2,000 of their cattle, and that only an operation of this magnitude would force the warriors to give battle in defence of their stock. He accepted that the campaign would have to be continued for a long time before the Nandi could be manoeuvred into a vulnerable position, so that the superior might of the government could force them to 'acknowledge themselves beaten and crave for peace'. Hobley doubted if Evatt had enough troops to bring this about in view of the fact that a large part of the field force was tied down by garrison duties. He also noted that escorts of some strength would need to be

provided if mail and transport services were to function normally for the duration of a lengthy campaign.^T

Jackson was unable to add much to Evatt's and Hobley's surveys, since hardly any news of the field force's progress was received at Port Ugowe for transmission to Entebbe. Jackson approved Evatt's requests for troop reinforcements and undoubtedly welcomed the belated decision to summon the Masai auxiliaries. Commenting on Hornby's seizure of Latongwa's cattle, Jackson implied that Evatt's tactics were bound to cause the Nandi to 'live in such a state of anxiety and fear of a surprise visit that they become heartily sick of us and finally realize we are their masters'. Latongwa's action had shown 'how natives are given to take advantage of a place that has already been visited to hide their cattle etc., and also proves, what I have always maintained, how absolutely necessary it is to take plenty of time over an expedition'.³⁵ Jackson's final comment was that 'so long as they think they can dodge and double about with impunity, they imagine themselves more cunning and better men and, of course, it is put down to the Laibon and his *dawa* (medicine)'.^U

Owing to the breakdown of telegraph communications with Entebbe, news of the unpropitious beginning of the expedition reached Johnston in western Uganda slowly and in piecemeal fashion. It was consequently not until 31 August that Jackson forwarded the priorities which the Special Commissioner wished the Commandant to bear in mind. Evatt was urged to 'dominate the railway route' and reminded of the importance of mending and guarding the telegraph. He was given discretionary authority to abandon Kipture and other posts, and also to close the road from Ravine to Bushiri if controlling this route hampered military operations and placed the security of the railway route at risk. Johnston considered it so 'important that the Nandi trouble should be adequately settled' that he ordered Captain C.C. Barlow to be ready at a moment's notice to move his half-company at Fort Portal, and offered to send further reinforcements from quiet districts, such as Katwe, Ankole and Bunyoro, in order to bring the campaign to a speedy end. The Special Commissioner, who presumably did not know that the services of the Baganda contingent had been dispensed with, authorized Jackson to appeal to the Regents to send 500 picked men to serve as armed porters, scouts and escorts, if Evatt thought this desirable.³⁶ Six days later Jackson notified Evatt of Johnston's distress over the destruction of the mail party on 19 July, and his instructions for Barlow and fifty Sudanese to proceed at once to Entebbe, where they would be shipped by dhow to Port Ugowe to reinforce the field force and protect the mail route. Thus, by arranging for Sudanese to help the sepoys in their contest with 'naked bandits', Johnston was obliged to reconsider the views he had re-stated to the Foreign Office, only a month before, that the Indian Contingent³⁷ was sufficient to guarantee the maintenance of the Protectorate.^V

Several rumours about the progress of Evatt's operations reached Hardinge and the Foreign Office, but very little official news. A railway report that parts for the *William Mackinnon* were being delayed because the Mau-Port Ugowe road was unusable owing to hostile tribes, prompted Hill to enquire whether the situation was serious enough to warrant postponing his visit to Uganda. Hardinge replied that there was no reason for the visit to be postponed, even though the road beyond Molo was unsafe for the moment without strong escorts. His information was that punitive expeditions were out and that the trouble was expected to be settled before Hill's arrival in October. But when Hardinge wired again on 24 August notifying the Foreign Office of the despatch of the Masai levies, he observed: 'from the few accounts which reach us here (sc. Nairobi) the disturbances between Mau and the Lake are somewhat serious'. These were the only official messages about the situation sent to the Foreign Office during this period. It was not, in fact, until 24 September, when Wortham's letters to his mother were seen at the Foreign Office, that news of the massacre of the mail party on 19 July³⁸ explained the non-arrival of despatches which should have reached England at the beginning of September.^W

The first phase of the operations left Hobley in no doubt that a lengthy campaign would be necessary before a settlement could be imposed upon the enemy. He nevertheless seized the opportunity, presented by Jackson's request for 'a short preliminary report on the real origin of the Nandi raid', to outline his views on the future administration of the Nandi and Lumbwa. The return of rifles and other stolen property as a first requirement of a peace treaty was in accordance with common practice, but he acknowledged that his other suggestions had of necessity to be 'of an exceptional nature'. He proposed that 1,000 spears

and 2,000 bows and sets of arrows should be confiscated,³⁹ and any Nandi found carrying arms without a pass treated as an enemy.⁴⁰ His fourth suggestion, that 'the clans clearly implicated in the recent outrages be forced to evacuate their present locations in the vicinity of the cart road',⁴¹ was likely to prove more difficult and costly to implement. The three areas he favoured for the reception of the evacuated sections were Lumbwa, the plains at the foot of the south escarpment, and the sparsely populated country north of Sclater's Road. In considering the merits and demerits of the first two locations, he thought that introducing Nandi into Lumbwa might retard the peaceful settlement of that country, and that their removal from 'the extreme fertility of the Nandi Plateau to the somewhat arid plains would prove a fatal bar to their successful development.'⁴² The only objection he could see to the country north of Sclater's Road⁴³ was that settlement there would entail considerable trouble and expense. He countered this objection by pointing out that trouble and expense were inescapable in devising any scheme for the efficient administration of the tribe. He concluded on a cautionary note that, unless the Nandi were 'actively controlled and administered', they 'will probably drop back into their old raiding habits and prove a perpetual terror to their more peaceful neighbours as of old' and, 'within the space of a year or two would again become a serious menace to the roads and any settlers'⁴⁴ that may have invested capital in the charming Nandi uplands'. By suggesting that several sections should be uprooted and removed to a location of the government's choosing, Holey signified his appreciation of the intractable nature of the 'Nandi question', which would need much more radical measures for its solution than those which had proved effective with the Baluyia and Luo.⁴⁵

Turning to the Lumbwa, Holey did not agree that kinship and sympathy with the Nandi, the refuge they had provided for their neighbours' stock, and rumours that some of the captured rifles had found their way across the Nyando River, amounted to sufficient evidence to convict the tribe of taking an active part in the rising. He recommended, therefore, that the expedition should concentrate in the first place on securing a lasting settlement in Nandi. Although he conceded that the attitude of the Lumbwa was defiant, and one of the chiefs had openly boasted that they were 'quite ready to fight the Europeans if necessary', this did not change his view that a satisfactory settlement could be arranged if a strong column was sent through Lumbwa as soon as the Nandi had been soundly beaten. After such a settlement had been made, Holey insisted that the district could only be effectively administered from a strongly garrisoned station in the centre of Lumbwa, and rejected the suggestion that control could be exercised from Fort Ternan, 'situated as it is some miles outside the frontiers of the country'. After Wortham lost touch with all the chiefs except Arap Tumbo, very little was known about the attitude of the Lumbwa and Sotik; but no trustworthy evidence could be produced that they had either participated in the recent raids against the Protectorate's communications, or were on the point of mobilising for joint action with the Nandi rebels. Holey's conclusion was that the Nandi, as they had shown their hand, had to be dealt with without dissipating the expedition's energies by adventures south of the River Nyando. After Evatt had shown that he had enough force to crush the Nandi, it should be possible to bring the Lumbwa under control before they could menace supply convoys and unarmed coolies, when the advance earthwork divisions, which were working between Nakuru and Molo in August, moved into the Nyando Valley.^X

In addition to Holey's long-term proposals, two less radical expedients for strengthening the government's control over the Nandi were being canvassed: the introduction of more Sudanese settlers, which was merely an extension of Johnston's dispersal scheme; and the formation of Uasin Gishu Masai colonies. Holey suggested that most of the Sudanese should be allocated to Fort Ternan, and that others should be sent to Bushiri, where he thought fifty or sixty families⁴⁶ 'would keep the Nandi off that road'. Evatt agreed that a colony at Bushiri would have a salutary effect, and recommended that a village with a ditch and thorn hedge should be constructed to house a garrison of thirty settlers armed with Remingtons. He also suggested similar settlements in Kamelilo, which was also in the vicinity of the railway route and equally in need of 'punitive police'. Holey promised to carry out the proposals as soon as possible, and planned to move Sudanese settlers from the mountainous regions of the Mau⁴⁷ to Fort Ternan and Bushiri, if they were discontented with their uncongenial surroundings or likely to become destitute.^Y

An increase in the number of Uasin Gishu settlers was a surprising suggestion, in view of the suspicions they had aroused that their conduct was motivated by a desire to

foment discord between the government and the people among whom they settled.⁴⁸ Although Uasin Gishu agents had of necessity been used in Kalenjin districts, where tribal informers could not be procured, Collectors regretted their dependence on information derived from this formerly powerful raiding tribe. Jackson, who had apparently forgotten the trouble they caused him at Ravine in 1896-1897,⁴⁹ asked Bagnall if he could arrange for Uasin Gishu from Baringo District to settle in Nandi. Bagnall responded by complaining that those settled near Ravine would not work, but preferred to 'steal, beg and live on the prostitution of their women'. He also pointed out that settling Uasin Gishu in Nandi would simply be 'replacing one set of idle cattle thieves with a worse', and suggested Kavirondo, who were 'more or less industrious', in their stead.⁵⁰ This unfavourable response apparently caused the scheme to be dropped.

Whatever the views expressed concerning the conduct of operations during the first phase of the expedition, the tactics to be employed after Evatt's forces had been strengthened, and the measures to be adopted for the future administration of the tribe, both civil and military officers were unanimous on one point. When the campaign was resumed, the Nandi were to be utterly crushed, and the field force retained in the district long enough to ensure that never again would they be tempted to threaten the Protectorate's authority and communications.

NOTES

1. See *NRBR* i, Ch. 4, pp. 107, 155, Ch. 11, pp. 268-269, 273, *NRBR* ii, pp. 24-25. For inter-*pororiet* co-operation in major raids and to meet the Masai threat, see *NRBR* i, pp. 22, 155.
2. See *NRBR* i, p. 31.
3. See *NRBR* i, p. 36. Nandi serving in the Lumbwa army were also killed. The Lumbwa had previously been defeated at the battle of Mao, when they fought the Masai against the advice of the Laibon.
4. Kakipoch, the founder *pororiet*, who considered themselves the guardians of tribal tradition, expelled the first Uasin Gishu laibons to settle in Nandi, and murdered a number of local laibons in the second half of the nineteenth century; see *NRBR* i, pp. 4, 28. For the prophecy of a Kaptumois, Mongo, foretelling the coming of the white men and the futility of resisting them, see *NRBR* i, p. 56; his competence as a prophet was derided by Koitalel, who assured his supporters that the Nandi would conquer the white men.
5. See *NRBR* i, p. 15. The *maotik* (see *NRBR* i, pp. 30-31) played a major part in prolonging the period of tension. Similar circumstances caused a traumatic upheaval in Masailand, where a civil war between Lenana and Sendeyu continued for more than a decade after the death of their father, Mbatian, in 1890; see *NRBR* i, p. 32.
6. The true state of affairs was not discovered by the British, who had taken advantage of similar divisions in other parts of East Africa.
7. Nandi, Lumbwa and other sources give conflicting accounts of the cause and date of his departure, some even placing it before or shortly after Kimnyole's death. The evidence suggests that Kipchomber shared his time between Nandi and Lumbwa for several years before 1899, and was consulted through *maotik* from both tribes irrespective of his place of residence.
8. Official accounts from 1900 onwards give Kibeles as the Chief Laibon, and only occasionally mention Koitalel; the opposite is the case in Kalenjin sources, see *NRBR* ii, p. 110. There is a precedent for the possibility that Koitalel and Kibeles were joint *Orkoik*, though the Nandi deny this. There is no doubt about their relative status by 1905, when the Nandi were demoralized by Koitalel's death and the realization that Kibeles, despite his efforts to rally them, was not an acceptable replacement.
9. See *NRBR* i, pp. 96, 111, 160. In August, Hobley corrected the impression that the Laibon was a chief or ruler. The *maotik* and their important role in Nandi society were seemingly not discovered until after the 1905 expedition; see A.C. Hollis, *The Nandi*, pp. 48-49, 86.
10. See *NRBR* i, pp. 95-96, 111, 160, 246-247, 319; *NRBR* ii, p. 82.
11. Kibeles, whose father was in fact Kimnyole's brother, Kipterer, was listed as Kimnyole's second son.
12. Presumably Kamngetung (close to the present-day Nandi Hills Township), near the place where Koitalel met his death in 1905.
13. For Hobley's views, see *NRBR* ii, p. 70; Bagnall said on 9.8.1900 (ESA A/20) that he would be 'surprised if they get much stock from Nandi as they are too slow for the job'.
14. They arrived at Port Ugowe on 3.8.1900; sixty-four left in canoes for Luba's on the sixth and 143

- travelled overland via Mumias. P.K. Bazonona, 'Kakungulu Omuzira wa Uganda', 1923, pp. 38-39, says Isaka Nziga's men returned with 300 cows and 2,000 goats, but this is not borne out by other evidence; (kindly supplied by Dr M. Twaddle).
15. Recognizing the deficiencies in the Baganda diet, Johnston asked Jackson on 18.4.1900 (ESA A/5/9) to press Apolo Kagawa to plant other crops besides 'sickly bananas'. Baganda were excluded from the 1917 Carrier Corps levy because of the high mortality rate among eaters of green food.
 16. Commissioning of the steamer was delayed as fresh drawings of the lost parts had to be sent to Kilindini. Cowham recommended that only caravans with an escort of at least sixty rifles should be routed through the Nyando Valley.
 17. Evatt could only surmise that these were the thirty men he had agreed with Hobley on 13.7.1900 to send to Ravine from Fort Ternan, 'at the first opportunity'; later when he learned that most of them had returned to Fort Ternan, he confessed he did not know how many men this left at Ravine.
 18. Aged 26; recently commissioned in the militia after five years as a planter, he arrived at Ravine on 25.7.1900. Bagnall based his claim to the Nandi Campaign Medal on this exploit (ESA A/27/17).
 19. Shooting for meat outside the four and a half-mile Game Reserve around the station was no longer possible because of Nandi marauders (HD, 13.7.1900).
 20. Probably including dependents of intercepted messengers and the nine soldiers killed on 9.7.1900.
 21. Most of the caves, which had been formed by huge boulders coming to rest after a volcanic eruption, are in places difficult of access. The entrances are screened from view by boulders and vegetation, and the caves escaped detection when Evatt marched through the area in July. Nandi sources say the first cave to be discovered was at Mogon, where an impetuous warrior fired an arrow from behind the barricade at a passing soldier.
 22. For a similar attack in November 1895, see *NRBR* i, p. 145.
 23. It was quicker and much safer to drive the cattle into the extensive forest close to the escarpment edge.
 24. Possibly Arap Lagat of the Kaptumois (*Eastern Uganda*, p. 58). The map of the expedition shows that the column marched through an area described as being under Arrakibiaga; this may be a typographical error. For the similar role played by the Uasin Gishu in Kamasia, see *NRBR* i, pp. 183, 225, 234, *NRBR* ii, pp. 33, 56.
 25. Galt says 'my Nandi interpreter'; if he was indeed a Nandi, and not an immigrant member of the station staff, this is the first record of a Nandi serving in this capacity.
 26. See *NRBR* i, pp. 241, 302, 315, 322-325, 352, *NRBR* ii, pp. 23, 49.
 27. Though by far the biggest haul of cattle made in the first phase of the campaign, it is not mentioned in official accounts; this suggests the cattle were eventually returned (see *NRBR* ii, pp. 111, 149).
 28. See *NRBR* ii, pp. 130, 140 and cf. *NRBR* i, p. 305. Hornby's attitude may have been influenced by the disappointing results of his operations against the escarpment sections.
 29. Sources vary about the number of auxiliaries; Bagnall says 200 Kamasia and fifty Uasin Gishu; Evatt, 300 Masai and Kamasia; Hardinge, 300 E.A.P. Masai; and Sandford, 400 Masai. Johnston's figure of 200 Kamasia and 600 Masai might be the total number employed throughout the expedition, as Evatt noted that owing to 'nostalgia' the Masai had to be sent home after a month's service.
 30. For the gradual improvement of relations with the Kamasia after the 1897 expedition and Johnston's intervention in November 1899, see *NRBR* i, pp. 268, 279, 307, 310, 314-315, 347, *NRBR* ii, pp. 22, 30, 32, 55, 56.
 31. After only five days with the field force, Henderson concluded on 1.8.1900 that little could be done to catch the Nandi warriors until several columns operating from different directions could be brought against them.
 32. A regular service was however maintained between Kipture and Ravine, some of the messages being carried by Nandi who were presumably members of Cooper's cadre of 'policemen-runners'.
 33. The report, which was compiled only three months after he became personally involved in Nandi affairs, gives a far fuller and more accurate account of Nandi history, organization and attitudes than anything produced by any of the Collectors who had been stationed at Kipture since 1896. Among his informants were 'prisoners, so-called friendlies, Lumbwa, Nyangori and Masai (sc. Uasin Gishu) settlers in Nandi'.
 34. Hornby found on 4.8.1900 that poles and thatch had already been cut to replace houses destroyed on 8 July. Food was also obtained from the Baluyia and Lumbwa in exchange for captured guns, though these were usually bartered for cattle (FOCP 7823/84).
 35. See *NRBR* i, pp. 232, 242, 321, 335.

36. Evatt did not reply to Jackson's direct question asking for his opinion, so the telegram may not have been delivered.
37. He also reaffirmed his conviction that, with the help of the millions of intelligent Baganda, 'we could ... maintain our hold over the remainder of the Protectorate'. For his views on the usefulness of Sudanese in the Eastern Province, see *NRBR* ii, p. 46.
38. Harding did not notify the Foreign Office that the fortnightly Uganda mail had not arrived at Mombasa at the end of July; when asked about this on 13.9.1900, his reply prompted the Foreign Office to question whether Johnston was 'personally cognisant of the disturbances' (FO 2/291). The only relevant Foreign Office instruction emanated from a railway report regarding escorts for telegraph repair parties (FO 3/296).
39. The figures are a marginal correction; the original has 500 in both cases. Hill advocated disarmament in Uganda in December 1898, but Salisbury thought the suggestion premature (FO 2/164). Lenana and the Kikuyu chiefs acquiesced in their people in the vicinity of Nairobi and the railway being disarmed in June 1900, 'as a first step towards total disarmament' (FO 2/290, FOCP 7545/96).
40. Bishop A.R. Tucker told Jackson that in 1898 (armed) Masai could be shot on sight in G.E.A. (FOCP 7954/59). It would have been out of character for Hobley to have suggested similar action against the Nandi; he presumably intended the offenders to be arrested and brought before the courts, the procedure followed by Ainsworth in May 1901 when Lenana asked for pass laws to be applied to certain Masai sections (FOCP 7823/185).
41. Ainsworth said on 20.3.1896 (FOCP 6849/144) that, in order to safeguard the Uganda Road, it might be necessary for the Masai to be 'punished, and either brought to submission or cleared out of the country'. Evacuation of areas near the cart road through Kipture and Bushiri would not have eliminated the risk of raids against railway installations in the Nyando Valley.
42. This proposal, which confirms Johnston's statement on 21.10.1900 (FOCP 7690/16) that the plains were 'uninhabited except within seventeen miles of the Victoria Nyanza', would have placed the Nandi astride the railway, and was apparently put forward because the area could be conveniently and cheaply controlled from Port Ugowe.
43. The location decided upon after the 1905 expedition.
44. Hobley presumably referred to the unoccupied Uasin Gishu Plateau and the country stretching eastwards towards the Mau. His concern for the 'successful development' of the tribe suggests that he would not have favoured European settlement of the evacuated areas, which would place a heavy burden on the Collector and hamper his efforts to persuade the Nandi to become reconciled to their lot. However, since no provision was made for re-occupation of the evacuated districts, the possibility that he foresaw their being settled by Europeans at a later date cannot be ruled out.
45. Neither had to surrender their weapons or be subject to a pass law. Only one of the smaller Baluyia sections, the Kikelelwa, had been required to move; see *NRBR* i, p. 124.
46. Settlements of this size could not be established until shipping could be spared to bring more settlers from Buganda; by the end of August only about 100 Sudanese had arrived at Port Ugowe.
47. Confusion was caused by conflicting instructions from Johnston and Jackson about locating settlers east of Kipture and Fort Ternan (ESA A/18/1). Hobley evidently did not know of Bagnall's failure to find a suitable site at Molo in June. Dugmore protested on 17.4.1901 (FOCP 7823/46) about putting Sudanese from the Nile District 'in "Colonies" like Mau where they were bound to die very quickly'.
48. See *NRBR* i, pp. 225, 235, 246, *NRBR* ii, p. 93. Cf. Hobley's statement on 2.2.1901 (ESA A/18/1) that the Uasin Gishu are known to have the faculty of stirring up strife in Nandi for their own gain'. Jackson (*op. cit.*, p. 200) and others attributed much of the blame for Nandi intransigence and the 1905 expedition to misunderstandings engineered by the Uasin Gishu.
49. See *NRBR* i, pp. 224, 231, 234-235, 249, 263. The size of the Baringo settlements in 1900 is not known; Isaac said in 1905 (CO 533/12) that 400 men were available for service at Ravine, where the settlement had been much expanded since 1900 by removing Uasin Gishu from other districts.

REFERENCES

- A. Towett, *op. cit.*; S.C. Langat, 'Some Aspects of Kipsigis History before 1914', *Ngano*, p. 86.
- B. Extensive but scattered references to Kalenjin and Masai laibons in the general literature, in books, articles and theses on the various tribes, and two unpublished papers presented in 1967 to a symposium at the University of Sussex: A.T. Matson, 'Nandi Response to a Dynastic Dispute'; T.H.R. Cashmore, 'Masai Succession Dispute'. Useful sources in KNA include annual reports, Political Record

Books, Special Branch reports, Nandi Unrest series of files, and memoranda on the Lumbwa laibons by C.M. Dobbs and G. Beresford-Stooke. For the position in 1905, see Nandi Intelligence Diary, item 80, COCP 771.

- C. Hobley-Com, 24.8.1900, ESA A/18/1. *From Chartered Company*, pp. 111-112.
- D. Hobley, *ibid.*; Haig in Evatt's Report. Neither incident is mentioned in accounts by Evatt and Hornby.
- E. HD, 26.7.1900. Hobley, *ibid.*
- F. Evatt-Com, 1.8.1900, ESA A/18/1; HD, 27.7.1900.
- G. HD, 28.7.1900 to 31.7.1900.
- H. Evatt-Com, 31.7.1900, 1.8.1900, ESA A/4/30, A/18/1; HD, 31.7.1900, 1.8.1900.
- I. Evatt-Com, 1.8.1900, ESA A/18/1; Cf. RL, 2.9.1900, 25.10.1900, for his poor opinion of Baganda in XV Company. Haig in Evatt's report; CO 536/85; G.W.T. Hodges, 'African Manpower Statistics for the British Forces in East Africa, 1914-1918', *JAH* 19/1 (1978), p. 110, and cf. the Haya in R.A. Austen, *Northwest Tanzania under German and British Rule*, p. 115.
- J. Wortham's letters, FO 2/381. CEUR-URC, 9.7.1900, 29.3.1901, WPO VII, VIII, COCP 614/8, FOCP 7732/67; Decaen's account in Hardinge-FO, 16.9.1900, FO 2/291; PUD; Hobley-Com, 9.8.1900, ESA A/18/1.
- K. RSD; Bagnall-Com, 1.8.1900, ESA A/20; Donald-Evatt, 29.7.1900, ESA A/27/17. Evatt-Com, 31.7.1900, ESA A/4/30. Wortham's letters, FO 2/381.
- L. RSD; Bagnall-Com, 1.6.1900, ESA A/20; Bagnall-Evatt, 8.8.1900, ESA A/27/17. Jackson-Evatt, 13.8.1900, ESA A/27/17. Hardinge-FO, 24.7.1900, 9.8.1900, FO 2/291, 556.
- M. Evatt-Com, 8, 13.8.1900, ESA A/18/1. Wortham's letters, FO 2/381.
- N. Evatt-Com, 13, 17.8.1900, ESA A/18/1; PUD. Haig in Evatt's Report. RL, 15.8.1900, 19.9.1900, he had '160 rifles of sorts additional to my own company' and over 300 porters; when approaching the fort he had to open fire to scare off Nandi warriors.
- O. HD, 2.8.1900 to 4.8.1900; Henderson, 'East Africa, 1900', *R.G.Q.*, October 1933; *The Times*, 9.12.1900; Hobley, *From Chartered Company*, p. 111. P.L. Deacon, 'Description of the Caves on the Nandi Escarpment', *JEANHS*, 13 (1918), pp. 292-295.
- P. HD, 5, 6.8.1900, Evatt-Hill, 18.10.1900, FOCP 7689/84, but not in Evatt's Report, which has few references to operations carried out by his brother officers; *The Times*, 9.12.1900.
- Q. Galt-Com, 17.8.1900. Hobley-Com, 16.9.1900, ESA A/18/1; Jackson-Hobley, 28.9.1900, ESA A/19/1; and cf. *Daily News*, 19.3.1901, FO 2/558, *NRBR* ii, p. 175.
- R. Bagnall-Com, 6.9.1900, ESA A/20; Evatt's Report; Hardinge-FO, 24.8.1900, FO 2/291, FOCP 7675/70; Sandford, *op. cit.*, p. 4; Johnston-FO, 21.10.1900, FOCP 7690/16.
- S. Evatt-Hill, 18.10.1900, FOCP 7689/84; Evatt's Report; HD, 28.7.1900, 1.8.1900; PUD. Coles-Com, 16.8.1901, FO 2/462; Hobley-FO, 13.12.1901, FO 2/551.
- T. Hobley-Com, 24.8.1900, ESA A/18/1.
- U. Jackson-Evatt, 23.7.1900, ('shall be glad to have news of you'), ESA A/18/1. Jackson-Hobley, 28.9.1900, ESA A/19/1.
- V. Johnston-Jackson, 26.8.1900, ESA (cited in Oliver, *op. cit.*, p. 324). Jackson-Evatt, 31.8.1900, 6.9.1900, ESA A/18/1; PUD. The position in the file of the papers for June and July suggests that they may have been sent to Johnston in western Uganda. Johnston-FO, 27.7.1900, FO 2/299.
- W. FO-Hardinge, 1.8.1900, FO 2/556; Hardinge-FO, 8, 9, 24.8.1900, FO 2/291, 556, FOCP 7675/70. Wortham's letters, FO 2/381. For information sent to the URC, see FOCP 7545/98/105/124, CO 614/7, WP VII.
- X. Jackson-Hobley, 17.8.1900, Hobley-Com, 24.8.1900, ESA A/19/1, A/18/1, (his recommendations for the future administration of Nandi and Lumbwa were omitted from Johnston-FO, 21.10.1900, FOCP 7690/16). Cf. RL, 15.8.1900, 'too big (an undertaking) for our incompetent commander and our small force'. CEUR-URC, 7.8.1900, 14.9.1900, FOCP 7545/124/144.
- Y. Hobley-Com, 4.9.1900, ESA A/18/1; PUD.
- Z. Evatt-Bagnall, 27.7.1900, Bagnall-Com, 8.8.1900, ESA A/27/17.

CHAPTER 10

Cave assaults

When 300 Masai and Kamasia auxiliaries joined the field force in the last week of August, Evatt had nearly 1,000 men under his command. After deducting troops and police on garrison duty and the Indian convalescents at Port Ugowe, approximately 700 fighting men, more than half of them regulars, were available for offensive operations. Evatt was determined this large force should seek out the enemy's cattle and bring the warriors to battle, so that the Nandi could be thoroughly and speedily crushed. All other considerations had to be waived so that operations could proceed without hindrance, and he accordingly refused to weaken his fighting strength by detaching soldiers for purposes not immediately connected with the work on hand. Government and private transport was brought to a halt, passengers and mails were detained at district stations, and no escorts were provided for roadmaking gangs or telegraph repair parties. Civil administration was virtually suspended and Kipture ceased to function as a district station.

Closure of the Uganda Road was not entirely a voluntary decision on Evatt's part, for the Nandi had disrupted the transport system by destroying the cart bridge over the River Mogong, and firing the stables between Ravine and Bushiri. To continue operating the western part of the Mau section, with no protection against the cold for draught animals during the night halts, would have resulted in heavy losses of mules and oxen; and cart convoys could not be resumed until a new bridge was built over the Mogong, and strong pickets organized to guard all the river crossings between Kipture and Bushiri. The only means of moving loads from Ravine to the Lake was by head-porters, a reversion to the method that had been used before the construction of Sclater's Road in 1896. Time would be needed, however, to muster sufficient men for this purpose, even if it was possible to recruit them in Kavirondo or at the coast. Porters were difficult to get from Zanzibar and the E.A.P.,¹ owing to the more attractive terms offered by the railway, and the absence of some 2,000 men on the Ashanti campaign.^A Hobley and J.P. Wilson had managed to recruit a full quota of Kavirondo porters when the field force was being assembled, but neither could guarantee to find enough men to take the place of Johnson's immobilized carts. Evatt had little choice, therefore, but to close the road and suspend transport operations until men could be spared to repair and guard the bridges between Kipture and Bushiri. Johnson, who had been largely responsible for reorganizing the transport system between railroad and the Lake, had perforce to agree with Evatt's views. He did, however, persuade the Commandant that the Nyando Valley cart road should be taken in hand as soon as escorts for the working parties could be spared.^B

Apologizing to Jackson for the inconvenience caused by the closure, Evatt pointed out that the troops under his command were the minimum required for the Nandi and Lumbwa campaigns, and that transport operations could not be resumed unless an extra company was detailed for escort duties. Similar considerations prevented him from detaching men from the field force to guard Caine's telegraph repair parties and protect the wire after the repairs had been effected. The only troops already on the way to the Eastern Province were Barlow's fifty Sudanese, and several weeks would elapse before III (Baganda) Company, which Evatt had asked to be sent from Buddu,² could be used in a supporting role. He decided, therefore, to bring up reserves of ammunition,³ obtain replacements for the incapacitated porters, and concentrate all his resources on an all-out attempt to smash the enemy. In order to facilitate military operations, the Commandant asked to be accorded full political control until subjugation of the Nandi was completed. This request was supported by evidence of the friction that had arisen between his officers and the Collector at Kipture. No reference was made to his political officer, whose enforced stay at Port Ugowe evidently caused Evatt no concern. Owing partly to indifferent communications between field headquarters and Port Ugowe, Hobley had been waiting for several weeks for news of Evatt's whereabouts so that he could rejoin the expedition. The commandant apparently made no effort to get in touch with his political officer by heliograph, or to keep him informed by other means of the progress of events.⁴ Jackson agreed to Evatt's request for political control, and instructed Hobley to 'work in harmony' with the military commander in the exercise of his new functions.^C

Evatt's plan for what he anticipated would be a decisive phase of the campaign was a simultaneous invasion of Kamelilo from three directions. Hornby's sepoys and Parkin's local troops and auxiliaries at Kipture were detailed to enter the operational area from the north and west respectively, and rendezvous with the headquarters force of sepoys, African soldiers and auxiliaries, which was to leave Fort Ternan on 25 August⁵ and work through southern and eastern Kamelilo. The two columns which left Kipture on the twenty-third made a slow start, because the porters were out of condition after a fortnight's rest and suffering from the effects of an unaccustomed diet. Along the line of march, detachments of forty riflemen were sent out with 100 auxiliaries, who scouted ahead in search of cattle. Baggage was reduced to a minimum in order to secure mobility and speed for sweeps lasting two or three days. This method 'involved considerable exposure, hard marching, and some independent fighting, mostly borne by the auxiliaries'. The Nandi were too vigilant to be trapped by day, and almost all their losses occurred when they were surprised by night marches. The rendezvous was kept with Evatt on the twenty-ninth, and the force returned to Kipture five days later with 500 head of cattle and 10,500 sheep and goats. Only fourteen of the enemy were killed and nine of the twelve prisoners taken were women. The Kamelilo, who evidently had little difficulty in eluding the auxiliaries, did not attempt to retaliate, and Henderson contrasted their lack of enterprise with the aggressive spirit of the escarpment sections. Much more stock had been seized than ever before, and the operation showed what could be done, with the help of Masai and Kamasia auxiliaries, when several columns were deployed within a restricted area. The number of cattle taken could hardly have come up to expectation, however, in a district where Evatt thought the bulk of the livestock was to be found.^D

Evatt found at Kipture that Browning⁶ had replaced Galt, who was leaving for England to have an operation for fistula. One of the women prisoners provided 'valuable information' about several of the escarpment caves, so Evatt decided to avenge the rebuff which Hornby had suffered six weeks previously. Before this could be done, arrangements had to be made to forward the passengers, mails and stores which Henderson had escorted from Ravine on 14 August. Cooper, who had fallen foul of Evatt and been superseded as staff officer by Whittle, was detailed to take the caravan to Mumias and Port Ugowe, and ordered to return to Kampala when his mission was completed.⁷ Accompanying the caravan were fifty of the 100 porters who had been certified unfit for further service;⁸ they were so broken down by the hardships they had endured that seven of them died on the march back to Mumias.^E

Before leaving Kipture on 7 September for the escarpment operations, Evatt sent a progress report to Jackson through Port Ugowe, the first reliable information that Holey had received for some time about the field force's activities and Evatt's future plans. Flying columns, which combed the country on both sides of the cart road from Kipture, inflicted a few casualties on the enemy and captured 262 cattle and 900 small stock. When the main party arrived at Bushiri on the tenth, Evatt heliographed Port Ugowe for replacements for the porters, 'who have been clamouring to be allowed to go home'. The field force then moved into the difficult, broken country to the west, where more damage was caused to Nandi morale in the following two weeks than throughout the previous two months.^F

On the thirteenth Evatt led a party of eighty riflemen, carrying a set of rockets and a barrel of gunpowder, to the cave which Hornby had attempted to capture in July. Defiant shouts and a shower of arrows greeted the sepoys, and Evatt concluded that a frontal assault would expose unprotected riflemen to unjustifiable risks. The Masai auxiliaries were ordered to form a solid phalanx with their shields, and approach the entrance under cover of rifle fire. When they reached the mouth of the cave, the Masai, disregarding the losses they sustained from arrows fired at them from flanking loopholes, gradually pulled down the stone barricade. Sepoys then forced an entry into the cave and captured its thirty occupants, eleven head of cattle, some small stock and food. Before leaving for another cave, whose location had been disclosed by the woman prisoner, the troops piled up the bodies of eleven 'gallant warriors' in front of the captured cave as a lesson to their colleagues. The Nandi version of the assault on Mogon, and on Mogong farther to the west, differs from that given by Evatt in his report and by Henderson in his private diary. The Nandi say the barricades were demolished by cannon shells,⁹ which killed so many warriors and non-combatants that for many years afterwards bones littered the floor of the caves, which stank of human remains.

These allegations are made without rancour, for the Nandi themselves adopted a similar technique¹⁰ when smoking or burning out the occupants of similar refuges on Mt. Elgon.⁹

The second cave was much larger and had many more entrances spread over a large extent of ground, so Evatt decided to post pickets and lay siege to it for the night. In the morning Hornby found that the occupants, who were apprised by shouted warnings of the fate of the first cave, had escaped by an entrance the besiegers had failed to find. One hundred and twenty-six cattle and 100 small stock were found in the cave, as well as a considerable quantity of grain. Once the Nandi realized the refuges were no longer secure, the occupants of other caves decamped, sometimes without removing all their animals and food reserves. Nineteen combatants, twelve of them Masai auxiliaries, were wounded during the operations, in which forty-five Nandi were 'authenticated killed' and 453 cattle, and 2,124 sheep and goats captured.¹¹ Before returning to Bushiri, three flying columns made sweeps through the Kapwareng forest, in which the escarpment dwellers had sought refuge with their stock.¹¹ The sweeps were designed to consolidate the advantage gained from the cave assaults, but the Nandi proved more adept at manoeuvring in the thick undergrowth than Masai from the open Rift Valley plains and slow-moving regulars. After twenty-nine Masai spearmen, who found themselves at a disadvantage in encounters with Nandi bowmen, were slain, the flying columns withdrew without bringing the enemy to battle or locating much of their stock.¹

While Evatt awaited the return of a detachment¹² that had been sent to escort passengers, mails and relief porters from Kitoto's, Henderson and Whittle worked through the forest to the north of the cart road, along which Evatt proposed to march to Kipture with the rest of the troops and the convoy from Kitoto's. In the course of a gruelling march by compass through dense undergrowth, through which a passage had often to be cut with bayonets, Henderson and Whittle lost their way, the latter spending four nights in the forest with nothing to eat except roasted sheep. The two raiding parties, who had captured only 104 head of cattle, joined Evatt's large convoy between Bushiri and Kaptumo on the twenty-third. Among the convoy passengers was Richard Grant, who was going to Ravine to collect replacements for the engine parts of the *William Mackinnon* which had been looted from Cowham in July. Two days later the field force marched into Kipture with 900 cattle, thousands of small stock and about fifty prisoners. Despite the losses the Nandi had sustained, Evatt's powerful column of 250 riflemen¹³ was 'followed the whole way by large numbers of hostile tribes', whose defiant bearing suggested that the capture of the escarpment strongholds and the forest sweeps had not had the deterrent effect which had been hoped.¹

Evatt was approached at Kipture by 'two or three' of the nearby chiefs with a request for negotiations. With no political officer to advise him, the Commandant responded in a peremptory manner, for he suspected their real aim was 'to gain time and remain on as good terms as possible with us in order to be able to afford sanctuary for the people and cattle of the openly hostile Nandi in the tracts of country which the chiefs in question laid claim to control'. Henderson, who had been appointed staff officer in place of Whittle,¹⁴ regarded the approach as further confirmation that 'the Nandi are beginning to show signs of giving in', and that the more perceptive leaders realized 'they are only kicking against the pricks'. The applicants were given 'severe' terms by Evatt, and promised three days' respite from military operations in which to think them over.¹⁵ Negotiations were apparently not resumed at the expiration of that period, either because the Nandi 'elected to suffer a little more punishment before submitting to what we intend to exact', or because Evatt thought the many other matters he had to deal with were more relevant to the expedition's success than treating with a few chiefs whose intentions and authority he mistrusted. If Hobley had been with him to draft the terms and pursue the negotiations, peace might have been concluded with the Kipture sections before the resistance of the more aggressive elements was strengthened by the reverse Evatt suffered in the following month.^K

The Commandant's main preoccupations were with transport and staffing arrangements for continuing the expedition, and its extension to Lumbwa, which he intended to press on with, 'whatever the Nandi do'. Maintaining his stand on the closure of the Uganda Road, Evatt transferred Johnson's transport establishment from Kipture to Ravine, so that the Nyando Valley cart track could be put in hand as soon as funds for the project were sanctioned.¹⁶ The last of the Kavirondo porters who had been with the expedition since

its inception were sent home, and time was needed for more reliefs to arrive and be broken in. The health of the fighting force was beginning to suffer from the hardships of the campaign: four of the five officers from the local companies were unfit for active operations, and the condition of the sepoys and local troops was causing concern. Orders had been received that Dr Milne was needed urgently at headquarters, and for Haig's competent Indian assistant, Kanhaya Lal, to be transferred to Mumias. Evatt protested about these dispositions on the grounds that casualties had been heavy, and many of his men were suffering from the results of continued exposure. He pointed out that it was impossible for one doctor to look after the sick and wounded of four columns, each of which consisted of 200 combatants and 100 porters. He considered three medical officers or assistants would be needed for the rest of the Nandi campaign, and also for the invasion of Lumbwa, where he thought resistance would be stubborn.^L

The satisfaction Evatt derived from his successes against the escarpment Nandi was clouded by some of the news that awaited him at Kipture. Although Baker had re-established his position at Ribo,¹⁷ where flooding of the River Kerio prevented the hostile Marakwet from approaching the post, Bagnall was worried about renewed threats to the fort and Uasin Gishu settlement at Ravine. Roving bands of Nandi warriors had been seen in the neighbourhood on several occasions, and an unsuccessful raid made on the large herd of cattle in the government enclosure. After this reverse, the Nandi confined their activities to killing stragglers¹⁸ and pilfering stock from small parties on paths near the station. Bagnall searched the forest several times without catching the marauders, and spent a fruitless night hidden in the Uasin Gishu cattle enclosure. As all the Uasin Gishu warriors from Ravine were serving in Nandi, fifty spearmen were recruited from Njemps to guard the unprotected settlement. The Njemps also offered to provide more auxiliaries for Evatt and Baker on demand, and a similar offer was made by the Kamasia. The activities of Nandi marauders forced Bagnall to close the recently established food market, because the Elgeyo and Kamasia were afraid to approach the fort with supplies. As no food was reaching Ravine from Kipture, both Bagnall's station and the Ribo outpost had to rely on deliveries getting through from Naivasha.^M

In addition to his local commitments, Bagnall was asked for ten men to guard the construction camp which Blackett had established at Elburgon. This was the first time a Collector west of the Rift Valley had been asked for the protection the railway engineers were entitled to demand from the civil authorities.¹⁹ Blackett's request was consequently an intimation to Evatt that time was running out, if he wished to conquer the Nandi before the arrival of coolie gangs on the Mau forced him to allocate large numbers of troops to the static role of protecting construction camps, supply convoys and working parties. Bagnall was reluctant to deplete his garrison of about fifty police to meet the railway's requirements, because he considered his position and supply routes at Ravine were threatened by the presence of Nandi bands in the surrounding forests. Blackett suggested that men might be obtained from the E.A.P. if Ravine could not supply the guards required. In order to avoid applying to the sister protectorate for assistance, Bagnall agreed, against his better judgment, to provide twelve policemen, and suggested their number might be increased by a detachment from Naivasha. The Chief Engineer considered this totally inadequate, and pointed out that the progress of the line and the avoidance of wholesale desertions depended upon the coolies and African labourers being guaranteed freedom from molestation.^N

Another source of anxiety for the Commandant was uncertainty about the arrival date of the reinforcements that had been promised from Uganda. Holey, who had set out on 17 September with the relief porters who joined Evatt's convoy at Bushiri, turned back at Kitoto's on hearing that Barlow and a few Sudanese of X Company had arrived in the steel boat at Port Ugowe on the eighteenth. The rest of the Sudanese did not join their comrades until five days later, as the Baganda-owned dhow in which they were sailing capsized and sank.²⁰ Fortunately the mishap occurred near a fleet of Baganda canoes, which was bringing Swahilis of IV Company from Bunyoro, and Dr J.L. Sherlock, who had resigned after six months' service and was awaiting permission to proceed to the coast. The dhow's passengers were rescued from the water and paddled to their destination by the canoeemen. On the twenty-fourth, sepoys of the Port Ugowe garrison detachment, who had been relieved by Swahilis of IV Company, left with the doctor and marched up the Nyando Valley to Fort Ternan. They were followed the next day by Barlow's men, with more relief porters and 120

head of cattle. Hobley accompanied the latter caravan on its journey to Kipture, where he hoped to rejoin the expedition he had left at the beginning of August.⁹

While awaiting these reinforcements, and the arrival at Fort Ternan of Hornby's sepoys, who had escorted passengers, mails, forty-six Transport Department carts and 1,000 captured cattle to Ravine on the twenty-seventh, Evatt decided to maintain the momentum of the campaign by making a second sweep through Kamelilo. He then intended to assemble the entire striking force at Fort Ternan for 'the grand expedition into the Lumbwa's country'.^P In preparation for this enterprise, Hobley and Parkin were sent with the headquarters stores to Fort Ternan, where they arrived on 8 October to bring Rumbold the first authentic news he had heard of the field force's activities for forty-five days.

During this period, only five items of news were brought in by Lumbwa women selling food at the fort, and Rumbold was unable to send out scouts from 'the blooming lot of cripples, the offscourings of three companies' that formed the garrison of thirty-eight men. Rumbold himself could not risk going more than a mile outside the fort for fear of being cut off by warriors rushing down from the hills or concealed in the bush and long grass. He did venture out on one occasion with eleven men to investigate when columns of smoke, which he thought might be enemy signals, covered the hills and billowed up the valley from the west. After going three miles down the valley, he realized that the source of the smoke was much farther than he thought and could not risk trying to locate it. To add to his worries, food and medical supplies for the garrison and their womenfolk were running out, and morale was lowered by frequent Scotch mists and daily thunderstorms. After a promising initial visit, Arap Tumbo made excuses for not coming into the fort again, and Rumbold began to think that he had thrown in his lot with the enemy. He also received information that another Lumbwa chief, Mageni, was implicated 'with the numerous murders and cutting up parties' and was harbouring Nandi refugees and livestock. As he became increasingly despondent, especially during recurrent bouts of fever, Rumbold grew anxious about the field force's fate, and whether some of the troops had been sent to quell a rebellion in Baganda or elsewhere in the Protectorate. He was also concerned about the possibility of a night attack by Arap Tumbo, and by bands of warriors 'in full warpaint' who were seen on the hills to the south of the fort. He considered attempting to capture Arap Tumbo, and making a dash through the night for Ravine, but realized that both enterprises would have been foolhardy with the resources at his command.

The first Europeans Rumbold had seen since the field force's departure on 25 August brought him little comfort. Parkin and Hobley told him that, apart from a few skirmishes, a small number of enemy casualties and the seizure of some 300 cattle and 2,000 small stock, 'nothing, absolutely nothing, has been accomplished'. Several officers were sick and highly critical of Evatt's conduct of the campaign, and even the sepoys were becoming restless owing to the attitude of Hornby, their company commander. In preparation for the imminent arrival of Hill, Jackson and the field force, Rumbold went out on the tenth with a foraging party of sixty rifles and 300 porters and camped for three days in the hills on the road to Kipture. Food was found in abundance, but the total haul was considerably reduced when about 100 Kavirondo porters took advantage of the long grass to desert. The Native Officer's party killed one Nandi and captured seventy-seven goats on the Tinderet foothills, and reported seeing cattle and warriors on the higher slopes. Rumbold left camp after midnight on the twelfth to capture the cattle but failed to catch the enemy unawares. The alarm was given just before dawn, and the party rushed by warriors who lost ten of their number killed. Nearly 200 sheep and goats were seized but, as the cattle were being driven away into the forest, Rumbold decided it would be too dangerous to follow them.^Q

Evatt's plans for the Lumbwa expedition were nullified when Hornby, with 'a hundred of (the) best troops and all (the best) transport', was instructed to meet the Superintendent of African Protectorates in order to escort him over the Mau and into Nandi.²¹ 'The most inopportune arrival of Sir Clement Hill' came at a critical juncture, 'when the military forces were fully engaged in exacting retribution from a warlike and troublesome tribe', and at a time, moreover, when Evatt thought his opponents' resolve to continue the struggle was beginning to weaken. Without Hornby's sepoys, major operations and the 'grand expedition' were ruled out; and Evatt later conceded that 'the natural course to pursue, under such circumstances, was to suspend operations'. However, having rested his men at Kipture, and allocated five officers and 296 other ranks for 'escort duty for the protection of the route via

the Nyando Valley',²² the Commandant decided to go ahead with the Kamelilo operations in the hope that an opportunity would present itself for dealing the enemy a crippling blow.^R

Evatt had hitherto operated without much interference from Johnston in western Uganda, and with none at all from the Foreign Office, which had been kept in the dark about the inception and progress of the expedition. But as the campaign dragged on without decisive results, the Foreign Office became anxious about the outcome and Uganda's ability to protect the railway construction gangs. The latter aspect was stressed by Colonel Coles, who was presumably kept informed of events through letters from former colleagues in the Eastern Province. Writing to the Foreign Office on 14 September about his 'great disappointment ... that the Wa-Nandi are behaving so badly', he added, 'but they are a turbulent lot, the tribesmen, and will want a lot of watching when the construction parties begin to work in their districts'.²³ In view of Johnston's absence from Entebbe and the breakdown of telegraph communications with Uganda, the Foreign Office had wired to Hardinge on 13 September for reassurances, 'because of enquiries from relatives and vague rumours of local disturbances'. As Hardinge's reply was anything but reassuring, he was instructed to find means of communicating with Johnston in order to 'ascertain whether he considers himself able to deal with the disturbances with present resources'.^S

As news of the expedition's failure to bring the operations to a speedy conclusion reached western Uganda, the Special Commissioner sensed that the campaign was beginning to get out of hand. Informing Evatt on 26 September of Johnston's imminent return to Entebbe, Jackson set out the priorities which were to be kept in mind. Johnston, who was unaware that the transport carts and Kipture staff were being transferred to Ravine, directed that the lines of communication must be kept open, so that passengers and mails could pass through the Nyando Valley and the fortnightly cart convoys between Nandi and Port Ugowé be resumed. Evatt was told that III Company was shortly to be sent from Buddu, and that 'the Special Commissioner attaches greater importance to keeping open communications than to the immediate subjugation of the Wa Nandi'. Although these instructions were similar in many respects to those sent to Evatt on 31 August and 6 September, they were more explicit about the degree of priority that was to be given to operations designed to ensure that 'the Nandi trouble should be adequately settled'. During the September operations, Evatt had chosen to concentrate on regaining the initiative he had lost in the first phase of the expedition, and had ignored Johnston's wishes concerning the telegraph and the need to 'dominate the railway route'. When Jackson forwarded Johnston's orders on 26 September, he prefaced the message with instructions that it was to be sent to Evatt 'by any possible means'. The original was forwarded from Port Ugowé on the twenty-seventh for transmission by heliograph from Kitoto's. A copy was also sent off by hand, but Knowles doubted whether it would reach its destination as 'no runner will now go right through' to Nandi. The message had presumably not reached the Commandant before he left for Kamelilo, nor while he was operating in the Nyando Valley, since he did not reply to the request for information about what he could do to comply with the Commander-in-Chief's orders.^T If this was the case, Evatt decided to press on with offensive operations without knowing of Johnston's wishes; if not, he may have considered that his arrangement for providing escorts in the Nyando Valley satisfied Johnston's requirements, and left the field force free to carry out its original task.

NOTES

1. An outbreak of smallpox at the coast and among the Kamba also affected recruitment (FO 2/291, Moffat's letter, 10.10.1900). Two cases occurred among seventeen porters sent up from the coast for Ribo (ESA A/20).
2. He thought escort duties in Nandi provided a 'good opportunity to test their capabilities'.
3. Eight boxes of Martini-Henry ammunition were delivered at Port Ugowé by the steel boat on 9.9.1900.
4. 'No communication with Nandi since the end of last month ... I moreover want to rejoin the expedition myself' (27.8.1900), and 'no mail and no communication with the expedition; all telegrams for Evatt wait him at Kitoto's' (8.9.1900) were typical of Hobley's many explanations to Entebbe of his ignorance concerning Evatt's whereabouts, and the location of passengers, mails and Reuter's telegrams.

5. Rumbold was too ill to travel and left in charge at Fort Ternan; Wortham was carried on a stretcher and taken by Parkin to Ravine on the thirty-first to recuperate.
6. Sidney Browning (c. 1866-1928); Assistant Collector, B.C.A., 1893; appointed 3rd Class Assistant, Uganda, 2.5.1900; arrived at Ravine 25.7.1900. He was to be relieved by the first official to come up from the coast; see *NRBR* ii, p. 164.
7. The caravan, which included Dr Moffat, William Grant and seven BNCOs, left on the seventh by Sclater's Road and arrived at Port Ugowe on the eighteenth.
8. Haig recorded in Evatt's Report that they 'made a wild rush to rejoin the column and it needed a strong guard to restrain them'.
9. If the Nandi version is correct the cannon was presumably a Maxim; it is unlikely that Evatt would have encumbered his transport with a Hotchkiss on the offchance of using it in broken, forested country; see *NRBR* i, p. 255. Hobley recorded that, after 'quite a stiff fight,... most of the enemy escaped during the night'. Johnston's version was that 'Hornby pursued (the Nandi) into a large cave, which he entered, accompanied at first by only a few Indian soldiers'. In memoirs related when his memory was failing, a Sudanese, who claimed to have been an eye-witness, alleged that an explosive charge was used to clear the barricades. Deacon *op. cit.*, says the caves attacked were Kakamet and Chebanan.
10. See *NRBR* i, p. 329. Caves were commonly used as refuges throughout East Africa, e.g., by the Banyoro, Maji Maji rebels, and by the Chagga, who used tobacco to smoke out the occupants.
11. It was said in 1905 (CO 523/12) that 1,900 cattle evaded capture in the Kapwareng forest in 1900. Evatt did not cross the Kibos gorge to seize herds driven into Nyangori.
12. Captured sheep, which the detachment took down to Kitoto's, arrived at Port Ugowe on 21.9.1900 in a caravan which included porters discharged from the field force (PUD).
13. These presumably included some reinforcements from Uganda.
14. Apart from the fact that Whittle was an inexperienced militia officer, the change may have been made because he had lost contact with Henderson during the forest sweep, with the result that fewer cattle were captured than might have been the case if both parties had operated together as planned.
15. The terms were not specified, and the episode was not reported to Entebbe or included in Evatt's Report.
16. Apart from traffic considerations, this would enable the troops to be concentrated for the defence of the Uganda Road, telegraph and railway.
17. While Baker was at Ravine from 13.9.1900 to 8.10.1900 for a minor surgical operation, his Eurasian clerk, Henry J. Moody, was in charge at Ribo.
18. Bagnall says women and children, but several of his statements are highly coloured and suspect.
19. Hardinge had fought a losing battle over paying for protecting the railway in the E.A.P. Apart from the line and lake surveys, railway staff had only been used in Uganda on subsidiary undertakings - repairing Sclater's Road, transporting and assembling the *William Mackinnon*, and erecting the temporary telegraph; see *NRBR* i, pp. 295, 356, 359-360, 368-369.
20. The first dhow (possibly the Katikiro's *Hazara*) built by Baganda working under a Swahili shipwright; her caulking was nibbled away by fish.
21. These instructions have not been found in any official papers, nor in Henderson's Diary, which ends on 26.9.1900, the day before Hornby left for Ravine and Fort Ternan. They are mentioned in Henderson's published account, which was written after he had read Evatt's personal file and comments on the expedition. Hornby, Haig and the sepoy went as far east as Njoro to meet Hill, and did not reach the assembly point at Fort Ternan until 22.10.1900.
22. From the numbers, these must have included reinforcements expected from Uganda. Apart from the section of IV Company placed at the disposal of the Transport Officer at Port Ugowe, the composition, provenance and location of 'the additional troops (that) became available ... for this purpose' are not mentioned in contemporary despatches; after leaving Evatt at Kipture early in October, Parkin told Rumbold (RL, 8.10.1900) that 6,000 coolies were beginning earthworks near Mau summit, and that preparations were in hand for a cart road from Molo to Port Ugowe to supersede the Ravine-Bushiri route, but he did not mention the troop dispositions planned to protect either operation. The statement in Evatt's Report raises the suspicion that he was anxious to show that he had anticipated Johnston's and Hill's wishes.
23. See *NRBR* ii, p. 184 for the Railway Committee's proposal for a volunteer corps to deter raiders.

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CHAPTER 11

A smack in the face

While Evatt was carrying out harrying operations in the Kamelilo Valley, information was received from a woman prisoner on 10 October that 'nearly the whole of the remaining Nandi cattle' were concentrated 'in the low-lying hills between the Nyando River and Lumbwa escarpment'.¹ The informant had just returned from the areas where Koitalel, Kibeles, and most of the hostile chiefs and warriors had taken refuge. These disclosures promised the Commandant the opportunity he had been seeking ever since he invaded Nandi at the beginning of July. At last circumstances seemed favourable for capturing a large number of cattle, forcing the warriors to do battle in defence of their stock, and destroying their faith in the Laibons' protective magic. The nature of the terrain would not only make it possible to 'deal a severe blow to the Nandi and their friends', but also give the troops time to follow up the enemy before they could reach the shelter of escarpment and forests. Although Evatt, who had been warned by Hobley and Parkin against antagonizing the Lumbwa while the field force was not in a position to deal effectively with them, realized 'there were risks in using depleted forces', he nevertheless decided the opportunity was too good to be missed. In coming to what his colleagues agreed with as 'soldierly decision', he was moreover acting in accordance with Johnston's wishes, since the Nandi warriors had taken up a position from which they could threaten the railway route.

Evatt acted with promptitude and, guided by his informant, marched his forces towards the enemy. She revealed that the Nandi intended to drive their cattle back across the Nyando as soon as harrying operations ceased in Kamelilo, so he decided against proceeding to Fort Ternan for reinforcements, as he had already sent orders from Kipture for Parkin to send a column to rendezvous with the field force on the slopes of Tindiret. These orders had not however been received when Rumbold left with his foraging party on the tenth with 'a roving commission to harry the natives and despoil them to the best of (his) ability'. Evatt's plan consequently miscarried, as the foraging party missed the field force, which had wheeled into a valley to the south-west and marched across country towards the Port Ugowe-Molo track.² Evatt proceeded along the track towards Fort Ternan on the twelfth and camped below Legatet Hill, some eight miles short of the station. Whittle was detailed to remain in camp with most of the 400 porters and with fifty-two rifles to guard the baggage and livestock, and instructed to get in touch with Parkin and with reinforcements that were reported to be on their way from Port Ugowe. Colour-Sergeant Ellison was given charge of a column consisting of fifty-five rifles and 120 Masai auxiliaries, and the remaining fifty-five riflemen and 120 Masai, together with three Indian signallers and a Punjabi Maxim-gun section, formed the main striking force under Evatt's personal command.³

Ellison was instructed to march along the track towards Fort Ternan for five miles before turning south across the Nyando, so that he could approach the Nandi encampments from the east and drive their occupants westwards towards the main column. Evatt intended to march straight to the Laibons' refuge in order to take them by surprise, and thus attain the objective he had failed to achieve at Kapsimotwa twelve weeks previously. Ellison was to inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy, but the capture of livestock was a secondary consideration for the main party, whose principal task was to kill or capture the Laibons. When this has been done, Evatt proposed wheeling his troops to the east so that they could engage the warriors driven towards them by Ellison.

By eleven o'clock that evening both columns had left Legatet camp. Ellison, a seasoned campaigner accustomed to exercising independent command, carried out his orders without a hitch. Taking the enemy by surprise at daybreak, he captured 700 cattle and 2,000 small stock, and 'like a wise man came to the conclusion that he then had quite enough on his hands and so started back at 8 a.m.'. The slow-moving column was rushed by large bodies of warriors, who were driven off with the loss of some fifty of their number killed or wounded, and Ellison returned to camp with his booty well before nightfall. The scene of the operations, and the attack on the returning caravan suggest that the warriors were Lumbwa, who had not had the experience of the Nandi in facing the massed firepower of disciplined riflemen.

The main column marched until three in the morning, when the hut in which the Laibons were reported to have taken refuge was rushed by spearmen. Taken completely by surprise, the six occupants only had time to shoot a few arrows before being overpowered and speared when the hut was burned down. Evatt was uncertain at the time whether the hut was in fact occupied by the Laibons, especially after his guide identified two corpses as Kibeles' remains. His doubts were increased when he learned that the Lumbwa had promised, at a council of war held on the same night as the attack, to 'actively assist' the Nandi. Evatt thought it unlikely that the Laibons would have stayed at home while deliberations of such consequence were being held. These misgivings had evidently been allayed by the time he wrote his final report, in which he claimed that Koitalel (not Kibeles) had been killed.⁴

After rounding up about 400 cattle in the vicinity of the Laibons' hut, the column climbed the escarpment to the Lumbwa Plateau. On reaching the summit soon after dawn, Evatt 'saw in the distance to the west a sight not hitherto seen in the whole campaign, a formed fighting body'. He recognized the danger of a retaliatory raid being launched against his small force, especially as there was no sign of Ellison or Parkin, and his Masai scouts reported the approach of another large fighting body from the east. Auxiliaries and a few covering riflemen were nevertheless sent on ahead to seize some of the stock the formed fighting body was driving away to the west. Pursuit operations were however stopped when it was realized the field force had penetrated deep into unmapped country, a considerable distance away from the Ligatet camp. Progress was slow on the march back owing to the 800 cattle and 3,000 small stock accompanying the column, and the precautions that had to be taken to ward off an expected counter attack. Evatt, who did not know how far he was from his base, decided it would be impossible to reach Ligatet before nightfall. At one o'clock in the afternoon of the thirteenth a halt was called at the foot of Cheplel Hill, where a bivouac was formed 'at a suitable site' covered with bracken and patches of scrub and tall grass.⁵ Although five hours of daylight remained for putting the camp into a state of defence, lack of tools, scarcity of trees, and the tiredness of the men, who had been on the move for fourteen hours, prevented the erection of anything more substantial than an 'indifferent' thorn screen around the cattle enclosure. The Masai had not been expected to help build the defences, but Evatt was dismayed to find 'the local troops could not be got to work in spite of the British officers giving an example'.⁶ When darkness fell the Punjabis took up position by the Maxim, auxiliaries guarded the cattle enclosure and half the riflemen were assigned to firing stations while the remainder rested. Two-hourly watches were arranged for the three officers, who were to patrol the perimeter, check the sentries, and ensure that every fire was extinguished as soon as the evening meal was cooked.

Evatt, who took the first watch, mistook the 'flicks' of arrows for the sound of twigs snapping underfoot as he made his rounds.⁷ Not realizing that the camp was being closely watched, he did not 'nip an assault in the bud' by ordering the troops to open fire in order to clear the enemy away from their positions around the camp. When he went to rouse Henderson for the eleven o'clock watch, a carelessly dowsed fire was blown into a blaze by the breeze, and immediately afterwards the camp was rushed from three sides by large bodies of spearmen. Pandemonium ensued, shots were fired indiscriminately in the darkness, and the stampeded cattle broke out of the thorn enclosure. Running towards the small mound upon which the Maxim had been placed, Evatt saw that Sherlock was dying from a spear thrust in the abdomen and Henderson was severely wounded.⁸ When he reached the Maxim, it was 'surrounded by a struggling mass of spearmen and, for the moment, (Evatt) certainly thought that the game was up'. His interpreter pointed out that the spearmen were Masai, whom he belaboured with his knobkerry and cleared away from the mound, where the Punjabis were in readiness waiting for the order to fire. The Commandant took the firing position and raked the camp with bursts of traversing fire. The terrifying reverberations caused by the sound of bullets striking the rocks on the nearby hill had a demoralizing effect upon the Nandi,⁹ who 'fled incontinently'.^A Firing ceased when the moon rose, and the worn-out defenders spent the rest of the night inside the cattle enclosure.

At daybreak the bodies of twenty-one warriors were counted inside and close to the camp, and the numerous spears and shields found lying about bore testimony to the precipitancy of the enemy's flight. British losses were seventeen killed and thirty-five wounded; twenty-seven of the latter were Masai auxiliaries, seven of them hit by misdirected bullets. Only about half the stampeded cattle were recovered as many had gone too far to

risk attempting their recapture.¹⁰ When the march back was resumed on the morning of the fourteenth, the doctor's body and the wounded were carried by their weary and dispirited comrades, but the Nandi made no attempt to molest the slow-moving caravan although it was strung out along some two and a half miles of track. Ligatet was heliographed for Whittle and Ellison to meet Evatt at the Nyando River ford on the Fort Ternan track, and in the afternoon of the fifteenth 'it was a depressed Commander who entered that fort'.¹¹

In what turned out to be the final phase of the campaign, the operations in the Nyando Valley cost the Nandi and Lumbwa seventy-four warriors killed, and about 1,039 cattle¹² and 3,100 small stock captured. Although heavy in relation to the campaign as a whole, these losses were not sufficiently severe to dampen the warriors' elation at the smack in the face which had forced the troops to seek the shelter of Fort Ternan. Nor could the losses justify Evatt's claim¹³ that fighting stopped because the enemy's will to resist was broken by 'these operations, (which) contributed the final blow which convinced the Nandi and Lumbwa that the time had come for making peace'.^B

Veterinary Officer Stordy came over from Ravine to tend the wounded until Haig and Hill's medical attendant, Dr W.H. Macdonald of the E.A.P., arrived on the twenty-second. Dr Copeland and the remaining Sudanese of IV Company at Port Ugowe were ordered by heliograph¹⁴ on the fifteenth to proceed immediately to Fort Ternan. The doctor refused to go and resigned, but changed his mind and left, 'under protest', three days later with Lieutenant T.N. Howard and III Company from Buddu. While Rumbold, Parkin, Hobley and Barlow were waiting for the field force to arrive at Fort Ternan,^C a telegram was received from the Foreign Office asking if the disturbances could be settled without outside help.¹⁵ Evatt replied on the twenty-first that 'there are sufficient troops in the Eastern Province to deal with the disturbances', but the inquiry and Johnston's instructions left him no alternative but to suspend his plans for subjugating the Nandi and extending the campaign to Lumbwa. The porters were discharged on the twenty-fourth,¹⁶ and 380 Masai levies, who had been severely mauled in the last month's fighting, left for Ravine with Rumbold and their share of the expedition's loot.^D Their departure confirmed that the field force had ceased to be a mobile striking formation, and had become an army of occupation carrying out a static role of safeguarding communications.

During a second period of enforced inactivity while waiting for Evatt at Fort Ternan, Hobley had written four despatches commenting on the military and political sides of the operations. The first related to the sequestration of Latongwa's cattle. Investigations at Kipture had convinced Hobley that the cattle did in fact belong to Latongwa and his people.¹⁷ He recommended retaining the animals for the present, so that the Commandant's 'local prestige' should not be lowered, and deferring their return until the field force was withdrawn at the close of the campaign.^E

The other despatches dealt with more general issues connected with the conduct and future planning of the expedition. Hobley considered that the embargo on transport operations, which Evatt had imposed so that all his forces could be engaged on securing a military victory, should be rescinded. As a temporary measure Hobley recommended withdrawing the punitive columns from the Nandi Plateau, so that the troops could be switched to the task of protecting Transport Department convoys and other parties using the main and feeder roads. One of the chief reasons he advanced in support of this reversal of Evatt's policy was that it was becoming increasingly difficult to recruit porters for the mobile columns. The Kavirondo chiefs had responded loyally at the beginning of the campaign, but had become reluctant to find replacements for worn-out porters and those wishing to return to their homes. This change of attitude Hobley ascribed to the protracted nature of the operations, and the hardships which the naked men had suffered in the cold climate of the Nandi plateau during the rainy season.¹⁸ The result was that porters could only be induced to enrol by the use of brute force, the temporary seizure of their cattle, and by resorting to means 'which produce ill-feeling among a peaceful people, who have paid their taxes and assisted the government in every way'. By supplying some 1,500 men from sections south of the Yala River and probably another 500 from the Mumias District, the Luo and Baluyia had proved their willingness to co-operate with the government in its efforts to crush their traditional enemies, but their loyalty was becoming strained by continuing demands for assistance. Moreover, the morale and mobility of the field force was beginning to be affected by desertions among the porters, over 100 of whom had quit their posts while foraging with

Rumbold in the Tinderet foothills. This mass desertion in hostile country suggested that the unarmed porters chose to take a chance of being speared on their journey home in preference to continuing with Evatt's columns. Another twenty also decamped from Fort Ternan in daylight, despite the fact that the station was under continual surveillance by Nandi scouts. These desertions, which were not mentioned by Evatt, Haig of Johnston, were particularly worrying to Hobley, who was concerned lest discontent among the Kavirondo would make it difficult for him to persuade the chiefs¹⁹ to provide the large quantities of grain which would be required as soon as transport, road construction and telegraph repair operations could be resumed.^F

The problems that had arisen over desertions and the provision of porter replacements were also adduced by Hobley in support of his plea that the campaign should not be extended to Lumbwa. The Commandant had planned such an extension in order to seek out the Nandi who had taken their cattle across the River Nyando, and to punish the Lumbwa for their part in the investment of Fort Ternan and for affording their kinsmen refuge and support. Evatt's request for more medical officers showed that he was under no illusion about the magnitude of the task he proposed setting 'the grand expedition', and his staff officer noted that the Lumbwa, who had 'never yet been visited except by single adventurous travellers', 'are particularly pugnacious and cocky, ... and openly boast that they have never been touched by the white man because he is afraid of them'. Evatt had nevertheless made up his mind before beginning the second sweep through Kamelilo that the time had come for undertaking their 'well-merited punishment'.^G Hobley asked for this plan to be countermanded because there was still no trustworthy evidence that the Lumbwa had been implicated in outrages on the Uganda road, or taken an active part in the rebellion.²⁰ The utmost that could be levied against them was that they had stopped supplying Fort Ternan with food, and that a few Lumbwa warriors had probably fought alongside the Nandi. On the other hand, Arap Tumbo of Kapsaus had remained loyal throughout, and had even prevented Sotik warriors from passing through his country to join the rising.²¹ Since Evatt had frequently asserted that the Lumbwa were hostile and 'known to have afforded refuge to about half the Nandi cattle and people', Hobley interviewed Lumbwa representatives at Fort Ternan in order to investigate the truth of these allegations. The representatives were unanimous in their desire to maintain friendly relations, and explained that not only would it have been contrary to custom for them to have refused asylum to their blood relations, but that none of the chiefs was powerful enough in any case to prohibit this accepted practice. Hobley concluded that it would be unwise to antagonize them by invading their country, because this would inevitably create unsettled conditions to the south of the Nyando Valley similar to those that had existed for several years to the north. With enemies operating from the hills on both sides of the river, resumption of regular convoys and protection of road construction, telegraph and other parties would become increasingly hazardous. Hobley declared that 'the Wa Nandi themselves are now practically broken and alone cannot effect much damage', but warned that their morale and effectiveness would be restored if the troops left Nandi to invade Lumbwa, and if the forces opposing the government were strengthened by the thousands of warriors the Lumbwa could put in the field. Although nobody knew the size of the Lumbwa army, Hobley was satisfied it was considerable,²² and that operations against all three sections of the tribe would extend over a wide area and take several months to complete. If the operations were to be successful, the field force would have to penetrate as far south as Sotik, where the northern sections were reported to have sent most of their cattle in anticipation of an invasion of their country. There was also the danger that a protracted campaign of this magnitude might delay the final subjugation of the Nandi, and retard the progress of the railway construction.

Hobley repeated his conviction that the most constructive way of dealing with the Lumbwa would be by allocating two companies to garrison a post in the centre of the country.²³ Patrolling by these troops should not only force Nandi fugitives to return to their own country 'where they would be dealt with at leisure', but also make the Lumbwa see the folly of harbouring their kinsmen and joining them in opposing the government. Hobley considered such a consummation could be achieved within a few months, after which most of the troops could be withdrawn and the military post converted into a district station. When this had taken place, he recommended that the selection of a Collector should be made with due regard to the need for tact and temperate judgment in conciliating and securing the co-

operation of the people.²⁴ This analysis was written before the attack on Evatt's camp, which Hobley acknowledged would 'undoubtedly complicate matters as the expedition has now carried war into the Lumbwa country, and it remains to be seen if the Wa-Lumbwa will now become actively hostile'. He nevertheless maintained that his arguments were not invalidated by uncertainty about Lumbwa reactions to the recent invasion of their country.²⁵

Knowingly or otherwise, Hobley formulated proposals that were in essence similar to the instructions from the Special Commissioner which Jackson had wired to Evatt on 26 September.²⁵ While the field force was operating in the Nyando Valley, Jackson at Entebbe and Knowles at Port Ugowe had already begun to implement Johnston's instructions, without reference to the Commandant who had been accorded full political and military control in the campaign area. Dhows had brought reinforcements from III and IV Companies for deployment along the transport route, a strongly-guarded mail caravan was dispatched from Port Ugowe to Fort Ternan, and orders issued for escorts to be provided for Caine's telegraph repair parties. Knowles found it difficult to meet all these exceptional requirements with his slender resources. Port Ugowe itself was held by thirty 'raw police', who were equipped with only thirty rounds of ammunition each, because a consignment of cartridges shipped from Baganda in September for their use was useless and had to be condemned. Smallpox had broken out in the police lines, and the refusal of the Kisumu Luo to engage as porters prevented Knowles from sending a detachment of IV Company to Fort Ternan. By the end of October most of his difficulties had been resolved: Caine had left for the Nyando Valley; the steam-launch had brought a hospital assistant and fresh supplies of ammunition; and porters had been found to transport IV Company to Fort Ternan. Orders had also been issued for Baganda under instruction as policemen at Kampala to relieve forty sepoy at Entebbe, Iganga and Luba's, so that they could reinforce the Port Ugowe garrison.¹

After these dispositions had been made, the Special Commissioner was satisfied that adequate forces were available to enable Evatt to implement his orders. These orders were repeated in a more detailed form in a telegram from Johnston which Jackson forwarded on 27 September: 'Your first consideration must be the protection of the mail, railway, telegraph and passenger route along the Nyando Valley between Ugowe and Molo; all other considerations must be subordinated to the main purpose of keeping this route open and perfectly safe for the passage of mails and passengers and the carrying on of railway work'. These explicit instructions shattered Evatt's hopes of a speedy resumption of offensive operations against the Nandi, and ignored his plans for an invasion of Lumbwa. Having to resign himself to the humdrum task of protecting communications must have been a galling experience for a commander, who was hoping to repeat in Nandi and Lumbwa the successes he had achieved against Kabarega, Mwanga and the Sudanese mutineers, and he 'was certainly most unwilling that operations should cease'.²⁶ The blow was especially hard as his last encounter with the enemy had been far from felicitous, and as Colonel Coles was reported to be on the way to Uganda to relieve him of his duties as Commandant.²⁷ Despite many declarations of his confidence in Evatt's professional competence, circumstances were forcing Johnston to relegate the army to a holding role, and to consider entrusting the resolution of the Nandi and Lumbwa question to administrative officers, whose assistance Evatt had 'practically ignored' throughout the course of the campaign.²

NOTES

1. Evatt possibly used this phrase to disguise the fact that he invaded Lumbwa; his official accounts do not mention the ascent of the escarpment, nor hint that 'the enemy' might have included Lumbwa. Langat, *op. cit.*, p. 89 says the cattle crossed into Lumbwa at Laliat and Kiburet. A Masai auxiliary, Tutuma ole Nabonga, in a muddled account recorded by Richard Waller in 1973, recalled that the informant was a Nandi girl; Rumbold says a Masai woman.
2. According to Henderson, Parkin arrived back at Fort Ternan on 15.10.1900, but this is not confirmed by Rumbold.
3. The size of the force available for what Evatt thought could prove a decisive encounter emphasizes the miscalculations made when plans for the expedition were drawn up. Numbers of troops and auxiliaries, livestock captured and casualties differ widely in the various accounts.
4. Evatt's statement went unchallenged, and explains why attention was centred upon Kibeles until Mayes

- established in August 1902 (FOCP 7954/152) that Koitalel was alive; see *NRBR* ii, pp. 88-89.
5. Henderson says three o'clock. Evatt insisted in 1931 'that there 'was ample time (as there was material available) to build an adequate boma to surround the captured livestock and the troops'. Rumbold noted that Evatt concentrated on building a cattle boma instead of making the encampment safe.
 6. The Effendi was found fast asleep under a tree. The wording in Evatt's Report, 'the men were tired out and would not work' was amended in the *London Gazette* to 'owing to various circumstances'. Evatt's precautions were later contrasted by Jackson (*op. cit.*, p. 213) with those he had taken in similar circumstances in Lumbwa in 1889.
 7. Evatt confessed he was not used to bows and arrows, and did not understand the warning given him by the Sudanese NCO, who, with 'commendable *sang froid*', accompanied him on his rounds.
 8. Pierced by spear thrusts in the right arm and in the left side below the waist, he was carried on a stretcher over the Mau to railhead at Nakuru; he left Mombasa on 19.12.1900, and was not passed fit for duty until 28.11.1901 (FO 2/294, 423, 550, 551).
 9. Several contemporary commentators, including Evatt, Henderson and Rumbold, confirmed Kipsigis claims that the Kapsigiriria, Sigowet and Libose sections of the Lumbwa took part, either on their own or in company with the Nandi. Langat, *op. cit.*, p. 89, says the Lumbwa made an unsuccessful reprisal attack on Fort Ternan, but this is not recorded elsewhere.
 10. Henderson says only 402 cattle and 300 sheep and goats were rounded up; this is roughly in accord with the report written on 15.10.1900 by Evatt, who nevertheless complained in 1931 that Jackson's statement that the Nandi 'retook their cattle' could not be justified by 'this comparatively insignificant loss'.
 11. Rumbold, who was expecting him to arrive from the hills to the north, recorded that Evatt 'pulled a very long face' when he told Parkin of the 'grave fiasco'. When Masai tried to console Evatt, 'Why so sad? When there is fighting some of the Elmoran (warriors) must die', he retorted by blaming them for quitting their posts and crowding the Maxim. Apparently with the intention of minimizing the seriousness of the episode, Johnston claimed that Evatt pursued his attackers for two days and 'inflicted severe punishment upon them', but this is not borne out by Evatt or by other eye-witness accounts.
 12. The boma Rumbold had built to receive the booty expected from the Kamelilo operations sufficed to house the 1,200 cattle brought in by Ellison and Evatt. The African troops were 'intensely dissatisfied' because 'no portion of the loot has been given them'.
 13. Kipsigis say many of the cattle seized by Evatt did not belong to Nandi refugees but to their hosts. Evatt conceded in 1931 that Jackson's expressions, 'a very nasty set-back' and 'the slap in the face', were justifiable at the time, but insisted that 'ultimate success was attained greatly through the Nyando Valley operations'.
 14. The first mention of a heliograph being used at Fort Ternan, where sepoy prospected the nearby hills for a signal station. Rumbold left on the seventeenth with forty rifles to hurry up Haig but returned three days later without meeting Hill's caravan.
 15. Telegraphed from Zanzibar by B.S. Cave on 3.11.1900 and communicated through the Press Association to the newspapers, 'in view of the anxiety'.
 16. Thirty were too ill to walk and two died before reaching Port Ugowe.
 17. Entebbe minuted on 3.11.1900, 'decision in favour of Latongwa'; see *NRBR* ii, p. 149. Hobley's circumstantial account is a good example of the different approach of civil and military officers when investigating contentious matters.
 18. Cunningham minuted lamely, 'no clothing asked for'. For the way the chiefs were treated during the expedition, and Hobley's protest, which was rebutted in some detail in Haig's medical report, see *NRBR* ii, p. 81.
 19. Chief Oganyo was fined and imprisoned on 5.9.1900 'for refusing to acknowledge the government and other misdemeanours'.
 20. Johnston attributed Lumbwa neutrality to the 'sound thrashing' that Evatt had given the Nandi, and noted that the Sotik had begun to march on Fort Ternan 'when they heard of one of Evatt's coups and decided to return home' (ESA A/38/4). Kipchomber's restraining influence and the attitude of the Kamasia may have discouraged the Lumbwa from taking a more active part before their country was invaded.
 21. Jackson evidently agreed with Hobley since he gave Arap Tumbo some cattle as a 'reward for loyalty during the Nandi punitive expedition' (ESA A/18/1).
 22. In 1902 it was estimated from figures collated from Intelligence Reports that, excluding the Sotik sections, the Lumbwa could put 4-5,000 spearmen in the field out of a total population of 35-45,000 (FO 2/804, Woodward, *op. cit.*, p. 11). Rumbold put their fighting strength at 15,000 and thought it

- could take a year to chastise them (RL, 16, 10.10.1900).
23. This was also advocated by Jackson (NRBR i, p. 189, FOCP 7954/41).
 24. See NRBR ii, pp. 37, 53, 164 for the calibre of Collectors appointed to Nandi.
 25. Hobley had left before Johnston's orders were received at Port Ugowe, but he may have seen them at Fort Ternan.
 26. Rumbold thought Evatt would 'mark time for a bit and won't risk another raid into Lumbwa country'; also that he would 'get into hot water for having acted imprudently if not madly', and be censured by a court of inquiry for courting disaster by 'not taking proper precautions' and for 'fanning the smouldering sparks of open resistance into a fierce flame' by invading Lumbwa.
 27. Johnston bombarded the Foreign Office with demands that Coles, a reserve officer, too old for active campaigning, and an ally of Ternan, should not return. He was overruled by Salisbury but Coles was not appointed Deputy Commissioner as Ternan had been. Evatt stated in 1931 that 'Coles was induced to return against his own inclinations' by Ternan, who was hoping to be the next Commissioner and wanted his friend as Commandant.

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- A. Intelligence Reports, Nos. 2 (Wortham, 26.6.1901), 11 (Gorges, 9.4.1902), FO 2/804; Woodward, *op. cit.*, p. 13; *Daily News*, 19.3.1901, FO 2/558; Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 213; KER 32 file, KNA; Towett, *op. cit.*; Langat, *op. cit.*, p. 89.
- B. Evatt-Com, 15.10.1900, FOCP 7689/84; Evatt-Henderson, 4.6.1931; Evatt's Report; *London Gazette*, 10.9.1901 (amendment in FO 2/461); Henderson, *R.G.Q.*, 1933-34, 'A Yarn about Uganda', *Hazlehurst School Gazette*, April 1901; RL, 9.10.1900 to 16.10.1900, presumably recording information from Ellison, Whittle and Native Officers; Salim Mkuu, *op. cit.*, Johnston-FO, 21.10.1900, FOCP 7690/16; Ternan-FO, 2.11.1900 (tele.), FO 2/294; *The Times*, 9.12.1900; map in Rumbold, 7.12.1901, FO 2/804, for the site of the Cheplel camp; Hobley, *From Chartered Company*, pp. 112-113; Jackson, *op. cit.*, pp. 213, 332; Moyse-Bartlett, *op. cit.*, p. 88; for an imaginative account of this and other incidents, see R. Hardy, *Iron Snake*, Ch. 11.
- C. Troop movements in ESA A/18/1, PUD, FO 2/300. Evatt's Report. Hobley, *ibid.*, p. 112, noting that the garrison was subject to daily bouts of sniping by Nandi riflemen.
- D. FO-Cave, 18.9.1900, Evatt-FO, 21.10.1900, FO 2/291; Reuter's Telegrams, 4.11.1900, in ZG, 7.11.1900. Evatt's Report; Rev. J.J. Willis, *Diary*, 1.11.1900, and 'Reflections' (unpublished typescript). RL, 25.10.1900; there were 900 head of cattle in his caravan.
- E. Hobley-Com, 12.10.1900, ESA A/18/1.
- F. Hobley-Com, 13.10.1900, ESA A/18/1; cf. RL, 10.10.1900.
- G. HD, 26.9.1900. See Cashmore, 'Studies in District Administration in the E.A.P. 1895-1918' (Ph.D. Thesis, Camb., 1965) for the attitude of the Giriama in 1914.
- H. Hobley-Com, 12.10.1900, ESA A/18/1; cf. RL, 9.9.1900, 18, 20.9.1900, 25.9.1900, 4, 16.10.1900; he thought the Lumbwa would probably have to be punished but agreed in the main with Hobley's analysis.
- I. Transport and troop movements in ESA A/18/1, A/19/1, PUD; Tarrant-Com, 3.12.1900, ESA A/10/1, which infers that the Iganga and Luba's sepoys were training Baganda police guarding the telegraph.
- J. Jackson-Evatt, 27.9.1900, ESA A/18/1. Evatt-Henderson, 4.6.1931. Hobley-Com, 13.10.1900, ESA A/18/1.

CHAPTER 12

Military balance-sheet

The field force had been operating for about three and a half months when Evatt disbanded the expedition on 21 October. Active campaigning had been carried out for most of this period, except for short breaks to allow three large convoys to pass through, and for Masai and Kamasia auxiliaries to be called in. The most protracted lull occurred shortly after the start of the campaign when Evatt rested his forces at Bushiri for nearly a fortnight. The Nandi took advantage of this tactical error to move large numbers of livestock and non-combatants to hiding places in the forests and mountains, or into Lumbwa. At the beginning of the campaign Evatt commanded a force consisting of seven officers (including one doctor and Colour-Sergeant Ellison), 341 regulars, 166 armed police and 210 Baganda gunmen; by the time peace negotiations were opened, the number of officers had risen to fifteen and the regular troops to a total of between six and seven hundred. The final complement, which was drawn from five stations in the Eastern Province and seven in the rest of the Protectorate, included men from seven companies of the Uganda Rifles and about 160 Sikhs and Punjabis from the Indian Contingent.¹ This considerable force represented over a third of the sepoys and about half the total establishment of officers and Uganda Riflemen for the whole Protectorate. When Johnston made his slighting remarks about the opposition to be expected from 'the naked bandits of forests and mountains', and Evatt prepared his plan of campaign, neither had envisaged that so large a body of men would be tied down in the Eastern Province in order to subjugate a tribe as small as the Nandi. In addition to the military officers, eight administrators, four doctors, six transport and five telegraph officials also assisted in the campaign. Thus for the third time since 1895 the Nandi engrossed the attention of a considerable proportion of the Protectorate's total manpower.²

In view of the demands made upon the army by the expedition, it was fortunate that reinforcements could safely be sent from garrisons in more peaceful areas. In Buganda, the Bakungu chiefs were fully occupied adjusting themselves to their new rights and responsibilities under the Agreement, and establishing themselves on the estates that had been allocated to them under the land settlements. Bunyoro, which had been desolated by years of fighting and the ravages of famine and disease, was being governed as a conquered territory by George Wilson with the help of Baganda agents. A form of indirect rule had been introduced with the co-operation of the surviving Banyoro leaders, none of whom seemed disposed to attempt to avenge Kabarega's defeat, or even to oppose the transfer of a large part of the tribal territory to Buganda. In Ankole, the last remaining focus of opposition to the Omugabe and Collector was removed in September by the deportation of the formerly powerful regent, Igumira. Fears of an Acholi rising in the Nile District were dispelled as a result of three months' campaign against Aotich of Payera, which Delmé-Radcliffe undertook without reference to Evatt or Johnston. In other frontier areas, Belgian activities in the Bahr el Ghazal³ and German incursions into Kavirondo from Shirati continued to cause anxiety, but not to the extent of persuading the Foreign Office to sanction measures to contain them.⁴ In the one frontier district where it was essential for the Protectorate's authority to be upheld, Johnston was becoming increasingly concerned about the activities of Lenana, 'who seems to be a thoroughly mischievous and even dangerous person', and the possibility of his inducing Naivasha Masai to raid caravans and government installations. Ainsworth did not however share Johnston's concern. He explained that the raids for which warriors from Uganda were summoned were against Sendeyu in German East Africa, and suggested that Lenana be appointed 'Liwali' at a salary of Rs 100 per month in recognition of his help in the past, and as a means of ensuring his 'good conduct and loyalty' in the future.⁵

In the few districts where hostilities occurred or rumblings of disaffection were heard while the expedition was in progress, steps were taken to minimize their effect by a temporary withdrawal, or by postponing punitive measures until troops could be found to carry them out. Baker was authorized to retire on Njemps if Ribo Post could not be held without assistance, and Fowler was told to avoid provocative action in Busoga⁶ and other districts of the Central Province. Proposals for restraining Kakungulu's followers were deferred in spite of Jackson's acknowledgement that, in their spoliation of local tribesmen,

they were behaving 'no better than Masai or Nandi cattle-lifters'.^C

In addition to official resources, the expedition was assisted by tribesmen from several districts. While the operations were in progress, porters, animals and carts of the Transport Department and military transport sections were augmented by about 2,000 Luo and Baluya porters. After the field force was disbanded, a similar number of Baganda were sent to move loads which had been left at railhead and Ravine.⁵ Porters who accompanied the Bukedi column to Mumias were returned to their homes, but other Baganda took rations, medical supplies, ammunition and reinforcements to Port Ugowe, because the *Victoria*, government and private sailing vessels and Baganda canoes could not cope with Evatt's requirements. The porters kept the troops supplied with necessities, and the failure to revictual Fort Ternan and issue a regular meat ration to the field force was the result of military decisions rather than a shortage of carrying power.

Something like 1,000 auxiliaries were recruited from five tribes for service with the field force and for strengthening station garrisons. The initial contingent of 210 Baganda gunmen saw little fighting and were discharged after a month's campaigning. Masai, Kamasia and Uasin Gishu spearmen took part in most of the subsequent operations and acquitted themselves well. Evatt, who had been lukewarm about using them at the outset, commented at the close of the campaign that 'it was not until (their) advent that really effective results were obtained'. He was particularly impressed with the Masai, 'who, so long as they were supported by rifles, were always ready to go anywhere'. Henderson went further and declared that without the 'enterprise and pluck' of the Masai, and their 'wonderful instinct for nosing out livestock, we alone would have secured little'. In view of these comments, it was paradoxical that shortly after Evatt's tardy decision to summon the Masai, the War Office, which was as much in the dark as the Foreign Office about the situation in Uganda, warned that it 'might entail inconvenient consequences' to use them against the Nandi. It was considered that such an arrangement would give official blessing to the raiding propensities of the Masai, and might lead to ill-will between the two tribes. Although the War Office had no doubt that the Nandi 'will stand but little chance against a British expedition', the fear was expressed that 'they will probably retaliate on the Masai if a favourable opportunity arises at some future time'.^D By calling in auxiliaries Evatt acknowledged, if only by implication, that regulars on their own could accomplish little against the Nandi. He was prepared to use the means at hand to complete his task without concerning himself with the repercussions his action might have on future relations between the Nandi and Masai.

The employment of auxiliaries might be regarded as a typical case of the deliberate use of one tribe against another, and the exploitation of tribal animosities in order to complete, and in the case of friendly tribes to consolidate, the process of pacification. It might on the other hand be seen simply as an admission that the Protectorate's resources could only be speedily augmented in an emergency by recruiting volunteer forces. The auxiliaries for their part responded to the request for help for reasons that bore little relation to either of these alternatives. The Masai and Uasin Gishu, 'who have all the characteristics of born poachers', were always eager to go anywhere for the excitement of a fight and the prospect of loot. Although the expedition held out the added inducement of participating in the defeat of their traditional enemies, the auxiliaries from Ravine, Naivasha, and the E.A.P. were probably motivated more by the promise of gain than by the prospect of reviving animosities which had to some extent been curbed since the advent of the British. The Kamasia responded to Evatt's summons partly as a means of increasing their herds, and partly as an opportunity of confirming their intention of discontinuing their formerly close association with their Nandi kinsmen. The Baganda, who had neither a traditional nor incipient feud with the Nandi, were influenced by mercenary motives and, to a lesser degree, by their leaders' desire to strengthen their position at home.

The number of Nandi capable of bearing arms was probably about 6,000 junior elders, warriors and uninitiated youths.⁶ Any hopes the Nandi may have cherished of their being joined by other tribes in the grand alliance that was allegedly proposed in June, or in a more narrowly based Kalenjin combination similar to that engineered by the Laibon in 1897, were only partially realized. Kamasia chiefs threw in their lot with the government by providing auxiliaries for the field force, and the only warriors from Baringo District who helped the Nandi were probably the Lembus, and possibly a few Kamasia dissidents who joined marauding bands operating in the neighbourhood of Ravine. Although the Nyangori and

Elgeyo presumably gave shelter to non-combatants and livestock, the Lumbwa were the only Kalenjin tribe to take a significantly positive stand in supporting the Nandi. Even this support was restricted for the most part to some of the more distant sections, until Evatt seized livestock from the northern Lumbwa when he invaded their country during the last week of the campaign. Thus, although the Nandi were far from being completely isolated, considerable progress had undoubtedly been made towards achieving the objective which had apparently been Berkeley's and Hopley's goal.⁷

Evatt claimed that 'an exemplary number' of 349 of the enemy were 'authenticated killed', so it is probable that total Nandi and Lumbwa fatalities, including women and children killed in the cave assaults, did not exceed 600, and the number captured was presumably too small to be mentioned in the final report.⁸ None of the captives, including those interviewed by Hopley at Port Ugowe, was important enough to be identified by name or position, or to be subjected to the educative process which had proved useful in convincing other captured leaders of the might and permanence of British rule.⁹ Another of Hopley's practices, the seizure of women hostages with the object of forcing their menfolk to come in and plead for their release, was not adopted by Evatt. This was presumably either because the women evaded capture, or because it was not thought worth while encumbering the columns with prisoners whom the Nandi might not attempt to ransom.

Material losses inflicted on the Nandi included the seizure of 3,466 head of cattle and 29,366 sheep and goats, a much bigger haul than in previous expeditions or in punitive operations elsewhere in the Eastern Province.¹⁰ A large number of houses were burned down and considerable quantities of food sequestered or destroyed. Standing crops were apparently left untouched in the early stages of the expedition, possibly because their destruction would have caused food shortages at the close of what was originally conceived as a short campaign. Although the loss of their homes and food supplies failed to bring the Nandi to their knees,¹¹ the hardships they endured in the forests and mountains during the heavy rains eventually weakened their resolve to continue the struggle. Women, children and the aged suffered most from the nomadic life they were forced to pursue, but endured these tribulations with the same fortitude as during the 1895 expedition.¹² The chiefs admitted at the start of the peace negotiations that they were weary of the struggle, and Hopley noted that 'the Nandi were becoming rather sick of sleeping in the bush'. Some of the Lumbwa welcomed the conclusion of the negotiations for similar reasons.¹³ The readiness of the Nandi to consider overtures for peace, and thus enjoy a respite from the attentions of Evatt's columns, was undoubtedly caused in part by the hardships they suffered during the military occupation of their country. Another consideration which hastened the opening of peace negotiations was the need to harvest the ripened crops in order to replenish the emptied granaries, and to clear trees and bush in preparation for the next season's planting.¹³

Government casualties were Dr Sherlock killed and Lieutenant Henderson wounded (twice); 17 Indians wounded; 45 local troops killed and 15 wounded; 46 auxiliaries and police killed and 57 wounded; and 15 porters killed and 16 wounded. In addition to these combat casualties, 3 sepoys, 7 other soldiers and 20 porters died from natural causes. The majority of fatalities among African troops occurred either before Evatt initiated his concentration policy, or during the final operations in the Nyando Valley. The sepoys suffered relatively few casualties, possibly because they usually operated in some strength and under the direct supervision of their officers. Baganda casualties of only 1 man killed and 2 wounded were small compared with the Masai auxiliaries, who lost 35 killed and 54 wounded during the assaults on the escarpment caves, the sweep through the Kapware forest and the night attack on Evatt's camp. The fact that the 31 casualties among the porters occurred either singly or in pairs at intervals throughout the campaign testifies to the tireless watchfulness of the Nandi for breaches of march or camp discipline. Dr Sherlock's death and the injuries sustained by Lieutenant Henderson were severe blows to the government's prestige, and ensured that news of the campaign would reach the outside world. The doctor was the third European to be killed by the Nandi, who were thus responsible for the deaths of more white men than any other of the Protectorate tribes.¹⁴

The low death and high wound-recovery rates were due in great measure to the energy and ability of Captain P.B. Haig, the expedition's medical officer. His achievements were especially creditable in view of the state of the troops at the beginning of the campaign, the trying climate and difficult terrain, the tactics adopted by Evatt, the uncertain food

supply, the length of the operations, and the shortage of medical staff. The weather was often wet and misty and the nights cold, and the men had to adapt themselves to variations in climatic conditions between the plateau and plains. Bowel and respiratory disorders, which were brought on by dietary deficiencies, inclement weather and the fording of swollen streams, accounted for the majority of cases requiring treatment.¹⁵ The troops operated mainly in broken, mountainous country, covered with rocks, forest and bush, and marched along narrow and often steep, slippery paths, with the result that there were many cases of sore feet, thorn and splinter wounds of the leg, and abrasions. Evatt's tactics entailed frequent marching and counter-marching, often by flying columns inadequately equipped with tents and blankets to withstand exposure in night bivouacs. As the striking force was usually absent from its base for several days, the wounded and sick often had to be carried considerable distances before they could receive treatment. The riflemen were called upon for special exertions, and sometimes had to run long distances in order to keep up with the unencumbered auxiliaries for whom they were expected to provide support. Shortages that occurred when supplies of captured meat and milk were insufficient to supplement the grain confiscated from the Nandi, probably explain in part why auxiliaries and porters suffered from 'nostalgia and homesickness' and had to be discharged.^F

Most of the wounds were caused by poisoned arrows but the *Keliot* (*Acokanthera*) poison was stale and only in two cases produced symptoms of localized blood poisoning. Neither of the patients died, and Haig attributed the successful treatment of this dreaded form of wounding to prompt medical attention and his embargo on the use of strychnine injections as an antidote.¹⁶

The provision of medical staff and equipment had been based on Evatt's assessment of the size of the force needed to crush the Nandi, and the kind of operations thought to be adequate to bring this about. Except for Dr Milne's temporary secondment and Dr Sherlock's short period of active service, no additional medical officers were posted to the expedition to help care for the reinforcements which Evatt found it necessary to call in.¹⁷ The result was that some of the columns operated without a skilled medical attendant, and could only receive proper treatment when they returned to base, or joined a column to which Haig or his assistant was attached. This state of affairs was particularly unfortunate as far as the porters were concerned. As they spent the nights in hastily constructed shelters and were seldom provided with enough substantial food for their arduous duties, the almost naked Kavirondo were especially vulnerable to the rigours of the unaccustomed climate of the Nandi Plateau. Nevertheless, if Haig's figure of only twenty deaths out of a total complement of around 2,000 was correct, the Kavirondo displayed remarkable strength, stamina and spirit. The sepoys, who were feeling the cumulative effect of the climate after two years' service in East Africa,¹⁸ local troops and auxiliaries also exhibited a laudable degree of hardness under trying conditions. The rigours of the campaign took their toll among the officers, many of whom had been serving in districts where climatic conditions were vastly different from those in Nandi. Dysentery deprived Evatt of the services of his political officer, Lieutenant Cooper had to be invalided home because the hardships of the campaign 'stimulated his latent lung disease into activity', and Lieutenant Wortham and Captain Barlow were withdrawn from their posts and sent to Ravine and Naivasha respectively to recuperate.¹⁹ The situation deteriorated as the campaign dragged on; and, when Evatt was arranging for the defence of the Nyando Valley and planning the last offensive, four of his five officers serving with the local troops were unfit for active service.^G

Before opportunities for obtaining much booty were largely restricted by Evatt's concentration policy to the unguarded telegraph in the Nyando Valley, the Nandi captured a considerable amount of property, including some fifty rifles and ammunition. Although total removal of the wire between Kitoto's and the Mau handicapped Evatt during the campaign, he decided to defer its restoration until troops could be released from offensive operations to escort repair parties and patrol the line.^H Communications were also disrupted by the seizure of carts and oxen, and by the destruction of the Mogong bridge and the stables on Sclater's Road. Failure to protect the Uganda Road and telegraph was criticized in East Africa and abroad, and was largely responsible for Johnston's decision to suspend offensive operations until transport and communication facilities were restored.

The tactics used by the Nandi were similar to those they had followed in all their encounters with the British since the battle of Kimondi²⁰ in 1895.^I Describing their system of

warfare as one of watching and waiting, Evatt admitted that the warriors were seldom seen, and Henderson noted that the contest was 'a game of hide and seek between the Government troops and the WaNandi with their cattle'. The warriors were skilful in their use of the terrain for purposes of concealment or attack, and their mobility was only limited by the endurance of their stock. They enjoyed an important advantage over many cattle-owning tribes in having abundant water resources distributed throughout the district, instead of being dependent on a few major watering points²¹ which could be destroyed or kept under constant observation by an enemy.^J They were also able to use the forest and *kaptich* salt licks,²² the location of most of which was unknown to the Collector at Kipture, and to graze their cattle in the extensive forest glades. The Nandi method of fighting depended to a large extent on the vigilance of scouts and outposts, and their ability to give cattle guards and fighting bands early warning of the troops' approach. These duties were often performed by women, who also took food and arrows to the warriors at night. Small boys, too, helped carry supplies as well as being given charge of sheep and goats. Recourse to guerrilla tactics was facilitated by the removal of livestock, non-combatants and food reserves to places of concealment, the lack of fortified villages, and the denial of guides, information and other forms of assistance to the enemy. Some intelligence about past events was obtained from prisoners by Hobley, but none of the items he recorded revealed anything of current or future plans. It was not until fighting had been in progress for nearly two months that any information which had a bearing on the conduct of the campaign was received from Nandi sources.

The alertness of the Nandi scouts was the cardinal factor in launching offensive operations, for it was on intelligence from this source that warrior leaders decided whether an attack had a reasonable chance of success and the best method for its execution. The leaders were skilful in assessing the probabilities and prudent in restricting attacks to parties who were weak or unprepared. Porters who ignored standing orders were speared near the line of march and on the outskirts of camps, messengers were waylaid and over-zealous auxiliaries ambushed, and small detachments of riflemen annihilated or severely mauled. Some of these attacks were sprung from prepared ambushes, but most were carried out by a few spearmen concealed in dense forest or long grass. The latter was the favourite medium of concealment because it enabled the raiders to escape more readily than by narrow forest paths. Attacks of this kind were difficult to guard against because columns had to march in single file through country that was too thickly covered with bush and forest for them to be provided with a protective screen. Summing up the problems the field force had to face, Henderson noted that 'these gallant savages were not to be despised; not only were they adept at invisibility and guerilla tactics, but they never missed a chance'.^K A few of the raids were carried out mainly for booty; two were concerned with the recovery of captured stock; and the remainder were intended to harry the enemy and disrupt communications. Most of the incidents occurred during the daytime though two of the largest operations were launched at night.²³

The tactics employed in 1900 differed in two respects from those adopted in earlier expeditions: the destruction of transport stables and the Mogong bridge, which showed that the Nandi had learned the significance of attacking communications;²⁴ and the investment of Fort Ternan, which suggested that they understood the value of immobilizing troops by containing them in fixed positions. On the other hand, the majority of the casualties suffered by the Nandi were caused by their recourse to a long abandoned practice, and their failure to devise means of countering a manoeuvre they seldom encountered in inter-tribal fighting. In the first instance, occupation of the escarpment caves as refuges rendered a large number of people vulnerable to a single attack; in the second, no means were devised for the early detection of night marches in order to guard against surprise pre-dawn attacks.²⁵

With the exception of these two particulars, customary fighting methods proved effective within the context of the weapons available to the warriors. The tactics adopted by the Nandi, and the constraints put upon them by Evatt's concentration policy, gave only occasional scope for the use of weapons designed for hand to hand fighting, the spear and *sime* (short sword). The bow, which was customarily a secondary weapon used mainly for hunting and as a prelude to a spear attack, accounted for the majority of government casualties. Haig observed that the bowmen were indifferent marksmen, except at close range, but acknowledged that their arrows had great penetrative power, especially when shot

through a high trajectory for a distance of up to a hundred yards. Some of the captured rifles were used against Fort Ternan but seemingly not elsewhere. The Nandi were unpractised in the use of firearms and preferred to trade them to the Baluya in exchange for cattle and food.²⁶

Although opposition was more widespread in 1900 and the external threat strengthened the ties between *pororosiek*, there is little evidence that this was reflected in a much greater degree of centralized direction and co-ordination in the conduct of operations than in previous expeditions.²⁷ Reliance was placed on the well-tried *pororiet* system under which operational control was exercised by local war leaders. They generally acted independently of their neighbours in 1900, though a few operations were carried out by several *pororosiek* on the pattern developed for cattle raids against distant tribes and contests with the Masai. None of the leaders who planned and directed these concerted enterprises became accepted as a tribal general,²⁸ nor did the successes gained from operating in combination convince the Nandi of the benefits to be derived from the creation of a tribal army. This was partly because two features of their fighting organization had an important bearing on the successful prosecution of the type of warfare favoured by the Nandi: continuance of the struggle was not dependent on the fortunes of a single *pororiet* or its leaders; and a *pororiet* fighting force could remain in the field for long periods without its weapon and food suppliers running much risk of being detected. Furthermore, the creation of a tribal army would have meant a radical change in structure and attitudes, either by the formation of a supreme council, or by recognizing the Laibon as the political head of the tribe.²⁹ Although Koitalel correctly sensed the temper of the people and added his authority and sanction to their resolve to rid themselves of the British, he was presumably chary of doing anything likely to jeopardize his recently acquired authority, until he was satisfied that the *pororosiek* who had sided against him after Kimnyole's death were fully reconciled to his assumption of his father's office.^L *Pororosiek* leaders were equally reluctant to surrender their independent commands, since this would mean investing Koitalel with powers which none of his predecessors had ever wielded. The *pororiet* system was too firmly entrenched, and had proved too successful, for major modifications to be made to it³⁰ during the short period that had elapsed since Nandi sovereignty was first threatened by the British in 1895.^M

One important consequence of this weakness in command structure was noted when the Nandi war organization was analyzed in connection with plans for the 1905 expedition: 'their tribal organization is too loose and their stage of civilization too primitive for them to act on interior lines to concentrate in force on one column, while threatened by movements of other columns'.^N The *pororiet* system nevertheless functioned reasonably well for the type of warfare the Nandi chose to undertake in 1900. It was obviously unsuited for mounting massive combined assaults against riflemen, but the Nandi had no intention of engaging in so unequal a contest. Previous expeditions had taught them that if the troops were constantly harried and kept at arm's length they would soon grow weary of the struggle, and retire before striking a decisive blow.

Evatt's intention on the other hand was to crush the Nandi by a military defeat from which it would take years for them to recover. The methods he eventually employed to try to bring this about were dictated to a large extent by the terrain and the tactics of the enemy. Evatt realized at the end of the first week's campaigning that the Nandi had no intention of giving him the chance of meeting them in open battle. They had also proved their skill in taking advantage of ill-considered troop dispositions, and demonstrated an exceptional aptitude for concealing stock.³¹ Evatt was consequently obliged to concert new plans, some of which were entirely defensive in character. In addition to the general inconvenience caused by some of these plans, regulations restricting the movement of loads, mail-runners and small parties of troops also hampered the work of the field force. Delays occurred in bringing up reinforcements and stores, drawing food from the reserve dumps, and sending supplies from foraging columns to static formations which had no other means of obtaining food.³²

There was often almost a complete breakdown of all forms of communication between stations and the field force, and between independent columns and campaign headquarters. Fort Ternan suffered particularly badly in this respect, with the result that Wortham and then Rumbold were cut off for several weeks at a time. Heliographs could only operate when

weather conditions were favourable, and proved a poor substitute for the abandoned telegraph as a means of maintaining contact with Entebbe, and with the Commander-in-Chief in western Uganda. Messages between operational wings of the field force often had to be transmitted through an intermediate station, with the result that senders were not always certain whether their messages had been received. This caused some unfortunate misunderstandings between the commanders concerned, and prompted Henderson to concede that, for the sort of fighting the field force was engaged upon, the Nandi practice of shouting information from hilltop to hilltop was 'at least as effective as our heliographs, if not more'.³³ Another drawback Evatt had to contend with was that the only map he had to rely on was the sketch made by Vandeleur in 1895, which was far from accurate as far as areas some distance away from Cunningham's line of march were concerned. As a result of this and the lack of reliable guides, distances were misjudged, parties sent out on night attacks lost their way, detachments which had been expected to act in concert lost touch with each other, and rendezvous, such as that between Evatt and the Fort Ternan column for the final Nyando Valley operations, were not always kept.³⁴

The Commandant chose to accept some inconvenience from faulty communications in order to deprive the enemy of targets for marauding bands. This concentration policy achieved its object, but offensive operations designed to seek out cattle, and so force the warrior herdsmen to do battle in defence of their stock, were less successful. The cattle had been driven to the most inaccessible parts of the country, and secreted in places difficult to find and dangerous to attack. This meant that search parties had to risk being attacked on ground not of their own choosing, and to change their line of march in accordance with the movements of the enemy.³⁵ Follow up operations after a successful raid were sometimes called off, because the troops could not keep up with the auxiliaries, and because men had to be withdrawn from search parties to guard the captured stock, and in some cases to drive them to places of safety. Inaccurate information or a tactical miscalculation caused Evatt to fail in one enterprise on which he had set great store, the capture of the Laibon. He had much more success in achieving his secondary aims of looting and burning huts and granaries, capturing small stock, and keeping the warriors on the move by marches and counter-marches, and by reconnaissance and foraging columns.³⁶

Because of the little progress made in the first phase of the operations, reinforcements were requisitioned from Busoga, Buganda and western Uganda, and Baganda gunmen were replaced by more mobile auxiliaries in order to increase the expedition's chances of locating the enemy's stock. Soldiers and spearmen were then organized in three independent columns which operated at the same time in widely separated areas. No attempt was made to undertake a general drive through the country by converging columns, so warriors from areas being worked over by independent columns had little difficulty in escaping with their stock into parts of the district that were free of troops. The expedition did not visit all the populated parts of Nandi, nor a number of outlying *kaptich* areas where large herds of cattle had been driven.³⁷ Evatt had insufficient men and fit officers for a co-ordinated driving operation which would have entailed working thoroughly through 1,600 square miles of country. He had no choice therefore but to attack when and where he could and to keep the enemy on the move. This he succeeded in doing, but localized raids on reported cattle concentrations did not always achieve the results he expected. Better results were obtained towards the end of the campaign when formerly independent columns operated together as a combined striking force. The force so composed was not however strong enough to surround and seize large mobs of cattle, and so provoke the enemy into launching a counter attack for their recovery.

When Evatt assumed command of the expedition he had been badly briefed on the magnitude of his task. Jackson had endorsed the original plan, which implied that disaffection could be thoroughly and expeditiously quashed by a march through Nandi and a similar demonstration in Lumbwa. This assessment was probably based on Evatt's campaigning experience in districts on the other side of the Lake, where he had contrived to bring large numbers of gunmen and warriors to battle in country that was more suited to riflemen and Maxims than the Nandi Plateau proved to be. He soon found that he had overrated the effectiveness of Baganda gunmen in mountainous country, and underestimated the resourcefulness of the Nandi warriors and the temper of the people. The original plan was altered to meet the problems encountered during the first phase of the expedition, and other

tactical adjustments were subsequently made in order to counter the guerilla methods employed by the enemy. In many respects, therefore, the initiative rested with the Nandi, for their evasive tactics and mobility dictated the methods Evatt adopted and often the route the field force followed. Evatt's inability to wrest the initiative from the Nandi, and so dictate the course and nature of the campaign, denied him the expected advantage of bringing massed and sustained rifle and Maxim firepower to bear on large numbers of the enemy. Denied this advantage, he failed to achieve the speedy, exemplary conquest that had confidently been expected at the beginning of the expedition, and met with 'two or three reverses' in what Johnston described as a 'most disagreeable, difficult'³⁸ and of necessity inglorious campaign'.⁰

After the last engagement, in which the Nandi scored at least a partial victory, the field force was split up into several detachments and relegated to a defensive role, and peace negotiations were initiated with a weary but by no means conquered army.

NOTES

1. Kipture, Mumias, Port Ugowe, Fort Ternan and Ravine; Entebbe, Kampala, Luba's, Fort Portal, Masindi, Masaka and Iganga. Men from 3, 4, 7, 10, 13, 14 and 15 Companies, referred to as 'local troops' to distinguish them from the 400-strong Indian Contingent, or 1st Battalion.
2. See *NRBR* i, pp. 135, 254-255.
3. Johnston's call for action in January was rejected by the Foreign Office, 'till we are in smoother waters elsewhere'; an expedition from the Sudan was authorized in September, and re-occupation of the Bahr el Ghazal planned for the following December (FO 2/297, 301, 291).
4. An exception was made in the case of Mutanda, whom Baganda under Andrea were instructed to depose in August because Jackson thought this could be done without causing discontent (ESA A/11/1, *NRBR* i, pp. 278, 280, 341).
5. See *NRBR* ii, pp. 137, 146-147.
6. Cf. G.W. Huntingford's estimate (*The Nandi of Kenya*, p. 80) of 4,710 warriors from a total male population of 14,140 in 1900, and Pope-Hennessy's figure (CO 533/12) of 2,000 warriors and 6,000 junior elders and youths capable of fighting in 1905.
7. See *NRBR* i, pp. 170, 217, 222, 343, 370, *NRBR* ii, p. 49. The conduct of the Nandi from 1901 to 1906 suggests that the support they received from the Lumbwa in 1900 more than compensated for the hostility or neutrality of the Luo, Baluyia, Baganda, Masai, Uasin Gishu, Njemps, Kamasia, Elgeyo and Nyangori.
8. Cf. 420 killed, hundreds wounded and 300 prisoners in Kitosh in 1895, and 250 Luo killed or wounded in the Uyoma operations in 1899. Johnston claimed on 3.3.1901 (ESA A/38/4) that the Nandi lost '200 of their warriors in one fight, 50 in another'; this is not substantiated by Evatt's Report or elsewhere.
9. 'I have found on previous occasions that a stay at the station has a great civilizing effect, the individual rarely giving trouble again but coming in at frequent intervals to pay his respects' (FOCP 7823/84). See *NRBR* i, pp. 153 (Maragoli), 159 (Kitosh), 165, 185 (Lago and Sebei), *NRBR* ii, p. 56 (Nyangori). Baker brought back Suk chiefs after the expedition in January 1901 (*NRBR* ii, p. 165).
10. Totals in Evatt's situation reports are 3,142 and 23,614 respectively; see *NRBR* ii, pp. 109, 111, for the suggestion that some of these belonged to the Lumbwa. It seems that small stock were sent to Port Ugowe and cattle to Ravine. Cf. Kitosh losses (1895) 1,660 cattle, 1,476 small stock; Uyoma (1899) 2,589, 18,700; Nyangori (1900) 1,003, 2,000.
11. Cf. Delmé-Radcliffe's observation (FOCP 7946/59) after the Lango expedition of 1901 that crop destruction was ineffective unless on a large scale. A 'scorched earth' policy was adopted in G.E.A. to counter the guerilla tactics of the Maji Maji rebels, and other similar measures were used in 1906 to drive the Kamelilo and Kapchepkendi out of Tinderet (G.C. Gwassa and J. Iliffe, *Records of the Maji Maji Rising*, pp. 27-28).
12. Elders who were boys at the time give graphic accounts of their experiences in the forests. Wives were again reprimanded by husbands who thought their homes burned down because the domestic fires had not been extinguished before the women left; see *NRBR* i, p. 158.
13. Food scarcity and child desertion in 1901 were attributed to the decreased acreage under cultivation because of the expedition (FO 2/804, ESA A/18/1).
14. See *NRBR* i, pp. 94-95 (Peter West) and *NRBR* ii, p. 67 (Fabri Foust).

15. Two sepoys, who had also been on the Bukedi expedition, suffered from blackwater fever, but no cases of malaria were diagnosed.
16. See *NRBR* i, p. 272; also RL, 19.9.1900, for the use of strychnine in African companies. 72 wounds were caused by arrows, 20 by spears, 3 by *simes* and 2 by stones.
17. Milne, 23 August to 25 September; Sherlock 27 September to 13 October. Johnston was incorrect in stating on 16.10.1900 (FO 2/301) that Sherlock was detained at railhead, (sc. Nakuru) by Evatt to attend to men wounded in the Nandi fighting. Haig did military duties in addition to his professional work (FO 2/803). The Treasury approved the appointment of three more doctors in July, 'with reluctance', but Johnston reported on 16.10.1900 a shortage of 8 doctors out of an establishment of 15 (FO 2/381, ESA A/31).
18. Hornby blamed the climate for the 'break up' of the 1898-1901 Indian Contingent (FO 2/599). See *NRBR* i, p. 343 for a similar effect on the 27 B.L.I.
19. See RL., for his frequent attacks of dysentery and fever. Cf. *London Gazette*, 18.9.1906 for the 1905 expedition in which fifteen per cent of the officers were invalided.
20. See *NRBR* i, pp. 142-143. The failure of this frontal assault also disabused the Nandi of their faith in the Laibon's promise to turn bullets into water; they quickly recovered from the dispiriting effect of this discovery.
21. Hardinge and Eliot suggested, in April 1898 and March 1901 respectively, blowing the Afmadu wells and picketing other sources of supply for the Somali herds. The Germans put guards around Gogo watering places during the Bushiri operations in 1888-1889.
22. It was customary for the Nandi to drive cattle long distances through the night to salt licks.
23. Nandi tactics were almost identical with those described by Hall in August 1896 and Ainsworth in November 1900 to support their opinion that 'attempting anything by force' against the Masai 'would be a very big undertaking' (FO 2/165, FOCP 7690/25, and cf. the analyses, based mainly in 1905 on the 1900 campaign, in CO 533/12).
24. Although Eliot (*op. cit.*, p. 214, FOCP 7953/91, *Africa* 6 (1903), Cd. 1626, p. 9) refuted this in the case of the railway and telegraph, and dismissed raids upon them as 'simply burglarious', loot could hardly have been the motive for destroying stables and a bridge.
25. After defeating the Masai in the 'eighties, the Nandi no longer needed to use the caves as refuges, nor had they to be on their guard against night operations. Night marches had been made by Ternan, Coles, Bagnall and Parkin (*NRBR* i, pp. 262-264, *NRBR* ii, pp. 23, 49-50, 62).
26. During his fortnight's stay at Fort Ternan, Hobley recorded (*From Chartered Company*, p. 112) that snipers fired some thirty rounds a day at the station; see also *NRBR* ii, pp. 91, 166. The rate of exchange was one cow for one rifle (*Africa* 15 (1904), Cd. 2331, p. 7).
27. See *NRBR* i, pp. 154-155; the stale arrow poison suggests a lack of central direction, prudence and foresight.
28. In contrast to the 1905-1906 expedition, no *pororiet* leader in 1900 is remembered by name.
29. External threats often created favourable conditions for ritual experts, such as Masai Laibons, Nyabingi, Yakan and Kolelo cult leaders, to extend their political authority at the expense of other tribal institutions.
30. Cf. the Langi; and the Somali, whose resistance 'was undertaken within the traditional framework of their segmentary system, and this made the 'attainment of widespread co-operation extremely difficult'.
31. The Nandi say they plugged the mouths and nostrils of cattle with grass to prevent them giving their position away by lowing. This was confirmed by Sturdy during the 1905 expedition (Colonial Reports (Misc.) 49, p. 83).
32. Sepoys complained of high food prices and their officers claimed extra ration allowances (FO 2/463, 551).
33. There was apparently no heliograph at the fort except for the few days Evatt spent there. When Parkin left Kipture early in October, Evatt said: 'You may find Rumbold at Fort Ternan or you may find the whole lot wiped out'.
34. See *NRBR* ii, pp. 71-72. Johnston noted on 21.10.1900 (FOCP 7690/16) that, owing to the mountainous, forested country and 'the inimical disposition of its people, the district ... has been one of the least surveyed portions of the Protectorate'; also that WOID maps, based mainly on rough route sketches, 'did not tally with much degree of accuracy with the actual features of the country'.
35. Cf. Pope-Hennessy's analysis in 1905 (CO 533/12): 'Nandi brought to action only by capture of stock and then only under conditions favourable to them'.
36. Evatt recalled in 1931 that he was known as 'the Ever-Marching Lord', and that the Nandi, who likened

the troops to 'a swarm of bees' because of their numbers and the difficulty of getting away from them, 'afterwards freely admitted ... that they had no rest'.

37. North and west of the Kimondi; north of Sclater's Road, east of Kipture; *kapotich* to the north, north-east and north-west of areas visited by the troops.
38. The disabilities Evatt laboured under were similar in some respects to those experienced by commanders in the Bushiri, Mazrui, Maji Maji and Mau Mau operations.

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CHAPTER 13

Johnston's dilemma and apologia

Shortly before the night attack on Evatt's camp in the Nyando Valley, Johnston returned to Entebbe from a four months' stay in western Uganda. When the tour began on 29 May, Jackson was apparently not given any special instructions on the course he was to pursue if, during Johnston's absence, the hitherto sporadic raids by Nandi warriors developed into a sustained threat to Uganda's communications. After learning that such a threat had arisen, the Special Commissioner sent his deputy five messages regarding the action to be taken to remove it. To begin with he suggested capturing the Laibon, strengthening the field force with troops from peaceful areas and Baganda irregulars, and reorganizing transport and administrative arrangements, so that Evatt could 'dominate the railway route', and also ensure that 'the Nandi trouble should be adequately settled'. Johnston evidently had no misgivings at this juncture about the outcome, much less did he envisage that he would be writing at the conclusion of the operations that 'this campaign has been, I do not hesitate to say, the most arduous thing ever undertaken by the armed forces',¹ because of 'difficulties greater than have attended any previous warfare in Uganda'.^A

He was satisfied in August that Jackson and Evatt could cope with the situation, and that the threat was not serious enough for him to consider curtailing his western tour. Johnston did in fact cancel his visit to Bunyoro,² but this decision was taken on medical grounds because of the risk of a fifth attack of blackwater fever, and not on account of anxiety over affairs in the Eastern Province. Even after learning of the annihilation of the mail party in the Nyando Valley, he merely notified Evatt that he was sending fifty reinforcements for the field force and to guard the mail route.^B It was not until his return to Fort Portal from Ruwenzori in mid-September³ that he changed the field force's priorities, from the immediate subjugation of the Nandi to the protection of communications. Jackson, when forwarding these instructions to Evatt, gave the impression that the tour had been cut short by the worsening situation in Nandi. But the Special Commissioner's decision to march straight for Entebbe from Ruwenzori was prompted partly by the need to prepare for Hill's impending visit, and partly by his eagerness to complete the estimates for 1901-1902, which he considered second only to the Uganda Agreement as a means of placing 'the Administration ... on a permanent and satisfactory footing'.^C

When he eventually returned to Entebbe on 30 September, Johnston was at last in a position to come to grips with the Nandi. Reports of their bravery, stubbornness and resourcefulness had caused him to reconsider his strongly held opinions about the unlikelihood of 'naked people, scarcely armed with anything better than spears, bows and arrows', standing against disciplined riflemen, and the ability of Indian Staff Corps officers and sepoy 'to reconcile (themselves) to the tactics of bush fighting' more readily than their British and African counterparts. He had also to re-examine the validity of his belief that the Baganda were 'the only people for a long time to come who can deal a serious blow at British rule'. These views had not been shaken by isolated Nandi raids, which he considered no more significant than similar symptoms of unrest in other districts where tribes had no conception of the government's might. He agreed with Colonel Coles that 'the disturbed conditions of the country and the irreconcilable nature of the people had been much exaggerated', and thought that pacification of the Nandi District, which was 'fairly under administrative control', could be completed by following a policy of 'patience and just treatment'. In bringing about a settlement with the Nandi and Lumbwa, he was also hopeful that district officers would be helped by the erosion of tribal solidarity which had (usually) occurred when other tribes were being brought under control. While this consummation was being achieved, Johnston considered the inconvenience resulting from an occasional hostile act did not even warrant the retention of regular troops in the Kipture and Bushiri garrisons. So he arranged for the lines of communication to be kept open by police,⁴ who could also deal with the few remaining 'bandit brothers' of chiefs who had accepted British rule. Should some Nandi sections maintain their truculent attitude, or if there were signs that a disaffection was spreading throughout the tribe, Johnston had no doubt the situation could be quickly and thoroughly remedied by a military demonstration or punitive expedition, whenever action of this kind

was considered opportune.^D

Discussions with his deputy at Entebbe early in October forced the Special Commissioner to acknowledge that the problem was proving more intractable than he had thought. He instructed Knowles at Port Ugowo to keep him 'informed hourly of developments of importance', and drafted his first communication to the Foreign Office on the expedition. On 10 October - three days before the setback on the Nyando Valley - he telegraphed that 'no anxiety need be felt about the troubles in Nandi which are now practically at an end; Colonel Evatt controls the district with a very strong force and the railway and telegraph routes are now quite safe for transit; the Wanandi are suing for peace and Mr Jackson has gone to make a satisfactory settlement'. The message concluded with the reassuring if not entirely truthful claim that 'all the surrounding people helped the Administration in the most loyal manner and no other tribe joined the Wanandi'.⁵ After receiving the news of the attack on Evatt's camp, Johnston followed his preliminary announcement with a long despatch on 21 October, describing the events leading up to the expedition, the forces placed at Evatt's disposal, and the arrangements that had been made for protecting the Nyando Valley. In addition to a condensed and carefully edited version of the report which Hobley had drawn up for Jackson two months earlier,⁶ Johnston outlined his plans for resolving 'the present trouble, which must now be disposed of once and for all by the effectual conquest of this troublesome race'. These measures included the provision of more reinforcements, the redeployment of troops to safeguard the Nyando Valley, and the despatch of 1,000 Baganda gunmen to augment Evatt's forces, and 2,000 Baganda porters to move the large number of loads which had accumulated at Ravine and railhead during the expedition. Johnston also notified the Foreign Office of his intention to visit Nandi as soon as Hill left Entebbe and the estimates had been sent home. The principal objects of this visit would be to assure himself that the railway route was adequately protected, to expedite the completion of the cart track down the Nyando Valley, and concert measures 'to bring about the complete subjugation of the Nandi, as it is impossible that this tribe can be allowed to go on any longer disturbing the peace of the Eastern Province, and threatening the communications between Uganda and the coast'. The Special Commissioner had no doubt about the need to complete the task which the expedition had only partly accomplished, though he was reluctant to forecast the time required or the resources needed to bring this about. Evatt had assured him that the conquest of the Nandi could be completed without much difficulty but Johnston, whose faith in the Commandant's assessments was evidently beginning to waver, preferred to reserve judgement until he had visited Nandi himself or received confirmation of Evatt's assurance from Jackson. In concluding the despatch Johnston took comfort in one of his most cherished notions, the conviction that 'we have quite sufficient resources in the Baganda to meet the case, either in a temporary increase in police or in regular soldiers'.^E

The Foreign Office was also reassured about the arrangements that had already been made for Evatt to furnish escorts for rail and telegraph working parties, and provide garrisons for construction camps and telegraph posts. Johnston pointed out that these facilities had not always been granted in the past because Protectorate officers had not been advised of the railway's needs. This was not true, for several applications were made during the expedition for telegraph escorts which Evatt consistently refused to provide, and Jackson had not insisted upon with any urgency.⁷ Although Johnston was irritated by the breakdown of telegraphic communications, his instructions that convoy escorts were not to be transferred to repair parties made it clear that this inconvenience was not to be removed at the expense of hindering the resumption of regular transport operations. Reorganization of the transport service was listed as one of the Deputy Commissioner's chief tasks during his stay in the Eastern Province. Walter Mayes was seconded to Jackson as a temporary transport officer, and local facilities were to be augmented by transferring J.W. Russell's porters, animals and vehicles from Kikuyu to Kipture, so that a steady flow of loads through Nandi and Bushiri could be ensured. Jackson's main concern, however, was to prepare for the abandonment of this route in favour of the direct road from Nakuru down the Nyando Valley. Sclater's Road was then to be given up because of defects in its construction, its remoteness from Ugowe Bay, and the 'predatory instincts' of the Nandi. Rest houses were to be built at staging posts located at twelve-mile intervals along the new road from Molo to Port Ugowe, and alternate posts provided with garrisons if Evatt considered them necessary and practicable. In order to prepare for the switch to the Nyando Valley, Jackson was

directed to investigate the advantages of transferring the Ravine transport depot to the railway route near the site for the new capital, and to resume work on converting the railway survey track⁸ into a cart road.^F

The Nyando Valley, which Johnston described as 'one of the best parts of the Protectorate as regards healthiness and water supply', was also selected for the inauguration of Indian settlement in Uganda.⁹ It was moreover 'totally uninhabited' because the Nandi, while making 'life impossible for the Kavirondo settlers on the west', had apparently 'refrained from settling themselves on account of their formidable neighbours, the Lumbwa'. Other considerations that influenced Johnston's choice of a site for the settlement experiment were that settlers in the valley could be supplied with food, if shortages occurred in the early days of the enterprise, and assured of protection when the railway was completed. It was hoped that compact settlements of Indian agriculturalists, together with the projected Sudanese colonies in the same area, would not only 'commence the re-population of a part of the Protectorate which is almost without settled inhabitants',¹⁰ but also provide freight for the railway, and an inexpensive means of discouraging the Nandi and Lumbwa from hostile activities in the country through which it ran. The approach of the railway was beginning to influence Johnston's thinking, and the overriding necessity of securing its safety was stressed to Sir John Ardagh, Director of Military Intelligence at the War Office, in a semi-official letter, which repeated Johnston's conviction that the Nandi threat to the railway had been settled once and for all by the 'overwhelming force that had been marshalled for its protection', and the formation of 'military colonies of Baganda'¹¹ and Sudanese all along the line'.^G

The number, length and scope of the Special Commissioner's despatches reflected his anxiety to anticipate critical comment in London by dispelling the suspicion that he had not appreciated the seriousness of the situation in Nandi, and the attendant disruption of communications throughout the Eastern Province. They also foreshadowed that the control and development of the province, and Nandi in particular, were destined to play a much more important part in Uganda affairs than at any time since the inception of the Protectorate in 1894. In the meantime, as 'questions of even greater importance than the Nandi rising' prevented him from leaving 'Uganda proper' for some time to come, Johnston decided to send Jackson to investigate 'the recent rising of the Wanandi', the reorganization of the transport service, and to 'attend to many other matters, which his knowledge of the country and people will enable him to understand and settle in a satisfactory manner'.^H

In considering Johnston's despatches, account must be taken both of his position in Uganda, and the fact that he had no personal knowledge of the Nandi and only a passing acquaintance with a small part of their country. Although he considered his Special Commission had endowed him with plenipotentiary powers,¹² it soon became evident when he began to exercise these powers that some of the Foreign Office officials thought otherwise. The mere fact that the British Cabinet had considered it advisable to appoint a Special Commissioner was in itself an indictment of the past record of the African Department and, in a lesser degree, of the efforts of his predecessors in Uganda. The possibility of misunderstandings and disputes arising as a result of the Special Commissioner's investigations and reports was increased by the fact that Lord Salisbury had brushed aside objections to the appointment of Johnston, 'the little, prancing pro-Consul', whom Hill had grown to dislike on personal and professional grounds during the period in which he had been largely responsible for East African affairs.¹³ After the Special Commissioner began sending home recommendations for reforming the Uganda administration, Hill seemed bent on discrediting their author. Almost all the early despatches, several of which never went beyond Hill's desk, were minuted with scathing or querulous comments. Johnston did little on his part to improve matters or to assuage Hill's embittered feelings. On the contrary, two sides of Johnston's personality - love of hyperbole and the telling phrase, and his inability to keep quiet or confine his comments to the matter in hand - sharpened Hill's mistrust of the Special Commissioner's intentions and competence.^I Several of Johnston's statements appeared to be based on the assumptions that Uganda had been grossly mismanaged in the past, and that its interest had been subordinated to those of the E.A.P.¹⁴ A number of his proposals, some of which were framed with precipitate haste on insufficient information, were revised, and even reversed,¹⁵ by fresh submissions before the Foreign Office had digested the original recommendations. Hill, though deprecating the unforeseen 'human and personal element which

comes in (and) always upsets principles', was given ample scope in Johnston's despatches for his critical faculties, which were exercised to modify many of Johnston's proposals, and to defer or reject¹⁶ some of his most cherished projects.^J

The Special Commissioner, who had taken up his appointment 'all aglow at the thought of struggling once more with the African Problem', became increasingly exasperated by the unfavourable interpretation which was often put on his schemes in London. His exasperation was increased by rumours that his sponsor, Lord Salisbury, whose powers were beginning to wane, would probably be handing over the Foreign Office to Lord Lansdowne after 'the khaki election'. These rumours were followed by the announcement that Hill was to visit Uganda in order to report on the work of an experienced African administrator to whom the Cabinet had confided a Special Commission.^K

One of the most bitter and protracted disputes arose over Commandant Ternan's expensive scheme for reorganising the armed forces. Johnston put forward counter-proposals to reduce the size and cost of the army, by replacing some of the regular officers by civilians and British NCOs, and a proportion of the troops by armed police. These recommendations with their implied criticism of the professional capacity of the Commandant, who was on friendly terms with Hill, were received with disfavour at the Foreign Office and passed to Ternan for comment. The War Office was also critical and, in view of imperial commitments in South Africa, China and the Gold Coast, and the unwillingness of the Indian Government to continue supplying troops for the African Protectorates, was particularly concerned about the practicability of sending reinforcements to deal with an internal emergency in Uganda, or with encroachments by its Abyssinian, Belgian and German neighbours. Hill was reluctant to give an opinion because Johnston would be 'sore if not accepted', and eventually Salisbury, whose inveterate mistrust of soldiers and military administrators had been vindicated by their shortcomings before and during the Boer War, had to intervene to settle the dispute. He was against overruling Johnston, who was as 'likely to be right as the War Office', and sceptical of the advantages of relying on drilled soldiers, whose value 'even in regular warfare is more questioned than it used to be'.¹⁷ Hill accordingly drafted a despatch authorizing the Special Commissioner 'to proceed tentatively on the lines which you have indicated'. After a warning about the possibly dangerous results of the recommendations, Hill noted that the War Office was doubtful of their expediency, and concluded that approval had been given on Johnston's assurance that 'the state of the Protectorate is now such as to justify a modification of the military establishment recently created', and that a reduction in the armed forces could be so regulated 'as to secure the Protectorate from risk'.^L When Johnston framed his proposals, settled conditions prevailed throughout the country, and there seemed little likelihood of a serious insurrection preventing him from devoting his time and energies to the more constructive aspects of his Special Commission.¹⁸ His complacency on this account was belatedly disturbed by the disruption caused by the Nandi in a campaign which had severely strained the partly re-moulded forces, and had also raised doubts as to the effectiveness of Indian Staff Corps officers, sepoys, Baganda levies and the armed constabulary in guerrilla operations.

Johnston was deflected from consideration of the Nandi question not only by his preoccupation with the Foreign Office's unsympathetic response to his proposals for reforming the Uganda Administration, but also by the need to counter criticism of his conduct of affairs from other quarters. His often 'humorous' comments on the railway administration, and his efforts to relieve it of some of the undertakings entrusted to it by the Foreign Office, were not calculated to gain the co-operation of the Chief Engineer, or to recommend the Special Commissioner to Hill and his influential colleagues on the Uganda Railway Committee.¹⁹ This intervention in railway affairs was resented by Whitehouse, who had the advantage of more rapid and reliable communication with London than Johnston enjoyed from Entebbe. He was generally defeated in his preliminary contests with the Chief Engineer, whose protests over Johnston's meddling found a receptive audience at the Foreign Office, and also received the ready backing of the Managing Member of the Railway Committee, who urged the Foreign Office to rule whether the railway should be 'worked on commercial principles or as a plaything for Protectorate officials'.^M After the Nandi delayed the construction of the *William Mackinnon* and carried off the telegraph wire from the Nyando Valley, Whitehouse was on even surer ground. The prevention of such hindrances to the progress of the railway's undertakings was a Protectorate responsibility which Johnston

had found difficult to carry out. Evatt's failure to effect the speedy conquest of the Nandi and render the Nyando Valley safe for railway operations was fully reported to the Railway Committee. The Chief Engineer's reports were passed to the Foreign Office, which became increasingly concerned lest the Nandi, and possibly the Lumbwa, would seriously hamper the progress of the railway after the earthworks divisions had crossed the Mau.

Distractions and complications arising as a result of the Special Commissioner's handling of men and affairs were by no means confined to major issues of Uganda's security or imperial interest. The disputes with the Chief Engineer and Ternan were reflected in Johnston's attitude towards railway staff and British army officers, and in relations between the latter and their colleagues in the Indian Contingent. After the build up of the armed forces following the mutiny, bickering was also common between administrative officers and soldiers,²⁰ partly because the latter affected to despise 'civil business as work for women and children', and often regarded service in Uganda as a welcome escape from battalion discipline with the prospect of opportunities for shooting game and collecting medals.^N

Several civilian employees resented Johnston's probings into their work and conduct, his promotions, staff changes and withdrawal of privileges, and the extra duties they were asked to perform as a result of his economies and reforms. One of the more disgruntled of the junior officials, Seymour Leet, complained to Lord Salisbury personally about Johnston's methods and the unsatisfactory state of affairs at Kipture and Kampala. Three brother officers, F.G. Banks, R.H. Leakey and Dr S.R. Walker, supported some of the accusations in this 'most improper' document, in which Leet complained that Johnston 'seems to have gone out of his way to make things so very disagreeable'. His assertion that the civil and military officers 'generally are dissatisfied', prompted Lord Lansdowne's private secretary, Eric Barrington, to minute that he had 'heard from another official who served under Johnston in B.C.A.²¹ that he has altered very much for the worse'.^O More serious accusations were made by Major Delmé-Radcliffe, who told Lugard that the Special Commissioner was no gentleman, but 'the most underhand, contemptible and objectionable man it has ever been my bad fortune to serve under'; also by C.S. Cockburn, a relation by marriage of a principal of Boustead, Ridley and Co., who informed the Foreign Office that 'Sir Harry Johnston killed my brother. I should like Sir Harry Johnston to see some of the letters I have received from Uganda about him'. Shortly after his arrival in East Africa, Rumbold heard damning reports about the 'little cad', who 'considers himself the salt of the earth and more powerful than Caesar', and whose 'whole energy is devoted to ... endeavouring to cut our salaries and deprive us of any right to leave, and also to make revenue out of officers'; after serving for a few months in Uganda, Rumbold, whose father was Ambassador to Austria, hoped the 'little bounder' would 'get the sack altogether'. Although a few experienced officials like Jackson, Grant and Hopley loyally accepted Johnston's proposals,²² Herbert Samuel sensed that George Wilson was no great admirer of the Special Commissioner, and Moffat only agreed to go back as Principal Medical Officer when he learned that a new Commissioner was to be appointed.^P

The C.M.S. missionaries were suspicious at first of Johnston's intentions. Bishop Tucker complained in January that his measures, which had been 'concocted in the Foreign Office', and not as a result of his own investigations, had 'disturb(ed) the country from one end to another'.²³ Roscoe and Cook protested in April against the rigorous penalties imposed on Basoga chiefs for failing to protect the telegraph wire; and by August, Cook found it difficult to speak with patience of the 'little man' who 'has turned the country upside down, and it is a mercy he has not plunged it into another rebellion'. Relations between Namirembe and Entebbe improved after the Uganda Agreement and land apportionment negotiations, and the Bishop subsequently became an influential, but ever watchful, supporter of Johnston's reforms.²⁴ The Catholics were apparently less critical of the Special Commissioner than the Protestants, though on one occasion Johnston had 'a tooth and nails fight' with the French Bishop.^Q

Other non-official observers like Decle, the *Daily Telegraph* correspondent, commented adversely on Johnston's conduct of affairs, and European traders sought an interview with Hill to ask for changes in some of the reforms that were detrimental to their interests. One of the most forthright critics was the business man, official and planter, F.G. Banks, who expected that 'nasty letters in the papers' would publicize Johnston's unfair treatment of officials, settlers, traders and Africans. Oppressive taxation, absurd regulations, foolhardy troop reductions, failure to control the Nandi, and general maladministration,

which had reduced the country to 'a worse state than during the mutiny', would, he hoped, bring the Special Commissioner's career to a speedy close.⁸

It must be stated in Johnston's defence that few of his adverse remarks on the railway, the E.A.P., Ternan and British army officers, his predecessors at Entebbe, and the African Department of the Foreign Office were entirely groundless,²⁵ and that a number of them were also voiced by Hardinge, Eliot and other commentators.⁵ Furthermore, some of the statements made by Johnston's detractors were motivated by personal considerations,²⁶ or based on a false or incomplete understanding of the facts.²⁷

Though he confided to his wife that 'some of my subordinates here hesitate to carry out my instructions', and were looking forward to a return to the old order of things when he left Uganda, Johnston was probably unaware how widespread was the hostility to his methods and plans. Nevertheless he knew from experience that all his innovations and reforms would not be accepted without criticism, and that some of these criticisms would be retailed outside Uganda²⁸ and reach the ears of the Foreign Office. He was not, however, the man to be deflected from his 'God-given task' by the knowledge that several of his proposals were regarded with suspicion, and that powerful forces were working against him in East Africa and London.¹

It was understandable in the circumstances that his accounts of the Nandi troubles and the measures taken to end them were coloured by the need to justify his policies, minimize the seriousness of the threat to communications and the railway, and present the situation in the Eastern Province in perspective in relation to Uganda as a whole. The half-truths and distortions he employed to achieve this purpose probably sprang less from a desire to mask the facts than from an ebullient, optimistic temperament, and a firm conviction that the Nandi problem was neither intractable, nor as important as many of the difficulties he had had to resolve in his long career. These considerations possibly induced him to describe the situation not as it was at the time of writing, but as he was confident it would be when the despatches reached London a month or so afterwards.

Johnston's attempt to gloss over the seriousness of the situation that had arisen in Nandi while he was absent from headquarters on his western tour can also probably be explained in part by the impression he gave that he thought he had been sent to Uganda to reorganize its administration, not to complete its pacification. He had consequently looked upon the Nandi outbreak as a tiresome and inopportune episode that had to be settled by district and military officers, without interrupting the completion of the more urgent and important tasks he had been specially commissioned to perform. Johnston was convinced that the success of his mission hinged on British relations with the Baganda, and the negotiation of a comprehensive and lasting agreement with their chiefs. Once such an agreement was made, he anticipated that it would not be long before a modified form of the political, land, taxation and other changes accepted by the Baganda could be introduced in other parts of the Protectorate. He therefore concentrated his talents and energies on achieving these goals as the most positive contribution he could make to the future well-being of the country.²⁹ Viewed in the context of this intention, the conquest of the Nandi, though desirable and probably one day unavoidable, was unproductive work which could equally well be carried out by somebody else at a later date.^U The inconclusive encounters during Evatt's attempt to conquer the Nandi, and the spectre they raised of the sort of prolonged and expensive conflict that had retarded Uganda's progress in the 1890s, caused Johnston to review the situation, and eventually persuaded him of the necessity of sending his deputy to tackle the problem on the spot.

The Special Commissioner's approach and response to the Nandi question showed that perplexing mixture of often conflicting personal traits which had been evident in his negotiations with the Baganda, and in the resolution of a number of other problems during his African Service.^V These personal characteristics, and the fact that many of his decisions were based on inadequate and at times inaccurate information, caused vacillation and inconsistencies in his policies. In his dealings with the Nandi this showed itself in indecision, and some confusion, on whether priority was to be given to the subjugation of the tribe or the maintenance of communications through its territory. Johnston's inability to reconcile, let alone achieve, these objectives was seemingly caused by his tardiness in acknowledging that both could not be attempted simultaneously with the forces that could be placed at Evatt's disposal.³⁰

NOTES

1. Rebutted in *The Times*, 14.2.1901, on the grounds that the insurrection had not endangered the Protectorate as much as the Sudanese mutiny.
2. He was still intending on 27.7.1900 (FO 2/299) to spend September in Bunyoro on his way back to Entebbe. If, as seems likely from FOCP 7690/125, A. Johnston, *op. cit.*, p. 188, and *JRAS*, 6/22 (1906-1907), p. 187, he went to Bunyoro in January 1901, then the Nile District was the only administered area not visited by Johnston.
3. In addition to official duties and linguistic research, he employed his time interviewing Congo Pygmies, searching for the okapi, and studying the flora and fauna on Ruwenzori. These 'various picnic excursions' and the 'very pleasant holiday at Government expense', which kept him away from Entebbe during the Nandi troubles, were criticized in Uganda; see, e.g., Banks' letters, 13.10.1900, 20.7.1901, 14.6.1902, and Moffat's letter, 10.10.1900.
4. His plans had not been fully implemented, because of delay in sending Sudanese from Buganda and difficulty in persuading local warriors to enlist as policemen. For Fort Ternan, which was on the telegraph route but not on the Uganda Road, a garrison of one company was proposed, but not provided until Rumbold's arrival on 14.8.1900.
5. Far from helping, most of the Lumbwa boycotted Fort Ternan and some fought alongside the Nandi.
6. References were deleted to matters which had not been reported to the Foreign Office, e.g., the paucity of information obtainable from Kipture; the tribute of goats allegedly levied on the Nandi; the number of animals seized in July by Parkin's troops and the Fort Ternan patrol. Johnston added that help was given by some Nandi 'clans'; that the Lumbwa attended the war council but did not join the rising; and that the warriors were incited by 'persons of influence', who effected 'considerable fusion ... in the general policy of the Nandi people'. Hopley's review, and the punitive and administrative measures to be taken after the Nandi and Lumbwa were defeated, were omitted. Johnston did not know that Hill was sending a *verbatim* copy of Hopley's report, which arrived in London on 10.12.1900, almost a month before Johnston's despatch.
7. When Caine's complaint that no escorts were available was passed on to Evatt on 11.7.1900 (ESA A/5/10), Jackson merely added 'Please do all you can'. He sent no further requests for escorts to Evatt until Johnston's orders from Toro were forwarded on 31.8.1900.
8. Funds for this were to come from savings on Army Service Corps officers' salaries when Johnson and his two colleagues were replaced by civilians.
9. A staunch advocate of Indian settlement, Johnston noted the 'large tracts of Eastern Uganda which are ... open to Indian immigration'. Eliot established a few Indian small holdings at Kibos in 1903.
10. The statement that 'the lower portion of the Nyando Valley is between 4,000 and 6,000 feet in altitude (sc. Kibigori to beyond Fort Ternan), and is well suited to be thickly settled by a negro population', suggests that Johnston envisaged, once the Nandi and Lumbwa were brought under control, that the Luo would expand a considerable distance beyond their limit in 1900, seventeen miles from the Lake.
11. Johnston's first reference to such colonies in Nandi; see *NRBR* ii, pp. 138, 147.
12. Girouard apparently laboured under a similar misapprehension when he was appointed Governor of the E.A.P. in 1909 (Mungeam, *op. cit.*, Chs. 10-12, Cashmore, 'Thesis', pp. 92-93, 286).
13. Salisbury also overrode Hill by appointing Johnston Commander-in-Chief, so that he could 'have a restraining hold over the fighting inclinations of the military' (FO 2/238, 378). Cf. Eliot's letter to Lansdowne on 11.4.1904 (FO 2/835) that his relations with the African Department had been soured from the outset by Hill's remark that Ternan would have been a much better man to succeed Hardinge.
14. He complained to the Foreign Office on 18.10.1900 (FO 2/300) that 'Uganda became the milch cow of Mombasa'; cf. Sclater, 12.2.1897 (FO 2/135), 'the whole idea of the E.A.P. is to make money', and Oliver, *op. cit.*, p. 309.
15. E.g., the squabble with the CEUR arising from Johnston's mistaken idea that Uganda was paying for the permanent as well as the temporary telegraph (WP VI, FOCP 7405/84); Johnston's announcement on 30.12.1899, rescinded on 5.3.1900, moving the site for the railway terminus from Port Florence to the mouth of the River Uro, (FO 2/204, 297). The spate of comments and proposals before Johnston reached Uganda also irritated Hill, who minuted a despatch from Naivasha on 11.10.1899 (FO 2/205), 'in a great hurry ... once again I deprecate action till he has reached Uganda and studied the problem locally'.

16. E.g., the Bahr-el-Ghazal expedition (FO 2/297, 301); extension of the Protectorate to Lake Rudolf (FOCP 7405/37); fusion of Uganda and the E.A.P. under a High Commissioner with his capital at King Edward's Town (Londiani) (FO 2/297, FOCP 7405/44, 7823/21).
17. Comparing 'native wars' in East Africa to operations against 'Whiteboys, smugglers and Celtic malcontents', Salisbury minuted that to deal with them on 'a sound military footing is a mere waste of money'.
18. The only danger Johnston foresaw was an Abyssinian invasion, which the Elgon and Ribo Posts and the projected chain of forts to Lake Rudolf were designed to deter (FOCP 7675/6/23).
19. Its members were senior members of the Foreign Office, Treasury and Crown Agents, and Sir John Kirk. Johnston's aversion for 'plaster(ing) the map of Africa with the names of unknown females' (*JRAS* 1 (1901), p. 20) prompted a 'somewhat ungracious discussion' about naming the railway terminus Kisumu, instead of Fort Florence after the Chief Engineer's wife (ESA A/7/5-6).
20. Hill witnessed this at Fort TERNAN in October (ESA A/8/1, RL, 25.10.1900), and hoped 'his tour would stop the constant back-biting and bickering' (FO 2/513). Johnston told the Foreign Office on 26.5.1900 (FOCP 7675/23) that only three British army officers were worthy of retention.
21. Presumably Galt, the only former B.C.A. official on leave at the time.
22. In view of the many interests Jackson and Hobley shared with their chief, it is remarkable that only a few, relatively minor references to Johnston appear in their memoirs, though both authors were lavish in their praise of other senior officers under or with whom they had served (Jackson, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-72, 332, 359, Hobley, *From Chartered Company*, pp. 94, 124, and cf., e.g., his praise for Berkeley, p. 73).
23. When Brodrick suggested intervening, Salisbury refused to pull Johnston up over a private letter and described Tucker, who knew his remarks about the Foreign Office were untrue, as 'a meddlesome man - a pestilent priest'.
24. Johnston recalled in 1923: 'That I did not (telegraph my resignation because of Hill's 'utmost disagreeableness') was perhaps more due to the English bishop than to anyone else'.
25. Cf. Macdonald's 'very depreciatory remarks' on the railway, the Protectorate administration and its staff in 'Uganda in Revolt'. Eliot's criticisms severely strained his relations with Hill.
26. Leet had been reprimanded and passed over, and Delmé-Radcliffe fined for infringing the Game Regulations; Wilson was disgruntled over his transfer from Kampala to Bunyoro; and Moffat over economies in medical services, and Johnston's refusal to allow him to accompany his sick wife beyond Nairobi on her homeward journey. Some of his critics acknowledged Johnston's talents, better qualities, and the help they received from him.
27. E.g., the discrepancy between the postal rates announced and those charged was not the result of Johnston's duplicity, but of TERNAN's misunderstanding of the agreement between Hardinge and Johnston (Cook's letters, 4.3.1900, 4.8.1900, FOCP 7690/151); changes in service conditions and salary cuts were unavoidable if pledges given by Berkeley, TERNAN and Dr Mackinnon (ESA A/5/8, FOCP 7403/112, 7405/99, 7867/143) were to be brought within the sanctioned estimates, and if Johnston was to comply with frequent Foreign Office exhortations for economy, 'having regard to the very heavy claims made by Uganda on the public purse' (FOCP 7675/18).
28. E.g., Hall wrote to his father from Fort Smith on 5.8.1900 that Johnston was 'oppressively obnoxious', and that 'all that can be clearing the country like rats from a sinking ship'.
29. He evidently expected the Baganda to fall in readily with his preconceived notions on the Agreement which, in fact, took nearly four months' hard bargaining to negotiate. Agreements were made with Toro (26.10.1900) and Ankole (7.8.1901), but not with the Bunyoro and Basoga as stated on pp. 367-368 of Johnston's autobiography.
30. Sufficient forces to achieve both objectives were not in fact mustered until the final expedition in 1905-1906.

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- A. Johnston-Ardagh, 23.10.1900, ESA A/7/7; cf. A. Johnston, *JRAS*, 27 (1927), p. 4, that Johnston 'tidied up several little wars'.
- B. A. Johnston, *op. cit.*, p. 188; Oliver, *op. cit.*, p. 319; Johnston, *Story*, p. 368, *Uganda Protectorate*, i, p. 152.
- C. Jackson-Evatt, 26.9.1900, ESA A/18/1. For the Ruwenzori trip, see Johnston, *Uganda Protectorate*, Chs. 5-6, *Story*, Ch. 15; A. Johnston, *op. cit.*, Ch. 9; Oliver, *op. cit.*, pp. 319-325.

- D. Johnston-FO, 26.5.1900, FOCP 7675/23.
- E. Johnston-Knowles, 6, 9.10.1900, Knowles-Corn, 8.10.1900, ESA A/19/1, A/18/1. Johnston-FO, 10.10.1900 (tele.), which arrived on 13.11.1900, FO 2/301; 10.10.1900 (arrd. 10.12.1900), 21.10.1900 (arrd. 8.1.1901), FOCP 7689/82, 7690/16. RL, 25.10.1900, says Johnston's telegram 'was delayed over three weeks at Port Ugowe, before ... being forwarded by letter to railhead'; by the same caravan that carried a telegram from Hill at Fort Ternan announcing suspension of operations and Government casualties.
- F. For the dispute over protection for railway parties, see Johnston-FO, 25.10.1900, FOCP 7690/14, and FOCP 7732/11/61. Johnston-FO, 10, 21, 25, 26.10.1900, FOCP 7689/82, 7690/14/16/17; Johnston-Jackson, 7.10.1900, ESA A/9/1.
- G. Johnston-FO, 26.10.1900, FO 2/300, 671, FOCP 7690/18. Johnston-FO, 21.10.1900, FOCP 7690/16; *Uganda Protectorate*, Ch. 13 for his definition of 'negro'. Johnston-Ardagh, 25.10.1900, ESA A/7/7.
- H. Johnston-FO, 10.10.1900, 6.1.1901, FOCP 7689/82, 7690/125.
- I. Baker, *op. cit.*, p. 11; Johnston, *Story*, pp. 217, 375-377; RL, 26.4.1901.
- J. Hill's minute to Johnston-FO, 27.3.1901, FO 2/465.
- K. Johnston (Tunis)-Sir T.H. Sanderson, 9.6.1899, FO 2/221. Z. Steiner, *Foreign Office and Foreign Policy 1898-1914*, pp. 25-28.
- L. Salisbury's minutes in FO 2/381, 302. M. Pinto-Duschinsky, *Political Thought of Lord Salisbury 1854-1868*, pp. 171, 173, 183; Oliver, *op. cit.*, pp. 311-313; Steiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 28, 53. WOJD-FO, 21.5.1900, FOCP 7405/81; FO-Johnston, 10.8.1900, FO 2/296, FOCP 7675/58.
- M. Johnston-FO, 10.10.1899, FO 2/204; CEUR-URC, 13.10.1901, FOCP 7732/123; B.T. Yonge, 'Sea Level and Sanity', *KWN*, 21.11.1975; Johnston's criticisms in FO 2/204, 297, 299, 300, and the Whitehouse collection at Rhodes House. O'Callaghan's memo on CEUR-URC, 25.6.1900, FO 2/380.
- N. Jackson, *op. cit.*, pp. 332-333; Hobley, 'Early History of Kavirondo', *KNA*, L. Portman, *Station Studies*, p. 186; Ternan-Hill (pte), 11.7.1899, FO 2/203; Johnston-FO, 17.3.1900, FO 2/297; Gorges-Hill (pte.), 15.2.1901, FO 2/514, 'heartbreaking' that 'my brother officers will laugh at me' if I return home 'without even a medal'; Dugmore-FO, 16.4.1901, FO 2/516; see *NRBR* i, pp. 305, 345, *NRBR* ii, pp. 11, 93, 139.
- O. Promotion complaints in FO 2/303 (Foaker, Bagnall, Leet), and ESA A/4/28 (Captain Lewis). Leet-Salisbury, 7.7.1900, 11.11.1900, FO 2/303; FO-Johnston, 6.3.1901, FO 2/459; *Daily News*, 19.3.1901, FO 2/558; Banks' letter, 9.1.1901. For Johnston's relations with his staff in B.C.A., see Baker, *op. cit.*, pp. 73, 80, 89-94, 116-119.
- P. D-Radcliffe-Lugard, 25.12.1900. Lugard Papers. Barber, *Imperial Frontier*, p. 27; Cockburn-FO, 30.11.1900, 24.2.1901, FO 2/384, 514. RL, 9.5.1900, 19.9.1900, 25.10.1900; the two got on well together when Rumbold was OC Escort on the Elgon trip in April-May 1901. Viscount Samuel Papers, 23.3.1902; Jackson-Hill, 24.8.1901, FO 2/457; Moffat's letters, 7.1.1900, 10.10.1900, 1.2.1901, Moffat-Hill, 21.12.1901, FO 2/467.
- Q. Tucker-Rev. H.E. Fox (Secretary C.M.S.) 11.1.1900, FO 2/378; Low, *op. cit.*, pp. 39, 41 (also Archdeacon R.H. Walker's views). Cook's letter, 4.8.1900. Johnston, *Story*, pp. 376-377. For the C.M.S. role in the negotiations, see Low, *op. cit.*, Chs. 2-4, Tucker, *Eighteen Years in Uganda and East Africa*, ii, Ch. 40. Jackson-Hill (pte.), 17.12.1901, FO 2/464.
- R. Decle-FO, 16.1.1901, FO 2/513. Traders' request, 15.11.1900, ESA A/6/9. Banks' letters, 28.4.1900 to 14.6.1902.
- S. A.T. Matson, 'Macdonald's Manuscript History of the Events of 1897 to 1899', *UJ*, 32 (1968), p. 218. For Eliot, see Mungeam, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-115 and *passim*, M.P. Sorrenson, *op. cit.*, 77-80.
- T. A. Johnston, *op. cit.*, pp. 209-210; RL, 25.4.1901. Oliver, *op. cit.*, p. 313; Low, *op. cit.*, p. 24; Baker, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-64.
- U. Johnston, *Uganda Protectorate*, i, pp. 257, 248, *Story*, p. 366; Oliver, *op. cit.*, pp. 299, 309; Low, *op. cit.*, pp. 17, 26, 30, 158; H.B. Thomas and R. Scott, *Uganda*, p. 40.
- V. For perceptive comments on Johnston's complex nature, see Oliver, *op. cit.*, pp. viii, 18, 66, 78, 178, 192, 197, 200, 224, 249, Baker, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-11, 43, 73, Ch. 7, Galbraith, *op. cit.*, pp. 7, 93, 102, 120.

CHAPTER 14

Johnston proposes and Hill disposes

While Johnston remained at headquarters dealing with matters held in abeyance during his western tour, Jackson was deputed to proceed to the Eastern Province to act on his behalf. This decision demonstrated that Johnston had changed his mind about the seriousness of the situation in Nandi, and implied that he was not entirely satisfied with the measures taken to resolve it. When R.J. Macallister and R.R. Racey began the pacification of Ankole – a kingdom with different tribal institutions from Nandi – Johnston had been content to leave punitive operations and settlement arrangements very much to the district officer, who was expected to act on his own initiative within the context of general instructions and occasional warnings from Entebbe.^A Johnston realized that something more than this was needed in Nandi, where the problem seemed more intractable, and where failure was likely to be more damaging to Protectorate interests and Johnston's reputation. The situation in the Eastern Province was also bedevilled by disputes between civil and military officers, which could only be resolved by tactful handling by a man of authority.

Jackson had granted Evatt full political control throughout the operational area, despite Hobley's protests about his 'indefinite and unsatisfactory' position as political officer, which he contrasted with the influence he had exercised in previous expeditions in his district. Evatt's pronouncement that 'even when the question of peace came under discussion, all decisions in the matter rested with the military authorities', caused Hobley particular concern. He doubted whether a soldier, with no experience of tribal societies and only a superficial knowledge of the country and people, could be trusted to arrive at just conclusions on political problems. Consideration of such problems was especially difficult with the Nandi, because of 'the circumlocution involved' in communicating with their leaders through Swahili and Masai interpreters.^B Hobley's representations were rejected because Jackson thought it impolitic to accept them so long as Evatt's professional services were required in Nandi.

On his return to Entebbe, Johnston anticipated that Evatt's presence would be less important now that offensive action was no longer the principal objective.¹ The Commandant's tardiness in carrying out his explicit instructions to restore transport facilities, and the brusque way in which peace overtures from the Kipture sections had been received, also possibly persuaded Johnston that it was time for Evatt's extraordinary powers to be curtailed.^C Furthermore, he probably thought a return to civil government would be expedient in view of the impending arrival of Sir Clement Hill. Although he pleaded pressure of other business for not meeting the Superintendent of African Protectorates in the Eastern province, this seeming discourtesy may have been Johnston's way of showing his dislike for Hill and disapproval of his unnecessary mission. The Deputy Commissioner, who had spent most of his service in the Eastern Province during troublous times from 1895 to 1898, and was moreover the only officer senior to Evatt and Hobley, was the obvious choice to re-establish civil administration in the Nandi District, foster better relations between civil and military officers, and wait upon the Superintendent. It was accordingly arranged for Jackson to meet Hill at Fort Ternan, where he was to outline Johnston's plans for conquering the Nandi and protecting the railway route.

Jackson's detailed brief covered a number of routine administrative matters,² as well as more important problems such as re-organization and protection of communications, collection of taxes, and the 'political settlement' of the Nandi and neighbouring tribes. Johnston evidently expected his instructions to be followed almost to the letter, since Jackson was authorized to communicate direct with the Foreign Office on the action taken to implement them.³ On one point the instructions could not possibly be misconstrued. Jackson was to 'impress on Evatt with the greatest emphasis that I regard it most important ... that we should straightway organize a perfectly safe transport route for passengers, mails and goods along the Nyando Valley'.^D

In the emphasis placed upon communications, Johnston's instructions were similar to those given to F. Spire in 1894 and Hobley and Jackson in 1895,⁴ but some of the other items reflected a broadening of administrative control in the province. On the most important

of these, the hut tax, Johnston merely restated his previous instructions that its collection should be undertaken with discretion, but enforced with some strictness in well-ordered settlements, 'where the people do receive protection at our hands'. Outside such settlements, 'where the people are thoroughly out of touch with us and in no way under our administration', tax was not to be collected unless it was willingly proffered, or payment was justified to meet the cost of an expedition to punish breaches of the peace.⁵ Although the Kamasia and their neighbours were not exempted by Johnston's general principles, no special efforts were to be made to enforce payment in the Baringo District. Johnston, who noted that the Kamasia were already offering considerable sums of their own accord, probably allowed them a temporary respite in return for their help against the Nandi, and as a means of encouraging the 'feud' between the two tribes, which he regarded as 'a happy circumstance'.⁶ The introduction of tax was not to be broached to the Lumbwa as no administration existed in their country, and Jackson was only required to do everything reasonable to keep them and their neighbours to the south⁶ in a friendly disposition. If the Lumbwa began raiding, during or after the Nandi campaign, Evatt's forces were to be sent against them as soon as the Nandi were conquered. Should such action become necessary, the operations were to continue until the Lumbwa were rendered powerless to do harm for some time to come.

Turning to the more pressing problem of controlling the Nandi, Johnston propounded the alternative aims as being 'either to so smash up the Nandi nation that it will be unable to send out parties of raiders anywhere near the Nyando Valley, or else to take advantage of a genuine desire on their part for peace and conclude a peace with some prospect of it being lasting'. If the latter course was found to be practicable, one of the terms to be imposed would be the surrender of a sufficiently large number of weapons to ensure that the warriors were disarmed for a long enough period for better influences to work amongst them. Johnston suggested that 20,000 spears and 10,000 bows should be confiscated, because replacement of that number of weapons would be a laborious, expensive and lengthy process.⁷

Jackson was given specific instructions about the tax the Nandi would be liable to pay in accordance with Johnston's general principles for the whole province. The tax was to be carefully explained to the people, as Johnston did not wish it to be forcibly imposed in such a manner as to provide excuses for further quarrels with the government. This cautious approach, which suggests that Johnston was dubious about the scope and effectiveness of the explanations made by the Kipture Collectors, may have been adopted in order to refute allegations that the present troubles were brought about by the injudicious imposition of taxes,⁸ which Holey had been ordered in January to 'put in force (in Nandi) as soon as convenient'. Insistence on explanations and circumspection was in keeping with Johnston's and the Foreign Office's declared policy, but the call for extra caution in this instance was undoubtedly a response to recent events.⁹ Although collection was not to be pressed unduly until the people recovered their prosperity, they were to be warned that 'they must give attention to the hut tax' if they expected to remain in possession of their homeland.¹⁰ Should Jackson feel the Nandi were hopelessly recalcitrant and would never settle as tax-paying subjects, he was authorized to consider forming Sudanese and Masai settlements in their country. Johnston seemed to imply that tax had never previously been demanded of the Nandi, despite the fact that some payments had undoubtedly been made by sections living near the station.

The Special Commissioner concluded by declaring that 'this policy, of course, is consistent with the cardinal object of your work in the Eastern Province, which (with the assistance of Evatt) is to render the Nyando Valley rail and telegraph route safer for transport than any other part of the Protectorate. This object is so all-important that no sacrifice is too great for its due accomplishment; and if you consider Evatt has not got sufficient forces on the spot, you must apprise me so that reinforcements may be raised elsewhere in the Protectorate and sent to him'. Jackson, thus, was left in little doubt as to what was expected of him and the Commandant: the restoration of communications east of the Lake; and the smashing of the Nandi unless they chose to sue for peace¹⁰ and accept the indignity of almost total disarmament. One important matter was not however made clear in Jackson's brief. If the proposed abandonment of Kipture was to be carried out, Jackson and the Nandi Collector were apparently to implement Johnston's instructions from Fort Ternan,

on the south-eastern fringe of the country, or from the unfortified temporary post at Bushiri, which was surrounded by sections which had not been conquered by Evatt.

When news of Evatt's mishap in the Nyando Valley reached the capital, the Special Commissioner decided to proceed with a plan which had been under consideration for some time. This was to send a sufficiently large force of Baganda irregulars so that the two objectives of subjugating the Nandi and protecting the Uganda Road could both be achieved at the same time. There was no doubt about Johnston's aims when the scheme was conceived, for he notified Fowler on 18 October of his intention 'to crush the Nandi once and for all', and to send 'a large force of 1,000-2,000 Baganda irregulars to harass the Nandi on the escarpment'. The irregulars were to be requisitioned through the Regents in accordance with article 13 of the Uganda Agreement, by virtue of which the Kabaka could be 'called upon to exercise ... his claim on the Baganda people for military service'. This obligation caused little discussion when the Agreement was being negotiated,¹¹ but its intention was obviously gratifying to Johnston, who wired the Foreign Office that its acceptance gave 'us complete control over the native army'.¹² His gratification was based on the notions he had conceived, a short while after his arrival in Buganda, that its inhabitants were the only people powerful enough to threaten the Protectorate's security, and that the Baganda, when stiffened by Indian troops, provided ample means for the maintenance of order throughout the country. He had held obstinately to this opinion despite previous attempts to use Baganda in the Eastern Province,¹² the dismissal of the Bukedi contingent in the early days of the Nandi expedition, and Evatt's request in August for reinforcements from disciplined companies of the Uganda Rifles in preference to Johnston's suggested employment of 500 Baganda irregulars.¹³

The War Office questioned the wisdom of placing too much reliance upon Baganda soldiers and armed police on the grounds that the Baganda, if potentially the greatest threat to the Protectorate, might prove even more dangerous if large numbers of them were given military training.¹⁴ Johnston was undeterred by this warning,¹⁵ and there was some justification on military grounds for his decision to send Baganda to Evatt's assistance. Since a considerable proportion of the army was already in the Eastern Province, garrisons in other provinces would be further depleted, and dissidents possibly encouraged to engage in hostile activities, if more troops were withdrawn from stations west of the Lake. Most of the regulars were stationed in Bunyoro, where they could not speedily be relieved for service in Nandi, or Buganda, where their replacement by Baganda auxiliaries might have unfortunate consequences. Since the Commander-in-Chief had no trained reserves to call upon, the only men available for strengthening the depleted Uganda garrisons or the Nandi field force were Baganda irregulars. The choice rested, therefore, between requisitioning Baganda for service under Evatt in the Eastern Province, or waiting until they could replace Uganda Riflemen in posts throughout the rest of the Protectorate.

Johnston's decision was probably influenced as much by political as military considerations. He was doubtless eager to try out the recently concluded Agreement in order to prove to himself, and to others, that it had the wholehearted backing of the Baganda people as well as the signatory chiefs. Much of the criticism of his military reforms would be rebutted if he could demonstrate that the Baganda did in fact provide a cheap and efficient instrument for maintaining law and order. If the venture succeeded, it would also finally dispose of the War Office's and Ternan's contention that the Sudanese were essential for the security of Uganda, an opinion that was anathema to Johnston. A less important consideration, but one which could not have escaped Johnston's attention, was that wages paid to the irregulars, together with the proceeds from a distribution of the expected loot, would enable the beneficiaries and their relatives to meet their liability for tax.¹⁶ The Special Commissioner wired Jackson on 17 October asking for his views on the proposal,¹⁷ but eventually took the decision on his own accord, and without reference to Evatt.¹⁸ Something had to be done quickly to restore the Protectorate's authority on the Nandi section of the railway route, and Johnston had no doubt that the arrival of the Baganda irregulars would swing the balance overwhelmingly in the government's favour.

Having made up his mind Johnston acted swiftly. He summoned the three Regents to Entebbe and laid the scheme before them. 1000 irregulars were promised for an expedition of two months' duration for service under Evatt in the Nyando Valley. Some of the contingents were to carry their own guns, and the remainder were to be issued with arms in accordance

with the government's obligations under the Agreement. The irregulars were to be paid three rupees for their services, and Johnston promised to allow them to 'retain all the loot which they may capture from the Nandi, if equally shared out'. In addition to the fighting men, the Regents agreed that 5,000 Baganda could be enlisted as unarmed porters to deliver to Port Ugowe the loads that had been delayed at Molo and Ravine by the Nandi expedition. Since the porters had no expectation of loot, they were to be given ten rupees for their services. The task of mustering and leading the party was entrusted to William Grant, one of Johnston's most senior and able officers, and the only one with experience in organizing and managing so large a caravan. The misadventures that occurred during Grant's journey with the Indian Regiment in March 1899 must have been known to the Special Commissioner, but he evidently thought a repetition was unlikely in the present instance. The recruits were to be commanded by Samwiri Mukasa, the Kangawo, and accompanied by other chiefs, so Grant would have more help in superintending the operation than on his previous journey.¹⁶ When the Baganda had accomplished their task, Grant was instructed to 'exhort' them to become 'military settlers' in the Nyando Valley, or wherever else Evatt thought they would be useful. Permission to enlist 200 Sudanese to strengthen the fighting wing of the expedition was also given.¹⁷ Their compatriots manning Port Ugowe were not, however, to be detailed for this project, because their services were still required at that station, and because Johnston thought Grant's force was already more than adequate for its task.^K

As soon as the Regents returned home Kampala was buzzing with news of the expedition. Details of the terms of service offered to the irregulars were sent to the C.M.S. in London by Roscoe, who noted that 'comment on this is superfluous'. Bishop Tucker took Johnston to task for giving the Baganda official encouragement 'to plunder as much as they please', since 'unlimited loot in their eyes means unlimited slaughter - in fact a war of extermination'. Deploring the return to uncivilized methods of warfare, the Bishop doubted Grant's ability to restrain the 'undisciplined auxiliaries' once they got in touch with the Nandi. He also feared that the moral effect upon the Baganda would be disastrous, so that years of good work among a people who were beginning to settle down after a long period of unrest would be undone. Johnston wrote a far from convincing disclaimer to Tucker's allegations, and suggested that the Bishop had lent his ear to a distorted account of the arrangements.¹⁸ Tucker's intervention may have persuaded Johnston to modify his offer regarding pay and loot, which had presumably been intended to encourage recruitment and reduce costs, but there is no evidence that such was the case. While this dialogue was proceeding, Grant,¹⁹ who had a high reputation for bravery among Baganda who had fought under him in the Eastern Province and elsewhere, mustered the expedition at Luba's and prepared to lead it against the Nandi.^L

By the middle of October, Hobley, Jackson and the Special Commissioner had each made his contribution to solving the Nandi problem, and their analyses and recommendations, if parochial in outlook, were almost identical in intent. Before these recommendations could be translated into action, Sir Clement Hill, the recently promoted Superintendent of African Protectorates, arrived in Uganda. In his room at the Foreign Office, he was in a much better position to consider the wider implications of Uganda policy than Johnston at Entebbe and his senior officers in the provinces. Hill was acutely conscious of parliamentary and press criticism of the 'Uganda muddle' in general, and the tardy progress of the railway in particular.²⁰ Salisbury, too, had recognized that Uganda, the *damnosa hereditas*, with its mounting grants-in-aid, which had caused one parliamentary critic to describe the Protectorate as 'a sink of money', could have serious repercussions at home, and the decision to appoint a Special Commissioner was influenced to some extent by this danger.^M Criticism had not been stilled, however, and its continuance was partly responsible for the Foreign Secretary's approval of Hill's visit of inspection. The mission was planned to cover British East Africa as a whole,²¹ including an inspection of the railway, but as far as Uganda was concerned it seemed unwarranted unless Salisbury had lost faith in Johnston's ability to carry out his special commission.

Before the days of speedy travel, it was unusual for the Foreign Office to sponsor visiting missions to investigate the conduct of its servants, or report on territories entrusted to their charge. Although officials had been sent out on rare occasions to enquire into specific problems, usually of a technical nature, a mission to conduct a general administrative survey was an exceptional departure from normal practice. Hill's tour represented a complete

reversal of the traditional policy of 'trusting the man on the spot', and could not have been viewed otherwise by Johnston, his fellow commissioners and their staffs.²² The wording of the despatch, which Hill had drafted to advise Hardinge, Johnston and Hayes-Sadler of the purpose of the visit, left no doubt as to its general nature, for Hill was to make the tour 'with a view of making himself acquainted with the local details of the different Protectorates'.^N In the Foreign Office, the mission was called 'a tour of inspection', but the Treasury refused to agree that a visit to enable Hill 'to obtain some personal knowledge of the country and the Uganda Railway' qualified as a Special Mission on the Diplomatic and Consular Vote, and decreed that the cost was to be met from the votes of the three protectorates.^O Once the mission was sanctioned, decisions on a number of questions of policy and practice had been shelved in London so that Hill, after investigating the problems on the spot, could report his findings to the Foreign Office or settle them with the local authorities.²³ The Superintendent arrived in Uganda not only with some disarmingly worded instructions, a sheaf of problems for discussion, and a hypercritical attitude towards many of Johnston's proposals, but also with definite views as to his status and authority as the Foreign Secretary's representative,²⁴ and the imperial interests concerned in the administration of the Protectorate.^P

Hill was aware of the troubles in Nandi long before he arrived in Zanzibar on 27 September. Hardinge had sent a reassuring reply at the beginning of August to a telegram asking if the visit should be postponed, but a later telegram warned that the troubles were more serious than Hardinge had thought. In London, on the voyage out, and at Mombasa, Hill had the benefit of discussions about Uganda with two of Johnston's severest critics: Ternan, who was taking up his appointment as Deputy Commissioner of the E.A.P.; and Whitehouse, who was anxious about the effect the Nandi rising would have upon the completion of the *William Mackinnon*, and the safety of railway caravans, construction camps and telegraph repair parties. The Collector at Ravine was asked on 3 October to furnish Hill with a summary of the progress of Evatt's operations. As a result of Hornby's account of the expedition, which Bagnall telegraphed to Mombasa on the following day, Hill decided it would be safe for him to proceed. He informed the Foreign Office on the seventh that, although communications beyond railhead were interrupted and several mails had been lost, he was hoping 'that we may be able to open the route again shortly'. In order to allay Whitehouse's anxiety about the safety of coolies on advanced sections of the railway construction, Hill arranged for Ternan to provide troops from the East Africa Rifles if protection could not be guaranteed by Johnston.^Q

After a short stay in Nairobi, Hill and Whitehouse continued their inspection of the line as far as Molo. Here they found Bagnall from Ravine, and Richard Grant, who was waiting for an escort to take replacement parts for the *William Mackinnon* to Port Ugowe. Hornby, the commander of the escort party which met Hill at Njoro, reported that the military situation was not serious, though the country east of the Lake was 'politically very unsettled'. On the strength of this professional assessment, the Foreign Office was informed that additional protection was not needed for the forward railway camps, but that troops would be held in readiness at Nairobi in case the progress of the railway was jeopardized by Nandi raiders. Hill's optimism about the safety of the coolies was evidently not shared by Whitehouse. After they parted company at Molo, the Chief Engineer sent a messenger²⁵ urging Hill that a hundred soldiers should be borrowed from the E.A.P., because the twelve policemen supplied by Bagnall in September were insufficient to reassure the working gangs and escort telegraph repair parties.^R

Hill found Evatt and Hobley at Fort Ternan on 22 October but not, as he had hoped, Jackson. The Deputy Commissioner had been delayed by the slow progress of 'our best dhow, the *'Winifred'*, which had necessitated his taking to canoes at Luba's for the remainder of the Lake crossing. Evatt had prepared a lengthy account of the field force's operations, which concluded with an explanation of his misgivings as to the genuineness of the peace overtures from the Kipture sections. The wisdom of the Commandant's response to this offer to parley, and of the 'grand expedition' against the Lumbwa, was possibly challenged by Hobley, since Jackson noted that Hill 'saw for himself (at Fort Ternan) the amount of friction existing between the soldiers themselves and between the soldiers and civilians'. When Evatt's account was discussed, he felt 'very bitter at Hill's criticism in allowing myself to be attacked by the enemy, while he quite forgot the predicament in which he himself had placed me' by

weakening the field force at a critical stage of the fighting.²⁶ Although these exchanges convinced Evatt that Hill was antipathetic towards him personally and 'without sympathy for our difficulties', he thought that the Superintendent nevertheless 'wished for my support against the Commander-in-Chief'. This support was not forthcoming, and this probably explains why the passage in Evatt's account, 'that such breaks' as 'have occurred in the continuity of the operations ... will probably occur again, but I trust that this may only slightly delay the ultimate result', was not challenged by Hill, despite the implication that Evatt expected the campaign to be resumed. Evatt was certain he was not given orders to discontinue offensive operations, 'for, in my then condition, I should certainly have referred them to the Commander-in-Chief'.²⁷ His suspicions that Hill was not only a 'temporizer, a fatal attribute when dealing with savages', but had already made up his mind as to his course of action, were confirmed when he ordered the Commander of the field force to encourage peaceful overtures from the Nandi and Lumbwa, and make arrangements for protecting the coolies, telegraph repair parties and the Nyando Valley route, and for speeding up improvements to the service road from Mau to the Lake.⁵

Hill's orders were similar, with one important exception - the need to seize 2,000 cattle and strike a crushing blow - to the recommendations made earlier by Hobley. They also met Whitehouse's demands, and Caine was accordingly instructed to replace the telegraph wire, an operation the Chief Engineer had refused to sanction as useless only as month before.

In order to implement Hill's instructions, Evatt submitted his scheme for splitting his forces into nine detachments to cover the area from the Lake to the earthworks divisions on the Mau, and to protect communications with Mt. Blackett, Ravine and Kipture. Garrisons for the Mt. Blackett transport depot, Fort Ternan and Kipture, and escorts for cart convoys and telegraph parties were provided for by detachments of a little under half-company strength. Larger contingents were detailed for duty with porter and pack transport caravans, railway earthworks labourers and road construction gangs.²⁸ Five detachments were under British officers and four, including the Kipture garrison, were entrusted to African commanders. Altogether seven officers and BNCOs and 538 men were thus deployed, almost double the number Evatt had detailed for a similar role a few weeks earlier. This meant that whatever hopes the Commandant may have cherished of a fresh offensive were completely dashed, unless considerably more reinforcements could be sent from stations west of the Lake.¹

Leaving Evatt to regroup his forces, Hill left with Hobley and Richard Grant to march to Port Ugowe, where he arrived on 26 October, a day after Jackson's belated arrival from Entebbe. Incommoded by a flock of sheep and goats for the Port Ugowe garrison, Hill's journey down the Nyando Valley was not as rapid as he would have wished, and probably tried his temper. Hobley pushed on ahead of the caravan, and so was able to warn Jackson of Hill's critical frame of mind and his views on the Nandi problem. This briefing failed to prepare Jackson for the treatment he received from a man with whom he had been on friendly terms for many years. 'He arrived here so upset and was so anxious to get on to see you, that he was scarcely open to either reason or argument, and I am of opinion his criticisms were not quite fair to us and were prompted more by Ternan and the E.A.P. people than from actual observations.'²⁹ For my own part, I felt completely non-plussed and scarcely knew what to say, so thought it discreet to say as little as possible under the circumstances. To add to my embarrassment I saw very little of him alone'. Hill insisted that the railway had been brought to a standstill, despite Hornby's assessment of the military situation, and the fact that a company of troops was guarding the earthworks division labourers at Londiani. He also made much of the squabbling among British and Indian officers in order, in Jackson's view, to justify his unconcealed prejudice against their commander. When Jackson was told that offensive operations were to be suspended so that peace negotiations could begin, he protested that 'to close down operations at such a juncture, and immediately after a bad setback, would only mean further and perhaps worse trouble in the near future'.³⁰ Hill remained obdurate to these representations from Johnston's plenipotentiary, and was adamant that 'it was imperative that the Chief Engineer should be in a position to announce at the earliest possible moment that the railway had reached the Lake, and that nothing must stand in the way of this being done.'^U

The day after his arrival at Port Ugowe, Hill sent a despatch to London outlining the

arrangements he had made with Evatt at Fort Ternan. After pointing out that 'the movement of the Nandi People' was an unfortunate occurrence when the railway was about to enter their country, Hill went on 'I feel sure that H.M. Government will wish that, whatever the future policy in regard to the tribe may be, we should endeavour so to arrange matters that peace may be patched up until the railway reaches the Lake. It so happens that all troops now on the east of the Lake are fully occupied and we must therefore temporarily suspend operations'. As a first step towards achieving Hill's objective, Jackson and Hobbey were 'requested' to proceed with a suitable escort to Kipture, where the safety of the garrison of only forty-one men was causing anxiety, and 'endeavour to come to some arrangement, which is likely to last for a couple of years at least, and which will not make the Nandi think that we are suing for peace'. Hill thought the Kipture visit would be concluded in time for him to consider its outcome on his return journey from Entebbe.³¹ If the peace overtures proved unacceptable to the Nandi, he consoled himself with the reflection that 'with two such experienced officers we have done the most we can to come to terms'. The despatch ended with the news that the Baganda expedition had set out to clear the transport blockage and keep the route open,³² and that Evatt had entered into friendly negotiations with a leading Lumbwa chief, a development which might ensure 'a continuance of good relations with the Lumbwa tribe, which is a matter of much local importance'.³³ No more time was wasted on further discussions with Jackson, and Hill left in the steam-launch *Victoria* on 29 October for Entebbe, where he arrived three days later to explain to the Special Commissioner the arrangements he had made with his Commandant and Deputy.

The speed of Hill's final decisions at Port Ugowe suggests that he was merely putting into effect the measures he had determined to adopt if he found the situation was such as he had been led to expect.³³ One of these measures – the priority to be given to the maintenance of communications – was identical with Johnston's orders to Evatt and Jackson. In other respects Hill stated categorically what Johnston had only implied or suggested as possible or alternative courses of action. By sending his Deputy to the Eastern Province, the Special Commissioner had implied that the political settlement of the Nandi was to be taken out of the hands of the military, and the approach to Latongwa³⁴ meant that Johnston thought it might be possible for an accommodation to be reached with some of the sections. On the other hand, the proviso that such an accommodation should not be attempted until Evatt had avenged 'the smack in the face', the intention that the Baganda contingent should be paid partly from the stock they captured from the enemy, and the possibility of an invasion of Lumbwa, show that the resumption of offensive operations had not been entirely ruled out. Moreover, even if Tucker's protest had caused Johnston to alter the role originally assigned to Grant's expedition it is not clear whether the Baganda were merely intended to strengthen Evatt's defensive arrangements, or to relieve the regulars of guard and escort duties so that they could complete the conquest of the Nandi. However confused were his thoughts and directives, it is nonetheless plain from his last despatch before Hill's intervention that, even if priority was to be given to protecting communications, Johnston had not abandoned his intention of pressing ahead with the subjugation of sections with whom Jackson was unable to arrive at an accommodation.³⁵

The Superintendent's orders were at variance on this issue with the declared policy of the Special Commissioner. They also appeared to go far beyond Hill's terms of reference, which were restricted to acquainting himself with local details, and did not authorize him to initiate measures that were in conflict with the policy laid down on a major issue by 'the man on the spot'. Furthermore, representations by Johnston's plenipotentiary were disregarded by Hill, who set his orders in motion without reference to the Special Commissioner, whom he was expecting to meet only four days after they were issued.³⁵ In notifying the Foreign Office of the nature and timing of his intervention, Hill gave only the slightest of indications that he felt his actions were exceptionable, or such as would cause adverse comment in Entebbe or London. After noting that he had already 'discussed' the action he had taken with Jackson, he went to some pains to explain that he expected, 'with the advantage of having had Sir Harry Johnston's opinions', to have further discussions with Jackson after his visit to Kipture. Hill then concluded with the hope that 'the result of our actions may be such as to recommend them to Your Lordship'.³⁶

The reasons Hill gave for his interference with Johnston's plans were apparently based on an appraisal of the facts as he saw them, irrespective of the possibility that his actions

might discredit the Special Commissioner by calling attention to his failure to settle the Nandi problem. Hill knew from his discussions with Ternan and Whitehouse that he could count on their support, and was well aware that any arrangement that would ensure the unhindered progress of the railway would be welcomed by his committee colleagues and the Foreign Office. If his intervention had been deferred until he consulted Johnston, there was a possibility of a head-on clash at Entebbe, which could have led to Johnston resigning his special commission, and to a public dispute as bitter as the debate which followed Eliot's resignation over a policy disagreement with Hill in 1904.^Y The timing of his intervention suggests that Hill was anxious to avoid such a clash,³⁶ and was uncertain whether his arguments would have persuaded Johnston to modify his policy so that the orders given at Njoro, Fort Ternan and Port Ugowe could have been issued from Entebbe in Johnston's name.

The Superintendent probably counted on Johnston's reluctance to challenge orders already being carried out,³⁷ and his unwillingness to renounce his special commission before he had finished his task. During his journey to Port Ugowe, Hill had moreover learned that Johnston's sponsor had finally decided to hand over the Foreign Office to Lord Lansdowne. Hill's forecast of Johnston's reaction proved to be correct. The special commission was approaching its term and many of its aims had been accomplished; much remained to be done, however, to complete Johnston's investigations, initiate further administrative reforms, and consolidate the advances already made.³⁸ He was also anxious to continue his ethnological and linguistic studies, and collect more material for a book on Uganda. Although understandably incensed at Hill's interference, Johnston reserved his remonstrances for his family and friends. Even after his special commission had ended, he made only restrained comments about Hill's conduct, but this was probably because, for some years after he left Uganda, he was expecting to be offered further preferment by the Foreign Office.^Z

If Johnston endorsed Jackson's opinion and also foresaw that Hill's intervention might lead to 'further and perhaps worse trouble', he took no action to protest officially about Hill's orders,³⁹ but allowed Jackson and Hobley to proceed with the 'thankless job' of carrying them out.^{AA}

NOTES

1. He was however told there was no hurry for him to return if Uganda Rifles business could be carried on at Entebbe without him; he returned to Entebbe early in February.
2. Including assessment of Boustead, Ridley & Co.'s losses in Nandi, with a view to making an *ex gratia* payment from stock captured by Evatt; this was dropped after Johnston saw Hill.
3. This authority was not exercised; cf. H.B. Thomas' Introduction (1969) to *Early Days*, pp. 7, 9-10.
4. See *NRBR* i, pp. 78, 86, 182.
5. Nandi was gazetted in May as an administered district for tax purposes, but there was little justification for its inclusion in the category of 'well-ordered settlements', especially as its inhabitants did not receive protection, which they had never sought and knew they did not need.
6. Presumably the Kisii, whose reputed ferocity was confirmed by Gorges (*op. cit.*, pp. 80, 85-89) in December 1899 and B. Whitehouse (*op. cit.*, pp. 175, 182, *COCOP* 614/7) in January 1900; cf. E. Gedge's Diary, 14.10.1889, Oskar Neumann, *JRGS*, 6 (1895), p. 276.
7. In this, as in the timing of the Lumbwa operations, Johnston followed Hobley. For the peace terms eventually agreed, see *NRBR* ii, p. 149.
8. E.g., *The Times*, 4.9.1900 (citing Reuters, Mombasa, 3.9.1900), 'the casuse of the outbreak is stated to be discontent arising from the hut tax'.
9. Johnston was unaware that, with the sole exception of the laibons (see *NRBR* i, pp. 30, 264), the egalitarian Nandi did not follow the practice common among other tribes of making customary gifts to chiefs or performing levy service for them.
10. Jackson (*op. cit.*, p. 332) says he was told to 'see old Latongwa, with a view to peace, after Evatt had struck a blow that would at least make amends for the smack in the face we had so recently achieved' (emphasis in original). Jackson had however left Entebbe before the smack was administered; cf. 1969 Introduction, pp. x-xi, xiii-xvi.
11. No comment was made by the Foreign Office Committee on the Uganda Constitution, whose chief concern was with the land proposals and hut tax. Though Johnston hoped that the Baganda might, in time, not

- only replace the Sudanese but also 'be made available for use throughout the Protectorate'. Article 13 leaves some doubt as to whether the right to levy troops was not restricted to the protection of Buganda.
12. See *NRBR* i, pp. 123, 137-139, 143, *NRBR* ii, pp. 3, 73, 81, 91, 95. His views on the martial qualities of the Baganda were also held, e.g. by Colonel J.A. Grant, Sir H.M. Stanley, Sir G. Portal, C.M.S. missionaries and even, to some extent, by Ternan. Johnston estimated the strength of the Baganda 'armed forces' to be 14,000 guns and 20,000 spearmen.
 13. Insisting that the Baganda were not 'hostile in intent', he claimed that their police, though 'a dangerous element before (were) now a source of strength' (FOCP 7675/23).
 14. The element paid in cash would also help popularize the rupee coinage, and thus hasten the withdrawal of cowries as a currency medium.
 15. Jackson, who had not replied to a similar request in August, did not receive Johnston's telegram until he arrived at Port Ugowe where he learned that the Baganda had already set out.
 16. See *NRBR* i, p. 366, *NRBR* ii, p. 1; Grant was exonerated in August 1899 (FO 2/200) for the disasters that befell the expedition. Mukasa recalled (c. 1925) that, as a result of a meeting between the Regents and Jackson (*sic*), he received a letter on 24th October, while tax-gathering in Bulemezi, ordering him to return to Kampala as he had been 'given command in order to find the Nandi'.
 17. It is not clear whether any Sudanese, who were presumably to be recruited from the Kampala and Luba's settlements, did accompany the Baganda.
 18. The Catholics apparently made no protest. Father Plunkett noted (*St. Joseph's Advocate*, Spring 1901) that 'Baganda soldiers, mainly Catholics, have been ordered to Nandi', and the Nsambya Diary, 21.10.1900, recorded the departure of Baganda troops 'for the war'.
 19. He arrived back at Luba's on 10th October from his first leave since he went to Uganda with Lugard in 1892. On the thirteenth, Grant, who had often been entrusted with special assignments, was detailed to persuade the Buvuma islanders to accept a Baganda chief. Five days later he was ordered to visit Entebbe, after completing the Buvuma mission, 'to talk over a plan I want you to carry out'. It is doubtful whether this conference took place, and on 24th Grant was told to fulfil his Buvuma mission while the Nandi expedition was assembling at Luba's (FOCP 7405/50, ESA A/10/1, A/11/1).
 20. Hill entered the Foreign Office as a clerk in 1867; Secretary to Sir Bartle Frere's Special Mission to Zanzibar, 1872-1873; Special Commissioner, Haiti, 1886; Commission of Inquiry into Consular Establishments in the West Indies, and K.C.M.G., 1887; Senior Clerk, 1894. Salisbury declared in a speech on 18.5.1899 that the railway would reach the Lake by the end of 1900 (A.S. Cooper's Papers, Rhodes House).
 21. When the mission was first mooted on 6th June, Brodrick suggested that Hill 'should go as far as Kampala', and Salisbury minuted 'Yes' (FO 2/556). There were several outstanding problems in Somaliland, and in the E.A.P., where a change of Commissioner was imminent on Hardinge's transfer to Persia.
 22. Special Missions were often sent to sovereign countries, e.g. Frere to Zanzibar (1872), Portal, and J.R. Rodd to Abyssinia (1887 and 1897), Macdonald and Portal to Uganda (1892 and 1893); inspectors were sent out to the Protectorates to report on projects such as railways and, after 1901, the armed forces. In his autobiography, pp. 375-376, Johnston said the Foreign Office intended Hill's visit 'to be regarded as an official journey, of a private nature, to render him familiar with the regions he was to control at the Foreign Office; but personally I ascribed it to critical intentions not altogether favourable to myself'. Dr Moffat wrote (letter, c. September 1900): (Hill) 'is evidently coming out to see things for himself. It seems to me rather like a slap in the eye for Johnston'; Captain T. Langton deduced from a letter from Rumbold (FO 2/384) that 'Hill seems to be stirring things up, and his visit seems to be a most popular one'.
 23. Since Johnston was seldom advised that his despatches were so referred, this was one of the causes for his uneasiness about the fate of his proposals.
 24. Equivalent to that of an Assistant Under-Secretary. His salary was £1,000 to £1,200 compared with Johnston's £2,800 p.a. for his two year assignment. Kirk wrote to Lugard on 23.7.1896 (Lugard Papers 40) that 'Sir Clement Hill is all very well, but he is perhaps equally or more fossil than Anderson and more welded to the narrowest official views'.
 25. Whitehouse asked Hill to reply before crossing the Mau as he probably would not be able to do so from the other side. Gorges was OC Caravan and Hill's secretary; he had been severely reprimanded by Johnston on 19.11.1899 (ESA A/5/8) for his attitude towards Martin.
 26. 'Enraged officers and civilians ... poured one long stream of grievances into his ears from lunchtime to dinnertime'. Parkin was particularly critical of the way the African companies had been treated (RL,

25.10.1900).

27. Evatt may not have been given a direct order that the fighting was to stop, because runners from Fort Ternan could have carried a telegram to Port Ugowe, which would have enabled the Commander-in-Chief to send his views on the order to Jackson before his meeting with Hill took place. Rumbold wrote on 25.10.1900 that Hill 'was absolutely furious with Evatt's operations', and ordered their suspension, and that 'Evatt has his tail between his legs and looks like a whipped hound'.
28. Hill had arranged with Whitehouse at Njoro to release Blackett's earthworks division for road works over the Mau (WP VII; CO 537/71).
29. Evatt formed the same opinion when he met Hill at Fort Ternan.
30. Cf. Jackson, *op. cit.*, pp. 332-333: 'we were then just on the point of recommending operations'.
31. Hill apparently thought that Jackson could patch up a peace quickly by assembling all the Nandi leaders at Kipture.
32. Although the first contingent left Kampala on 21.10.1900, the expedition did not proceed beyond Luba's until 11.11.1900.
33. E.g. CEUR's September Report (FOCP 7545/151), 'so far no impression has been made on the Wanandi'.
34. There is no evidence other than Jackson's memoirs, p. 332, that he was told to open peace negotiations with Latongwa, but the matter may have been discussed verbally with Johnston at Entebbe.
35. The telegraph to Entebbe was working from Port Ugowe, where it could have been reached in an emergency by escorted runners from Fort Ternan.
36. During Frere's visit to Zanzibar in 1872, Hill witnessed the discomfiture of the head of a special Foreign Office mission, and the success attending the intervention of Kirk, 'the man on the spot'. This episode was written up in somewhat simplistic terms in Johnston's *Kilimanjaro Expedition*, (1886), pp. 20-21; see A.T. Matson, 'Harry Johnston and Clement Hill', *UJ*, 23 (1959), pp. 190-191.
37. The reasoning Johnston presumably relied upon when he submitted the Telegraph Regulations (FO 2/299) and the Uganda Agreement (FO 2/380) to the Foreign Office as *faits accomplis*.
38. By October the two impediments to his remaining in Uganda - Ternan's return and rejection of 'all my schemes *en bloc*' - had been removed.
39. Eleven days after his meeting with Johnston, Hill, who was 'amiability embodied' (*Story*, p. 377) during the final days of his stay in Uganda, informed his Foreign Office colleague, E.A. Crowe, on 10.11.1900 (FO 2/429) that 'the Nandi trouble is, I hope, in a fair way to settlement'.

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 - Y. *Africa* 8 (1904), Cd, 2099; Eliot, *op. cit.*, pp. vi-vii, letter to *The Times*, 4.8.1904; Sir H. Parlett, preface to Eliot, *Japanese Buddhism*, pp. xviii-xxi; Mungeam, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-115; Sorrenson, *op. cit.*, Ch. 4.
 - Z. Hill's intervention not mentioned in *Uganda Protectorate* (1902), nor in Johnston's *Story* (1923), which has several critical comments on Hill's conduct, including the summoning 'without any warrant that I could see in his instructions', of a council of representatives in Kampala; see also Johnston's sympathetic appreciation of Hill in *JRGS*, 41 (1913), pp. 498-499, the portrayal of Hill in the character of Bennet Molyneux in *The Man Who Did The Right Thing* (1921), and A. Johnston, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-214. RL, 26.4.1901, 22.9.1902.
 - AA. Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 333.

CHAPTER 15

Baganda expedition and a 'thankless job'

While awaiting Hill's arrival at Entebbe, Johnston pressed on with arrangements for the Baganda expedition as the readiest means of strengthening Evatt's forces. Orders were telegraphed for Knowles to issue ammunition from the Port Ugowe magazine to Grant's 'transport expedition', and to store consignments of dried and pounded bananas which Baganda chiefs were providing from supplies received in lieu of tax. Cows were to be driven down from Busoga to Kavirondo, where it was hoped they could be exchanged for bullocks in order to provide meat for the expedition. Evatt was advised that the Baganda, who were expected to arrive at Port Ugowe in the middle of November, were to clear the transport block at railhead¹ before being placed at his disposal for 'safeguarding the Nyando Valley route'. Marshalling so large a body of men took much longer than Johnston expected, and the expedition had not left Luba's when Hill arrived at Entebbe and told Johnston about the orders he had given for a peace mission to the Nandi. Hill's modification of the Special Commissioner's plans did not however necessitate cancellation of the Baganda expedition, the first object of which was to get the transport moving again. Since Johnston's second aim – subjugation of the Nandi – could not be pursued until the result of Jackson's mission was known, the Baganda auxiliaries, after clearing the railhead loads, were to be switched to a more defensive role than Johnston had originally intended,² and were only to be employed as guards and convoy escorts in the Nyando Valley.^A

The employment of Baganda porters enabled Johnston to dispense with the services of the Luo and Baluyia, who were becoming increasingly averse to enlisting for work in Nandi. The smouldering discontent which Hobley had noted in the final stages of the campaign flared up in a dramatic fashion on 12 October. A Kisumu leader, Nganu, when asked for a fresh batch of porters and men to take down the mail, tried to stab Chief Ogalo. Knowles seized some of Nganu's livestock, 'until he shows himself willing to assist instead of obstructing the Government', but nine days later his people 'flatly refused' to go to Fort Ternan as porters with a section of IV Company and a hospital assistant, Ram Rao.³ These incidents gave substance to Hobley's warning that further calls for porters might have unfortunate results by undermining relations with the Luo. As soon as arrangements for Grant's expedition were settled, Johnston decreed that Luo and Baluyia refusing to volunteer as porters were not to be 'impressed' into service.^B

The first contingent of 200 Baganda under Samwiri Mukasa joined Grant at Luba's on 3 November. One of the Regents, Zakaria Kizito,⁴ brought a second draft on the sixth, and told Grant that the full complement could not be mustered for two or three days. Angered by these postponements, Johnston instructed Grant on the ninth that there was to be no further delay as 'the war is practically at an end'. Grant was told there was little likelihood of the Baganda being attacked, and that his 'main object now, therefore, is to convey 2,000 porters guarded by 1,000 *askari* to railhead to fetch away 2,000 loads and return'; also, that only those who were disposed to volunteer for a further period of service as porters were to be encouraged to stay on in the province. Some of the delay, which in the circumstances was not excessive,⁵ was caused by the time taken to count out cowries for an advance to the porters of half a month's pay as a subsistence allowance for their families. Preparations for the expedition had been rushed through with undue haste, with the result that insufficient food had been provided for the huge party assembling at Luba's. F.G. Banks, who was establishing a private coffee plantation about six miles from the station, complained that the surrounding countryside had been raided for a week for food, including the wanton destruction of small and unripe bananas. Noting that the local people, some of whom were given refuge on his estate, were starving through the depredations of what was virtually an army of occupation, Banks commented, 'do you wonder that the black man often revolts against the pale-face'. Grant, too, was evidently aware of the devastation caused by his men, since he telegraphed Entebbe, for permission to pay Rs 500⁶ to the Basoga chiefs around Luba's as compensation for food 'supplied' for the expedition's needs.^C

5,300 Baganda carrying mail, food and eleven cases of Johnston's natural history specimens eventually set out from Luba's on 11 November. When the news reached Entebbe,

Johnston wired immediately refusing to sanction the employment of more than 3,050 men. Although he had himself authorized Grant to enlist 5,000 porters and 1,000 irregulars, Johnston added petulantly that the expedition was to be dissolved without any pay and the chiefs held responsible if they refused to reduce the numbers. When Grant received this ultimatum at Iganga, he instructed Tarrant to send 2,000 men home by the Jinja road. Grant's troubles were not however over, for on his arrival at Mumias on the sixteenth he found another telegram stating that Johnston could not bother any more with the 'unfortunate expedition', which was to be disbanded forthwith unless the Baganda complied with the terms agreed with the Regents. Insisting that he had never intended a single Baganda to go beyond Molo, the Special Commissioner ordered Grant, if the Baganda decided to comply with the agreed terms, to move the loads from Ravine before clearing the Molo store. Grant's representations to the Kangawo, who was held by Johnston to be 'personally responsible for the trouble we have had', eventually resolved the deadlock. Grant had earlier notified Entebbe that he was proceeding with Samwiri, the irregulars and only fifty porters,⁷ but on the seventeenth he marched the entire expedition of some 3,000 men out of Mumias. At Port Ugowe two days later, he found that only forty loads of food had been delivered from Buganda to see the caravan through to its destination and back to Kavirondo. The expedition had to wait for supplies to be shipped across the Lake, and it was a week after Johnston had asked if half the caravan could proceed before Grant was able to leave for Ravine on the thirtieth with 1,000 porters and 200 gunmen. Food delivered by the *Winifred* on the following day enabled the remainder to follow on 2 December under Mayes' leadership. Their departure relieved the strain on the Port Ugowe food reserve, which had been much depleted by the hitch in the expedition's commissariat arrangements.⁸

Grant's final directive before he left Port Ugowe - and was out of telegraphic communication with headquarters⁸ - was that, on the return journey, the Baganda were to be detained at Port Ugowe, in case their services were needed against the escarpment Nandi. This reversion to the programme originally envisaged for the expedition suggests that Johnston doubted whether further fighting could be avoided, if he was to 'bring the war with the marauding Nandi tribe to a satisfactory and complete close'. Meanwhile, after clearing the consignments from Ravine and Molo, the Baganda returned to Port Ugowe on 17 December with a total of 1,600 loads. Arrangements were also made for cart convoys to bring the remaining 600 loads from railhead, so Grant could justly claim that one part of his mission had been satisfactorily completed.⁹ Since Jackson and Hobley had almost finished their peacemaking task by the time the Baganda returned to Port Ugowe, there was no cause for their remaining in the Eastern Province to carry out the second part of Johnston's instructions. Grant accordingly left Port Ugowe on the eighteenth for Iganga, where he found orders awaiting him to revisit Buvuma, and on the thirty-first Samwiri led the expedition into Kampala.⁹ The mission had been carried through without opposition, though dysentery and smallpox had taken their toll, and many of the men who were 'unable to withstand the change of climate and food' died of natural causes.¹⁰ Johnston wired his congratulations to Iganga and asked if any of the Baganda were ready to enlist as police in Nandi. Volunteers were not however forthcoming for this more permanent type of employment¹¹ in uncongenial surroundings.⁸

The contribution made by Baganda auxiliaries in the Nandi campaign was confined to the indecisive first phase, during which their effectiveness was diminished by the evasive tactics of the enemy, and their morale lowered by home-sickness and illness brought on by a rigorous climate and unsuitable diet. III Company (Baganda) of the Uganda Rifles, which did not arrive at Port Ugowe until 16 October, was employed on escort duties with the road construction gangs and cart convoys in the Nyando Valley, and took no part in the fighting. These duties, together with the provision of canoes, dhows and food, and the transport work undertaken by Grant's expedition, played a much more important part in the struggle than the contribution made by the Baganda in offensive operations.¹² Their co-operation and help, though undoubtedly of much value to the hard-pressed administration, as well as being especially gratifying to Johnston and their missionary friends, hardly warranted the plaudits bestowed upon Samwiri Mukasa¹³ and his followers.⁶ The Special Commissioner's pronouncements,¹⁴ that 'the appearance of 3,000 Baganda soldiers and porters on the scene assisted to bring the war to an abrupt conclusion in our favour', and that the Nandi 'suddenly coming in to sue for peace ... would be found to be as much due to Grant and his

large force as to anything else', must be regarded as 'thoroughly Johnstonian'.^H

While Grant was marshalling the Baganda at Luba's, Jackson and Hobley prepared for their mission to patch up a peace with the Nandi. There was a touch of irony in the fact that the task was to be undertaken by two officials who had most reason to appreciate the temper of the people, and were under no illusions about the difficulties they were likely to encounter in implementing Hill's instructions. Both had consistently followed a policy in other districts of treating their charges fairly whenever possible, and of hitting hard and decisively if conciliatory measures failed to persuade them to mend their ways. Years of experience in the process of pacification had taught Jackson and Hobley the overriding necessity of maintaining their personal and official prestige, and of not being deflected from persevering with measures that had been decided upon to combat disaffection.¹⁵ They were now being forced by Hill's intervention not only to act in opposition to the declared wishes of their chief, but also to carry out a policy which they themselves disapproved of. Only six months previously Jackson had ordered Evatt to effect the thorough punishment of the Nandi; and, although Hobley had recommended in October a temporary suspension of operations so that the transport blockage could be eased, he too was as convinced, at the end as at the beginning of the campaign, that pacification could only be brought about by a decisive and deterrent military defeat. Both were agreed that a solution of the problem would only be in sight when the warriors had been crushed, the Laibon's claims to supernatural powers shown to be spurious, and tribal morale broken to such an extent that the Nandi were forced to give up the fight and take the initiative in seeking a peace. When Hill's orders were issued there were few signs that the losses inflicted by the field force had brought the Nandi to this pass. The most that could be said was that they were becoming tired of the conflict and continual harassment, and that some of them were ready to call a halt so that they could return to their normal way of life.

As in all previous expeditions, little contact was made with Nandi leaders during the course of the campaign, so few opportunities occurred for discussing ways of bringing hostilities to an end. With the sections near Kipture tolerably friendly relations had been maintained, but even these had been jeopardized by the headstrong action of an army officer and the uncompromising attitude of his commander. The people around Bushiri severed their connections with the fort some weeks before the campaign began, and Wortham's only contact with tribesmen near Fort Ternan was limited to occasional communications with a small section of the Lumbwa under Arap Tumbo. Two women prisoners and a few captured warriors imparted items of useful information to Evatt and Hobley, but it was not until the end of September - after three months' fighting - that any of the leaders offered to open peace negotiations. These overtures, from sections which had taken no active part in the fighting, were treated with reserve by Evatt, who thought they were prompted more by self-interest than a genuine desire for peace. Evatt missed this opportunity of testing the sincerity of the petitioners, but overtures by 'two or three' nominally friendly chiefs could by no means be regarded as a token of submission by a beaten enemy. The prospects of the Nandi suing for peace were not encouraging, even before Evatt's setback in the Nyando Valley, and there seemed little likelihood of their improving until some of the war leaders submitted and the Laibon was captured or killed. The prospects were even slighter after the warriors' morale was boosted by the 'smack in the face', and their faith in the Laibon's ability to outwit the enemy strengthened as a result of his third escape from forces sent to apprehend him. When Hill discussed the situation at Fort Ternan on 22 October, nobody could advise him on the measures the Nandi were likely to take in order to exploit their successes in the Nyando Valley, though Hobley probably warned him that the Lumbwa, some of whom had recently expressed a desire for peaceful relations, would probably withdraw their request now that the war had been carried into their country.¹

Johnston decided, before he heard of Evatt's setback, that Jackson should re-open negotiations with the chiefs whose approaches Evatt had rejected in September. As far as other sections were concerned, Jackson was only empowered 'to take advantage of a genuine desire on their part for peace'. Johnston apparently hoped for a localized settlement which would secure the government's position around Kipture, and prepare the ground for similar arrangements to be negotiated with other sections as soon as they become convinced of the futility of further resistance. When he left Entebbe on 10 October, Jackson thought his chances of achieving Johnston's limited objective were encouraging; by the time he arrived at

Port Ugowe a fortnight later, the Nyando Valley setback had rendered his hopes of success less certain. Hill's modification of the terms of reference for Jackson's mission meant that a general settlement was to be sought by means of a political accommodation with the enemy, instead of being imposed upon them after a crushing military defeat. Since retribution was not to be sought for the 'smack in the face', Jackson realized he would be negotiating from a position of weakness.¹ At the best it might be possible for him to confirm, and then to build upon, the alleged desire of a few of the sections to call a truce; at the worst he might find himself in the humiliating position of having to offer concessions to the Nandi in return for their co-operation in restoring settled conditions along the railway route.

After Hill left for Entebbe, Jackson and Hobley were detained at Port Ugowe until 3 November owing to the reluctance of Luo porters to go to Nandi. Before he left, Jackson was told that all the Nandi cattle had been driven back across the Nyando River by the Lumbwa, who were reported to be in earnest about their desire for peace. If this rumoured intelligence proved correct, Jackson hoped it would make the Nandi more amenable to reason, since they would have only their own 'insecure forests'¹⁶ in which to conceal their flocks and herds. In a much more optimistic frame of mind than when he had remonstrated with Hill, Jackson was even hopeful of coming to 'terms with the greater part of the Nandi clans, if not all'. Outlining his plans for the first part of his mission, Jackson proposed 'to try and get a message' through to Kipture, so that Browning could assemble the friendly chiefs in readiness for his arrival. In order to keep Johnston informed of the progress of the negotiations, Jackson hoped to organize a chain of communications linking Nandi with Entebbe. If it was impossible for messengers to travel between Kipture and the Mumias telegraph office, messages would be sent by runner to Ravine for forwarding under escort from Fort Ternan to the telegraph office at Port Ugowe. After meeting Lieutenant F.S. Keen at Kakamega, Jackson and Hobley marched along Sclater's Road to Kipture with an escort of sepoys¹⁷ drawn from garrisons in Buganda and Busoga.¹⁸

Meanwhile Johnston had adjudicated upon the dispute over the cattle which Hornby had seized from Latongwa's people in August. The twelve cows and five calves which were claimed by the chief as his personal property were to be returned to him; and disposal of the remainder was left to Jackson, who was told that these too should be returned to their owners, providing his investigations showed that 'the clan' had taken no part in the rising. In following Jackson's and Hobley's advice against that of his military officers, Johnston was possibly influenced by the need to strengthen Jackson's hands in peace negotiations with the Kipture leaders.¹⁸ Peace was in fact quickly concluded with leaders in touch with the district station, and on 15th November Jackson reported that peace had been made with half the tribe. This claim was probably exaggerated for Jackson had been unable to get in touch with the Kamelilo and escarpment Nandi. It was however rumoured that the former had sent representatives to see Evatt at Fort Ternan; and friendly Nandi told Jackson that the escarpment sections had decided to cease hostilities and stop molesting caravans, but were afraid to visit Kipture for peace talks. Jackson hoped the escarpment *pororosiek* would overcome their reluctance to visit the station when they heard of the successful conclusion of the Kipture negotiations. He nevertheless thought it impolitic for him to wait at Kipture for their attitude to change, in case his inactivity might be construed by them, and others, as a sign that the government had already decided to close the campaign and declare a general peace and amnesty.¹⁹

The Nandi representatives at the Kipture discussions acknowledged that they had begun the fighting without provocation, and undertook 'to live in peace with us, not to molest traders, strangers, etc., not to damage any railway property, including the telegraph, not to raid any of our friends, not to harbour our enemies or their property, and to forbear from taking the law into their own hands in the event of a stranger molesting them'.¹⁹ Every 'chief' was given a paper setting out the agreed terms, which were attested by the signatures of Jackson, Hobley and the Kipture leaders. The Nandi gave a supernatural significance to the proceedings by bringing 'a great peace medicine' in the form of a traditional stool, which was heaped with 'a conical mass of moist red clay ... studded all over with the yellow *solanum* fruit'.²⁰ The peace mission had made a promising beginning, and Johnston was sufficiently pleased with the results to permit Jackson to accompany Hill on a shooting trip north of Ravine, provided the negotiations continued to proceed satisfactorily.²¹

During the journey from Kipture to Fort Ternan, which took him past the spot where

the mail party was annihilated in July, Jackson saw a number of Kamelilo, all of whom expressed a keen desire for peace. Some of their chiefs had visited Evatt but had returned home by the time Jackson and Hobley arrived at Fort Ternan on 16 November. Three Kamelilo chiefs came in four days later and Jackson spent the afternoon discussing peace terms with them. Although they declared themselves ready to make peace there and then, Jackson declined to fall in with their wishes. He insisted that they had first to bring in the rifles they had captured, and also the paraphernalia²¹ for carrying out what Jackson described as 'the most binding blood-brotherhood ceremony' known to the tribe. The chiefs said they would have some difficulty in retrieving all the rifles, and Jackson thought this would probably be the case as the Kamelilo were scattered over a wide area. He was nevertheless satisfied that they were in earnest, and would probably produce a token number of rifles when they returned for another conference three days later. He also anticipated a successful outcome to the negotiations as a result of what he had been told of discussions between Kamelilo and Lumbwa leaders and 'an old Nandi chief' who had accompanied him from Kipture. Jackson was not so optimistic about the escarpment Nandi, who had taken no part in the Kipture negotiations and refused to part with their captured rifles. He was not unduly perturbed about their seeming contumacy, because the acquiescence of the Kipture and Kamelilo negotiators would deprive the escarpment sections of support if they resumed hostilities. Should they persist in their recalcitrance, Jackson insisted that all the 'clans', and especially the most turbulent *pororiet* in the western corner,²² must be forced to submit, since it would be 'fatal' if their hostile activities were allowed to go unpunished.^N

Jackson had every reason to be pleased with the response from the Kamelilo, who posed the most immediate threat to the railway construction gangs. He was also gratified that four Lumbwa chiefs, who were still at Fort Ternan when he arrived, had already made a provisional settlement with Evatt. After a heated altercation with 'the leading chief', who displayed a cut on his arm and accused Jackson of breaking blood-brotherhood with the tribe,²³ the Lumbwa eventually agreed it was they who had not kept faith. Peace terms were written down on pieces of paper and accepted by the four chiefs, who expressed their pleasure at the conclusion of the agreement, because 'they can now sleep in peace and women can bring forth children in their huts and not in the forests'.²⁴ As a result of the co-operation of the Lumbwa and the imminent confirmation of peace with the neighbouring Kamelilo, Jackson was able to report that the Uganda Road was 'practically open', and that settled conditions could be anticipated in the upper Nyando Valley before the railway gangs crossed the Mau.^O

When Hill arrived at Fort Ternan from Port Ugowe on 28 November,²⁵ Jackson felt free to accompany him to the Baringo hunting grounds, as peace had been finally concluded with the Kamelilo on the previous day. Hobley was deputed to treat with the escarpment sections if they sued for peace or, if needs be, to defer negotiating with them until Jackson returned. He thought it unlikely that they would make any overtures during his absence because of their recent refusal to send representatives to Kipture or Fort Ternan in response to his summons. Jackson showed his report on the progress of the negotiations to Hill, whose comments showed that he clung to the conviction that the problem could be settled without resort to further military operations. To Jackson's demand for the return of the rifles captured by the Kamelilo, Hill minuted 'we must not spoil the peace for the sake of the past'; and on the probable need for exemplary action against the Kakipoch, he counselled 'Patience and again Patience'.^P

As soon as Johnston learned of the successful outcome of the Kipture and Fort Ternan conferences, he lost no time in telegraphing the news to the Foreign Office, with a typically optimistic assurance that 'the Nandi difficulty may be considered as at an end'. He was doubtless eager to record the successes achieved by his representatives before they met Hill at Fort Ternan. He may also have hoped to minimize the effect of the notice which Ternan, without the knowledge of the Uganda authorities, had inserted in the *Official Gazette*, warning travellers and merchants that the Uganda Road was temporarily closed to traffic owing to the Nandi disturbances.²⁶ Despite the assurance given to the Foreign Office, Johnston evidently realized that military measures might still be needed to extend and consolidate Jackson's achievements. In preparation for the possible resumption of operations, Grant was ordered - on the same day as the reassuring telegram to London was despatched - to detain the Baganda irregulars at Port Ugowe in case they were required against the

escarpment Nandi. A reserve of 200 cattle was also being built up at Fort Ternan to provision troops who might have to bring obdurate sections to their senses. In taking these precautionary measures, Johnston sided with Jackson against Hill, who would be out of Uganda before the operations began, and could hardly object to such a course of action in view of his own admission that Jackson's mission might not succeed.^Q

Hill's party left Fort Ternan at the end of November with Jackson, who was detailed to act as his 'stalker and backer-up' for the Baringo shooting trip, and Evatt. It is doubtful whether Hill met any Nandi leaders at Fort Ternan, or discussed their future with them at any other time during his visit, so little credence can be given to the claim that he 'told them that their independence would be respected as long as they behaved themselves'.^R Although the Superintendent put remarkably little on paper about his East African inspection, it is improbable that he would have neglected to record such an important promise, or that nobody else would have noted the pronouncement or his discussions with the chiefs.

Jackson took no further part in the Nandi settlement until his return to Ravine from Nairobi on 18 December. In the meantime Hobley had got in touch with the escarpment sections from Port Ugowe, and Latongwa had met leaders of the south-western *pororosiek* at Bushiri. As a result of these endeavours, a meeting took place at Port Ugowe on 7 December with representatives of most of the escarpment sections. Hobley, who was assisted at the deliberations by Ujoo from Nyangori and Arap Kuna, a Nandi chief,²⁷ reported that the representatives made 'their submission' – an expression which Jackson had eschewed in connection with the earlier negotiations – and were granted peace on 'practically the same terms' as those accepted at Kipture and Fort Ternan. Hobley regarded the very satisfactory attitude of the belligerent escarpment chiefs as proof that they were 'heartily sick of fighting'. They told him their people were dispirited as a result of an outbreak of dysentery, which was probably brought on by the hardships they suffered during the expedition. The sections affected by the Port Ugowe settlement included all the *pororosiek* from the escarpment area west of the River Kundos, with the exception of two small 'clans' to the west of Bushiri, and two small sub-sections of Kapsiondu to the east of that station. An envoy was sent to sound out their intentions but Hobley expected it would be some time before they submitted. He did not attach much political importance to their unwillingness to conform with their neighbours, and was confident that escorts could be greatly reduced in size now that the Nyando Valley route was 'quite safe again for small parties'. Before the end of the year Kapsiondu representatives visited Port Ugowe to make their submission,²⁸ but Hobley refused to treat with them until they demonstrated their sincerity by bringing in some of the property they had looted.^S With this exception, the 'thankless job' had, with the assistance of Latongwa and other Nandi leaders, been completed more easily and swiftly than Jackson and Hobley could ever have thought possible.

NOTES

1. Johnston apparently thought railhead was at Molo; the line was open for traffic to Nakuru, though construction trains were working some twenty miles beyond, i.e., between Njoro and Elburgon. The Molo store had presumably been receiving loads by Russell's mule convoys from Kikuyu.
2. Since Johnston did not refer again to an offensive role for the Baganda until four days after Hill left Entebbe, it may have been Hill's presence rather than Tucker's protest that caused a temporary change in Johnston's original plan.
3. Hobley was at Fort Ternan during this period, and his assistant at Port Ugowe was in a very poor state of health at the end of his tour. Knowles was told on 17.10.1900 (ESA A/19/1) that Ram Rao, who had been sent to replace Copeland after Sherlock's death, was not to go on to Fort Ternan 'unless the escort supplied ... is quite sufficient'.
4. He returned to Kampala, leaving Samwiri as the *Mugabe* (Commander) and Misera Kanya in charge of the porters.
5. Men who had been there themselves, or had heard of the experiences of others in the Eastern Province, were probably reluctant at first to volunteer; Musa Kasolo refused to go because 'we shall all die on the Mau'. Johnston took a more charitable view in *Uganda Protectorate* (p. 254) in which he expresses his pleasure at the immediate response to his request. Although Johnston thought Grant should have left Luba's by 3.11.1900, he did in fact arrive at Port Ugowe about the time Evatt had been told to expect

him.

6. The money was not sent but authority given for taxes in lieu to be written off.
7. This suggests he was thinking of placing the auxiliaries at Evatt's disposal.
8. Over thirty telegrams passed between Entebbe and stations along the route in the first major enterprise in Uganda to be almost entirely organized and directed by telegraph.
9. The men were kept waiting a week for their pay because their documents had gone astray (ESA A/9/1). It is not clear whether the irregulars, whose expectations of loot had not been fulfilled, were rewarded at the higher rate paid to porters.
10. Several smallpox cases occurred among the station staff during the twelve-day stay at Port Ugowe (ESA A/18/1). Drs Moffat, J.H. and A. Cook thought at one time that the returning caravan introduced sleeping-sickness into Busoga and Buganda (FOCP 7953/230, 7954/10/58).
11. Grant's men had already earned more than enough to pay their tax; there were much more attractive openings for the adventurous and impoverished in Buganda and other kingdoms, and with Kakungulu in Busoga and Bukedi.
12. The misapprehension that Grant's irregulars took part in the fighting probably arose because they had been recruited for this purpose; see *NRBR* i, p. 163, for a similarly mistaken impression in 1895.
13. His recollections, recorded some twenty-four years after the event, include several incidents not mentioned elsewhere: the 'very big parade' he put on at the Port Ugowe Collector's request to terrorize the Nandi; his visit to railhead at Nakuru; a dispute with Mayes over the transport of 2,000 bags of food, which the Collector (presumably at Port Ugowe) decided in Samwiri's favour; and a rebellion he quelled on the return journey, when 2,000 porters complained of their heavy loads.
14. Johnston, who threatened on 13.11.1900 (ESA A/11/1) to send a 'horde of Baganda', who were 'thirsting to overrun the island', to punish the Bavuma, and suggested enlisting 2,000 Baganda to fight a 'robber Nandi clan' in December (see *NRBR* ii, p. 165), evidently continued to have no doubt about the effectiveness of a Baganda force as a punitive agent and deterrent.
15. Cf. Lugard (Perham and Bull, *op. cit.*, iii, p. 388): 'do not go to war and shoot down natives if it can possibly be avoided, but if you do start give them a lesson they will never forget', and Johnston's advice to Martin in January (*NRBR* ii, p. 32). Prestige not unnaturally became an obsession with early administrators, who were trying, with the backing of often ludicrously small garrisons at isolated stations, to impose their will on huge populations; see Cashmore 'Your Obedient Servants'; D.A. Low, *Lion Rampant*. No officer had served long enough in Nandi to establish much personal prestige.
16. It was not realized at the time how much stock escaped detection in these 'insecure' refuges.
17. Possibly the forty-two men who, after being relieved at Entebbe, Luba's and Iganga by Baganda police recruits from Kampala, were sent to Port Ugowe for garrison duty (OC Troops Order, 19.10.1900, ESA). As soon as he heard of Sherlock's death, Johnston wired imploring Jackson on 17.10.1900 (ESA A/9/1) not to leave Port Ugowe without an escort strong enough to defy the Nandi.
18. Johnston did not follow Hobley's suggestion that Latongwa be given a present of cattle at the end of the campaign.
19. The terms accepted by the Lumbwa; those accepted by the Nandi were not recorded but were presumably identical or similar in purport. See *NRBR* ii, p. 156, for a discussion on the terms.
20. Red clay, and fruit from the *solanum campylanthum* shrub (sodom apple, Nandi *labotuet*), were often used in ceremonies. Hollis, *op. cit.*, p. 13 queried, 'were the Nandi handing over the control of their country to the white man?'
21. Consisting of a small tusk of ivory and a donkey skull, which were respectively splintered and broken in pieces during the ceremony. Jackson presumably relied for these details on a verbal account of the rite carried out by Foaker at Guasa Masa in February 1896, the only recorded instance (with the exception of the trader, Peter West, in 1895) of the Nandi making blood-brotherhood with a European; see *NRBR* i, pp. 168, 90. For Nandi views on blood-brotherhood, see *ibid.*, pp. 45, 99.
22. Kakipoch, the *pororiet* farthest away from the railway gangs. The Tinderet and Fort Ternan sections, called the Kamelilo Nandi by officials, had previously been considered the most belligerent.
23. Presumably that made with unnamed Lumbwa at Ravine on 24.3.1896, not the ceremony carried out on 13.10.1889 with Menya Kisharia of Baveti (Buret); see Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 211, *NRBR* i, p. 62. Jackson countered the apparent reference to Evatt's invasion of Lumbwa by reminding the chief that they had broken blood-brotherhood twice, presumably by joining the Kalenjin combination in 1897, and helping the Nandi attack Evatt's camp. The 'leading chief' was probably Arogobelia, who was described by Gorges on 9.4.1902 (FOCP 7953/151) as Jackson's blood brother, and as being implicated in the attack on Evatt's camp.
24. This shows they had taken precautionary measures during the campaign.

25. The *William Mackinnon*, on her first voyage out of Entebbe, brought Hill to Port Ugowe on 20.11.1900; he left for Fort Ternan on the twenty-second with a strong escort of sepoy under Lieutenant T.N. Howard.
26. This incident is mentioned in a satirical account of the strained relations between Johnston and Ternan in Portman, *op. cit.*, Ch. 6. Johnston complained on 6.1.1901 (FOCP 7690/125) of the tendency in coast towns to magnify reports of disturbances from the interior.
27. Probably the Kaptalam from near Kipture who accompanied Bagnall against the Kamelilo in March. It is not clear whether pieces of paper were given to the Nandi representatives.
28. When they visited the new station at Kaptumo the following month, not so much for 'reasons of friendliness as the desire to discover if possible the lines of our future policy with regard to themselves', they told Hobley that their chief, Arap Kongureit, had fled to Kamasia in order to escape punishment for Foust's death.

REFERENCES

- A. See the Busoga files, ESA A/10/1, A/11/1 for this section. Johnston-Knowles, 24.25.10.1900, ESA A/19/1; Tomkins-Com, 12.12.1900, ESA A/8/1.
- B. PUD. Johnston-Jackson, 3.11.1900, ESA A/9/1.
- C. Mukasa, *op. cit.*, M. Wright, 'Baganda on the Frontiers' (unpublished MS), p. 151. Johnston-Jackson, 3.11.1900, ESA A/9/1. Johnston-Tomkins, 9.11.1900, ESA A/9/1. Banks' letter, 10.11.1900.
- D. Knowles-Com, 19.11.1900, 1.2.1900, Hobley-Com, 4.12.1900, ESA A/18/1; PUD.
- E. Johnston-FO, 10.7.1901, FOCP 7867/32. *Africa* 7 (1901), Cd. 671, p. 15. Hobley-Com, 17.12.1900, ESA A/18/1; Oliver, *op. cit.*, p. 327, including the unsupported statement that the porters were 'to speed the assembly of materials for the Nyando Valley section of the line'.
- F. Tomkins-Com, 8.1.1901, ESA A/8/1. Mukasa, *op. cit.*; *Mengo Notes*, January 1901; Moffat's letter, 17.1.1901.
- G. *Mengo Notes*, November 1900, but see *ibid.*, January 1901, 'the Baganda ... were not required to help quell the rising'; *The Times*, 9.12.1900; A. Kagwa, *Ebika* (1908), in *UJ*, 16 (1952), p. 155; C.M.S. Papers, 1901; Johnston, *Uganda Protectorate*, p. 254, in which he implies that Grant's Baganda co-operated as a fighting force with the Uganda Rifles; J.V. Taylor, *Growth of the Church in Buganda*, p. 269. Mukasa, *op. cit.*; M. Wright, *Buganda in the Heroic Age*, p. 166.
- H. *Africa* 7 (1901), p. 15; Johnston-Tucker, 1.12.1900, ESA A/23/1.
- I. Hobley-Com, 13.12.10.1900, ESA A/18/1; Lumbwa told Rumbold on 25.9.1900 that their chiefs, impressed by Evatt's operations in Kamelilo, 'do not intend to offer any resistance and will pay any fine demanded'.
- J. Johnston-Jackson, 7.10.1900, ESA A/9/1. Jackson-Com, 29.10.1900, 2.11.1900, ESA A/8/1; Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 332.
- K. PUD; Jackson-Com, 2.11.1900, ESA A/8/1. Knowles-Com, 22.10.1900, ESA A/18/1.
- L. Johnston-Jackson, 3.11.1900, ESA A/9/1, which possibly arrived too late to affect Jackson's decision. Jackson-Com, 15.11.1900, ESA A/8/1.
- M. Jackson-Com, 15, 20.11.1900, ESA A/8/1. Hobley, 'Anthropological Studies in Kavirondo and Nandi', *JRAF* 1903, p. 343. Johnston-Jackson, 16.11.1900, ESA A/19/1.
- N. Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 333; Jackson-Com, 20.11.1900, ESA A/8/1. Rumbold had heard on 4.10.1900 that three Kamelilo chiefs wished for peace and two intended to fight on.
- O. Jackson-Com, 20, 21, 24.11.1900, ESA A/8/1; RL, 27.11.1900. Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 211.
- P. PUD. Jackson-Com, 20, 27, 29.11.1900, ESA A/8/1.
- Q. Johnston-FO, 23.11.1900, FO 2/301, crediting Evatt with making peace with the 'Lumbwa tribes' and one Nandi section. *Official Gazette*, 1.11.1900. Johnston-Grant, 23.11.1900, ESA A/11/1; Jackson-FO, 18.7.1901, 20.8.1901, FO 2/463; Hill-FO, 27.10.1900, FOCP 7689/84; cf. RL, 17.12.1900, that the Ribo expedition would begin 'directly Hill leaves the country'.
- R. Jackson-Com, 29.11.1900, ESA A/8/1; Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 70. *Times of East Africa*, 23.6.1906, reprinting 'The Trouble with the Nandi' by the Mombasa correspondent of *African World*.
- S. Jackson-Com, 6, 20, 27.12.1900, ESA A/8/1; Hobley-Com, 6, 10, 26.12.1900, 2.2.1901, ESA A/18/1.

CHAPTER 16

The patched-up peace and its aftermath

The efforts made to coerce or persuade the Nandi to bind themselves to the government by formal treaty at the conclusion of previous operations had all been fruitless. Punitive forces were withdrawn on three occasions before any discussions took place with *pororosiek* representatives, and Ternan had to content himself in 1897 with exhorting a 'few natives' to keep quiet and visit Kipture, or risk incurring the government's displeasure. Similar exhortations after the 1895 expedition elicited, from a few unnamed emissaries of doubtful authority, a number of promises which the Nandi failed to honour, and a blood-brotherhood ceremony they chose to ignore.¹ Most of the earlier expeditions were undertaken to obtain redress for sporadic, localized outrages, whereas Evatt was charged with the task of conquering the entire tribe in order to quell a generalized outbreak and prevent its recurrence. This objective had not been achieved when Jackson was ordered by Hill, not to secure a final settlement of the problem, but 'to come to some arrangement'. The result was that the patched-up peace had the character of an accommodation between equals,² rather than an acknowledgement of submission on the part of a defeated enemy.^A

The accommodation that was arrived at was brought about by discussion and agreement and not by the imposition of previously determined obligations.³ Both sides gave a sense of occasion to the proceedings by means of their peculiar type of 'magic': a ceremonially decorated stool, and the pieces of paper handed to the Nandi signatories. The reason for Jackson's choice of this procedure, which had not been used in the Eastern Province since Holey's treaties with the Kabras and Kitosh in 1895, is not clear.^B The more impressive printed treaty forms were no longer appropriate except in territories, such as those visited by Macdonald in 1898 and Gorges in December 1899, which had not yet been brought 'under the administration of the Commissioner'. The pieces of paper were possibly intended as a compromise arrangement⁴ designed to distinguish Nandi from Kavirondo, Kamasia, and Masai, where a written record was not considered necessary and from areas where Johnston planned to negotiate formal treaties in order to acquire rights for the disposal of land in 'friendly disposed districts'. Jackson may also have deemed the occasion worthy of something more than a verbal agreement, in order to emphasize that jurisdiction over the Nandi would no longer be exercised solely by 'usage, sufferance and other lawful means', but also by 'Convention, Agreement or Arrangement'.^C

The peace terms were settled, not at a tribal conference, but after discussions with groups of *pororosiek* leaders at Kipture, Fort Ternan and Port Ugowe. Jackson had perforce to accept this arrangement, which was in fact similar to Holey's policy of transferring political decisions in Kavirondo from the tribe to the clan. The procedure was not without its advantages, for it ensured a wider expression of opinion and agreement than would have been the case if the terms had only been discussed with representatives willing to travel to a tribal conference.⁵ Even more unusual than the methods which Jackson was compelled to adopt was his failure to identify the negotiators and the *pororosiek* they purported to represent. Latongwa, Arap Kuna and Arap Kongureit, all of whom had cooperated with the government in the past, were the only chiefs, and Kamelilo and Kapsiondu the only *pororosiek* named by Jackson and Holey, who were content to describe the other negotiators in general terms as representatives of the Kipture, Kamelilo and escarpment Nandi. Jackson may have thought it superfluous to burden his despatches with descriptions of the signatories, whose names and *pororosiek* were presumably given on his copy of the pieces of paper. The presumption is however raised that the pieces of paper may not have been forwarded to Entebbe, since Johnston did not send the Foreign Office details of the leaders with whom his plenipotentiary had entered into solemn agreements. This omission passed unnoticed in London, as also did his failure to send a full report of the proceedings and agreements after he 'met a number of Nandi Chiefs' in January 1901, and 'confirmed the terms of peace which had been entered into with them with Mr Jackson'.⁶ As a result of Johnston's uncharacteristic reserve about the details of Jackson's mission, the peace terms were not scrutinised in the Foreign Office, which was accordingly unable to give them formal endorsement and send its customary approval for the manner in which the proceedings had been conducted.^D

Both in content and the methods adopted to secure it, Jackson's peace was very different from what had been intended before and during the campaign. All the 'steps ... of an exceptional nature' for completing the pacification of the Nandi - after they had been forced by a decisive military defeat to plead for peace - were left in abeyance. The return of captured rifles and other booty was not pressed;⁷ general disarmament of the warriors was not demanded; and no steps were taken to move the Nandi from the vicinity of the Nyando Valley, or to establish Baganda and Masai colonies.⁸ Other obligations, such as the provision of food and labour, which were generally imposed to signify acceptance of British rule, were not required on this occasion. Although payment of tax had largely replaced cattle fines as evidence of submission after an expedition, the Nandi were not asked to pay either.⁸ Tax was not always demanded when heavy losses were sustained in punitive operations, but a promise to pay when a tribe had recovered its prosperity was invariably insisted upon. No such promise was exacted from the Nandi who, unlike the Kamasia, did not offer payment of their own accord. Jackson did not claim the right to interfere in the processes of tribal government, and chiefs were not made answerable for the actions of their warriors, or made responsible for apprehending the perpetrators of the outrages that had led to the expedition, or other offenders.⁹ Another obligation Jackson knew he could not enforce was to require the Nandi to give up the Laibon, who was held to be largely responsible for the rising, so that he could be imprisoned or exiled. The same applied to *pororosiek* war-leaders, none of whom had been captured in the fighting.¹⁰ Finally, the pledge given under the first article of the agreement was far less specific and onerous than the promises usually required that government orders would be obeyed, and that tribal leaders would cooperate with district officers. The exceptional nature of the settlement was indicated, even if unwittingly, by the wording of this article, which bound the Nandi 'to live in peace with' the government, not under it.^F

Jackson's decision not to insist on conditions usually imposed after punitive operations was based partly on the knowledge that the Nandi had not been humbled as a military power, and possibly on reservations regarding the status of the signatories and their ability to enforce the terms they accepted. The principal consideration was to ensure that the terms were such as the Nandi could accept, so that Hill's objective of an 'arrangement ... likely to last for a couple of years at least' could speedily be concluded. Johnston's endorsement of what to all intents and purposes was a non-aggression pact was presumably based on the same considerations. Since the government had promised nothing beyond a cessation of hostilities,¹¹ much more rigorous terms than Jackson deemed it politic to propose could wait until the agreement was broken.¹² Force could then be used to bring about a final settlement based on conquest, as in Bunyoro, not on obligations acceptable to the other party.^G

Jackson departed in other respects from conventional usage in his negotiations with the Nandi. Although it was customary on such occasions for the government to exercise its patronage by distributing gifts to tribal leaders, and sometimes by loaning them livestock to herd, none of the Nandi negotiators benefitted from these marks of official favour.¹³ It had also become standard practice under Johnston's administration for some of the captured livestock to be returned to an offending tribe when peace was imposed after punitive operations. This concession was possibly not offered by Jackson to the Nandi, because he thought better results would be obtained if it was granted by Johnston, whom the Nandi had never seen, than by his deputy whom they had known for several years. This would also be the case if presents or other awards were to be made to some of the chiefs whose prestige would be immeasurably increased if largesse was distributed to them by the Special Commissioner at a tribal gathering. Furthermore, should Johnston decide that one of them merited recognition as the principal intermediary between the government and people, the forthcoming visit to Nandi provided an opportunity to mark the occasion with all the ceremony and authority at the government's command. Jackson did not suggest a candidate for this office, possibly because he doubted whether any of the signatories possessed enough authority to warrant such recognition, or was disposed to seek preferment over his fellows. Latongwa, the only leader who had ever seemed inclined to seek recognition as 'the principal Nandi chief', had been powerless to influence other *pororosiek* leaders before and during the rising, and had shown that the sporadic efforts to support his pretensions were founded on misconceptions regarding his standing and the structure of Nandi Society.¹⁴ Although other *pororosiek* leaders also adopted a conciliatory attitude during the peace talks, this was

because a respite from conflict suited their people; their cooperation in bringing about an end to the fighting did not mean that any of them was willing to ally himself more closely with the government.

The peace terms were similar in content to those imposed on the Kavirondo by Hobley soon after his arrival at Mumias in February 1895. Under these treaties the leaders agreed to live peacefully with their neighbours and the administration, to allow freedom of movement to caravans and traders, and to refer disputes with foreigners to Mumias station. Hobley had however insisted on the terms being ratified at a tribal assembly, and confirmed by a blood-brotherhood ceremony which often included representatives from neighbouring tribes. As his influence over the Kavirondo increased, Hobley made sterner demands upon them, such as the restoration of guns and looted property, the apprehension of offenders and caravan deserters, the provision of food and porters, and the payment of tax. In order to ensure these demands were met, clan and tribal chiefs were accorded recognition and held responsible for the actions of their people. A few of these nominees became reliable agents, but many found it impossible to secure compliance with their orders from members of other clans, or on matters which were outside the scope of tribal custom. Most of the treaties were signed at Mumias or Port Ugowo by chiefs who came in and asked for protection. When peace terms were imposed elsewhere, some of the representatives were generally escorted to a government station so that they could witness the strength and permanence of the British occupation. Cattle fines were levied or hostages demanded on some occasions, and the names and status of the representatives reported to Entebbe.^H

Although the terms agreed with the Nandi in 1900 did not go as far as Hobley's later treaties, they did include the requisites for a similarly tolerable state of co-existence as had enabled the embryonic administration in Kavirondo to function in accordance with Hobley's instructions to 'interfere as little as possible in local affairs'. The similarity of approach can be explained by the fact that Hobley's chief concern in 1895 was to safeguard the Uganda Road, while Jackson's instructions from Hill were to ensure peaceful conditions along the Nyando Valley route. By accepting without comment the terms his deputy had arranged, Johnston seemed content to leave the Nandi very much to their own devices, provided they allowed the government to do likewise. Indeed, some months before Hill's arrival on the scene, Johnston had decided that the inauguration of a forward policy in Nandi was inopportune. He thought only a token administration was necessary, provided this ensured settled conditions along the Ravine-Bushiri cart road and the railway route, and allowed him to press on with plans for developing the more promising districts of the Protectorate.^I

The undertaking not to damage railway or telegraph property, which was in effect an extension of the promise to live in peace with the government, was intended to stress the implications of this general promise in two particular instances. Acceptance of this condition, and its bearing on the attainment of Jackson's principal objective, possibly induced him to drop other demands of a more exacting nature. The promise not 'to harbour our enemies or their property' was possibly obtained in order to facilitate reprisals against a refractory *pororiet* by denying it succour from other sections. If the prohibition was in fact intended to regulate relations between sections in this way, it implied a right to interfere in tribal affairs, and an acknowledgement from the Nandi that the government was entitled to exercise that right. It was unlikely that Luo or Baluya would take refuge with their traditional enemies, so the prohibition may have been included to prevent refugees and malcontents from other Kalenjin tribes from seeking asylum in Nandi. Although the Lumbwa only played a secondary role in the fighting before the final phase, their close ties with the Nandi had become evident during the expedition.¹⁵ A military alliance between the two tribes remained a threat throughout the campaign, which had shown that subjugation of the Nandi was a formidable undertaking even when they received only passive support from the Lumbwa.^J An invasion of Lumbwa would pose the same threat, as the Nandi would probably fight alongside their neighbours and provide refuges for their non-combatants and livestock. By the promises exacted from the Nandi and Lumbwa Jackson had done all that was possible at the time to lessen the danger of an aggressive alliance between the two most bellicose tribes near the railway route.

Although the obligations accepted by the Nandi were not as severe as had been intended, they nevertheless marked a significant strengthening of government control. Taken in conjunction with the promises made by the northern Lumbwa, the peace terms improved

the prospects of ensuring peaceful conditions on the railway and other routes, and of extending the Protectorate's authority to the country south of the Nyando River.¹⁶ The prohibition on raids against friendly tribes promised the removal of a long-standing grievance of the Baluya and Luo, and gave some credibility to the claim that the government was doing all in its power to afford them protection from their enemies. Despite the limitations imposed upon him by the terms of his brief and the timing of his mission, Jackson could justly claim that he had done his utmost to prepare the ground for the peaceful submission of the Nandi. Once they became accustomed to their new relationship with the government, he probably hoped they would gradually accept the more rigorous obligations that had been imposed on the Baluya and Luo. When he visited Nandi in January, Johnston could discuss the return of looted rifles, the imposition of hut tax, and the provision of food and labour for maintaining district posts and services, and instruct Hobley to induce the people to accept a greater degree of government interference, as soon as steps towards this end could be taken without endangering Jackson's settlement.

Neither Johnston nor Jackson could however be certain about the people's reaction to the terms which had been accepted on their behalf. Many Nandi were undoubtedly sick of the struggle before the negotiations began, and were consequently disposed to welcome a return to their normal way of life. An agreement to stop fighting was moreover something they understood, for similar agreements were arranged with enemy tribes when the Nandi were suffering privations at home as a result of natural calamities. Although the hardships, food shortages and disease from which they were suffering in November were caused by a human agency, the circumstances at the time of Jackson's mission were not otherwise dissimilar from those that prompted the Nandi to agree to a truce, so that their womenfolk could enter enemy territory to obtain food. Such truces with the Baluya and Luo were generally sealed at a 'magical' ceremony which purported to bind the participants to live in peace with each other forever. The Nandi, whose raiding economy had afforded them no experience of other forms of peacemaking, were possibly misled by these similarities into accepting the agreement with Jackson in the belief that, like a traditional truce, it could be broken whenever it suited the convenience of one of the parties to do so.^K Furthermore, since the Nandi were being asked to comply with a number of restrictions for which they had no precedents in their dealings with other tribes, it is questionable whether the people understood all the implications of the general pledges made by their representatives. Another factor that was likely to influence the people's attitude towards the peace terms was the status of the negotiators and recipients of the pieces of paper. Because of Jackson's and Hobley's failure to report the names of the leaders they treated with, and Johnston's remissness in not naming 'all the principal Nandi chiefs' who visited him at Fort Ternan and Ravine, or accompanied him on his journey through Nandi in January, it is impossible to say whether the so-called chiefs were office-holders of standing, such as judges, *maotik* and *pororosiek* war-captains, or men of straw put forward in their stead.¹⁷ It is however certain that Koitalel, who may have held a watching brief through the *maotik* in their capacity as intermediaries between *pororosiek* leaders and the Laibon, did not play a direct part in the negotiations.^L

Despite these reservations, and whatever the final outcome of the patched-up peace proved to be, the leaders who negotiated its terms could no longer boast that the Nandi had never entered into an agreement with the British. Now that an agreement had at last been made, future acts of aggression could justly be regarded by the government as rebellion.

By the time Hill left the Protectorate in the middle of December the measures he had instituted two months previously were beginning to bear fruit. Hostilities had ceased and peace terms had been negotiated with most of the Lumbwa. The Nyando Valley road had been re-opened and the transport camp moved from Ravine to near Londiani, fortnightly convoys had been resumed and mail was being forwarded at regular intervals. The first carts to leave Kipture after a break of more than two months arrived at Port Ugowe on 9 December, and eighteen days later the Ravine-Kipture-Bushiri route was abandoned when the first convoy was driven up the Nyando Valley from Port Ugowe to Fort Ternan. Grant's Baganda expedition had shifted the backlog of urgently needed stores from railhead and Ravine; and passengers, many of whom had been held up for several weeks, were able to continue their journey to Uganda.^M Progress had also been made in other spheres of transport and communications: the *William Mackinnon* sailed from Port Ugowe on 13th November on her maiden voyage to Entebbe; the Nyando Valley cart track was being improved by 900 coolies

from railway earthworks divisions, working from the east, and by Ramsay's road construction parties from the west; and Caine had begun restoring the telegraph line from Molo to the Lake. Finally, the safety of the construction gangs had been assured, without the help of troops from the E.A.P., and it was confidently expected that the line could be pushed forward from railhead at Njoro without danger or delay. There was, thus, a considerable element of truth in the Foreign Office comment on the Nandi settlement that 'this satisfactory result appears due in some measure to Sir Clement Hill'.^N

Commentators discussing Hill's intervention with the benefit of hindsight have almost invariably condemned it as ill-judged, badly timed, and inevitably expensive in the long run. Some have also noted its unfortunate repercussions upon the Nandi, who suffered severely in expeditions which had to be undertaken to complete the task which Evatt left unfinished in 1900.^O There is no doubt, however, that in the short term the patched-up peace conferred considerable benefits on Her Majesty's Government.¹⁸ Construction of the railway proceeded almost without incident during the lull in hostilities that followed the completion of Jackson's mission, and the Foreign Secretary was able to silence his critics by announcing that the rails had reached the Lake on 19 December 1901; regular telegraphic communication was re-established in February 1901 between Downing Street and Entebbe,¹⁹ and work on the cart road completed. The need to call in reinforcements from overseas was averted at a time when Britain's military resources were stretched to the utmost by commitments in South and West Africa, Somaliland and China. The peace also brought benefits to the local authorities: once the unimpeded movement of men and supplies was assured, some of the troops who had been concentrated in the Nyando Valley were diverted to the Nile, Bukedi and Baringo Districts and other danger spots; and the task of completing the pacification of the Eastern Province and strengthening its administration was resumed. The E.A.P. and railway also benefited from the free flow of goods from Mombasa, and the former administration was released from its undertaking to protect construction workers in Uganda, at a time when the East Africa Rifles was unable to cope unaided with minor, localised disturbances in the Kikuyu, Kamba, Masai and Tana districts²⁰ and the rising in Jubaland.^P

The wisdom of Hill's intervention has been questioned mainly because of its long term results. Although the patched-up peace was viewed with forebodings from the outset by Jackson, Hobley, Johnston and the military, it was welcomed by missionaries and other non-officials, because it promised an end to the inconvenience they had suffered through mail and transport delays and the breakdown of the telegraph system. Criticism of Hill's action became more widespread when Nandi warriors resumed their attacks on the telegraph, dislocated transport in the Nyando Valley, terrorized the coolies and delayed completion of the permanent way to the Lake.²¹ This resurgence of aggression on the part of the uncowed Nandi ultimately left the government no alternative but to conquer the tribe with the largest punitive force ever employed in British East Africa before the Mau Mau operations.²² The government suffered considerable losses in the 1905-1906 campaign, while Nandi casualties were immeasurably greater than those inflicted upon them by Evatt's abortive expedition.²³ It is however debatable whether Hill's intervention rendered this outcome inevitable, and whether it would have been more expedient in the long run to have foregone the short term gains in order to continue the attempt to conquer the Nandi in 1900. Had Johnston persevered in his intention to crush 'this troublesome race', restoration of settled conditions in the Nyando Valley might have been effected in a relatively short time, and possibly before the railway construction gangs crossed the Mau.²⁴ But this presupposes that the Nandi were not merely prepared to negotiate a truce, but were so broken and demoralized as to be near to admitting defeat. Although they were undoubtedly showing signs of wearying of the conflict by the end of October, their resistance to Evatt's final sweep in the Nyando Valley demonstrated that their morale remained high and they were still to be reckoned with as a military force. The conflict might therefore have dragged on for some time, and possibly until casualties as heavy as those which forced the Nandi to admit defeat in 1905-1906 were inflicted upon them.^Q

A policy of complete subjugation could only have been carried out in 1900 if sufficient forces could be mustered locally, or adequate reserves be speedily sent to their aid. It is however doubtful whether many more regular troops could have been spared from other parts of the Protectorate, or whether a fresh contingent of Baganda gunmen would have been more effective than the one that Evatt sent home. Although spearmen could have been

recruited on short term engagements from the Masai, Kamasia and Njemps, they had not only proved of limited use against an enemy conversant with their fighting methods, but also extremely vulnerable when engaged upon their principal task of seeking out livestock in the dense Nandi forests. It is arguable therefore whether Johnston could have raised a strong enough force from the Protectorate's own resources 'to bring about the complete subjection of the Nandi'. Since help of a decisive nature could not be expected from the hard-pressed E.A.P., reinforcements could only have been obtained from overseas. This would probably have necessitated a Cabinet decision in London and consent of the Viceroy's Council in Delhi. The Indian authorities were however reluctant to send troops abroad for 'police' duties, and it would take time for sepoys to be recruited and shipped to Mombasa. Unless decisive action was taken swiftly against the Nandi, there was every possibility, after Evatt's invasion of Lumbwa in October, that operations would have had to be extended to the large tract of territory stretching from the Nyando Valley to the Masai-Kisi borders. Finally, no matter what and how many troops could have been mustered, it was far from certain that enough porters would have been forthcoming without resorting to forced 'volunteering', which district officers were ill-equipped to impose and supervise. Such a system would probably cause resentment among tribes who were settling down, and beginning to meet demands from which they could benefit. Even with the whole-hearted co-operation of the Baluya and Luo, it was doubtful whether the supporting services could have provided and moved the vast quantity of food and stores that would have been required to keep Indian, Baganda and local contingents in the field for a protracted and extensive campaign.²⁵

Judging from the response of the Nandi after they admitted defeat in 1906, it is possible, if they had been utterly crushed by Evatt in 1900, that their relations with the government would have been put on a better footing in the ensuing years; and in that case, the 1903 and 1905 expeditions might not have been necessary. If, on the other hand, the fighting in 1900 had dragged on for months, large forces would have been needed for offensive operations and for safeguarding the Nyando Valley transport system, the Nandi and Lumbwa would have become more embittered, and the end result might well have been an uneasy accommodation similar in content and effect to that negotiated by Jackson.

On balance, therefore, it seems that Hill's policy was not only partially successful but probably the most expedient in the circumstances. It was also in accordance with the strategic doctrine enunciated in July 1896 by the Foreign Office and approved by its military advisers: that, if punitive measures could not be avoided altogether, they should be restricted whenever possible to ensuring tolerably settled conditions and reliable communications, until completion of the railway reduced the logistic problems and risks of conquering belligerent tribes. The realization of many of the Foreign Office's hopes for the security and well-being of the East African territories depended on early completion of the railway, which was considered the pre-requisite for creating a unified military establishment, extending the civil administration, and uniting the two protectorates.^R With so much at stake, and taking account of the British Government's other commitments at the end of 1900, it is difficult to blame Hill for seeking a respite from conflict in the one area where the Foreign Office's hopes for East Africa's future were being threatened.

The 'peace of sorts (that) was patched-up' created an opportunity for the first time of persuading the Nandi that it was in their best interests to co-operate with the government.^S Failure to take advantage of this opportunity was undoubtedly responsible in part for the misunderstandings and animosity which bedevilled Nandi-British relations until 1906; but it cannot fairly be considered that Hill's intervention made such an outcome inevitable.²⁶

NOTES

1. See *NRBR* ii, pp. 24, 50, 62; *NRBR* i, pp. 266, 166-170.
2. Johnston wrote in 1902 that 'the Nandi, having had enough fighting, sought for and obtained terms of peace'; others also chose to forget that the Nandi had not been beaten, and glossed over the fact that the government, as well as some of the Nandi, took the initiative in seeking peace. Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 332, and Hopley, *From Chartered Company*, p. 113, did not share these views.
3. Having been 'negotiated rather than dictated', the agreement was similar in this respect to that made with the Baganda; as the Nandi gained nothing from it beyond a cessation of hostilities, they did not

regard the agreement in the same light as the Baganda did theirs.

4. When Jackson went to Nandi, neither Johnston nor Hill expected him to make a formal treaty, only to explore the possibilities of ending hostilities.
5. At the risk of 'giving a touch of burlesque to the proceedings', the Uganda Agreement was signed and witnessed by a large number of people, 'as they would then be unable at a future date to plead ignorance of its provisions, and its binding nature on the Kabaka, Chiefs and people' (FOCP 7405/50). Hardinge expressed similar views on 11.6.1896 (FO 107/53).
6. None of the pieces of paper appears to have survived at Entebbe; nor in Nandi, where nothing is remembered of this episode. Johnston had the names of the signatories to the Uganda Agreement typed in order to prevent printing errors. The return of captured rifles was the only 'peace term' specifically mentioned by Johnston during his visit to Nandi, when he also warned the chiefs against taking the law into their own hands, and interfering with traders and the telegraph.
7. Jackson's and Hobley's demands to the Kamelilo and Kapsiondu were apparently dropped, though four rifles surrendered in mid-January may have been handed in by Kamelilo. Johnston's view that the return of captured rifles was one of the peace terms was confirmed by Hobley in February (FOCP 7823/84), when he recovered forty-six weapons from the eastern Baluya. Johnston claimed on 3.3.1901 (ESA A/38/4) that these were the 'sum total' of rifles seized by the Nandi in 1900; Hobley thought several of them had been looted in 1895 and that some were not from Nandi at all. The Kakamega were still buying rifles from the Nandi in September 1901 (North Nyanza Political Record Book, KNA). General disarmament and removal of the Tinderet Nandi to Kapiyet were carried out after the 1905-1906 expedition.
8. Johnston's proposal on 28.9.1901 (FO 2/463) to recoup Boustead, Ridley and Co. 'from out of the war fine inflicted on the Nandi', presumably referred to cattle captured during the fighting.
9. After a mile of telegraph wire was stolen in December, Johnston urged that 'the robber clan', which had not sent a representative to meet him during his visit, should be dealt with by chiefs who had accepted the peace (ESA A/19/1, FO 2/461).
10. Several chiefs were deported from Buganda and Bunyoro. The exiled Igumira of Ankole arrived at Port Ugowe while Hill and Jackson were there in October. Jackson had to deal in 1898 with the consequences of Ternan's blunder in deporting Teres after he came in to ask for peace; see *NRBR* i, Chs. 12, 15. Another attempt to seize the Laibon could not be made without risking a general resumption of hostilities; Jackson evidently thought it pointless to follow the precedent set in the case of Kabarega, Mwanga and Gabriel and offer a reward for his capture.
11. The Nandi were not 'guaranteed the possession of the lands they occupied', in accordance with the principle enunciated in Johnston's General Report. Like the Somalis, but unlike the Kavirondo, Masai and Kisii, the Nandi did not ask for protection or anything else. They were promised at the peace conference in December 1905 (COCF 771) that, if there was no further trouble, they 'will not only not be interfered with, but will be assisted in every way'.
12. Apparently the only warning the Nandi received about the consequences of breaking the agreement was given in January by Johnston, who told them 'very firm measures might have to be taken to expel them from the countries in proximity to the Uganda Railway', if they broke the 'treaty of peace' by cutting the telegraph wire (FO 2/461).
13. Jackson possibly thought it unwise, and even dangerous, to give a Nandi charge of a fellow-tribesman's cattle.
14. Men, whose claims to recognition were far less 'legitimate' than Latongwa's, were often selected as chiefs in other districts because of their readiness to persuade others to acknowledge the Collector's authority.
15. Since the terms accepted by the Nandi cannot be positively established, this promise may only have been required of the Lumbwa, who had often been warned of allowing Nandi refugees and livestock into their country.
16. After his journey in December 1899, Gorges (*op. cit.*, p. 89) suggested that a base in Lumbwa would be needed if the Kisi were to be brought under control.
17. No details of the peace negotiations are given in Jackson's or Hobley's memoirs, and Johnston's visit to Nandi with Hobley in January is not even mentioned. For *maotik* and men of straw, see *NRBR* i, pp. 30-31, 323.
18. The Foreign Office minuted (FO 2/556) that 'the steps taken at Sir Clement Hill's instance appear to have had the most satisfactory result'. Hill's statement in 1904 (FO 2/836), that 'we have practically had quiet ever since ... he had stopped further fighting', shows he had no misgivings about the rightness of his action. His papers were destroyed shortly after his death, and his views were not of

course given the same publicity as those of his detractors; cf. the controversy between Lugard and Macdonald in A.T. Matson, Introduction to Macdonald, *Soldiering and Surveying in British East Africa*, (1973 reprint).

19. Large quantities of wire were recovered from Nandi houses, and ninety-four mules brought up fresh supplies from railhead (FOCP 7732/11). The Foreign Office minuted (FO 2/383) 'fairly satisfactory, more so than we had expected some weeks ago'. Adhesion of the E.A.P. and Uganda systems to the International Telegraph Convention, which had to be postponed for a year owing to the damage caused by Nandi raiders, was proposed again in April 1901 (FOCP 7545/58/61, 7823/74).
20. The departure of the Indian Contingent in October reduced the strength of the E.A.R. to 1,000 men. After A.C. Jenner's murder on 16.11.1900, 450 sepoy were shipped to Jubaland to reinforce the local companies. Both protectorates were alarmed about Lenana's intention to intensify hostilities against Sendeyu, and his attempts to involve the Naivasha Masai in the family feud; Jackson suggested on 20.12.1900 (ESA A/8/1) that Lenana might be deported to prevent a serious outbreak in Masailand.
21. Construction work is generally regarded as having been completed when the tunnel in the Nyando Valley was opened for traffic on 21.9.1904.
22. With the exception of the Jubaland expedition in 1901. The twelve companies of 1 and 3 K.A.R. which, together with sepoy from Uganda, armed police, Masai and Somali levies, and two armoured trains, were employed in 1905-1906, enabled Lieutenant-Colonel E.G. Harrison to draw up a more comprehensive plan of campaign than Evatt could have carried out with the number of extra troops that were likely to have been placed at his disposal for continuing punitive operations in 1900.
23. Government losses: 121 killed and wounded; Nandi: 1,117 estimated killed, and 150 Nyangori; 16,213 cattle and 36,205 small stock captured; several thousand homes, gardens and granaries destroyed; see COCP 771/70, CO 533/11 for Colonial Office comments on the high casualty figures.
24. Earthworks divisions began work on the western slopes of the Mau in mid-December (FOCP 7732/11, RL, 17.12.1900).
25. At Hill's suggestion, Johnston granted an increase in November to Kavirondo porters, who were so 'miserably paid ... that they almost refused to carry loads' (FO 2/462). Evatt's failure to provide adequate rations for the Nyando Valley detachments caused considerable discontent among the sepoy (FO 2/463, 464, 520, 551), and may have been the reason for a number of desertions from local companies (ESA A/27/17, PUD, 20.12.1900).
26. It is hoped to discuss in a further volume the genesis of the 1905-1906 expedition, and the extent to which it was caused by the resolve of the Nandi to regain their independence, and by the government's failure to make good use of the opportunity created by the patched-up peace.

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- B. For Uganda Agreement see J.A. Rowe, *Tarikh*, 3/2 (1970), p. 35; M.S. Kiwanuka, 'Nationality and Nationalism: the Buganda case'; EASR paper, January 1968, p. 7. *NRBR* i, pp. 123, 131, Berkeley-FO, 17.12.1895, FOCP 6827/287, for Hobley's treaties.
- C. Gorges, *op. cit.*, p. 89, 'thoroughly friendly relations were established with the Sotik, Lumbwa and Kach' but no treaties were signed. Johnston-FO, 13.10.1899, FOCP 7403/64. *London Gazette*, 22.10.1899, p. 5557, *NRBR* i, p. 374.
- D. Hobley-Com, 21.12.1898, ESA A/4/14, Lonsdale, *op. cit.*, Johnston-FO, 31.1.1901, 17.3.1901, 1.4.1901, FO 2/461, FOCP 7823/64/84; Johnston-Hill (pte.), 3.3.1901, ESA A/38/4; Johnston-Viceroy of India, 15.3.1901, FO 2/551; Johnston, *Uganda Protectorate*, p. 258. See FOCP 6362/67/81/117/126 for Foreign Office scrutiny of Lugard's treaties.
- E. Hobley-Com, 24.8.1900, ESA A/18/1; Johnston-Jackson, 7.10.1900, ESA A/9/1.
- F. For deportees, see *NRBR* i, p. 280 (Mukwenda and Kaima); *NRBR* ii, pp. 1, 20 (Mwanga, Kabarega, Joss); Evatt-Com, 21.8.1899, ESA (six minor Banyoro chiefs); PUD; pers. com., Rev. D. Weeks (Igumira); Oliver, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-119 (Ja Ja of Opobo). Hobley-Com, 2.2.1901, Jackson-Mayes, 26.9.1901, ESA A/18/1, A/19/1, confirming that it was unwise to consider capturing the Laibon.
- G. Johnston-Jackson, 29.11.1900, ESA A/9/1. Ternan-Evatt, 3.6.1899, FOCP 7402/40; Johnston-FO, 13.10.1899, FOCP 7403/64; an agreement was not made with the Banyoro until 1933.
- H. Hobley's Diaries; Lonsdale, *op. cit.*, *NRBR* i, ii, *passim*.
- I. *NRBR* i, p. 86; *NRBR* ii, pp. 49, 95.

- J. Langat, *op. cit.*, p. 89.
- K. *NRBR* i, pp. 24-25, Matson, 'History of Malaria in Nandi', *East African Medical Journal*, 34/8 (1957), p. 436; R.A. Manners, Ch. 19 of P. Bohannon and G. Dalton, *Markets in Africa*, p. 510. D. Mokamba, 'Kisii-Kipsigis Wars of the late 19th Century', *Kenya Historical Review* 2/2 (1974), pp. 227-228; Towett, *op. cit.*; I.Q. Orchardson (ed. A.T. Matson), *The Kipsigis*, p. 7; Muriuki, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85; L.S.B. Leakey, *Southern Kikuyu before 1903*, pp. 495-496; B.E. Kipkorir and F.B. Welbourn, *Marakwet of Kenya*, p. 36, for truces in inter-Kalenjin conflicts, 'which need not end in total victory'.
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- M. *Official Gazette*, 15.11.1900, 15.12.1900, 1.1.1901; PUD, 29.9.1900, 9, 27.12.1900; Jackson-Com, 20.12.1900, ESA A/8/1; Johnston-FO, 28.2.1901, FOCP 7690/124; RL, 17.12.1900. *Mengo Notes*, December 1900, January 1901; *CMI*, February 1901, p. 122, March 1901, p. 209; Willis, 'Reflections', pp. 7-8, PUD, 14.11.1900; Jackson-Com, 1.11.1900, Knowles-Com, 4, 14.11.1900, ESA A/8/1, A/18/1.
- N. FOCP 7732/11. Minute to Johnston's telegram, 23.11.1900, FO 2/301.
- O. Eliot-FO, 30.11.1901, 9.4.1902, FOCP 7946/11, 7953/91 (these comments must have widened the rift between the two men which eventually led to Eliot's resignation in 1904), Eliot, *op. cit.*, p. 147; Gorges-Com, 13.12.1901, ESA A/18/1; Jackson-Eliot, 29.5.1902, FOCP 7954/41; *African Standard*, 16.5.1903; Major P.B. Osborn-Com, 30.12.1904, FO 2/915; Brigadier-General W.H. Manning, 26.9.1905, 3.3.1906, CO 533/4, *London Gazette*, 18.9.1906; Pope-Hennessey, 20.10.1905, COCP 771; *The Field*, October 1905; Lord Hindlip, *British East Africa*, pp. 47, 138; *Times of East Africa*, 17.11.1906; H.A. Wilson, *British Borderland*, p. 130, Mrs. E. Huxley, *op. cit.*, p. 69; M.F. Hill, *op. cit.*, pp. 203, 237; Moyse-Bartlett, *op. cit.*, p. 89; Oliver, *op. cit.*, p. 328; C. Miller, *Lunatic Express*, p. 388. Ternan was similarly taken to task by Eliot (FOCP 7867/21, Mungeam, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-74) over the abrupt termination of the 1901 Jubaland campaign, and obliquely by Johnston (*History of the Colonization of Africa by Alien Races*, 1913, p. 386). For a different view, see Sir A. Rumbold, RL, pp. 57-61.
- P. Ainsworth's Diary, FOCP 7690/25, 7823/185, 7867/16, 7953/91, FO 2/451, 456.
- Q. Cook, *op. cit.*, pp. 143-144. M.F. Hill, *op. cit.*, p. 242. *London Gazette*, 18.9.1906; Moyse-Bartlett, *op. cit.*, p. 204. Johnston-FO, 21.10.1900, FOCP 7690/16.
- R. FO-WOID, 30.7.1896, FOCP 6861/84; *NRBR* i, pp. 373, 376; FO-Treas., 13.2.1900, FO 2/377; Hill's minute to Hardinge-FO, 8.11.1895, Salisbury's minute to Johnston-FO, 18.2.1900, FO 107/338, 2/297; Craufurd-Ainsworth, 10.7.1899, Msa. Arch., Ukamba Out, No. 46; Mungeam, *op. cit.*, pp. 33, 43.
- S. Hobley, *From Chartered Company*, p. 113.

CHAPTER 17

A fresh start

Hill's instructions changed the priorities for Jackson's mission by placing the emphasis on a search for an accommodation with the Nandi, rather than on the 'great aim' of destroying their capacity to raid 'anywhere near the Nyando Valley'. While carrying out Hill's wishes, Jackson also gave some thought to the detailed orders he had previously received from Johnston. These required him to find out what was happening in the Eastern Province, and make recommendations for dealing with the numerous problems which had been shelved while part of the area was under military rule, and the remainder had received scant attention from the Special Commissioner and his senior officers. Chief among the problems which Jackson was directed to investigate in his general review was the future administration of the Nandi, which had become even more important and urgent after the conclusion of the peace settlement. The degree of control that had been exercised from Kipture since 1896 was obviously insufficient to consolidate the progress towards pacification which had been achieved during the negotiations. Something more impressive and consistent would be needed to persuade the Nandi to continue to respect the government's authority, and so ensure that the promising results of Jackson's efforts were not to be speedily nullified.

Little that was relevant to the problem could be found among the recommendations put forward by Johnston, for he – and to a lesser extent Hobley – had concerned himself almost entirely with the punishment to be inflicted after the Nandi had been decisively beaten in the field. One of his suggestions that 'the more Masai imported into the country the better' was disregarded by Jackson, who probably thought they would create the same strained relations with the Nandi as had delayed the pacification of the Kamasia while he was stationed at Ravine in 1896–1898.¹ Johnston's earlier recommendation that the Baganda, who had twice invaded the country as allies of the government, should be encouraged to settle in Nandi was likewise ignored.² Even if they could have been induced to fall in with Johnston's wishes, Jackson evidently had no intention of risking a clash with the Nandi by subjecting them to the oppressive and arrogant treatment that had antagonized the Basoga, Bakedi and other tribes among whom the Baganda had served and settled.³ Hobley had recognized in August that something more radical than Johnston's proposals would be needed to bring the Nandi more into line with the Baluyia and Luo. Pointing out that 'a certain outlay of money and trouble will be necessary ... if they were to be actively controlled and administered', he forecast that there would be no further trouble if this was done, but that serious disturbances were bound to recur, 'within the space of a year or two', if it was not.⁴ Hobley had the opportunity to discuss his views in detail with Jackson during their journey through Nandi in November, and it can be assumed that the recommendations forwarded to Entebbe were the product of their joint discussions.

Jackson's findings, which were based on the premise that 'we cannot abandon Nandi',⁵ included none of the 'steps of an exceptional nature' that had been advocated before Hill's intervention. His two principal recommendations – retention of the same Collector for a period long enough to ensure some degree of continuity, and removal of the district station to a site nearer the more populated parts of the country, and better placed to keep an eye on sections likely to endanger the Nyando Valley route – were fundamental if any lasting improvement was to be looked for in relations with the tribe. Jackson sided with those who thought the 'ramshackle' station at Kipture had been badly sited in May 1896 by Sclater, who had been guided by considerations connected with the cart road project rather than by administrative convenience.⁶ Now that Sclater's Road had been superseded by the Nyando Valley route, and as the buildings at Kipture were badly in need of repair, Jackson proposed to investigate Hobley's choice of 'a first rate site' at Camp Ishirini, where there was ample land for a Sudanese settlement. Hill minuted his agreement with 'whatever the experts think best', and sanctioned a re-allocation of £600 from the surplus on the land survey vote⁷ for building a new station. Jackson planned to send a new Collector to Camp Ishirini to build a thorn enclosure for the livestock and two sheds; when this had been done, Kipture was to be dismantled by Browning, who was then to relieve the transport officer at Port Ugowe.⁸

The choice of a new Collector presented greater difficulties. During his short period in

temporary charge of the district, Browning had alienated the Kipture sections by his casual, off-hand manner, procrastinating habits and lack of interest in their affairs.⁶ The arrangement Jackson had made in August for Browning to be relieved by the first official to arrive from the coast was upset by Hill, who ordered Partington⁷ to proceed to Port Ugowé, where he thought the newcomer's ignorance of Kiswahili would be less of a handicap than at Kipture. When the Nandi chiefs were asked for their choice of a Collector, they nominated the three officials who had served for reasonably long periods amongst them: Lambala (Jackson); Bagge, who was expected to return to Toro on his arrival from England; and Bagnall, who was due for leave. Since there was no administrative officer available in the province to replace Browning, Jackson recommended promoting his Temporary Transport Assistant, Walter Mayes,⁸ to Acting Assistant Collector, and entrusting him with the tasks of establishing the new district station, and strengthening and extending government control throughout the district. Justifying his choice of Mayes for what in the circumstances was a key position, Jackson observed that he 'was a plucky little man, who got on exceedingly well with all Africans and would not mind being left on his own'. He also surmised that Mayes would doubtless 'take unto himself a Nandi wife', an act which 'alone will appeal to the people'.⁹ With only local mails and an occasional caravan to deal with now that mail and transport convoys were being re-routed through the Nyando Valley, a post entailing the minimum of office work would suit Mayes' temperament, and enable him to move freely about the district on his horse. Jackson looked upon 'his being able and willing to go about amongst the people as a most important point',⁹ and he anticipated that the new Collector would 'soon be known personally to all the various clans'. Jackson concluded with a damning indictment of government policy towards the Nandi since 1896: 'I believe the fact of the natives saying, 'we know there is a white man at Kipture but we never see him', is the main reason of our having had, up to date, absolutely no control over them'. Pointing out that twelve officers had been in charge of the district since 1896 - an average of three a year¹⁰ - Jackson summarized the results of a disastrous policy, for which he himself could not entirely disclaim responsibility, by declaring that 'under these circumstances, there is little wonder at our having no control over them'.

Owing to the number of officers nearing the end of their tours, and the inadvisability of entrusting one of the most unsettled districts in the Protectorate to a young or newly-appointed official,¹¹ the choice of Mayes was probably the easiest and quickest way out of a pressing difficulty. Providing Jackson was not mistaken about Mayes' suitability for the post, it should moreover be possible for him to administer the district for two or three years, because his leave entitlement would not begin until his new appointment was confirmed by the Foreign Office. Jackson had evidently convinced himself that Mayes' lack of administrative experience would not jeopardize the improved relations that had been established during the recent negotiations, and Johnston, who had himself recommended Jackson's nominee for promotion in February, agreed that the choice of Mayes, 'a well educated man, very good at accounts, and speaking the native languages with fluency',¹² met the demands of the situation. He did however suggest that Captain Gorges, the officer in charge of the Fort Ternan garrison and a former Collector at Naivasha, might lighten Mayes' burden by undertaking 'a certain amount of civil work' amongst Nandi and Lumbwa sections near his fort.¹³ Hill did not comment on the proposal, even though he recognized as a general principle that effective control depended to a large extent on the character and ability of district officers, and though, in this particular instance, he was personally concerned in seeing that the settled conditions brought about by his intervention were maintained. He possibly considered that happenings on the Nandi Plateau would no longer be of much consequence, providing they did not interfere with the troop dispositions he had sanctioned for ensuring the safety of the Nyando Valley route and the advance of the railway.¹⁴ This apparent unconcern was moreover in keeping with the Foreign Office practice of dealing with problems on an *ad hoc* basis: Hill's immediate objectives had been secured, and local officials could be left to cope with future difficulties as they occurred.¹⁵

In addition to his long term plans, Jackson proposed, on 20 November, that the sincerity of the Nandi signatories should be put to the test by inviting them to provide auxiliaries to help punish the Japtulleal for raiding Ribo Post and cutting up Arab caravans. Johnston had previously suggested moving Baker's station to Lake Baringo, but Jackson argued that withdrawal from Ribo before the offenders had been punished would have a bad

moral effect on the neighbouring tribes, and even on the more distant Nandi and Lumbwa. Although the Japtulleal were known to have captured about forty-five rifles and to have a number of Sudanese mutineers in their ranks, Jackson was nevertheless confident that they could be dealt with by one and a half companies, reinforced by 200 Nandi warriors and a similar number of irregulars drawn from the Njemps and Lumbwa. This suggestion, which was made before peace was concluded with all the Nandi sections, was in keeping with Hobley's practice of calling upon tribes to undertake certain duties immediately after they had submitted, and while they were anxious to avoid a resumption of punitive operations.¹⁴ Service with the forces of their former antagonists provided the defeated warriors with a means of forgetting their humiliation, an outlet for their spirit of adventure, and an opportunity to recoup some of the cattle they had lost through their recent misfortune. From the government's point of view this practice brought home to former adversaries the strength and firepower of the Protectorate forces, lessened the chances of the warriors harbouring resentment, and deterred the rest of the tribe from resuming hostilities at least until the auxiliaries had returned to their homes. Hill, who had recently witnessed the difficulties the Protectorate faced in safeguarding its major interests, opposed retaliatory action against the Japtulleal, and minuted 'I shall argue strongly against any punitive expeditions off the route'. In view of the overriding need to concentrate resources in and around the Nyando Valley, he thought Johnston's extension policy north of Ravine was premature. He even had reservations about the advantages of maintaining the station at Ravine,¹⁵ which had lost much of its usefulness after the Uganda Road was diverted to the south.^G

When, towards the end of December, large bands of Japtulleal and Turkana were reported to be advancing on the Njemps and friendly Suk, Baker urged Bagnall at Ravine to raise the Nandi and Kamasia so that the threat from the north could be contained. Jackson commented that if all the Suk and Turkana were involved this meant 'war to the knife', and suggested 'overwhelming the country with a mixed horde of Masai, Njemps, Nandi and Lumbwa'. Captain Gorges' columns, which attacked the invaders in Janaury, included 400 Masai, 100 Njemps and 100 Uasin Gishu auxiliaries, but no Nandi warriors were summoned to take part in the operations. This was possibly because of delay in concluding peace with the Kapsiondu, reports of renewed disaffection in the upper Nyando Valley, and a 'war scare in Lumbwa'. Meanwhile Jackson had also had second thoughts about employing Nandi irregulars, 'since there is no white man who *knows* them who could be told off to take charge of them'. Thus, through indecision or uncertainty of the outcome, this opportunity was lost for testing the temper of the Nandi leaders, and for enlisting the support of the warriors by allowing them to share in the expedition's booty of 520 cattle and 10,000 sheep and goats, 'by far the greater part of which was distributed among the friendly native allies'.^H

Reports of disaffection in the upper Nyando Valley originated in the theft, on 21 December, of a mile of telegraph wire near Camp Bibi, and only a short distance from Colour-Sergeant S.W. Bone's guard detachment at the Mount Blackett transport depot. This suggested that the Tindiret sections, some of whose leaders had attended the peace negotiations at Fort Ternan in the previous month, did not intend to honour the promises given in their name.¹⁶ The Chief Engineer decided as a result of this incident to disregard Hill's explicit instructions, and to postpone replacing the telegraph line until its immunity from theft could be guaranteed. Cunningham wired Hobley for advice as to whether all the Nandi 'clans' who had made peace should be called upon to seek out the culprits, and thus give practical proof that their protestations of loyalty were genuine. The action contemplated by Cunningham was not covered by the promises made to Jackson, and indicated the latitude the government intended to exercise when interpreting the peace terms. Hobley was instructed to report the outcome of his approaches to the chiefs to Johnston, who was considering sending 2,000 Baganda to punish the robbers if the Nandi refused their help.¹⁷ Hobley's immediate reaction was that the thefts had been carried out by Dorobo. This supposition was later supported by Lumbwa visitors to Port Ugowe, though they also put forward an alternative suggestion that 'Masai loafers' from railway earthworks camps may have been responsible.^I

Reports reaching Jackson at Ravine stated that the wire had also been cut in several other places and he, too, was inclined to incriminate the Dorobo. The railway engineers

insisted that Nandi chiefs should be made responsible for protecting the line, but Jackson doubted the practicability of enforcing this demand.¹⁸ He suggested instead that the reputed marauders should be denied access to the wire by offering the Nandi and Lumbwa rewards for capturing any Dorobo seen within fifteen miles of the telegraph line. As Hobley was confined to his station by Mayes' grave illness¹⁹ and the flooded state of the Kano Plains, he summoned the Kamelilo and Lumbwa chiefs to Port Ugowe for discussions. The summons was apparently ignored and Browning's enquiries at Kipture proved fruitless. Evatt, who also investigated the incidents from Fort Ternan, was confident that the thefts were not the work of Nandi or Lumbwa, but that Dorobo, 'loafers', or possibly caravan porters were responsible. In connection with Cunningham's enquiry about raising a levy to punish the offenders, Evatt declared that none of the chiefs was 'strong enough to combine friendly Nandi against hostile Nandi', a proposition which Hobley, who was still apparently smarting under the treatment he had received as political officer during the campaign, rejected as being 'merely theory, as so much depends on circumstances'.²⁰ His own enquiries had convinced him that the Nandi were not 'actually hostile', although he conceded that some of them were buying cattle by trading captured rifles to the Kakamega and elsewhere in Kavirondo. No further steps were taken to confirm the identity of the culprits, and Johnston decided against sending the Baganda and making the incidents a *casus belli*.²¹ Jackson persuaded Whitehouse to persevere with the replacement operation, and by the end of the year the wire had been restored from mile 500 near Londiani to mile 553 between Muhoroni and Kibigori. This episode and the gun-bartering in Kakamega were the only incidents that gave grounds for anxiety that the Nandi would not honour the peace, and by the end of the year the way was open for implementing Jackson's plans for the closer administration of the district.

The first question to be settled in this connection was the location of the new station near Camp Ishirini. An inspection by Jackson, Evatt and Hobley had to be cancelled owing to Johnston's impending visit to Nandi, and a site at Kaptumo was not finally decided upon until the end of January. Before this had been done the new regime was inaugurated under somewhat unpropitious circumstances. Mayes was recovered sufficiently by New Year's Eve to be carried in a hammock to Kipture, where Hobley considered his chances of a speedy convalescence were better than at Port Ugowe. The sick man's caravan was accompanied by sixty Sudanese settlers,²² who had been engaged to build the new station and act as Mayes' bodyguard. Despite his ignorance of administrative procedure, and the number of questions that had been held in abeyance during the six months the district was under military rule, Mayes was not given any written instructions for his guidance.²³ After he had regained his strength at Kipture - and a Swahili carpenter had arrived from Buganda and a mason from the coast - his first task was to build a new station at Kaptumo, to make it impregnable against attack and, if possible, to arrange for its food supply. When this had been done the small district garrison was to be transferred to Kaptumo, where Mayes hoped to persuade the Uasin Gishu at Kipture to settle under his protection.²⁴

Among the outstanding matters awaiting the new Collector's attention were an application for a substantial land grant from Chambers, Ormsby & Co.,²⁵ cultivation of trial plots of maize and, if the experiment proved successful, distribution of seed to the people. Johnston wanted Mayes to persuade some of the warriors to enlist in the armed constabulary, and to investigate how the wild rubber vines, which grew profusely in the Nandi forests, could profitably and prudently be exploited.²⁶ Evatt, who evidently equated pastoralism with idleness and truculence, recommended that advantage should be taken of 'the deprivation of a portion of their livestock' to make the Nandi increase the area of land under cultivation, in order to lessen their dependence on cattle;²⁷ and he warned that the prospects for a permanent peace would depend to a large extent upon Mayes' success in bringing about this revolutionary change of attitude.²⁸ But above all the new Collector's principal task was to move about the district and get to know the people, so that he could establish the same kind of personal relationships with them that Hobley had achieved during his six years' stay in Kavirondo.

NOTES

1. His change of mind since July (see *NRBR* ii, p. 96) may have been influenced by discussions with Hobley, who thought the Uasin Gishu a disruptive element in Nandi.
2. Johnston did not propose sending Baganda agents to Nandi, a wise decision in view of the unrest they caused in the only Kalenjin district (Sebei) in which they served (J.M. Coote's diary, 1909-11). Cf. William Grant's comment on 1.7.1898 (ESA A/4/11) that 'no Mganda no matter whom should be placed over the Wasoga'.
3. Presumably a reference to the discretionary powers to abandon Kipture which Johnston gave Evatt during the campaign. Hill may also have asked Jackson whether a station on the Nandi Plateau was necessary.
4. See *NRBR* i, pp. 209-210, 367; also pp. 328, 356, 358 for Hobley's and Colonel Broome's views.
5. £2,400 had been included in the 1900-1901 estimates (FOCP 7261). Attempts to recruit from India failed, and R.C. Allen accepted the post of Chief Surveyor on 30.11.1900 (FOCP 7403-4, FO 2/294, 383, 428).
6. Jackson noted on 6.7.1901 (FOCP 7867/143) that Johnston had transferred Browning to the accounts department because 'he was not quite fitted for dealing with natives'.
7. Appointed 3rd Class Assistant 1.7.1900; arrived at Port Ugowe 8.11.1900. After a probationary period with Hobley at Port Ugowe, he served with distinction in Lumbwa and was specially selected on that account to administer Nandi after the 1905-1906 expedition (CO 533/14, Hobley, *From Chartered Company*, pp. 120, 157).
8. (1863-c.1928); master mariner from Glasgow, who lost his ship and joined Charlesworth, Pilling & Co. at Zanzibar in 1891; 1895 Smith, Mackenzie & Co.'s agent and transporter on the Uganda Road, centred mainly on Mumias; awarded £100 for services in Sudanese mutiny; 1898-1899, transporter on his own account; recommended for a government post by Macdonald and George Wilson, but considered unsuitable by Berkeley; January 1900, temporary employment with P.W.D. at Entebbe; October 1900, Transport Assistant in Eastern Province; appointed 3rd Class Assistant, 12.3.1901; retired 12.12.1911.
9. Berkeley made the same point on 28.11.1898 (FOCP 7400/132) and the Foreign Office on 17.7.1899 (FOCP 7402/17); cf. Hobley's views in September 1899 (*NRBR* ii, p. 5). For the cancellation of Bagge's tour in November 1898 and Cooper's more enterprising approach, see *NRBR* i, pp. 346, 351, *NRBR* ii, pp. 15, 36.
10. Five officers were in charge in 1900.
11. Hobley, Bagnall, H.M. Macallister (Naivasha), Knowles, and Transport Officers Johnson and Brown were due for leave; Martin was expected to be moved from the Eastern Province on his return from leave; Jackson, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-72. Writing to Galt on 23.6.1900 (FO 2/546), Chief Accountant G.D. Smith said six 3rd Class Assistants were on the way, but presumed that 'your billet (Nandi) is too senior a one for them - a la Stanley C. (Tomkins)', another 3rd class official who was left in charge of Kampala in September 1898; see *NRBR* i, p. 350.
12. Mayes' failure to pass the Swahili language test in May 1903 was attributed by Eliot (FO 2/713) to his utter inexperience of examinations. The horse mentioned by Jackson apparently did not live long in Nandi as Mayes asked in August 1901 (ESA A/18/1) for a government mule.
13. When Jackson complained on 20.11.1900 (ESA A/8/1) of Hill's unwitting interference with his plans for Browning and Partington, Hill minuted 'I told Jackson to shift men as he pleased'.
14. See *NRBR* i, pp. 123-124, 190, 336, 354, *NRBR* ii, pp. 31, 56; Ainsworth and Hall also used this procedure in the E.A.P. Hobley was averse to measures that encouraged inter-tribal feuding, and usually restricted his requirements of a defeated tribe to civil obligations.
15. Johnston made a spirited defence of Ravine and his extension policy on 21.10.1900 (FO 2/300). Ravine was relieved and a new station established on Lake Baringo after Baker burned Ribo Post on 19.2.1901. Cf. the fate of Guasa Masa, Kabras, Kakamega, Kipture and Bushiri, and the decline of Machakos and Mumias, as examples of how transport considerations outweighed all others.
16. Willis (*op. cit.*, p. 101), who passed through the disaffected area a fortnight before the theft, noticed that 'the Nandi ... were not in the best of moods'.
17. Evatt was loath to release troops committed to protecting the Nyando Valley; only 145 men were eventually mustered for the Suk-Turkana expedition, with the result that Gorges had to withdraw before achieving all his objectives (ESA A/27/17, FO 2/514). Although the new Commandant, Colonel Coles, arrived at Entebbe in mid-December, military arrangements in the Eastern Province were left to Evatt, probably because of the disruption of telegraphic communications east of Port Ugowe.

18. Cf. the demands made on Basoga chiefs in April under the Telegraph Protection Regulations (*NRBR* ii, pp. 56-57). Jackson added that the Dorobo destroyed the game and caused forest fires, details that were likely to appeal to Johnston and Hill.
19. Mayes was nursed by Hobley, who wired Entebbe on 21.12.1900 for a doctor to be sent over by boat.
20. An unspecified number also left Port Ugowe for Nandi on 15.1.1901. It is doubtful if there were any Sudanese at Kipture other than soldiers and police.
21. Jackson, who did not learn until 5.1.1901 (ESA A/27/17) that Mayes had been sent to Nandi, probably thought he would be briefed there by Johnston during his forthcoming visit. On 24.6.1901 (ESA A/18/1) Mayes reminded Jackson that he had not yet received his 'letter of instruction'.
22. The applicants already owned a 'plantation' at Buzula in Busoga; Johnston's reply outlined his thinking on land policy and stated that he would not agree to 'dispose of land occupied or owned by natives'. An application for coffee and tea land close to the railway in the Nandi District had been made, at Bagge's suggestion, by a man in the Congo on 27.9.1900, and a similar enquiry had been received in May (FO 2/382, ESA A/4/28).
23. Cattle captured from the Nandi in 1900 were not sufficient to induce them to act as Evatt wished. Control of 'pernicious pastoral proclivities' was often urged by officials and settlers as a means of resolving political and agrarian problems.

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- B. Hobley-Com, 24.8.1900, 10.12.1900, ESA A/18/1.
- C. Jackson-Com, 20.11.1900, ESA A/8/1, and for Kipture, *R.G.Q.*, 1.7.1933, Cunningham-Hobley, 5.12.1900, ESA A/19/1.
- D. Mayes' life history in CO 533/25; Macdonald-Berkeley, 26.6.1898, 20.5.1899, Hill's minute, 26.7.1898, and Berkeley's opinion, 26.7.1899, FO 2/174, 221, 236; for later comments on his character and capabilities, see Stewart and Bagge, 24.9.1904, FO 2/839, R.L. Antrobus, 4.5.1906, Sadler-CO, 25.5.1906, CO 533/14, Girouard-CO, 26.5.1910, CO 533/74; Meinertzhagen, *op. cit.*; by 1905 he had several Nandi wives.
- E. Johnston-Hobley, 23.11.1900, ESA A/19/1; Jackson-Com, 20.12.1900, ESA A/8/1. Johnston-FO, 18.2.1901, FO 2/297, 461. Johnston-Hobley, 23.11.1900, 11.12.1900, ESA A/19/1.
- F. Hill's memo, on Johnston's General Report, 27.7.1901, FO 2/519. Johnston-Jackson, 7.10.1900, ESA A/9/1, confirming that Kipture could be closed so that Evatt 'may concentrate his forces as far as possible in the Nyando Valley'.
- G. Jackson-Com, 20.11.1900, ESA A/8/1; Bagnall-Com, 30.11.1900, ESA A/20/1. Johnston-Jackson, 7.10.1900, ESA A/9/1. Cf. A. Johnston, *op. cit.*, p. 214, on his brother's efforts 'to convert poachers into keepers'; G.F. Scott Elliot, *Naturalist in Mid-Africa*, p. 157. Johnston-Jackson, 29.11.1900, ESA A/9/1.
- H. Baker-Bagnall, 31.12.1900, ESA A/20/1. Jackson-Com, 8.1.1901, ESA A/8/1. Johnston-FO, 6.1.1901, FO 2/461, FOCP 7823/63; Gorges-Hill, 15.2.1901, FO 2/514; RL, pp. 64-67; Moyses-Bartlett, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93. Jackson-Evatt, 5.16.1.1901, ESA A/27/17.
- I. Johnston-FO, 31.1.1901, ESA A/38, FO 2/461; FOCP 7732/4/11/22. Cunningham-Hobley, 27.12.1900, ESA A/19/1, for the gradual imposition of obligations on defeated tribes, see Low, *Lion Rampant*, p. 24. Hobley-Com, 30, 31.12.1900, ESA A/18/1.
- J. Jackson-Com, 8.1.1901, ESA A/8/1. Hobley-Com, 21.31.12.1900, ESA A/18/1. Hobley-Com, 3.1.1901, ESA A/18/1.
- K. Hobley-Com, 3.1.1901, 7.3.1901, ESA A/18/1, FOCP 7823/84; North Kavirondo General Diary, December 1900, KNA. Johnston-FO, 31.1.1901, FO 2/461; FO-Johnston, 26.3.1901, FOCP 7690/182, approving Johnston's *casus belli* decision.
- L. Jackson-Com, 27.12.1900, ESA A/8/1; Hobley-Com, 27, 28, 31.12.1900, 2.2.1901, ESA A/18/1; PUD. Hobley-Com, 21.12.1900, ESA A/18/1.
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22.12.1900, FOCP 7690/103.

- N. Evatt's Report; cf. Ainsworth-Com, 13.6.1899, FOCP 7402/23, Eliot, *op. cit.*, pp. 106, 143-144, Sir Henry Belfield-CO, 3.4.1914, CO 533/117, C.M. Dobbs, *Kenya Land Commission Evidence*, iii, 3439, Sorenson, *op. cit.*, pp. 219, 253; R.M. van Zwanenberg and A. King, *Economic History of Kenya and Uganda*, p. 93.

CHAPTER 18

Repercussions and responsibility

Evatt's unexpectedly protracted campaign had important repercussions far beyond the Nandi borders. Of immediate concern to the government, and to missionaries and immigrant traders throughout Uganda, was the effect the operations had upon communications, both existing and projected. The partial disruption of transport arrangements by Nandi raids became almost total when Evatt decided on strategic grounds to close the road. This caused traffic accumulations at road stations and railhead which were not finally cleared until several weeks after the fighting ended. Goods and passengers were held up for long periods, and one party of White Fathers turned back at Fort Smith and proceeded through German East Africa to Kampala. Indian and other trading caravans ceased operating, and the railway blamed its disappointing traffic receipts on the blocked caravan route from railhead to Port Ugowe. Postal services were erratic, one overseas mail being totally destroyed, while another apparently went astray. C.M.S. missionaries in Bunyoro were so exasperated by the chaotic conditions on the Uganda Road that they sent an experimental consignment of mail by the Nile route.^A Excess expenditure of £3,046 on the temporary telegraph construction vote was attributed to the cost of replacing wire and equipment stolen by the Nandi. The system lost much of its value to official and private users as telegrams sometimes took seven weeks from Kampala to Mombasa. Several messages, including notification of the Bahr el Ghazal expedition, and communications concerning replacements for the Indian Contingent, were lost and had to be repeated; and decisions, such as delimitation of the Anglo-German frontier, appointment of a magistrate for the railway zone in the Eastern Province, and the application of Indian Acts to Uganda, had to be taken without reference to the Special Commissioner.^B As a result of the disruption and inconvenience caused by the Nandi, O'Callaghan suggested an investigation¹ to determine whether wireless telegraphy could supplement the vulnerable telegraph, which had failed to fulfil its original function of a 'military line'.

Thefts of engine parts and the abandoning of masts and timbers on the Nandi escarpment postponed the commissioning of the *William Mackinnon* for several months. These setbacks, together with losses incurred through earlier Nandi raids on steamer caravans, increased the cost of the vessel to £32,941, 'an amount considerably over what was expected, due largely to troubles with the Nandi'. Ben Whitehouse's contract for the lake survey had to be extended by six months,² and work on the cart road down the Nyando Valley was suspended throughout the duration of the campaign. On the credit side, delays in deliveries from the coast gave a fillip to the investigation of local resources, several of which were found to provide acceptable substitutes for higher-priced, imported commodities used by Europeans and Baganda leaders.^C

In the political field, Johnston was compelled to postpone pacification and reorganization in other parts of the Protectorate, and to reconsider his plans for extending the area under effective occupation. Withdrawal of Hornby's sepoys before they completed their work in Bukedi meant that the Elgon post was once again deferred,³ and that Kakungulu had to be left, without effective supervision, 'to bring the unruly Kedi or Lango people under control'. Occupation of Bugisu had to be held in abeyance while Hornby was fighting the Nandi, and symptoms of unrest among its inhabitants ignored. Problems in William Grant's district,⁴ which had been shelved while he was on leave, could not be tackled until he returned from Nandi with the Baganda expedition at the end of the year.^D In the unadministered country to the north-east, where Johnston intended to establish a chain of forts from Ravine to Lake Rudolf, Hill's opposition to the projected extension of jurisdiction was vindicated by the critical situation that occurred around Ribo at the beginning of the Nandi campaign. Evatt's refusal to help Bagnall punish the Japtulleal for annihilating Baker's food party and sacking Ribo diminished British prestige in the area, and encouraged incursions by Suk and Turkana which necessitated the despatch of a punitive expedition in January 1901. The Foreign Secretary, whose interest in the advance to the north had slackened as a result of the settlement of the Nile question and an easing of tension on the Abyssinian border, was easily convinced by Hill early in 1901 that 'we must prevent the enthusiasm of our agents from entangling us in these remote places', where 'we've bitten off

more than we can chew'.⁵ 'Increased responsibilities north of Baringo' were expressly forbidden, a similar prohibition was placed on expansion in other outlying areas, and an embargo imposed on scientific and other private expeditions⁶ beyond railroad.^E

Hill's disquiet about 'the results of this constant pushing on' was more in keeping with the realities of the situation than Johnston's expansionist proposals. The application of Hill's policy in the country south of the Nyando River did, however, prove less judicious. Despite their proximity to the railway route and the help they gave the Nandi during the expedition, sanction for a post among the Lumbwa was withheld until work on the railway was brought to a halt in April 1902 by a raid on a construction camp by 500 Lumbwa warriors.^F A number of lessons were nevertheless learned in 1900. These continued to influence policy decisions for some time, because of the large proportion of the army that was allocated to the defence of the railway route. Not only were the sepoys and local companies of the Nandi Field Force retained in the Nyando Valley, but additional contingents from the Nile and Masai Districts were also sent by Johnston to the Eastern Province, 'where I want to hold the railway route very strongly'. The events of the past few months had evidently convinced him that the Sudanese, Baganda and Masai were not 'the only people ... who can deal a serious blow at British rule'.^G Moreover, so long as a recrudescence of Nandi hostility could not be ruled out, it was considered unwise to dispense with the costly Indian Contingent, whose departure had long been regarded as a major factor in redressing the imbalance between expenditure on the armed forces⁷ and the funds available for more constructive purposes.^H

Underlying these policy decisions was the fact that the Nandi had exposed the weakness of the military arm, and revived doubts about its capacity to cope if disturbances occurred in several districts at the same time. The only recourse in this contingency would be to summon reserves from India⁸ to reinforce the local companies, which had been weakened as a result of the Sudanese mutiny and Johnston's reorganization proposals. Reports in October of 'an apparently somewhat serious outbreak of disturbances on the eastern border of Uganda', together with a lack of agreement about the wisdom of training tribal warriors to replace the Sudanese companies, and eventually the Indian Contingent, set in train the lengthy discussions which led up to the formation in January 1902 of the King's African Rifles, and the embodiment of 600 seasoned B.C.A. troops as a reserve battalion for service in all the East African protectorates.^I

The weakness of the military arm was recognized in unofficial circles in Uganda, where the failure of the administration to induce the Nandi to accept foreign rulers was regarded as an indictment of its policy and a reflection on the competence of its officers. Tolerably settled conditions had been established in other districts along the Uganda Road by peaceful processes or moderate displays of force; but similar results had not been allowed to take advantage of the government's weakness to disrupt communications. If the reasons why peaceful measures had failed in Nandi were not fully understood, unofficial opinion was unanimous in agreeing that 'it is rather humiliating to think that a tribe of natives with scarcely (if any) a gun amongst them and using for the most part bows and arrows, can defy and has defied since May all the well-armed Indians commanded by a Colonel, all the Nubis and all the native troops and maxim guns sent against them'. Fears were expressed that the lessons that should have been learned from the Sudanese mutiny had apparently been ignored,^J and that there was no guarantee that the punishment inflicted upon the Nandi would cause them to mend their ways.⁹

One matter upon which there was general agreement was that the prospects for averting a repetition of Evatt's lengthy and inconclusive campaign would be greatly improved when reinforcements and supplies could be sent by rail to disturbed areas. The decision in November 1901 to place the railway under one administration, and its protection under a single military command, was probably influenced by the fact that Hill had seen for himself that the Nyando Valley section was likely to be the most vulnerable link in the chain to the Lake. This decision, which was also influenced by his forecast that the relations of the Uganda Commissioner 'will in future lie largely with the Nile route', deferred consideration of Johnston's proposal for the fusion of the two protectorates¹⁰ under a High Commissioner stationed on the Mau.^K Finally, the events of 1900 also played a part in bringing about the submission of the Nandi in 1905-1906, the plans for which were drawn up by K.A.R. officers on the basis of an analysis of the reasons for Evatt's failure.¹¹

In the administrative sphere, the transport chaos and military setbacks that occurred

on Sclater's Road expedited the switch to the Nyando Valley route, which diminished the importance of Ravine, Kipture and Mumias. The priority given to the transport of reinforcements and supplies for the field force severely restricted the number of unemployed Sudanese who could be sent from Uganda to form settlements in the Eastern Province.¹² The disruption of activities elsewhere in the Protectorate as a result of the outbreak stressed yet again the need to devote more attention and resources to districts near the lines of communication; also the wisdom of avoiding provocative measures,¹ and of entrusting the resolution of political problems to administrative rather than military officers.¹³ Berkeley had come to the same conclusions after the 1895 expedition, but the measures he was able to take to strengthen the administrative structure in the Eastern Province had been largely upset by the Sudanese mutiny and its aftermath. After the defeat of the mutineers and the deportation of Mwanga and Kabarega, Ternan and Johnston had been principally concerned with settling the Buganda issue and establishing treaty relations with rulers west of the Lake. Neglect of the eastern districts, and the resultant weakness of the local administration during the Nandi campaign, underlined the need for a firmer hold over this part of 'the intervening country' than Entebbe had ever attempted to achieve in the past. This was recognized by Hill when he sanctioned the troop dispositions for safeguarding the railway route in October, and by his proposal, in the following July, that the Deputy Commissioner¹⁴ and Assistant Deputy Commissioner of the enlarged East Africa Protectorate should both be located in Uganda's former Eastern Province.

Despite the rejection by the Foreign Office and Johnston of newspaper reports attributing the Nandi troubles to the hut tax,¹⁵ the cautionary advice given to Uganda officials, and the unhurried, circumspect way in which taxation was introduced in the E.A.P., suggest that the local authorities and the Foreign Office were anxious to avoid giving grounds for similar accusations elsewhere in East Africa. Eliot was continually reminded of the wisdom of proceeding tentatively even when chiefs in the more settled districts responded encouragingly to the idea of a hut tax; he was also warned to exercise particular care in introducing taxation in Masailand,¹⁶ where its collection was thought most likely to be resented and to endanger the railway.^M

The conflict with the Nandi also had repercussions on neighbouring and other tribes. The most northerly sections of the Lumbwa were demoralized for a time by the attempts to isolate them from their southern kinsmen, and by accounts from refugees of the field force's activities in Nandi. Eventually, however, the success of their first major encounter with the invaders strengthened the ties between the Lumbwa and Nandi, and indicated that the Lumbwa would not stand idly by if they were similarly provoked in the future.^N On the other hand the Kamasia, whose refusal to grant asylum to fugitives and livestock saved their country from being invaded, profited from the distribution of booty to the auxiliaries, and were consequently more than ever disposed to side with their benefactors than with the Nandi.

Among the non-Kalenjin peoples, the Masai and Uasin Gishu once again received material benefits for their services against the Nandi, and campaign reports on the conduct of the former encouraged the E.A.P. to persevere with the formation of a Masai company of the East Africa Rifles. The loyalty of the Kavirondo was strained to such an extent that two Luo chiefs had to be punished for their unco-operative attitude, while the Kabras, Kitosh and Kakamega showed signs of becoming restless as the campaign dragged on. Hobley protested on two occasions about the adverse effects which demands made upon the Baluya and Luo were having on the relations he had painstakingly fostered with them since 1895.^O The money earned by supplying food and labour for the field force, though considerable in amount, was hardly commensurate with the sufferings endured by the porters, and Evatt's failure to control the Nandi and Lumbwa in and overlooking the Nyando Valley prevented the Luo from pushing eastwards from their settlements near the Lake.¹⁷

Despite the self-congratulatory tone of Samwiri Mukasa's reminiscences about his journey through Nandi after the fighting had stopped, the experiences of the Baganda auxiliaries and the sufferings of Grant's porters made their fellow tribesmen reluctant to settle or work in the Eastern Province. A small colony was established at Port Ugowe, but the hundreds of men who were said, in March 1897, to be ready to work on the railway from Naivasha to the Lake did not come forward in June 1901, when the Chief Engineer called for 2,000 volunteers,¹⁸ and the Baganda did not in fact offer their services in any

numbers until after the Nandi were defeated in 1905-1906.^P

The bravery and doggedness of the Nandi boosted their prestige in the eyes of other tribes,¹⁹ some of which could contrast the army's triumph over the Sudanese mutineers, and Mwanga and Kabarega, with its indifferent performance against the Nandi; on the other hand, the fact that the British had not been beaten and driven out was calculated to discourage others from trying to succeed where the Nandi had failed.^Q

Much more important than the repercussions among other tribes was the effect which the campaign, the terms negotiated to bring it to a close, and the arrangements made for administering the district, might have on the Nandi themselves. Whether they could be convinced of the futility of further resistance and the benefits to be derived from co-operating with their former adversaries would depend, in part, on the extent to which the factors that had estranged the Nandi in 1895, and caused them to persist in their opposition to alien rule, had been correctly identified and taken into account in the settlement arrangements.

Explanations for the continued intransigence of the Nandi were put forward by many commentators, among whom the C.M.S. missionaries were the most impartial and perceptive. Bishop Tucker was convinced that 'the hostile attitude of the Nandi is due to the actions of Europeans (I do not mean Administrative officers) and their coast followers'; in particular he put the blame on Andrew Dick and his agents, 'who by cruel and unjust treatment stirred up the people to hostility and revenge'.²⁰ Discussing 'the real cause of the disturbance', a contributor to *Mengo Notes* wrote in August that 'reports tend to show that the present methods adopted by their "Protectors" in dealing with them could scarcely be called conducive to peace. The white man is in Nandi, not because the natives want him there, but because the white man wants to keep the road open to Uganda. When, therefore, native chiefs choose to disobey the commands of the officials at the various forts, does it necessarily mean that they are rebels, if it was not their wish that they should come to govern them? but they are apparently treated as rebels, and ... a "punitive expedition" is sent out'. A factor upon which Eliot was later to lay much stress was identified in November by a missionary linguist, whose analysis of the Nandi rising recognized that 'many troubles are due to misunderstandings between people and officers, the one not knowing the language of the other'.²¹ Reflecting the views of local missionaries, the *C.M.S. Annual Report* for 1901 recorded that Slater's Road, the telegraph and the opening up of the Nyando Valley route had caused the Nandi to resist, because they resented 'the intrusion of the white man so near to (their) native hills'. One of the Society's most influential supporters, T.F.V. Buxton, suggested in the *Church Missionary Intelligencer* for November 1901 that 'the little war' of 1900 might have been avoided if a policy designed 'to keep things going at the lowest possible cost' had not been followed.^R Although C.M.S. missionaries expressed themselves strongly about the government's shortcomings, their own views on the Nandi question were not altogether consistent. Querulous complaints regarding the inconvenience and privations caused by Evatt's failure to quell the rising, and thus restore communications with Mengo, were made simultaneously with protests about the injustice of punishing the Nandi as rebels for disrupting the transport and telegraph systems. The Catholics were equally irritated by delays on the Uganda Road but less inclined to offer advice. Father Plunkett did however suggest that Nandi attacks on caravans and thefts of telegraph wire were in response to an order requiring them to build a road.²²

Official assessments of the underlying causes of the conflict were as diverse as those of the missionaries. Evatt confessed he was unable to discover a specific reason for the outbreak, but considered that resentment at the presence of foreigners, and the prophecies and influence of the Laibon, were contributory factors. The Commandant also deplored the consequences of opportunities for easy loot which had been presented to the enemy, owing to slackness and indiscipline amongst troops who scorned the Nandi as fighters. Hobley admitted that the Nandi had never made peace after previous expeditions, and 'have all along viewed our presence in the country with veiled repugnance, and just tolerated us without any friendliness ... only so long as they thought it advisable'. Describing the warriors as restless 'raiders by nature' in whom 'a sort of blood lust seems to be ingrained', he concluded that the Nandi vaguely realized that the government intended to check their raiding activities, and challenge the supremacy they had established over other tribes by force of arms.^S

Jackson, who had more dealings with the Nandi than either Evatt or Hobley, was

more sensitive than his colleagues to the effect of provocative actions on a bellicose people.²³ Replying in June 1900 to a request from the railway for compensation for property destroyed when the Nandi sacked the telegraph station at Kitoto's, Jackson anticipated Tucker's conviction by declaring that 'my own experience of the WaNandi proves conclusively, I think, that such attacks are not altogether unprovoked, but more in the nature of reprisals for thefts or maltreatment of the people, not necessarily of recent date, but acts over which they brood for months until they see an opportunity of retaliating'. Although five months later this declaration did not prevent him from reporting that 'all Nandi acknowledge they began operations without provocation', he also conceded that they were not entirely to blame for their unco-operative attitude. His forthright condemnation of the way in which shortages and frequent changes of staff had prevented officials at the badly sited district station from making any impression on the people was a sad commentary on the staffing position throughout Uganda. Although he did not say so, the implication was that it was also a reflection on the conduct of affairs since 1895, as well as a reproach to the British Government for its parsimonious attitude towards the protectorates, and its methods of recruitment. Successive commissioners had accepted that requests for sufficient staff for effective administration would be received with coldness in Whitehall, and had accordingly framed their annual estimates with this in mind. Some of the holders of patronage appointments made in London, as well as a number of officials who were recruited locally in emergencies, proved unsuitable, and few of them displayed outstanding qualities. Often this meant that a vacancy in the district administration had to be filled by a man of mediocre calibre and, in some cases, by whatever official happened to be available. Nandi had suffered more than many other districts on this account, and none of the Collectors had stayed long enough at Kipture to form the sort of personal relationships²⁴ which Grant, George Wilson, Hobley and others had established with the leaders and people of their districts.¹

Johnston attributed 'the only warfare which has disturbed (his) otherwise entirely peaceful administration' to the 'inimical disposition' of the Nandi, and simple greed. He also expatiated on the way in which 'this very difficult question of the subjection of the Nandi tribes had been shirked by former Administrators', and implied that this had led the Nandi to believe the government did not have the will and means to control them. Suggestions that the Nandi may have been provoked were repudiated by the Special Commissioner, who contended that 'so far as we are aware they had absolutely no grievance to complain of. Caravans had ceased to traverse their country, as the Nyando route along the projected railway was preferred. No taxation had been imposed on the Nandi; in fact, on account of their waspish nature, they had been left severely alone'. The statements, that caravans had ceased to pass through Nandi and taxes had not been imposed, were untrue; nor did the expressions, 'so far as we are aware' and 'had been left severely alone', apparently cause Johnston any uneasiness about the capacity of the Kipture Collectors, or the guidance and resources they had received from Entebbe. He evidently saw the problem as a straightforward case of unprovoked rebellion on the part of a wayward and avaricious people,²⁵ who would cease to be troublesome only after their martial pride had been humbled.^U

A junior official, who had acted as Collector at Kipture for about a month in May 1900, viewed the problem in a different light. Seymour Leet complained, in a letter addressed to Lord Salisbury personally, that the menial tasks performed by collectors did not allow them time 'to visit their district or to know the chiefs and people and know what is going on'. When he was supposed to be in charge of the Nandi, Leet had been expected 'to issue flour to natives by the pound, measure cloth for natives, weigh and issue iron wire, brass wire and beads'. He protested, 'should officers be given an opportunity of coming into touch with the chiefs and people - instead of being kept in the various forts performing the duties of Clerks and Storekeepers - thereby losing prestige with the European traders - and natives - the grievances of both chiefs and people could be heard (and) settled, thus preventing these murders and raids ... and making the road safe'. He also pointed out that four officers had been in charge of Nandi between February and May, 'at a time when the Hut Tax was being collected, that it was rather perplexing to the native chiefs', who collect the taxes, 'and consequently made them discontented'. Leet alleged in a later letter that 'the Nandi Expedition was brought about owing to an Indian's hut being burnt'. Instead of ordering an enquiry to ascertain what the victim had done to incite the local people in this way, Johnston had directed that the Indian should be avenged. Leet protested to Barrington, 'Their (*sic*) is

absolutely no justice given to these natives; if the chief had been sent for and enquiries made as to why the hut was burnt and have the man punished but not to punish a tribe of thousands of people who are innocent, the expedition (would have been) unnecessary'.^v

Leet's own record in the Niger Coast and Uganda Protectorates had been far from satisfactory, and he had every reason to try and discredit Johnston, who had been obliged to reprimand him for disobedience and dereliction of duty. The embittered junior official's evidence cannot however be entirely disregarded. His account of the burning of the Indian's hut is presumably a garbled version of the attack on the telegraph office at Kitoto's, which took place while Leet was at Kipture. His distorted account was subsequently denied by Nandi participants in the raid, and can probably be ignored. He was on surer ground however on the effects of the staffing position and the Collector's enforced preoccupation with the minutiae of station routine.²⁶ The observations on tax collection are also in accord with evidence from other sources that tax had been paid by some of the sections near Kipture. Galt, Hobley and Jackson had debated whether payments by the Koilegei affected Latongwa's claim for restitution of the cattle which Hornby had seized; and Hobley heard that a demand from the Kipture Collector for 'a tribute of goats' had been used by the Laibon to induce an assembly of elders to authorize a resort to arms.²⁷ Despite this disinterested evidence and Leet's categorical assertions, Johnston consistently denied that tax had ever been levied on the Nandi.²⁸ Although the head of the African and Asian Departments at the Foreign Office minuted, in September, that the disturbances were 'the result of Johnston's hut tax which he had put on to make his estimates look better', Salisbury's successor accepted without question Johnston's assurance that Nandi intransigence could not be ascribed to its imposition.^w

Lansdowne's readiness to accept Johnston's assurance was probably influenced by allegations in the press connecting the introduction of tax with the genesis of the Nandi conflict. *The Times* of 4 September 1900 quoted a Reuter's message from Mombasa reporting that 'the cause of the outbreak is stated to be discontent arising from the hut tax', but that 'no trustworthy information is obtainable as to the real origin'. The rider was omitted on 24 December by the *Times of India*, which put the blame entirely on 'our policy of forcing on them measures such as Sir Harry Johnston's hut tax'. A *Times* correspondent, who described the Nandi on 23 January 1901 as a degenerate tribe of the Masai family, apparently had no fresh information to support Reuter's reported cause for the discontent.²⁹ Explaining that 'being more or less of an outcast people, they have kept aloof from other tribes and constantly fought shy of Europeans', he accepted that 'troubles like the present are to be expected until they understand our intentions, and as yet they have had very little opportunity of doing so'. In the same paper on 14 February, a special article, which was possibly written or inspired by Johnston, declared emphatically that 'no tax whatsoever had been imposed on the Nandi tribe'. This was questioned on 19 March in a lengthy article in the *Liberal Daily News*. The writer, who 'evidently ... knows a good deal of what goes on in Uganda',^x also reported that 'local opinion points to the influence of a few troublesome and discontented Swahilis as the origin of the rising'. He continued, 'It is not correct to say the hut tax was not imposed and did not lead to the trouble, for we are informed although the Nandi have always been troublesome, they fell in for the most part with the idea of the hut tax, and a good many of them have paid it; unfortunately, some of the chiefs who were on their way to pay at the local station were fired on by Nubian sentries. This occurrence, if correctly reported, appears to have been little understood on the spot, for we are informed, in opposition to the advice tendered by the local civil officer, the military authorities proceeded to punish numbers of the natives, some of whom had paid the tax'.³⁰

Hill refuted the allegations made in the *Daily News*, and assured Lansdowne that 'the origin of the trouble was not the hut tax, which was not enforced, although the people may have heard of it'. Hill repeated the conclusion he had reached a few days after his arrival in Uganda, that the expedition had been forced upon the administration by the attitude of the Nandi, 'who off and on since 1895 ... have committed a series of outrages'. Echoing Evatt's explanation that 'the people had been worked up to the necessary pitch by the prophecies and influence of the Laibon, ... who is said to be especially inimical to Europeans', Hill reported that the hostility of the Nandi was 'the culmination of a dislike of our presence, which ... has been fostered for their own ends by the Laibons, or High Priests, of the tribe'. Local officials and the Foreign Office were only too ready to impute Nandi resistance to the

machinations of their ritual expert and to liken his pernicious influence to that of a Mahdi or Mullah.³¹ It was possible by so doing to imply that the perverse and otherwise inexplicable animosity of the Nandi, having been aroused and sustained by similar religious processes as the fanaticism encountered in the Sudan and Somaliland, could not have been softened if a different policy had been pursued, or kept within bounds by the measures usually employed to forward pacification.³² Acceptance of this view of the overwhelming significance of Koitalel's role was facilitated because nothing was known personally of the elusive Nandi Laibon, and very little had been learned about his office and the sanctions the people could invoke to deter him from acting contrary to the public interest.³³ Two East African precedents seemed, moreover, to confirm the Foreign Office's analysis: the terror Mbaruk bin Raschid inspired among the Nyika as a result of his 'magical arts' and 'spells'; and the arbitrary authority which E.A.P. Commissioners were misled into believing Lenana wielded over the Masai.³⁴ The Masai analogy suggested that Koitalel, too, was a 'monarch of such considerable powers, both real and imaginary', and 'a powerful ... religious and hereditary chief', whose dictates the Nandi would not dare question.³⁵

The Foreign Office followed Johnston not only in the dispute over taxation, but also in rejecting the War Office's claim, which was also made by independent observers, that the Nandi had 'taken advantage of the fact that the Uganda Protectorate garrison in these parts has, within the last year, been considerably reduced'.³⁶ On every count the Foreign Office remained adamant in refusing to admit that sins of commission or omission on its part, or on the part of its local representatives, were responsible in any way for creating or exacerbating the problem. The Nandi were held by implication to be wholly accountable for the conflict, which would not be finally resolved until they had been persuaded or forced to change their attitude.

In contrast to the conflicting views on the origins of the outbreak, there was almost unanimous agreement about the immediate causes which had compelled the government to combat it by armed might: disrupted communications had to be restored, and the Nandi taught, before the railway gangs crossed the Mau, that the administration had the power and will to defend its interests and punish disturbers of the peace. The relevance of these considerations to the genesis and timing of Evatt's expedition was repeatedly stressed by Johnston, who tended to gloss over the factors that had affected the response of the Nandi to the alien occupation of their country. It was 'the erection of the telegraph wire along the Nyando Valley' that 'had tempted them to acts of aggression' in order 'to temporarily enrich themselves'; and 'the raids on transport carts, mail caravans and isolated telegraph stations'³⁷ were nothing more than their reaction to the punishment they received for stealing the wire.³⁸ Much as Johnston would have preferred to postpone a clash with the Nandi, the disruption they caused left him with no alternative but to make them understand that they could no longer continue to rob and harry at will, and challenge the government's authority. Evatt's campaign cannot therefore be considered as forming part of a planned subjugation process: it was simply an inescapable response to a Nandi initiative which transformed an uneasy but tolerable situation into a threat of critical proportions.

The reasons for the Nandi response to the fitful attempts that had been made since 1895 to pacify them, and for the intensification in 1900 of their efforts to rid themselves of the intruders, were much more deep-seated than Johnston and many others recognized or were prepared to admit. After two decades of freedom from fear of invasion by other tribes, the advent of the British was a bewildering experience which threatened the Nandi way of life. The nature and extent of the threat was apparently not fully appreciated at the outset, probably because of the unimpressive character of the government presence and the few demands made upon the people by its agents. Life went on much as before, and the Nandi seemed content to let things be, in the expectation that the often solitary stranger at Kipture would weary of his sojourn amongst a people who were usually indifferent, and often openly hostile, to his presence. Furthermore, when extra troops were brought in to undertake reprisal raids for sporadic acts of aggression, the punishment inflicted did not convince the Nandi that the raiders were endowed with exceptional military skills, or commanded resources so overwhelming as to ensure that they could remain in the country for as long as they wished.³⁹

By 1900 the Nandi realized their relations with the government were approaching a decisive phase: increased activity in and near their country indicated that the British had no

intention of leaving;³⁶ occupation of the Nyando Valley was threatening to isolate them from the Lumbwa; and they sensed that their way of life would have to change, and could never be the same again, if they continued tacitly accepting a government that might become strong enough to intervene in tribal affairs, levy tribute, and ban raiding expeditions.^{CC}

The Laibon, realizing the government was determined to curb his supernatural influence over the people, concluded that something more than passive resistance and sporadic raiding was required, if his authority was not to be eroded and the Nandi were to regain their formerly unchallenged freedom of action. By playing on tribal pride in the military prowess of the warriors, and by reminding the Nandi of their previous successes against government forces, Koitalel sought to persuade even the more hesitant elements that the British, like the Arabs and Masai before them, could be ousted by a united and determined effort. Knowing that the warriors needed little persuasion, he calculated that, by encouraging their warlike aspirations, he could count on their help in convincing the waverers of the benefits to be derived from following his advice. Tribal unity and morale, which had been disturbed for a time by Kimnyole's murder, had been restored after Kipchomber's departure, and Koitalel judged that most of the people were ready to make a concerted attempt to rid the country of the unwelcome strangers.

Kipchomber's former followers, some of whom continued to have reservations about the wisdom of resorting to armed conflict under his brother's sponsorship, had few cogent arguments to counter those put forward by Koitalel's supporters. Although it was nearly five years since the Nandi had been accorded the unsought, and to them incomprehensible, status of British protected persons, only a small number of people in the vicinity of government posts had profited from trading and co-operating with district officials. Exhortations to increase production and exchange livestock had largely gone unheeded, and only a score or so warriors had been recruited as mail runners or enlisted into the police. The vested interests that supported Collectors in other districts had not been created, either by stimulating a demand for novelties as a reward for supplying food and recruiting labour, or by the exercise of government patronage in such matters as the herding of surplus stock, and the payment of commission for collecting taxes.³⁷ Most of the people had no dealings whatsoever with the Kipture officials, and nothing beyond experimental sowings of a few exotic food crops had been done to investigate the resources of the district.

In contrast to what has been said of many other African peoples, the Nandi had no doubt about their inherent right to be independent. They had, moreover, no cause 'to appreciate the advantages of British government, (which) means the defence of the weak against the strong and a guarantee as to the safety of life and property'; nor did they need to seek the Collector's³⁸ help in settling personal or sectional feuds and inter-tribal conflicts, and in deciding land and other disputes. Even those who might have preferred to co-operate had not been encouraged to do so by being provided with a dependable alternative to the *pororiet* form of decision-making and control, and the pronouncements of the Laibon. None of the Collectors had stayed long enough to fill such a role, or to select and support a leader who was willing to throw in his lot with the government, and capable of rallying behind him the less militant sections of the tribe. Such a man was usually found in other chiefless societies, either from those with a claim to some form of traditional leadership, or from 'commoners' who had associated as servants, interpreters or caravan headmen with Europeans. Latongwa, alone among the Nandi leaders, had apparently put himself forward as a tribal representative for a short period in 1898; and few, if any, of the people had come under notice and formed lasting personal relationships through working with Europeans.^{DD}

When Hall and Ainsworth faced a similar situation in Masailand, they persuaded Lenana that the interests of his people and office would best be served if he co-operated with the government in return for its recognition of his authority. Lenana accordingly undertook several unc customary commitments, such as the apprehension of offenders, the return of looted stock, and the provision of mercenaries for punitive operations. He also honoured the treaty of peace which Hall arranged between the Masai and Kikuyu in October 1893, prevented a few raiding expeditions, implemented measures for containing the spread of cattle disease, and facilitated the passage of the railway. As a trusted but shrewd ally of the British,³⁹ Lenana gradually established a much more pervasive control over the Masai than any of his predecessors had ever exercised; and, at the end of 1900, his reputed status as 'the Masai King or Paramount Chief' was officially recognized by his appointment as a

salaried government agent.^{EE} The Nandi Laibon on the other hand was unknown, except by office, to the Uganda authorities, none of whom had ever contemplated persuading him to follow the example of his Masai counterpart.⁴⁰ If such an attempt had been made it would almost certainly have been fruitless. Koitalel was in a much stronger position than Lenana, who had been forced by sectional and 'dynastic' quarrels, natural calamities and attacks by neighbouring tribes to ask for help in order to arrest the declining fortunes of his people. This help was forthcoming, and his confidence in the E.A.P. officials, with whom he had had dealings for a number of years, was vindicated by the way his people were treated after the Kedong massacre. In contrast to the Masai, the Nandi, who had never been advised by their Laibon to welcome the strangers whose coming he had prophesied, were recovering in 1895 from the confusion caused by Kimnyole's murder, and had retained, under Koitalel's guidance, their dominant position in eastern Uganda.^{FF} Nothing had happened since that time to commend an alliance with the government to Koitalel, whose personal influence over the Nandi was in the ascendant as a result of the profitable raids he sanctioned, the protection he afforded to warriors, non-combatants and cattle during the punitive expeditions, and the ease with which he outwitted Ternan's attempt to apprehend him.

By the middle of 1900 Koitalel evidently sensed that the Nandi expected him to give formal expression to the general conviction that a concerted effort should be made to drive the British out. Although the Nandi knew from previous encounters with the enemy that the struggle would test to the full their courage and determination, three considerations tempered the presumptuousness of their conviction, and gave them hope of ultimate victory.⁴¹ Considerable government forces had proved almost as ineffective as the Arabs and Masai in the difficult Nandi terrain, and the disruption caused by isolated, localized guerilla raids suggested that a more extensive and co-ordinated use of these tactics could render untenable the continued occupation of their country. The third consideration was the confidence the Nandi had in the supernatural powers of the Laibon as a result of the successes they had achieved with the help of his advice and protection. Koitalel's oracular declaration, that the Nandi could compel the British to 'go back to the coast whence they came',⁴² was possibly delayed because of the response of the Kipture sections to the Collector's request for help in the expeditions against the Kamelilo in November 1899 and March 1900. The Kipture leaders' attitude after Koitalel made his declaration suggests that his supporters rebuked the defectors, who had disturbed the unity of the tribe and thus diminished the prospects of a Nandi victory. However this may be, the Kipture leaders were certainly alarmed about the outcome if they ignored Koitalel's declaration, which they knew to be in accord with the views of the majority of the people.

To sum up, there seems little reason to doubt the unanimous opinion of informants that Nandi resistance was much more than a Laibon-inspired revolt against an alien occupying power, which was bent upon destroying their forefathers' faith in their ritual expert. Although the people were undoubtedly sustained in the struggle by their belief in Koitalel's supernatural powers, and strengthened in their will to resist by the support he gave to their endeavours, the decision to oppose the government was taken by the leaders, not by the Laibon. Koitalel's role was to stimulate and provide a focus for tribal hopes, and eventually to give oracular expression to aspirations which *pororosiek* war-leaders thought they could satisfy.

NOTES

1. Suggested on 22.1.1900 and 1.1.1901 (FO 2/297, 301), and carried out by Stallibrass in November (FO 2/523, 579), after inadequate communications caused similar problems during the Ogaden expedition.
2. The survey, which should have been finished by 1.10.1900, was completed within the estimate of £3,700.
3. One of Hornby's colleagues told Rumbold on 18.6.1900 that the expedition 'was within striking distance of its objective, ... some Waganda Mohammedans and the remnants of old mutineers'. A station to administer the Bagesu was established on the south-west flanks in 1904, and a cattle-trading post set up on the Kelim River in Sebei in 1917 (M. Twaddle, 'Founding of Mbale', *UJ*, 30 (1966), pp. 25-38; Barber, *op. cit.*, p. 150).
4. Reorganization of Busoga; installation of a Baganda chief, Nova Jumba, in Buvuma; attacks on escorts and

- the telegraph, and inter-tribal raiding; disaffection among Muslims and the need to curb their growing influence; move of Luba's station to Jinja; fuelling facilities for the *William Mackinnon*; squabbles between mission adherents and the activities of traders and European settlers.
5. In Johnston's absence, Jackson ruled on 13.8.1900 (ESA A/11/1) that a policy of concentration rather than expansion was to be followed. A draft telegram concerning the territories north of Ravine was amended by Lansdowne on 28.4.1901 (FO 2/465) to read: 'We (should aim at) strongly desire to concentrate(ing) and avoidance of outlying posts'.
 6. The Foreign Office banned Vicomte du Bourg de Bozas' expedition on 19.12.1900 (FO 2/294), 'owing to recent troubles in Nandi'; Johnston denied on 17.1.1901 (FO 2/465) that Nandi was unsettled, but that the country to the west of Lake Rudolf was 'in a disturbed condition owing to fighting between native tribes'.
 7. The 409-strong Indian contingent cost £19,099 p.a. compared with £66,320 p.a. spent on 2,006 local troops; the estimated 'overlapping charge' for replacing the sepoys due for release in April 1901 was £15,500. Expenditure on military and police accounted for £119,168 out of a total budget of £228,012.
 8. Four hundred and fifty sepoys were shipped in December 1900 to Kismayu for the Ogaden expedition, which cost about £150,000; the Foreign Office sought to engage a battalion of Sudanese, Somalis, B.C.A. Rifles or sepoys to relieve the Sultan of Zanzibar's troops who had been sent to Mombasa as a reserve.
 9. Although more promising openings elsewhere, and shortage of staff and funds, were the chief reasons for the delay in establishing missions in the Eastern Province, uncertainty about the government's ability to cope with a repetition of the Nandi disturbances in 1900 may have been a contributory factor.
 10. Johnston accepted on 27.7.1900 (FO 2/299) that this probably could not be achieved during the term of his special commission. Attitudes had hardened by the time the issue was raised again, and the scheme was never implemented.
 11. For example, number of troops, type of campaign, and a more intensive search for cattle hiding-places; ignoring so-called friendly sections; sealing off the operational area, and denying the Nandi access to Lumbwa; and capture of the Laibon (COCF 771). For Evatt's failure, see RL, 26.7.1901.
 12. The numbers envisaged by Johnston in April never reached the Eastern Province, possibly because Jackson was not convinced of the wisdom of the settlement proposals.
 13. Jackson's settlement of the Nandi conflict after Evatt's failure to resolve it by military means, together with Johnston's aversion to military administrators (FO 2/464), virtually ended the disproportionate influence which soldiers had exercised since the Sudanese mutiny.
 14. Hill wanted Jackson for the post so that he could work among the Nandi and Masai (FO 2/463, 519). One of Johnston's reasons for resisting the proposed extension of the E.A.P. was that it was undesirable to remove the Uganda Deputy Commissioner from the Eastern Province, which he was 'better able to manage ... than anybody else' (FO 2/464). Jackson became Deputy Commissioner (and Hopley, Assistant Deputy Commissioner) of the E.A.P. on 1.4.1902.
 15. For the validity of these allegations, see *NRBR* ii, p. 175.
 16. Ternan argued on 4.12.1900 (FOCP 7690/25) against being hard on the Masai because of the effect on the railway of a Masai rising. Eliot made 'tentative overtures only' to Lenana in January 1902 (FOCP 7946/79), so that the introduction of taxes could 'be dropped without difficulty if (it) appears likely to give rise to discontent'. Tax Regulations for the E.A.P. were promulgated on 23.10.1901, and collection began in 'coastal' districts in January 1902. Foreign Office disquiet about taxes was influenced by the interest they aroused in Britain, and by the results of their imposition in some of the Colonial Office African protectorates.
 17. M. Whisson (*Crisis and Challenge*, p. 63), suggests that the Luo were more ready to accept a cash economy at the turn of the century because they were hemmed into a crowded area with limited pasture by powerful tribes to the south and east.
 18. See *NRBR* ii, p. 147 for other reasons for this. Only thirty volunteered, a third of whom 'have been continuously incapacitated' by sickness.
 19. Cf. a Foreign Office clerk's surmise in February 1901 (FO 2/456), when tribes near Kikuyu were raiding just across the Uganda border, that the 'disturbances may not improbably be connected in some way with the late troubles in the neighbouring Nandi country'; taken in conjunction with Hill's views on the Nile outlet for Uganda, this suggests that geography was not the Foreign Office's strong point.
 20. See *NRBR* i, Chs. 4, 7. The pernicious influence of coastal Muslims was a favourite C.M.S. theme.
 21. On 8.6.1900 (FO 2/793), Johnston (and the Treasury) opposed a grant to the C.M.S. for training interpreters until revenue equalled expenditure. His General Report did not include Kalenjin as one of

- the four language groups recruits would be required to study.
22. *St. Joseph's Advocate* for Spring 1901, but not mentioned elsewhere.
 23. See *NRBR* i, Ch. 7, and *NRBR* ii, p. 17, for his views on the Kedong massacre, and the provocative conduct of railway coolies.
 24. Some officials developed a proprietary interest in 'their' people, which could degenerate at times to xenophobia; see e.g. Hall's letters, 26.11.1899 to 16.3.1900, for his loathing for the Kamba after his six years' service with the Kikuyu.
 25. Elliot confessed 'it is difficult to conceive why a numerically weak tribe, and a tribe that had previously been punished for similar offences, should take up such a foolish policy', and concluded that 'their operations were simply burglarious'.
 26. Although the Foreign Office called Leet 'a bad lot' and deprecated the tone of his letters, Lord Cranborne minuted, 'I am inclined to think that we shall have to consider the increase of our staff out there'.
 27. No tax payments, all of which were presumably made in kind, appeared on the return of 1900-1901 (FOCP 8040/277), but they may have been credited to the expedition account.
 28. Despite his order to Hobley on 12.1.1900 (*NRBR* ii, p. 35), Johnston did not press taxation in Nandi, although he was receiving reports that Hobley, J.P. Wilson, Bagnall and H.M. Macallister were collecting at Port Ugowe, Mumias, Ravine and Naivasha.
 29. Reuter's (*The Times*, 5.11.1900) could not discover whether 'the trouble has arisen in consequence of any new arrangement made with the natives'. Newspaper 'correspondents' were often C.M.S. missionaries and sometimes disgruntled officials.
 30. The incident is not reported elsewhere but may be a garbled version of Hornby's seizure of Latongwa's stock. If the report was not taken from Leet's correspondence, it may have emanated from Galt who was home on leave in March 1901.
 31. Cf. British statements concerning Nyabingi (Kigezi) and Mkwati (Rhodesia), Rembe (Lugbara) and Muraa (Kisii), and German views on Kinjikitile's role in the Maji Maji rebellion. Later resistance movements were sometimes attributed to Ethiopianism, millenarian prophets and Communism.
 32. Kipchomber was first named by Jackson in 1897 (*NRBR* i, p. 319); Koitalel and Kibeles by Hobley in August 1900 (*NRBR* ii, p. 89). None of the Collectors had seen a Laibon, who had sworn 'never to see the face of a white man', until Mayes met Koitalel and Kibeles in 1903 (FOCP 7953/91, FO 2/839). Commissioner Hayes-Sadler interviewed Kibeles in December 1905. Contrast Lenana, who met Hall in 1893, visited Ainsworth at Machakos in May 1899, and was interviewed by Hardinge in 1897 and 1900. Kinnyole's murder (*NRBE* i, p. 31) by the Nandi, because 'his oracles were so unpropitious', was recorded on 24.8.1900 (ESA A/18/1) by Hobley, who was apparently unaware that this was not an isolated incident; see *NRBR* i, p. 29.
 33. Hall and Ainsworth understood the position better and were careful to avoid asking Lenana to undertake obligations that might have been difficult for him to fulfil; see Mungeam, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-42, 130. Ainsworth observed on 13.6.1899 that 'chiefs who stand by the Government in matters like this get left by their people, who are unable to see ahead like their chiefs' (Ukamba in file 1899 KNA). Hobley only discovered in August 1900 (ESA A/18/1) that the Nandi Laibons were not chiefs, but 'soothsayers' who 'are consulted on questions of peace and war'.
 34. Work on the telegraph from Molo to Port Ugowe did not begin until September 1899, and the first raid on telegraph staff or material to be positively attributed to the Nandi took place on 21.2.1900; only one telegraph station (Kitoto's) was raided. Johnston ignored 'acts of aggression' against armed parties, convoys and transport facilities, in some of which the booty to be obtained was negligible.
 35. Troops brought in for the 1895 and 1897 expeditions departed after a few weeks; Kipture was left without a European from 19.11.1897 to 11.2.1898 during the Uganda Relief Operations. Cf. Lugard, *Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, pp. 579-580, and see Turton, *op. cit.*, p. 127 for Somali reactions to inconclusive punitive operations, and *NRBR* ii, p. 31, for the effect of the Uyoma expedition on the Luo.
 36. Their raiding economy and immunity from invasion had not accustomed the Nandi, unlike the Lumbwa, Luo, Baluya and Kisii, to the idea of the permanent occupation of enemy territory. Although the expulsion of the Masai provided space for future expansion, the initial aim was to gain access to grazing areas and salt licks rather than to acquire territory for settlement. When Arab traders and early European caravans camped in the district, they invariably departed after a short stay.
 37. There is no evidence of a Nandi leader receiving ten per cent commission, which Hobley was told to pay on 12.1.1900 (ESA A/5/9), and which was formally authorized on 10.5.1900 by Instruction no. 22.

38. See *NRBR* ii, pp. 9, 48, for the two recorded instances of Nandi seeking redress through the Collector, and contrast the numerous complaints and disputes referred to Hobley, Hall and Ainsworth. The Nandi had not suffered to anything like the same extent as the Masai, Kamba and Kikuyu from cattle disease, famine and smallpox, and did not have to seek the Collector's help on this account. They were also less inclined to seek an accommodation than the Baluyia or Luo, some of whose leaders were accustomed to enlisting the support of coastal traders and foreign mercenaries.
39. Ainsworth observed on 26.11.1900 (FOCP 7690/25) that Lenana was 'much too clever to think he could, with any chance of success, tackle the forces of Her Majesty's Government'; he was also shrewd enough to resist proposals if he knew he would have difficulty in carrying them out. He did however agree in June 1900 to Ainsworth's disarmament proposals (*NRBR* ii, pp. 95-96) and asked, in May 1901 (FOCP 7823/185), that Masai visitors to Nairobi should be subject to a pass law.
40. Disapproval of E.A.P. policy towards Lenana may have deterred the Uganda authorities from considering an approach to Koitalel.
41. This was not an uncommon conviction among tribes, such as the Lumbwa, Kisii, Giriama and Lango, who had not been subjected to punitive operations; cf. Stigand, *Administration*, pp. 286-287.
42. Hobley was almost certainly mistaken in attributing the declaration to Kibeles.

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- D. Bugosa District files, ESA A/10/1, A/11/1, and A/4/30, A/22/1, A/23/1, A/27/17; Twaddle, *op. cit.*; T. Tuma, 'African Chiefs and Church work in Busoga', *Kenya Historical Review*, 4/2 (1976), pp. 265-281; Johnston-FO, 6.4.1900, 29.5.1900, FO 2/298, 299. Jackson-FO, 24.1.1902, 19.3.1902, FOCP 7946/144, 7953/85.
- E. Lansdowne's minutes to Johnston-FO, 6.1.1901, Gorges-Hill, 15.2.1901, FO 2/461, 514; FO-Johnston, 7.3.1901, FO 2/465; Steiner, *op. cit.*, p. 47. Roberts, *op. cit.*, which also discusses extensions made by Johnston despite Foreign Office opposition; Barber, *op. cit.*, Chs. 3, 4; cf. FO-Jackson, 27.8.1901, FOCP 7867/136, FO-Sadler, 28.1.1902, FO-Eliot, 19.7.1901, FOCP 7946/42, 7867/51.
- F. Hill's minute to Johnston-FO, 6.1.1901, FO 2/461. Matson, 'Founding of Kericho', *KWN*, 31.10.1958; Matson and Sutton, *op. cit.*, p. 181; Jackson-Com, 29.5.1902, Eliot-FO, 7.5.1902, FO-Treas., 13.5.1902, FOCP 7954/41, 7953/103, 122. Pacification of the reputedly ferocious Kisii was out of the question.
- G. Jackson-FO, 24.12.1901, FO 2/464; Johnston-FO, 31.1.1901, Johnston-Hill, 16.1.1901, FO 2/461. Johnston-FO, 17.3.1900, FOCP 7405/51.
- H. 1900-1901 Estimates, FOCP 7261. FO-India Office, 10.2.1899, Brodrick's minute to Ternan-FO, 9.5.1899, Hill's minute, 3.2.1900, Jackson-FO, 24.12.1901, FO 2/256, 201, 377, 464.
- I. For Ogaden, see FOCP 7689, 7690, FO 2/723, Jackson-CO, 26.8.1905, CO 533/3, Moyse-Bartlett, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-120, Mungeam, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-77. FO-Treas., 23.10.1900, URC Memo., 2.8.1900, FO 2/383; Moyse-Bartlett, *op. cit.*, Ch. 5. For local and Foreign Office views on African warriors as soldiers, see FO 2/464, 519-520, 544, FOCP 7823/30, 7689/117, 7675/6, 7690/187.
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- L. Johnston-Tarrant, 13.11.1900, Jackson-Grant, 3.4.1901, ESA A/11/1.

- M. Johnston-Tarrant, 13.11.1900, ESA A/11/1; Jackson-FO, 14.6.1901, 6.8.1901, FO 2/462, FOCP 7867/89; Johnston-FO, 18.5.1901, FO 2/462; FO-Jackson, 7.9.1901, FO-Sadler, 28.1.1902, FOCP 7867/157, 7946/42. Hardinge-FO, 28.12.1899, 10.8.1900, FOCP 7404/18, FO 2/289; Ainsworth's Diary, 29.3.1900, 6.12.1901; Hill's Memos, 15.5.1901, 27.7.1901, FO 2/517, 519; Mungeam, *op. cit.*, pp. 55, 77-78, 90, 110; correspondence with Eliot in FOCP 7823, 7867, 7868, 7946, 7953. For Lugard's warning, based largely on Johnston's tax measures in B.C.A., see *Rise of our East African Empire*, ii, 644-645.
- N. Langat, *op. cit.*, p. 88; Gorges-Corn, 13.12.1901, ESA A/18/1; Gorges-OC Troops, March 1902, FOCP 7953/151.
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- S. Evatt-Hill, 18.10.1900, FOCP 7689/84. Hobley-Com, 24.8.1900, ESA A/18/1, also Hobley-Com, 23.8.1905, COCP 771, *From Chartered Company*, p. 123, 'one always felt they (Nandi and Lumbwa) would be glad to see the back of us'.
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CHAPTER 19

Durable peace or temporary truce

It was convenient for Johnston to stress that an uncontrollable urge to acquire telegraph wire caused the outbreak in 1900, and for the Foreign Office to deny that any of the blame could be apportioned to Her Majesty's Government and its local agents. Also for both to explain the intransigence of the Nandi since 1895 by generalities such as their 'inimical disposition', rather than to acknowledge that their hostility had been aroused and sustained by a desire to live their lives in their own way, and to free themselves of the unbidden foreigners with whom the tribal leaders had never entered into treaty or other obligations of any consequence.

After peace terms had been negotiated with some of the leaders the situation had undoubtedly improved from the government's point of view. Although neither promises nor concessions were made to the Nandi, the onus for ensuring a durable peace nevertheless rested not only on the Nandi negotiators, but also on the effort the government was prepared to make to show the people that more was to be gained from co-operation than from a renewal of hostilities. The peace agreements put an end to the fighting, in which neither side could claim to have been the victors, and provided an opportunity for gradually establishing better relations with the Nandi than had ever been attempted during the periods of uneasy peace that had followed previous expeditions.

In one respect the situation was vastly different at the end of 1900 than in 1895 and 1897, when the expeditionary forces returned to their home stations immediately after the operations ended. Despite his claims that Evatt had 'succeeded in completely subjugating the Nandi' and that Jackson had concluded a 'durable peace', Johnston did not change the troop dispositions for defending the railway route, but had in fact increased the number of regulars and auxiliaries at Evatt's disposal.¹ Nobody else acquainted with the problem was as optimistic as Johnston about the results of Evatt's and Jackson's endeavours to resolve it by military and political means. Evatt, who had been sceptical of Nandi protestations during the expedition, was not disposed to rely on the undertakings they had given to Jackson, and refused to release enough troops from the Nyando Valley detachments to enable Gorges to fulfil his mission in Suk.^A Jackson had not sought to hide his misgivings about the wisdom of negotiating with the Nandi before the 'smack in the face' had been avenged, and neither he nor Hobley could have been entirely satisfied with some of the exceptional aspects of the peacemaking process. Hill had never envisaged that Jackson would be able to do much more than make some sort of an arrangement with the enemy. He had thought the effort worth while, despite the risk that 'the premature conclusion of the military operation' might 'lead the Nandi to think that we could not go on any longer', and that the respite from fighting might only prove to be temporary.^B

Shortly after news reached London of the raids which precipitated the conflict in 1900, O'Callaghan pointed out that 'recent events should warn us of the unspeakable dangers to which hundreds of unarmed men and helpless women and children - in scattered railway settlements - may be exposed at the hands of savages by whom they are surrounded'.² He advised his colleagues on the Railway Committee of the responsibility they would bear if they deferred sanctioning a volunteer force, so that European and Indian employees could defend themselves against such attacks. His recommendation was approved by the War Office and Colonial Defence Committee; but the Foreign Office, which had turned down a similar proposal in August 1899 on the grounds of cost, and possibly because of the feeble opposition the railway had encountered in the E.A.P., did not refer O'Callaghan's scheme for discussion between the two Commissioners and the Railway Inspecting Officer, Col. T. Gracey,³ before Jackson had almost finished his peacemaking task. The War Office was concerned at the delay and, two months after the conclusion of the peace negotiations, repeated its advice that the formation of a volunteer corps should be expedited.^C

The priority given to concentrating troops along the road, telegraph and railway route through the Nyando Valley reflected the general unease that was felt about the reliance that could be placed on the promises the Nandi had made to Jackson. It also showed that government strategy was to remain the same as it had been since 1895 - to secure the lines

of communication and, if possible, to defer pacification of the Nandi and Lumbwa until completion of the railway made this a less hazardous undertaking. The result of the final clash could not be in doubt, but its postponement for any length of time, or possibly even its avoidance, might depend on whether preoccupation with safeguarding the railway route would deflect the government from following 'the one procedure which Britishers pride themselves upon ... subjugation by administrative methods'. 'A continuing and steady pressure' instead of the previous 'alternation of licence and punishment', 'worthy of Morocco or Turkey', could not, moreover, be maintained if, as had been the case after the 1895 and 1897 expeditions, interest in the Nandi flagged because of other commitments, and the attractions of Buganda and other districts where the prospects of development and revenue were more promising.^D

Even if Entebbe did maintain the interest it had been forced, albeit reluctantly, to show in 1900, subjugation by administrative methods would take time to achieve, and could be thwarted by circumstances beyond the government's control. Measures to bring the Nandi more into line with the Luo and Baluyia could only be introduced slowly and with circumspection in a district where two separate governments had been functioning side by side since 1895. Provided the lessons of the past five years had been properly learned, the government could nevertheless avoid emphasizing the drawbacks of the new dispensation, even though the Nandi could only gradually be convinced of its advantages. Efforts to implement Evatt's recommendation that the Nandi should be compelled to lessen their dependence on cattle, and enforcement of a ban on all raiding expeditions, including those against 'unprotected' tribes,⁴ were certain to cause resentment and possibly reprisals. A too legalistic interpretation of the peace terms, and their unilateral extension by including matters not discussed at the negotiations, were likely to have the same effect. Although, on the question of taxes, Johnston advised against undue pressure being applied until the Nandi recovered their prosperity, and implied that collection would probably be unwise before Mayes could enlist the help of sectional leaders⁵ to explain the reasons for the government's demands, it had been made plain to Jackson in October that there was no question of the people being excused from paying. Finally, the Sudanese, Masai and Baganda colonies,⁶ which Johnston had advocated during and after the expedition as an aid to pacification, were likely to have the opposite effect to that envisaged by their proposer.^E

The scope for introducing measures beneficial to the Nandi was limited among a people whose satisfaction with their way of life had not disposed them to welcome the few opportunities for acquiring trade goods and money that had been offered them in the past. There was little likelihood of a dramatic change of attitude as a result of the peace negotiations, during which Jackson had evidently thought it useless to expect the Nandi to make the customary promises of providing food and labour for the maintenance of the district station and services. Some degree of change could however be expected if the warriors were offered congenial employment in the army and police, and as auxiliaries in punitive expeditions against other tribes. Employment in these capacities would accustom the warriors to co-operating with the Collector, and enable them to replace some of the stock that had been lost during punitive expeditions.⁷

A better understanding between Protectorate and Railway headquarters and their staffs⁸ could also have a beneficial effect by denying the warriors easy opportunities for looting, and thus prevent the sort of incident that had soured relations in the past.^F It was also important, if misunderstandings were to be avoided, that Mayes should be given enough troops,⁹ so that he could call upon disciplined soldiers to carry out his orders, and not be dependent upon the services of his 'bodyguard' of Sudanese settlers.

Although the Nandi were not deflected from their purpose on this account, the isolated nature of their position had been brought home to them in 1900 by the refusal of the Luo, Baluyia and Nyangori to join them, the defection of some Kamasia, and the limited assistance the Lumbwa had given until Evatt invaded their country towards the close of the campaign. The peace provided an opportunity for control over the neighbouring districts to be tightened, and for their inhabitants to be afforded greater protection from raids in order to strengthen their reluctance to consider an alliance with the Nandi. As far as the unadministered Lumbwa were concerned, troop concentrations in the Nyando Valley would restrict movement from and into Nandi, and also enable Gorges to point out the risks that sections near Fort Ternan would run if they formed a rebellious coalition with the Nandi. The

decision to defer establishing a station in Lumbwa was probably taken not only on grounds of expense, and uncertainty about its being welcomed by the central and southern sections, but also because it was thought possible to isolate the Nandi by cowing, or winning over, the Lumbwa leaders near the Nyando Valley, some of whom had reputedly prevented Sotik warriors from joining in the contest against Evatt's forces. If these measures to increase the isolation of the Nandi were successful, fresh approaches for help in driving the British out would be even less likely to be entertained than in 1900. This would mean that the Nandi would once again have to take on the government single-handed if they contemplated breaking the peace.

In view of Mayes' background and inexperience, probably the most useful contribution Entebbe could make to ensure that this chance of winning the confidence of the Nandi would not be thrown away was to see that the Sub-commissioner closely and regularly supervised his activities, and prevented him from adopting methods that might revive suspicions about the government's intentions. During the first few weeks at Kaptumo, the new Collector would be sustained by the Special Commissioner's presence in the district and by Hobley's experience and counsel. But when Johnston left to tour the northern districts before proceeding to the coast, and Hobley went on leave,¹⁰ there was a danger that Mayes would be left very much to his own devices. In the longer term, projected staff changes and Johnston's reorganization of the administrative structure were likely to have a considerable bearing upon the Collector's relations with his senior officers. J.P. Wilson, who had failed to impress his personality upon the Nandi during his six months' stay in 1899,¹¹ was to relieve Hobley at Port Ugowe and take charge of the rest of the Eastern Province as well. His powers were however restricted under the reorganization proposals to the gradual exercise of 'a general political supervision over his province', and his Collectors were expected to rely very much on their own initiative and discretion in running their districts. Moreover, should an emergency arise, Mayes would probably be dependent on runners to get help from the Sub-commissioner, and from Mumias, Fort Ternan and Ravine,¹² even if the money was forthcoming for extending the telegraph to Kaptumo.^G

Hill had a personal interest in seeing that the settlement was not jeopardized by ill-considered or provocative actions by the Commissioner and his local representatives. It was by no means certain however that this interest would be maintained after he returned to Downing Street, and became immersed in the multitude of other problems arising in the five protectorates under his charge. His immediate objective had been attained, and his restraint, when commenting on Jackson's proposals for the future administration of the Nandi, suggests that he was content to follow precedent and leave their implementation to the man on the spot. His general approach to the problem, and his cautionary comments on Jackson's recommendations for recovering looted weapons from the Kamelilo and forcing the south-western *pororosiek* to accept the peace terms, had nevertheless made it plain that he would not look kindly upon measures that might shorten the breathing space secured by the settlement. In one important particular, his categorical rejection of allegations that the troubles had been caused by 'an experimental and perhaps dangerous tax', made it unlikely that he would put pressure on the Commissioner for its speedy imposition in Nandi. Indeed, if he held to the general principle of 'no tax - no protection', the Nandi would be excused payment until some of them sought the Collector's help over internal disputes or against external enemies.^H Hill would probably also be wary of relaxing the ban on travellers who might incite the Nandi to take reprisals against them, and so break one of the terms of the peace agreement.

The only positive contribution the Foreign Office could make towards consolidating and extending the gains that had been secured by Jackson's settlement was to ensure that the Commissioner was provided with sufficient means for the effective administration of the district and the Protectorate as a whole. The debate on the causes of the conflict, and the resources available for dealing with it, had raised unfavourable comments on the 'penny-wise ... pound-foolish' policy which had characterized the Foreign Office's attitude towards the protectorates from the outset. The results of a policy of 'injudicious economy' and 'unintelligent parsimony' had been shown by the number and quality of the staff that could be afforded in Nandi,¹³ and by the army's inability to provide adequate garrisons and escorts, so that offenders could be sought out and punished and others deterred from following their example.^I Although Hill admitted his own qualified responsibility for some of the financial

difficulties that had beset the Uganda administration, British public opinion and the Treasury had also played a part by insisting that expenditure be kept to a minimum. In addition to the inhibiting effect of the Treasury's attitude on the Commissioner's annual assessment of his administrative and military requirements, the Lords Commissioners minutely scrutinized and often rejected applications for extra staff and services, and on occasions virtually dictated policy.¹⁴ Partly as a result of the Nandi conflict, informed public opinion and the Foreign Office were beginning to question the wisdom of curbing expenditure and shirking imperial responsibilities, but this change of attitude was not likely to have much effect locally until the huge budget deficits¹⁵ caused by the Boer War had been reduced.¹

Since neither Entebbe nor the Foreign Office could do much of a constructive nature to help, responsibility for maintaining and building on the peace devolved to a great extent upon Mayes. His personal qualities would be quickly assessed by the Nandi,¹⁶ who would also carefully observe whether the manner in which he began to tackle his task indicated a conciliatory approach to their problems and aspirations. Providing he did not prove unacceptable to the people from the outset, he might in time win their respect and establish a better understanding with them than any of his predecessors had managed to achieve. His first test would come when he tried to arrive at an accommodation with the little-known and hitherto hostile sections in the neighbourhood of the site for the new station at Kaptumo. He had also to induce one of them, the Kapsiondu, to agree to the peace terms and, if possible, to persuade the most amenable of the Kaptumo leaders to co-operate with him at least to the same extent as Latongwa had done with some of the Kipture Collectors. Only after the station had been put into a state of defence, and he had accomplished the first part of his mission, could he begin his 'most important' work and 'go about amongst the people'. This would allow the Nandi to get to know him, and provide an opportunity for collecting the sort of information upon which Hobley had based his studies of tribal structures and customs in Kavirondo. The urgent need for such an investigation had been demonstrated during the last outbreak, when Hobley had found that the intelligence recorded at Kipture was superficial, patchy, and mostly derived from unreliable and often biased sources. A crucial question needing thorough and tactful enquiry was to establish the real position of the Laibon in Nandi society, in order to test the validity of the commonly held opinion that the Nandi were a gullible people, too subservient to the Laibon to question his authority and, in particular, to disobey his orders to oppose the government. Another long term objective was to persuade some of the leaders to become chiefs, and acquire a vested interest in supporting the Collector and supplying auxiliaries to help keep the more intransigent sections in order.

Progress in these fields depended on eschewing provocative actions, such as demands for men to undertake uncongenial employment, the use of foragers and unsupervised buying parties to obtain food supplies for the station,¹⁷ and the seizure of cattle as fines for cursorily investigated misdemeanours. A better understanding with the Nandi would also be put at risk if Mayes failed to restrain the looting proclivities of the Sudanese ex-soldiers and their womenfolk at Kaptumo, and at other places where they were given land in accordance with Johnston's resettlement programme. The Uasin Gishu, whom Hobley held partly responsible for the previous Collectors' unsatisfactory relations with the Nandi,¹⁸ could prove equally troublesome if Mayes had to continue to use them as agents, informers and auxiliaries, and if he gave too much credence to the intelligence supplied by his Uasin Gishu interpreter.^K Misunderstandings caused by outside agencies such as traders and caravans, and misconduct by railway coolies and 'loafers', were more difficult for Mayes to control.^L He nevertheless had to guard against being partial when investigating and punishing incidents occurring outside the railway zone,¹⁹ if he wished to satisfy the Nandi that justice would be done when they brought their complaints to Kaptumo for redress.

Thus, Mayes' task was indeed a daunting one calling for exceptional resources of ability, tact and character. If he was to succeed where others had failed he would also need the counsel and unremitting backing of his superiors. In so far as it was within the government's power to order events, the support he received, and the success or failure of his own efforts, would probably prove decisive factors in shaping future relations with the Nandi, and in determining whether the peace was as durable as Johnston claimed.

The factor beyond the government's control that was most likely to upset anything the Foreign Office, Entebbe, the Sub-commissioner and Mayes could do to establish a settled administration in Nandi was the unpredictable character of the people. Although Johnston was

confident about the durability of the peace, and Jackson and Hobley recognized that it was the best that could have been obtained in the circumstances, there nevertheless remained a number of questions that none of them could answer with much assurance. It was uncertain whether the status of the signatories was recognized by the people they purported to represent; and even more uncertain whether the terms would be honoured by the warriors as they tired of the more irksome restrictions, such as the embargo on raiding expeditions, which the signatory elders had agreed should be placed on their freedom of action.²⁰ As far as the rest of the people were concerned, it was uncertain how they would regard attempts to select leaders for official preferment, widen the peace terms, isolate some of the *pororosiek* (as had been done in November 1899 and March 1900), and establish a more active and pervasive form of control than they had ever been subjected to in the past.²¹ Only time could tell whether all the implications of the unprecedented restrictions accepted at the peace talks had been understood and endorsed by the people, or whether they would eventually come to regard the peace as no more binding than a traditional truce.

Whatever the uncertainties about the response of the Nandi, even less was known of the attitude of the Laibon, and the effect this might have on the people's acceptance of the peace terms. It was not even clear whether Koitalel acquiesced in the accommodation arrived at with the government or whether he had tried, and failed, to prevent it from being negotiated. In view of the general agreement regarding the Laibon's responsibility for the exceptional hostility of the Nandi, especially in comparison with the opposition encountered in societies without a comparable dignitary, it is significant that neither Jackson's nor Hobley's accounts of the peace negotiations mentioned that none of the three Laibons known to them by name had taken part. Johnston did not query this omission, and was not himself questioned by Hill's deputy at the Foreign Office about the Laibon's attitude towards the peace. Despite his readiness to emphasize the importance of the Laibon's malevolent influence, Hill, too, seemingly acquiesced in what appears to have been a conspiracy of silence on this issue. He did not think to ask whether the 'High Priests', who had nurtured opposition to British rule for their own ends, were among the leaders with whom Johnston confirmed Jackson's arrangements in January 1901.

In the absence of positive evidence concerning the Laibon's activities at the time, it can only be conjectured that intelligence from 'spies' and *maotik*²² may have persuaded Koitalel that there was a general desire for a cessation of hostilities, and that continuation of the conflict might end in humiliating and perhaps irreparable disaster. A temporary truce, on the other hand, would allow the Nandi to maintain morale at the level it had reached after the final encounter with Evatt, and time to recruit their strength. Koitalel also possibly foresaw that, by the time the Nandi were ready to resume hostilities, his tacit acquiescence in the truce would be forgotten, but his guidance and protective role during the expedition would not. This episode illustrates the ambiguous position of the Laibon in Nandi society. Before and during the expedition Koitalel was the mouthpiece for the consensus of opinion that the time was opportune for an attempt to drive the British out; towards its close, the Nandi leaders, recognizing that they were not succeeding as well as the Laibon had assured them they would, had decided, apparently without reference to Koitalel, that negotiation of an agreement with the enemy was the most expedient course for them to adopt. Whether this apparent loss of confidence in the Laibon's advice and assurances would be merely temporary depended partly on the benefits the Nandi obtained from the peace, and partly on Koitalel's willingness to accept any further erosion of his authority without a struggle.

No matter what reservations local officials, missionaries and others may have had about the reactions of the Nandi and the Laibon to the peace, the government had no choice but to welcome it, unless the means could be found to continue the struggle until the issue was 'disposed of once and for all by the effectual conquest of this troublesome race'.²³ The means were not available, so Hill and Jackson had respectively set out the guide lines for protecting communications, and for resolving the problem by political means. In order to achieve the former and more urgent objective, what were thought to be adequate measures were taken for garrisoning and patrolling the Nyando Valley, which was to be controlled by what was a military administration in all but name.²³ The secondary objective was to secure Nandi acceptance of British rule, to the same extent as it had already been accepted by all the other tribes near the railway route from Mombasa and along the Uganda Road to Kampala. In order to achieve this, the station on the Nandi Plateau was to be moved from Kipture to

Kaptumo, and placed in charge of a Collector whose commitment to the hitherto overriding responsibility of maintaining communications was reduced to a minimum, so that he could devote much more time than his predecessors to touring the district and gaining the confidence of the people.

Hobley, Jackson, Johnston and Hill had all, at different times and to varying degrees, been hopeful of the effect that 'patience and proper explanations', and 'the steady influence of a sympathetic European, known to have force behind him', would have upon the Nandi.^N Hill had gone even further and been optimistic that the settlement altered the situation to such an extent that pacification could probably be achieved in time by the normal, peaceful processes of district administration. If the government was not merely paying lip service to the doctrine of 'subjugation by administrative methods', or was not simply playing for time until the railway reached the Lake, these confident forecasts indicated that a determined effort was to be made to avoid a repetition of the mistakes of the past five years, and to persuade the Nandi of the benefits they could derive from a form of settled government based upon the peace. If this was indeed the intention, it is difficult to reconcile the sanguine expectations it aroused with Jackson's recommendation, which neither Hill nor Johnston had questioned, that a newly recruited, temporary, local, third-class official should be entrusted with the formidable task of carrying it out.

NOTES

1. Johnston's recommendation on 31.3.1901 (FOCP 7823/82) that 124 Somali infantrymen, mounted on Aden ponies, should supplement Evatt's more static formations, was approved but not implemented.
2. The reference was presumably to the Nandi. A few minor cases of dacoity between Nairobi and Railhead, and two small outbreaks in the Kikuyu escarpment area, were quickly dealt with by E.A.R. patrols and police.
3. He arrived on 3.1.1901 at Port Ugowe, where he found himself at cross purposes with Johnston over their projected meeting (FOCP 7732). His report strongly supported the formation of a volunteer force (FO 2/442).
4. Elgeyo, Marakwet, Suk, the Central 'Nilo-Hamites', some of the Elgon tribes, a few sections in North and Central Kavirondo, and all the South Kavirondo tribes did not come within the category of 'friends' in the peace terms.
5. Hobley made use of these in Kavirondo but relied mainly on Mumia and Odera; Eliot insisted that explanations should be made by the Seyyidie Sub-commissioner, and persuaded Ali bin Salim to help (FO 2/553). There was nobody with extra-sectional authority or pretensions to help Mayes in Nandi.
6. The principle enunciated in Johnston's General Report that, 'in imposing terms of peace, once hostile natives have been guaranteed possession of the lands they occupied', did not apply to the Nandi, who were not given such a guarantee, nor had peace terms been imposed on them after a military defeat. There was thus no bar on African colonies; and also, at a later date, on Asian and European settlement in Nandi, parts of which Johnston described as being suitable for this purpose.
7. Hobley noted on 5.11.1905 (CO 533/12) that losses, though in total not large, were sometimes locally considerable and made it necessary for warriors from some areas to raid for cattle and guns in order to marry.
8. Lack of co-ordination between Protectorate and Railway authorities also gave rise to acrimonious exchanges between the two administrations before, during and after the campaign.
9. Only forty-one men were stationed at Kipture at the end of the campaign; Hill commented on 27.10.1900 (FOCP 7689/84) that 'the small garrison is somewhat insecure'.
10. Jackson went to Entebbe to act for Johnston. Hobley, who was told on 1.1.1901 (ESA A/19/1), that he might not be posted back to Port Ugowe on his return, left Mombasa on 22.4.1901, and Johnston on 27.5.1901.
11. See *NRBR* i, p. 367, and *NRBR* ii, Ch. 1; he was not one of the three officers named by the Nandi as a possible successor to Browning.
12. Hobley submitted an estimate on 22.1.1901 (ESA A/18/1) for linking Kaptumo with the Nyando Valley line; until the connection was made in 1907, messages to Port Ugowe and Fort Ternan had to be taken by runner down the escarpment to Kibigori.
13. Cf. L. Portman (*op. cit.*, p. 65), Acting Collector at Naivasha shortly after the Nandi campaign: 'but that John Bull is not honestly assuming the responsibilities attached to his estate is only too clear to those

- who live on it'; RL, 9.5.1900, 19.9.1900.
14. WOID representations on military requirements were often disregarded by the Foreign Office, or rejected, when forwarded with Foreign Office backing, by the Treasury.
 15. A deficit of £53,207,580 was announced in April 1901 and income tax raised from 1/- to 1/2d.
 16. The Nandi are perceptive judges of character and, in the writer's experience, seldom wrong in their first impressions. Cf. Hobley, *JRAS*, 22 (1922-1923), pp. 190-191, 'Natives have an intuitive insight regarding Europeans ..., they seem to know at once whom they can trifle with, and who not, and whom they can trust'.
 17. When construction gangs were working in the Nyando Valley, food supplies from outside the district would be less uncertain than when Kipture was dependent on Kavirondo and Naivasha.
 18. Shortly before going on leave, Hobley arranged on 2.2.1901 (ESA A/18/1) to move the Uasin Gishu from Kipture to the neighbourhood of Fort Ternan, where 'they can do no harm, and might be temporarily settled at a spot to protect the telegraph line', but this was not carried out.
 19. Offences committed inside the zone came within the purview of the Railway Magistrate, R. Donald. When he heard of Donald's appointment, Johnston commented on 19.12.1900 (FO 2/300), that his separate jurisdiction 'will probably cause difficulties, in Nandi for example'.
 20. See Sandford, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-191, for the attitude of the warriors towards the elders in the Masai Treaty case, 1913.
 21. In order to escape the unpalatable consequences of the peace, many families moved away from the vicinity of roads and stations; they settled mainly in the north-west, where they were nearer the more profitable raiding grounds, and farther from the troops in the Nyando Valley and from surveillance by Mayes at Kaptumo.
 22. They were undoubtedly privy to the negotiations, and some may have been signatories to the agreements.
 23. Political supervision was nominally exercised by Hobley from Port Ugowe and Isaac at Ravine; military officers were given magisterial powers, and 'tried small cases of theft, assault and trading without a licence' (RL, pp. 94, 62).

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- B. Eliot-FO, 9.4.1902, FOCP 7953/91.
- C. O'Callaghan-URC, 2.8.1900, FOCP 7545/105; FO-CDC, 15.9.1900, FO 2/383; Brodrick's minute to Craufurd-FO, 15.8.1899, FO 2/197; FO-Ternan and Johnston, 23.11.1900, FO 2/296, FOCP 7545/163; WOID-FO, 10.1.1901, FO 2/513. For 'recent events' in the E.A.P., see Hardinge-FO, 24.2.1900, 31.3.1900, 27.6.1900, 18.8.1900, FO 2/285, 286, FOCP 7675/32, FO 2/290; CEUR's Report, 12.6.1900, FO 2/296, FOCP 7545/96; Hall's letter, 2.1.1900; Ainsworth's Diary, 17.2.1900, 6.18.3.1900.
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- E. Johnston-FO, 27.4.1900, 26.10.1900, FOCP 7405/121, 7690/18.
- F. Johnston-FO, 25.10.1900, FO 2/300; URC Meetings, 24.1.1901, 2.5.1901, FOCP 7732/11/61.
- G. Johnston-Hobley, 20.11.1900, ESA A/19/1. Johnston-FO, 28.11.1900, sending Circular No. 43, FO 2/300, FOCP 7690/78. FO-Treas., 24.8.1900, Hill to investigate telegraph extension, FO 2/381; for previous proposals, see *NRBR* i, p. 369, *NRBR* ii, p. 11, FO 2/199, 205, FOCP 7422/30/36/52/57.
- H. Hill's Memos, 27.3.1901, 27.7.1901, FO 2/465, 519.
- I. Buxton, *CMI*, November 1901, p. 848; *The Times*, cited in *ZG*, 6.11.1901.
- J. Hill's Memos, 23.1.1899, 27.3.1901, FO 2/250, 465; cf. his minute to Hardinge-FO, 14.2.1899, FO 2/194. Treas.-FO, 30.11.1901, sanctioning a *punkah wallah* for the Zanzibar Court at Rs. 4 p.n. FO 2/548; cf. Lugard, *Dual Mandate*, p. 163. WOID-FO, 25.3.1901, FOCP 7690/180, which also criticized local forecasts after a punitive expedition that peace and good order would obtain. For changing attitudes towards expenditure and Treasury control, see Note by Brodrick, December 1899, FO 2/253; WOID-FO, 31.12.1900, FO 2/384; Lansdowne's minute to Hill's Memo, 27.3.1901, FO 2/465; Hill's minute to Eliot-FO, 18.6.1901, FO 2/449; Cranborne's minute to Eliot-FO, 2.12.1901, FO 2/451; A.M. Burton, 'Treasury Control and Colonial Policy in the late 19th Century', *Public Administration*, 44 (Summer,

- 1966); Hill, *op. cit.*, p. 54; Lucy, *op. cit.*, p. 327; Galbraith, *op. cit.*, pp. 203, 207; Steiner, *op. cit.*, p. 52; J.A. Grenville, *Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy*, pp. 120, 300-301.
- K. Jackson-Baker, 16.10.1901, ESA A/20/1, blaming 'a very large proportion of our troubles' on unsupervised food parties; cf. Radcliffe-Coles, 12.9.1901, FOCP 7946/59. Gorges' Report on the Uasin Gishu, July 1901, FO 2/804.
- L. Hardinge, 2.12.1899, WP V; Hardinge-FO, 24.2.1900, FO 2/285; Hall's Letter, 15.8.1899; Ainsworth's Diary, 6.3.1900; Mungeam, *op. cit.*, p. 62.
- M. Johnston-FO, 21.10.1900, FOCP 7690/16.
- N. Hill's minute to Eliot-FO, 9.6.1904, FO 2/836.

Appendix I

Collectors at Kipture and Military Commanders at Fort Ternan

<i>Name and Appointment</i>	<i>Dates</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
1. KIPTURE		
Wilson, J.P. (-1911) IBEA Coy., 20.12.1890; 2nd Class Assistant, 30.8.1894.	8.1.1899 to 12.6.1899	OC Mau District; posted to Entebbe as Legal Assistant.
Cooper, Captain (Major), R. , Uganda Rifles; arrived at Kipture 27.8.1898.	13.6.1899 to 17.2.1900	Resigned to serve in Boer War.
Bagnall, (Militia) Captain, C.E. , (1861-1923); 2nd Class Assistant, 7.7.1896.	18.2.1900 to 5.4.1900	Transferred to Ravine as OC Baringo District.
Leet, W.H.S. ; ex-Niger Coast Protectorate; 3rd Class Assistant, 16.8.1899.	24.4.1900 to 18.5.1900	Disciplinary posting to Entebbe.
Galt, H.St.G. (c. 1872-1905) B.C.A., August 1893; 3rd Class Assistant, 20.11.1897; 2nd Class, 29.7.1899.	19.5.1900 to early September 1900	Invalided to the U.K.
Browning, S. (c. 1866-1928) B.C.A. 1893; 3rd Class Assistant, 2.4.1900.	early September 1900 to early 1901	Handed over to Mayes, and posted to Entebbe.
Mayes, W. (1863-c.1928); P.W.D., Entebbe, January 1900; 3rd Class Assistant, 12.3.1901.	left Port Ugowe for Kipture 31.12.1900	
2. FORT TERNAN		
Pereira, Lieutenant (Captain), C.E. (1869-1942).	mid-September 1899 to January 1900	Resigned.
Wortham, Lieutenant, P.W.T.H. (1874-1955).	c. 28.1.1900 to 22.8.1900	Left on recuperative local leave.
Rumbold, Captain, W.E. (1870-1947).	23.8.1900 to 7.10.1900	
Parkin, Captain A. (1862-).	8.10.1900 to c.20.12.1900	OC Eastern Military District.
Gorges, Captain, E.H. (1868-1949).	c.21.12.1900	OC Eastern Military District.

Appendix II

Service Awards

Evatt called special attention in his Report to Hornby, Haig, Ellison and Stordy, and acknowledged the services of his staff officers, Henderson and Whittle. Coles added the names of Evatt, Parkin, Johnson, and Yuzbasha Ibrahim Effendi Hassan of XIV Company. Johnston sent these recommendations to the Foreign Office on 5.2.1901, and Jackson later commended Haig, Subahdar-Major Sundar Singh, who was severely wounded during the campaign, and Subahdar Faza C. Khan. The Foreign Office forwarded Johnston's and Jackson's recommendations to the Military Rewards Committee, which approved Evatt's promotion to Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, and referred the award of a Distinguished Conduct Medal to Ellison to the King, and the Star of India recommendation for the Subahdar-Major to the India Office.

Coles recommended a medal, with clasp, 'Nandi 1900', for all officers and men in the Eastern Military District between Port Ugowe and Ravine (including Nandi Station, Fort Ternan and Mumias) between 24 May and 30 October. The Military Rewards Committee approved the Africa General Service Medal, with clasp, 'Uganda 1900', for operations against the Nandi from 3 July to October 1900. Claims were made personally by Bagnall and Gorges, and by the War Office on behalf of Corporal C. Neilan, Lance-Corporal A.E. Shorter and Sapper G.J. Richardson, who were working on the telegraph during the fighting. Manning suggested on 8.8.1901 that Hill was entitled to a medal, and one was awarded to him on 4.11.1905 'by the Army Council in connexion with your political mission at the time of the operations'.

The campaign was the first in the Eastern Province to be reported in the *London Gazette*, and the first for which a medal was awarded.

References: FO 2/443, 459, 460-1, 514, 517, 544-545, 548, 655, 803; CO 533/23; ESA A/27/17 (NRBR ii, pp. 34-35); *London Gazette*; Hill's Papers; Moyse-Bartlett, *op. cit.*, Appendix C; RL, 24.10.1901.

For previous expeditions, see NRBR i, pp. 156, 163, 267, FO 2/381, NRBR ii, p. 39.

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